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ABSTRACT
This thesis explored Concurrent Engineering, one recent approach to product innovation 
(Parsaei and Sullivan, 1993; Syan and Menon, 1994), which seeks to achieve a balance 
between organisational, technological and human factors in new product development 
(Prasad, 1996) in order to gain efficiencies of time and cost, and improve product quality. 
As a contribution to the literature on implementation processes, the thesis presents the 
findings from a longitudinal case study of a project, which sought to introduce CE into an 
Australian manufacturer of military electronics systems. It also examines the implications of 
introducing CE for the overall organisation. Particular attention is given to HRM aspects 
and the role of human resource management (HRM) in the implementation of CE. It is 
argued that HRM is a key consideration for the successful introduction of CE. Almost all 
aspects of managing the product development process under a CE approach are linked to 
people management. Yet, surprisingly, HRM often receives little attention in implementing 
CE. A possible explanation was found in the play of organisational power and politics 
around the project. Drawing on the case study findings, the thesis demonstrates that CE, 
despite the technical connotations of the term, is a complex organisational issue in the sense 
that its successful implementation requires appropriate organisational culture, skills, 
structures, and interpersonal relations. So, when companies consider the introduction of CE 
the human side of the organisation should be included in the focus from the beginning.
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PART ONE
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM
As markets become increasingly globalised manufacturing companies have to compete not 
only in terms of quality and cost, but increasingly in terms of time-to-market and 
innovativeness of their products (Clark and Wheelwright, 1995). Effective product 
innovation processes have therefore become the focus of considerable interest. Many 
different approaches, practices and tools have been adopted to address this problem 
(Rosenau, Griffin, Castellion and Anschuetz, 1996; Syan and Menon, 1994). Some focus on 
individual project performance improvements and others on performance improvements 
across a portfolio of projects.
Concurrent Engineering is one recent approach to effective product innovation. In contrast 
to other approaches, which often focus on a particular aspect of product innovation (Brown 
and Eisenhardt, 1995; McDonough and Griffin, 1997), CE seeks to achieve a balance 
between organisational, technological and human factors in the new product development 
process. The CE concept emerged in the USA in 1980s, but it is based on perspectives 
within the disciplines of engineering and management that can be traced back to the early- 
20th century (Gerwin and Susman, 1996; Smith, 1997). Its philosophy represents a 
systematic approach to the organisation and management of the integrated and concurrent 
design of products and their related manufacturing processes (Winner, Pennell, Bertrand, 
and Slusarczuk, 1988). CE aims to overcome disintegration in the product development 
process by realising cross-functional integration (i.e. high level co-ordination, co-operation, 
communication), integration of design (i.e. product life cycle issues considered up-front), 
and a high level concurrence between project tasks (overlaps, parallel activities) (Haddad, 
1996b; Clausing, 1994).
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Numerous CE surveys, which provide a snapshot in time, convey the picture that CE is 
widely adopted by companies in many industrialised countries. But to date the CE literature 
is predominantly anecdotal. Empirical research on CE did not appear until the late 1980s. 
Even then it rarely dealt with processual aspects of CE, and only few detailed studies of CE 
implementation processes exist (see e.g. Lettice, 1995; Thamhain, 1994; Poolton, 1994; 
Smart, Lettice, and Evans, 1995). The requirements of successful CE implementation are 
largely glossed over in the CE literature. Up to now the problematic processual and complex 
nature of CE implementation remains poorly understood and CE an ambiguous and vague 
concept with interpretative flexibility (Abrahamson, 1996). Furthermore, only few studies 
are available of the appropriateness of CE for different industries, organisations and product 
types. Attention has been mainly paid to industries like automotive, aircraft or electronics 
characterised by complex products and customers in markets.
While there has been an emphasis in the CE literature on technology, it has increasingly 
been recognised that the organisational dimension is decisive for the successful 
implementation of CE. However, despite the growing emphasis on organisational factors 
(DeLorge, 1992) and the realisation of the importance of Human Resource Management in 
the CE literature (particularly for achieving cross-functional integration), no longitudinal 
studies have addressed the implementation of CE from a non-technical viewpoint or 
analysed the role of Human Resource Management in this process. Despite scattered notions 
of HRM aspects, the CE literature - and indeed the product innovation literature generally - 
remains shallow with regard to the role of HRM. Where there have been explanations of the 
role of HRM in CE and product innovation, these have been essentially universalistic and 
prescriptive (Atuahene-Gima, 1996).
The implementation of CE varies across companies. It is process and product dependent, as 
well as contingent on an organisation's strategy and structure. In turn, these factors lead to 
variations in the organisational arrangements for CE. A company can use a variety of cross­
functional arrangements, including inter-departmental committees, integrating departments.
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or liaison roles for achieving effective integration. The cross-functional team, however, is 
widely considered central to CE (Trygg, 1993). It is the most common structural feature in 
reports of successful CE practice (Moffat and Gerwin. 1994). While the CE literature 
mostly refers to the cross-functional team in very generic terms, such teams can vaiy widely 
along a number of dimensions, including size, temporality, location, scope, leadership, 
degree of involvement, and level of governance. In addition to structural differences, cross­
functional teams van' according to a process dimension. This dimension refers both to the 
size and nature of the task upon which they are engaged and to the capacity they have for 
solving problems, making decisions and resolving conflicts. Variations in cross-functional 
arrangements including variations in cross-functional teams are likely to require different 
HRM alignments and differing HRM practices ranging from the selection of appropriate 
cross-functional arrangements to the selection of appropriate tools and techniques. Aspects 
of leadership, team sponsorship, team member selection, performance measurement and 
rewards, as well as career management and team member development, also have to be 
considered. Yet, surprisingly the CE literature has largely neglected the HRM issue 
(Schubert and Couchman, 1998).
A broad range of literature, managerial as well as organisational, has emphasised the 
increasing significance of Human Resource Management in today's organisations (Storey, 
1995: Clark, 1993). These views are broadly based on the recognition of "people as the most 
valuable resource" in an organisation. In man}- cases, however, this recognition is not 
consonant with the organisational reality, despite the rhetoric of company vision and 
mission statements. There are also two major knowledge gaps in this area. The HRM 
literature has focused on man} aspects of cross-functional integration such as team-building, 
leadership, and performance appraisal for teams (Campion and Higgs, 1995; MacDuffie, 
1995; Clark, 1993; Howes, 1997, Belcher, 1991). However, these HR issues are "treated 
broadly in isolation from other HRM activities: no account is made o f the need for  
functional integration - where HRM program areas need to be treated and linked as a
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systematically related whole" (Zanko, Couchman, Badham, Schubert and Zainuddin, 1998, 
p. 132). Despite the need for internally consistent, mutually supportive HRM, a holistic 
strategic approach to organisational integration has not yet been developed (Clark and 
Mallory, 1996). Secondly, although the interdependence of various HR elements (such as 
training, job design, selection, recruitment, rewards, performance) has been recognised 
(Youndt, Snell, Dean and Lepak, 1996; Klein and Maurer, 1995), this recognition has rarely 
been applied to CE (Haddad, 1996b).
Derived from the above gaps it appears that HRM is a hidden agenda in CE. CE, despite the 
technical connotations of the term, is an organisational issue in the sense that its successful 
implementation requires appropriate organisational culture, skills, structures, and 
interpersonal relations. Based on the discovered shortcomings and theoretical and empirical 
knowledge gaps in previous research, the initial research question was defined as: "What 
role does Human Resource Management play in implementation o f C E ? At a later stage, 
after the preliminary case study1 brought about the need to differentiate HRM (HRM was 
commonly equated with the HR Department and its work), the research question was refined 
into: "What role does Human Resource Management as a generic organisation-wide activity 
and a specialist function play in implementing CE?".
As a contribution to the research literature on CE implementation processes, this thesis 
presents the findings from a longitudinal case study (18 months, from February 1996 to July 
1997) of a project that sought to introduce CE into an Australian plant developing and 
producing military electronics systems. In a rapidly changing industry (with less funding 
available, higher levels of competition for projects, and a more demanding approach to 
procurement projects by the customer), not only the case study company but all companies 
in this industry sector are increasingly required to compete in terms of quality and cost, as 
well as time to the market and innovativeness of their products. Their traditional approach to
1 Details o f the preliminary case study are provided in chapter two and the appendix.
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product development is often no longer tenable (Defence Industry and Logistics Program of 
the ADFA, 1997).
An opportunity to restructure project procedures in the case study company arose under an 
efficiency-improvement program initiated by the company's multi-national parent. As part of 
the analysis conducted by consultants under this program, it was suggested that CE offered 
considerable promise for the company. The company's senior management accepted this, 
and a CE implementation project was initiated.
The case study examined the implications of introducing CE for the overall organisation and 
explored the role of HRM as a specialist function and organisation-wide activity in this 
process. It did not look at a product development project, which applied a CE approach, but 
specifically investigated the introduction process of CE.
One of the first steps in this process was the appointment of a CE Project Team. This team 
commenced work by analysing the problems in the company's design and development 
procedures. After a year of activity and extensive consultation within the company, the CE 
Project Team proposed a "solution set". This was based on CE principles, but was 
customised to address the specific problems identified within the company. It clearly 
reflected a more technical bias. Although effective communication and co-operation among 
project personnel were recognised as important factors in achieving integration and 
concurrence, there was a major emphasis on procedures, systems and tools. Some attention 
was given to the design of project teams, addressing issues such as team formation, training 
for team building, the definition of clear team goals, and a team charter. A formalised team 
structure was also proposed. But the roles, responsibilities and authority of the individual 
teams and of team members were insufficiently defined. Other than the project team 
structure, organisational and HRM issues remained basically untouched. The necessary 
changes to implement the Implementation Team's version of CE were not specified in detail 
and concentrated mostly on technical modifications. Organisational implications of the shift 
from a functional to a more project-oriented matrix structure were not addressed.
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Furthermore, the company's CEO claimed that HRM was of the highest importance. 
However, a specialist HRM function did not exist within the company. Rather, there was a 
more traditional Personnel Manager, basically concerned with administrative tasks and not 
with more strategic issues. Neither did the company have a consistent HRM strategy. A 
stated company orientation towards teamwork was not reflected in its HRM policies and 
practices. Given the nature of HRM policy and practices in the company, it was perhaps not 
surprising that only limited support was given to the CE Implementation Team from the 
personnel department. Neither was the personnel department involved in the initiation and 
management of organisational change. This role resided mainly with the company's 
executive and line managers. Furthermore, the case study revealed that only certain HR 
issues were discussed, both within the overall organisational change process as well as 
within the CE implementation project. Thus, it became necessary during the case study to 
analyse (a) why HRM issues in general received only minor attention, and (b) what 
prevented HRM issues from being sufficiently considered in the development of a CE-based 
solution set. Other questions were also raised: why did a HRM specialist function not exist 
in the company, although HRM was claimed to be of major importance; and why were HRM 
specialists not involved with the management of change?
It is now widely acknowledged that organisational change is an essentially political process, 
involving conflict struggles, negotiation, bargaining, compromise, and the "play o f power" 
(Buchanan and Boddy, 1992). The introduction of CE, which necessitates substantial 
organisational change, is no exception. Successfully implementing CE involves developing 
high levels of collaboration across departmental and disciplinary boundaries, usually via the 
medium of the cross-functional project team. Accompanying this formation of more 
autonomous project-focused units within the organisation, is a devolution of authority and 
accountability (e.g. over budgets, schedules, the management of risk, and resources) from 
functional managers to the project teams. But such change will inevitably involve power
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struggles, between different groups and individuals (some of whom will be seen as "losers" 
and others as "winners” from change).
In the case study company many power struggles were detectable. The exercise of power 
and political lobbying had a significant influence on the course and outcome of the change 
process in general and of the CE implementation project in particular. Indeed, the playing 
out of organisational politics provided a possible explanation for the way the company dealt 
with HRM and CE. From its inception, the CE Project was seen by senior management to be 
of secondary importance. This perception was reflected in the selection of the project team 
leader and of the team members. Though resources in the form of people's time were 
provided to develop a CE concept suitable for the company and to conduct intensive training 
throughout the organisation, senior management gave little active support to the more far- 
reaching changes that were proposed. In addition, functional managers most often acted to 
protect their territories, and some were rather resistant to any change in the product 
development process. In this environment, and in the absence of any dedicated HRM 
specialists within the company, there was no recognition among managers that a strategic 
HRM approach could significantly contribute to the success of CE and organisational 
change. This was especially the case for the CE Project Team leader, who saw HRM issues 
as outside the purview of his project and so did not attempt to develop a strategic HRM 
approach as part of the CE concept.
The case study did not bring about the expected finding in as much as it revealed very little 
consideration of HRM issues during the attempt to introduce CE. That initiative had so far 
proved to be of only limited success. Little had substantively changed within the company, 
and although there had been some improvements, most development projects were still set 
up and managed following a more traditional approach by the end of the investigation. There 
was an interesting irony here. It is the author's view that competitive success in the defence 
electronics industry will increasingly depend on the adoption of effective product 
development practices based on CE principles, and that to successfully implement these
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practices requires a major shift in the approach to HRM policy. But until senior management 
in the case study company takes this view on board, and is prepared to act on it, the 
company is unlikely to achieve high levels of cross-functional integration and thus, the 
competitive advantage it needs to survive and prosper.
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
Arising out of the above discussed knowledge gaps in CE research and practice, this thesis 
has taken up a number of challenges.
The first objective was to identify and understand the issues manufacturing companies face 
by attempting to improve their product development performance. Increasing globalisation 
and global competition lead not only to the need to systematically and rapidly use new 
technologies, but also to reorganise the conventional approach to product development, in 
order to remain competitive. Competitiveness is required in terms of quality and cost, but 
increasingly in terms of time-to-the market and innovativeness of products. The traditional 
product development process (with features such as a linear sequential process with few 
overlapping activities, organisational compartmentalisation, an inadequate integrative 
mechanism to co-ordinate the overall effort, and a lack of consideration of downstream 
issues upfront) becomes a barrier for product development success.
The second objective was to develop a conceptual framework that illustrates both the 
primary importance of the organisational enablers (Haddad, 1996a, b) and the key elements 
of complexity manufacturing companies face in implementing CE. A main argument put 
forward in this thesis was that there is no "one best way" in implementing CE (Poolton and 
Barclay, 1996; Schubert and Couchman, 1998). Internal factors (such as a company's 
product and process, its strategy and structure) and external environmental factors (e.g. the 
market a company operates in) shape CE implementations. These differences will lead to 
different cross-functional arrangements (including different types of cross-functional teams) 
for different types of projects.
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A third objective was to analyse the CE implementation process in the context of an 
Australian manufacturer with a market approach different to that commonly found in the CE 
research literature. So far attention has been paid mainly to industries such as automobile, 
aircraft or electronics which develop complex products and sell them to customers in 
markets. The case presented here, by contrast, focused on the development of complex 
products, but which are developed under contract for a single customer. With this, the author 
aimed to show the applicability of CE in this particular industrial setting.
The fourth research objective was to explore the role of HRM as a specialist function and as 
an organisation-wide activity in the implementation of CE. The author wanted to explore 
firstly, what efforts, services and intentions towards the management of its employees, 
expressed through its HRM strategies, policies and practices were undertaken by the 
company in the context of implementing CE. And secondly, how HRM as a specialist 
function was involved in the initiation and management of CE and in the initiation, 
elaboration and establishment of appropriate HRM policies and practices that support CE.
1.3 RESEARCH STRATEGY
Before the author engaged in the actual case study presented in this thesis, she carried out a 
preliminary case study about CE in order to identify and understand the issues 
manufacturing companies may encounter or be confronted with in dealing with CE. The 
preliminary case study was conducted at a different plant and company than the one chosen 
for the main case study, as outlined in chapter two. The insights gained from the preliminary 
case study contributed to the operationalisation of CE and the refinement of the initial 
conceptual framework as introduced in chapter three. The model guided and informed the 
remainder of the study and was in turn tested and further elaborated by the research. The 
research strategy and process are described in chapter two.
Equipped with such a framework the author approached the fourth research objective, 
exploring the role of HRM in implementing CE, by participating in a sustained company
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attempt to define and implement CE. Organisational change, like the implementation of CE, 
is a processual and contextual process (Pettigrew, 1973, 1988; Dawson, 1996). It requires 
the consideration of past, present and future conditions as well as the internal and external 
context in which an organisation functions. Therefore, a decision was made to undertake a 
longitudinal and processual case study. Ordinary case studies, which only provide a 
snapshot in time, are often superficial and exhibit little contextual investigation. In contrast, 
the longitudinal and processual approach made it possible to gain in-depth information 
about: the substance of the change itself; the significance attributed to HRM in the transition 
process; the involvement of HRM with CE; as well as the interaction between various 
factors within this process (Dawson, 1996). It made it possible to investigate the change 
process as it unfolded over time within its contextual framework and to use multiple sources 
of data. Data was collected within a single firm over an 18-month period through participant 
observation and interviews. The primary data was complemented with a range of secondary 
sources, including company memoranda, procedure manuals, and minutes of meetings.
In parallel, and based on the selection of the case study company, the study provided the 
opportunity to investigate CE in the Australian context. MILSYS, as the case study company 
is called in the thesis, was an Australian producer of defence electronics2. This enabled the 
author to analyse the applicability of CE for a company with a particular market approach, 
the development of complex products developed under contract for a single customer.
The investigation started with the analysis of MILSYS' traditional product development 
process. In parallel the author analysed the company's approach to HRM generally and in 
relation to product development. She also examined other internal and external contextual 
conditions, particularly developments within the industry sector the company operated in 
and Australia's Defence policy. In comparison to the investigation of the actual CE Project,
2 In order to rigorously ensure the confidentiality requirements set by the company and to ensure that 
the name o f the company can not be inferred from the analysis, the author anonymised the name of 
the company and all relevant data sources.
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the analysis of the context occupied almost as much time, and is given a similar amount of 
space as the process itself. This highlights the high dependency of the CE implementation 
process on its contextual conditions and the enormous complexity of such an organisational 
change process, as proposed in chapter three and four.
Some of the key results of the investigation, as mentioned earlier, showed there was little 
appreciation among MILSYS' managers of HRM's potential contribution to the success of 
organisational change and CE. These findings raised a number of questions about the nature 
of CE as a concept and its potential application, the disparity of management rhetoric and 
management practice and the problematic nature of socio-technical changes (Badham, 
Couchman and McLoughlin, 1997). In the next step it became thus necessary to analyse why 
HRM issues received only minor attention within the CE Project. Attention was then given 
to play of organisational power and politics as a possible explanation for these findings. 
Drawing on the conceptual framework the study shows that a significant organisation-wide 
change like CE is neither a unidirectional nor a rational undertaking. On the contrary, it is a 
messy, complex, and multi-layered process. It is strongly shaped by its organisational 
context and actors, in other words by its inherent play of organisational power and politics. 
How the thesis is structured in detail is described in the following section.
1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE
An important aspect in implementing CE is the creation and establishment of organisational 
and cultural conditions most appropriate for cross-functional integration, and their reflection 
in HRM policies and practices. With this in mind the present work seeks to illustrate the 
complexity of the CE implementation effort and the role HRM plays in such an undertaking 
using the example of an Australian company with a particular market approach.
The first part of this thesis comprises the methodological and theoretical considerations on 
which the longitudinal processual case study - discussed in Part Two - is based.
3 0 0 0 9  03 232 371  4
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Chapter one introduces the reader to the research problem of this thesis, the four main 
research objectives and research strategy, and lays out the structure of this thesis.
Chapter two describes the selected research strategy, the "double-loop research process ". It 
introduces the preliminary case study as the key element of the first loop and the main case 
study as the key component of the second loop. It explains why a longitudinal processual 
approach was chosen for the main case study and justifies the decision on theoretical, 
practical and methodological grounds. The chapter also explains the applied research 
methods. It outlines the selection process of the case study company, the methods used for 
data collection and analysis and shows how the quality of the study was ensured.
In chapter three, Concurrent Engineering is introduced as one particular approach to 
improve the product development process. The chapter introduces the first part of the 
theoretical framework (the CE implementation framework) of this thesis that was derived 
from the findings from the literature analysis, and guided the further investigation. An 
overview is then provided of different research perspectives on CE. The chapter also 
discusses the suitability of CE for different industries, product types and manufacturing 
systems as well as its dependence on a company's size and market approach. The conditions 
for cross-functional integration are then discussed, and the cross-functional team introduced 
as widely seen success factor for CE. It is shown that cross-functional teams can vary widely 
along a structural and a process dimension. In the last part of this chapter the requirements 
for successful CE implementation are summarised, whereas emphasis is given to the 
organisational enablers rather than the technical enablers.
The fourth chapter turns attention to HRM in CE. It introduces two main views on HRM: 1) 
HRM as synonym for personnel management, and 2) HRM as a broadened approach to 
personnel management. The latter was adopted for the analysis of HRM in this thesis, as 
reflected in the second part of the theoretical framework introduced at the beginning of 
chapter four. After a brief examination of critical developments in the HRM field, HRM's 
influence on organisational performance is discussed. The chapter then links HRM with CE
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and discusses various levers of HRM that are considered of critical importance to CE. Based 
on a review of a broad range of research literature, the author identified (and discusses) a 
number of key areas where HRM policies and practices could support and facilitate CE and 
for which CE may have significant implications respectively. These key areas are 
performance measurement and reward, training and development, selection and staffing, job 
design, career management, and employee relations. The final part of this chapter links the 
earlier introduced two parts of the theoretical framework. It shows that the combined 
framework not only reflects the complexity of CE implementation but also the assumed role 
of HRM in CE.
Chapters five to nine present the results of the main case study and form the second part of 
this thesis. Chapter five and six introduce the context within which the CE Project was 
embedded, with chapter six concentrating on HRM.
In chapter five, the reader is introduced to the environmental and organisational conditions 
faced by the CE Project. The chapter begins with a summary of MILSYS' history outlining 
the main events in MILSYS' development up to the time of the initiation of an organisation­
wide change program in 1994. Then, with the examination of the recent changes in 
Australia's Defence strategy and policy, a link is drawn to the initiation of the change 
program in MILSYS. The change program is interpreted as a response to the new conditions 
faced by organisations in the Defence industry, more precisely the defence electronics 
industry. The competitive success of organisations in this industry sector will increasingly 
depend on the adoption of effective product development practices based on CE principles. 
To undermine this assumption, the chapter also provides an analysis of the limitations of the 
company’s organisational structure and its traditional linear-sequential development process. 
Chapter six provides more details about MILSYS' approach to HRM. HRM is analysed as 
specialist function and also as an organisation-wide activity. The chapter shows that the 
restriction of the Human Resource Department to administrative and welfare services 
hindered its involvement with the organisational and cultural change process in MILSYS
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and thus its involvement with CE. In addition, the chapter examines functional, project and 
business administration management and its responsibility for HRM and discusses the 
changes that evolved in this regard over the course of the organisational change program. 
Chapter seven analyses the actual CE Project. It introduces the CE Project Team and the aim 
and course of the CE Project, commencing with the nomination of the CE Project Team, and 
the team's study of available literature on CE. It examines the work of the CE Project Team 
and the achieved outcomes such as the proposal of a "solution set" after more than a year's 
work. With the presentation of the concept, chapter seven discusses how the team was able 
to apply general CE principles, and at the same time customise the CE concept to address 
specific problems identified within MTLSYS. It is shown that the proposed solution reflected 
a more technical bias. Despite the recognition of effective communication and co-operation 
as important factors in achieving integration and concurrence, it placed major emphasis on 
procedures, systems and tools. Apart from the project team structure, organisational and 
HRM issues were basically untouched. The chapter concludes that despite the numerous 
training sessions and seminars, the CE initiative so far proved to be of limited success, as 
little substantive changes were introduced. By the end of the case study period most 
development projects were still set up and managed following a more traditional approach. 
One reason the implementation of CE within MILSYS was of limited success is discussed in 
chapter eight. It is shown that CE is an essentially political process, involving conflict, 
struggles, negotiation, bargaining, compromise, and the "play o f power" (Buchanan and 
Boddy, 1992). The chapter shows that the CE implementation process was shaped by the 
actions and interactions of a whole "cast o f characters" (Hutton, 1994), i.e. different groups 
and individuals within the company. Three of the groups (the CE Project Team and the 
groups of functional and project manages) and three individual key players (the Technical 
Managing Director, the OCC Project Leader, and the CE Project Leader) are investigated in 
detail with regard to their influence on CE. The chapter concludes that the exercise of 
organisational power and political lobbying indeed influenced the course and outcome of the
15
CE Project. It also influenced the role HRM played in this process and - in the case of 
MILSYS - prevented more far-reaching change.
Chapter nine, finally, summarises the case study results. It concludes that the presented case 
may be interpreted as negative in as much as it revealed little consideration of HRM issues 
during the attempt to introduce CE and because the prospects for the full implementation of 
CE and the adoption of a strategic HRM approach seemed limited in the foreseeable future. 
Within this context the chapter points to an interesting irony of the case, namely that in 
order to remain competitive, defence electronics companies are becoming increasingly 
dependent on the adoption of effective product development practices based on CE 
principles. However, these practices will not be successful unless a major shift to the 
companies' approach to HRM is realised. The chapter then summarises the thesis 
contribution to theory and practice. At last, the chapter points out several critical questions 
that remain unanswered, but for which the presented thesis provides a reference point for
further research in this area.
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2 M ETHODOLOGY
The aim of this chapter is to describe and justify the chosen research design and 
methodology. First, the research strategy, the double-loop research process, is outlined, 
followed by a discussion of the processual case study approach as the most appropriate way 
to answer the research question. The chapter continues with a description of the research 
methods starting with the selection process for the appropriate case, followed by an outline 
of the data collection techniques and the data analysis process.
2.1 THE DOUBLE-LOOP RESEARCH PROCESS
The research approach can be best described as a double-loop research process, as shown in 
Figure 1. It encompassed the development, test and refinement of a conceptual framework. It 
also involved the development of interpretations through a "continuous interplay between 
academic pre-conceptualisation (based on a comprehensive knowledge o f the area under 
study) and detailed empirical descriptions o f emerging themes and topic" (Dawson, 1997, p. 
390).
The starting point was the author's interest in product development and HRM, as well as her 
knowledge and experience in the latter field3. An initial literature review complemented her 
knowledge and experience and led to the identification of the research problem: the 
insufficient exploration of HRM in Concurrent Engineering implementations. The 
discovered shortcomings and theoretical and empirical knowledge gaps in previous research 
led to the definition of the research question: What role does HRM play in the implemen­
3 Prior to this study, the researcher was involved in elaborating and managing a comprehensive team 
work implementation project (2 years). This implementation o f teamwork at the shopfloor level in a 
large German multinational in the metalworking industry involved, for example, the design of a 
comprehensive qualification program and a close co-operation with the workers council of the 
company. She was also responsible for elaborating a new personnel information system comprising 
o f personnel statistics, personnel planning and personnel development data, and was involved in the 
design and application o f a flexible annual working time concept and a new company-wide wage 
arrangement
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tation of CE? Based on a detailed literature review the author developed a conceptual 
framework, introduced in chapter three and four. It reflects the primary importance of the 
organisational dimension in the implementation of CE (Haddad, 1996b). The literature 
analysis was used to identity key aspects of CE and organisational issues relating to the 
successful implementation of CE.
Parallel to theory building the author decided on the methodological approach. The nature of 
the research question determined the design of the research process and the decision for a 
processual case study approach. As discussed later, this approach made it possible to 
investigate the change process as it unfolded over time within its contextual framework. It 
enabled the researcher to deal with the dynamic and complexity of change and generate 
"sound knowledge not only o f processes and outcome but also o f why and how outcomes are 
differentially shaped by processes" (Pettigrew7, 1997, p. 342).
The next step was a preliminary case study, as described later, in order to further develop 
the theoretical framework. With the help of the preliminary case study the author aimed to 
identify and understand the issues manufacturing companies may encounter or be confronted 
with in dealing with CE. A further literature review and continuous discussions of evolving 
ideas with other researchers and supervisors accompanied the study. All those activities, but 
especially the insights gained from the preliminary case study, contributed to a better 
understanding of CE. They confirmed that despite the increasing recognition of the 
organisational dimension for the successful implementation of CE, HRM in this context had 
received little attention. The terms HR function and HR Management were often used 
synonymously by company members. Based on their narrow definition, they did not think 
about HRM as playing a role in the investigated product development projects. In order to 
better explore the role of HRM in CE it thus became necessary to distinguish between HRM 
as a specialist function and HRM as generic organisation-wide activity. The initial research 
question was changed to: "What role does Human Resource Management as a generic 
organisation-wide activity and a specialist function play in implementing CE?". With an
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accordingly refined research question and conceptual framework the second stage of the 
research process was entered.
The second loop represents the main investigation, which was based on a single longitudinal 
processual case study of a sustained company attempt to define and implement CE. The 
researcher decided to conduct such a case study for theoretical, methodological as well 
practical reasons (Barley, 1990; Pettigrew, 1990; Van de Ven and Huber, 1990). The first 
(and theoretical) reason was that the relationship between CE and HRM was poorly 
explored in the research literature and that the question why CE is difficult to put into 
practice was largely left open in CE research. Both aspects will be dealt with in the 
conceptual framework. Practical reasons were the limited time, resources and funding 
available for the study, as well as the problematic issue of gaining access to organisation(s). 
The aim was to gather not only a time series of snapshots (Pettigrew, 1990), but rich 
contextual data over time in order to grasp the dynamics of the CE change process. In order 
to achieve this, a longitudinal processual case study seemed to be most appropriate. A 
continuous investigation over a period of at least 12 months was seen as a minimum 
requirement for such an analysis by the researcher. With this requirement and a fieldwork 
phase of about 6 months in the preliminary case study, it was considered unrealistic to focus 
on more than one in-depth processual case study in the framework of a Ph.D.
The main investigation consisted of comprehensive data collection and analysis. The results 
of the case study are discussed in Part Two of this thesis. As illustrated in the double-loop 
research design, an ongoing literature review and discussions with colleagues again 
complemented the empirical investigation. The case study revealed that HRM did not play a 
major role in the implementation of CE. Only certain HR issues were discussed, both within 
the overall organisational change process as well as within the CE implementation project. 
The HR Department was not a HRM specialist function, apart from minor administrative 
support, it was not involved in initiating or implementing CE.
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Figure 1: The Double-Loop Research Design
Therefore, a number of further research questions arose that needed to be addressed in the 
analysis: Why was HRM not dealt with systematically in designing and implementing CE? 
Why were substantial HRM issues neglected or received only minor attention? What 
prevented HRM issues from being sufficiently considered in this process? These questions 
are dealt with in chapter nine. The findings derived from the data analysis yielded a better 
understanding of the empirical phenomenon and enabled the author to refine the CE 
concept.
After laying out the double-loop research design, the followring section briefly introduces the 
preliminary case study, which was an important element in the research process.
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2.2 THE PRELIMINARY CASE STUDY
The preliminary case study was undertaken in order to test the conceptual framework, refine 
the research question and to determine the selection criteria for the case in the main 
investigation. For the preliminary study a heavy manufacturing company was selected4. The 
company was suggested by the author's supervisors and finally chosen by the researcher for 
three main reasons. Firstly, the company was actively engaged in product development. 
Secondly, it was willing to allow the study of selected development projects, and thirdly and 
most importantly, indicated that it was using a CE approach in some of its development 
projects. The investigation focused on two specific product development projects (see 
Appendix A for a summary of the two projects).
Over a period of 6 months, from July 1995 to January 1996, the researcher spent on average 
one day per week in the company (a total of 26 days). During this time a close relationship 
was established with key players in both development projects. Information was collected 
through interviews, informal discussions inside and outside office hours, observations and 
company documentation, (see Appendix B for more information on the data collection in the 
preliminary case study). The information was cross-checked by triangulating the different 
sources of data such as interviews, observational data and company documents. In addition, 
the case study report was circulated among a number of key project personnel in order to 
corroborate facts and evidence presented in the report and to avoid factual errors and the 
inadvertent release of sensitive commercial data.
During the preliminary case study the researcher examined practices, procedures and 
structural arrangements used in the company's development process with reference to the 
application of CE (see Appendix C) as determined in the conceptual framework (see chapter 
four). Of particular interest was the role of HRM in these projects. The author wanted to
4 The company name was changed and data anonymised in order to ensure the confidentiality 
requirements set by the company.
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find out what HRM issues were considered in managing projects and by whom as well as 
who applied and maintained these HRM policies and practices? Both projects were analysed 
within their organisational context. Particular attention was paid to the projects' structural 
arrangements and how the team members co-operated within the project, within the 
company, and with customers and suppliers. The organisational context comprised the 
hierarchical structure and culture of the company, team co-ordination mechanisms, 
resources and support systems, communication and information systems. The analysis of the 
structural arrangements covered issues such as the structural arrangements chosen, the 
number of people involved, the functions represented at the project and their responsibilities 
in this context.
The preliminary study increased the author's understanding of product development 
processes under CE and its embeddedness within the organisation. The findings pointed to 
the need to differentiate between HRM as a specialist function and organisation-wide 
activity in the context of CE. With the help of the preliminary case study the researcher was 
able to refine the research question and the conceptual framework, thereby gaining a better 
understanding of CE.
The next section provides a background to the main case study. It discusses the 
appropriateness of the processual case study approach for the selected research problem.
2.3 THE PROCESSUAL CASE STUDY APPROACH
The research focus of this thesis was on a complex organisational phenomenon, a lengthy 
organisational change process within its context, where the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and the context were not clearly evident5 (Yin, 1984/1989). The context ŵ as 
manifested in the company's formal and informal structure, powder relationships, its way of
D Bucciarelli's "Designing engineers" (1996) and 'Life among scientists"by Charlesworth et al. 
(1989) provide two interesting studies of contemporary phenomena within their context with not 
clearly evident boundaries between phenomenon and context.
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co-operating and communicating, its culture over time, as well as its external environment 
such as the market it operated in and its customers and suppliers. The context in which the 
process was embedded played a determining role regarding the course, shape, duration and 
outcome of the process. The necessity to consider past, present and future as well as the 
internal and external context in the interpretation of the organisational phenomenon, thus, 
guided the decision for a processual case study. The value of processual research^ stems 
from its opportunity to capture the dynamic in social processes (Van de Ven and Huber, 
1990). It also allows the study of contemporary phenomena over an extended period of time 
within their organisational and historical context (Johnson, 1987, p. 58) by observing how 
they are shaped by the various elements, actions and politics within that context. Following 
Pettigrew's (1990) requirements for a contextual analysis, the researcher was able to analyse 
the change process at the vertical and horizontal levels as well as their interconnection 
through time6 7.
In his discussion about contextualism as a theory of method Pettigrew (1990, 1997) points to 
the duality of context and action and to the holistic and multifaceted causation of change, as 
essential issues to address in doing processual research. For the case study it meant that not 
only various internal features in their temporal occurrence, but also processes over time in 
the parent company, the industry sector and market the company operated in had to be taken 
into account. It was also necessary to look at various changes in the company (e.g. INTRA-
6 Over the last couple of years growing attention has been turned towards processual research, a 
development which emerged "in line with an increasing emphasis on qualitative approaches to 
management issues" (Ropo et al., 1997, p. 331). Complex organisational phenomena however, have 
been the focus of a number of researchers for many years, see for example Allison (1971),
Mintzberg and McHugh (1985), Weick (1993a, 1993b, 1995), Huber and Glick (1993), Thomas 
(1994). In order to grasp the "dynamics o f organisations and human conduct" (Ropo et al., 1997, p. 
332), Pettigrew (1990, 1997) has been advocating processual approaches for more than 30 years. He 
strongly contributed to its present definition and reputation.
7 The vertical level refers to the inner and outer context in which the phenomenon is embedded and the 
interdependencies between its higher and lower levels. The horizontal level embraces the temporal 
interconnectedness of the change process in past, present and future.
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NET installation, changes in appraisal system) as brought about by CE but which in turn 
influenced the further implementation of CE.
Yin's case study framework (1984/1989), which has been applied by a number of processual 
researchers (Pettigrew, 1990; Orton, 1997; Fox-Wolfgramm, 1997), guided the development 
of the research design. A case study approach was chosen because the focus of research 
interest was a contemporary phenomenon over which the investigator had no control (Yin, 
1984/1989). As the investigation circled around "what-and why questions", a decision was 
made for a single exploratory case study. This enabled the researcher to explore why things 
happened in a particular way in order to develop a deep understanding of the process.
An organisation-based design was chosen, because the inclusion of the organisational 
context was important. Organisational capabilities were needed to initiate and sustain the 
CE. CE, in turn, had implications on the organisation (such overcoming traditional borders 
of co-operation and communication, building up new integration mechanisms) which then 
again influenced the CE implementation process. By looking at the CE Project in isolation, 
the contextual conditions would have been neglected. Empirical data were thus collected at 
three levels: the project (the CE Project), the organisation (MILSYS as company with its 
particular features) and the organisation's environment (the market MILSYS operated in and 
its customers).
In addition, the chosen research design allowed to employ different methods of data 
collection, both quantitative and qualitative, and to deal with a variety of evidence (Yin, 
1984/1989).
2.4 RESEARCH METHODS
The preceding section outlined the characteristics of the processual case study approach and 
discussed it in relation to the defined research question. This section shows in more detail 
what research methods were applied in order to gather, analyse, and evaluate the relevant 
data. It starts with a discussion about the selection process of the case study company,
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followed by a description of the data collection techniques, distinguishing between primary 
and secondary data sources. The third part provides an insight into the data analysis and 
evaluation process and shows how the issues of validity, reliability and generalisability were 
addressed.
The operationalisation of the author’s variables is undertaken in chapter three and four. The 
indicators of CE are discussed in chapter three, and the indicators of HRM as a specialist 
function and as an organisation-wide activity in chapter four.
2.4.1 Se l e c t in g  Th e  Ca s e
One of the most difficult steps in conducting a case study takes place before the actual 
investigation can get underway. It is broadly described as the search for an appropriate case. 
The initial task was to find organisations that already used a CE approach in their product 
development process or had the intention to implement CE within the following year. This 
proved to be difficult, particularly as CE can be interpreted broadly. Though the concept of 
CE is not new, a universally accepted definition of CE does not exist, and companies give 
emphasis to quite different aspects. The author therefore determined specific criteria for an 
appropriate case (guided by the findings from the preliminary case study). The company had 
to be an Australian manufacturer actively involved in new product development processes 
with a product type suitable for CE (Poolton and Barclay, 1996). It had to have the intention 
to introduce or had recently introduced CE and was willing to provide access to its 
organisation in order to study the phenomenon.
The search for a suitable case was supported by a related research project, the Cooperative 
Research Centre for Intelligent Manufacturing Systems and Technologies (CRC) Project A7 
"Concurrent Engineering: Organization and Implementation", which aimed to develop a 
"catalyst" diagnostic toolkit. One of its information sources was Australian research on new 
product introduction (mainly surveys and 5 case studies). These surveys confirmed that CE 
was interpreted broadly and emphasis was given to quite different aspects of the process.
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Only a limited number of firms were identified intending to implement or already 
implementing CE and meeting the above outlined criteria.
The selected company was planning to restructure its product development process by using 
a CE approach. As with the preliminary case study company, it was willing to provide 
access for the author to study the conventional development process as well as the 
implementation process of CE. In contrast to the company in the preliminary case study, 
however, the company in the main case study paid more attention to the organisational side 
of the implementation process. This was reflected in the initiation of an overall 
organisational and cultural change process. After initial talks, the author was given formal 
access to the company, formal approval to talk to all relevant people and the permission to 
take part in meetings and training sessions. Senior and middle managers were informed 
about the author's presence in the company and were asked to support the research.
2.4.2 D a t a  C o l l e c t io n
Processual research is implicitly assumed to be qualitative in nature (Hinings, 1997, p. 493). 
Its representatives, however, do not restrict themselves to qualitative methods, but resort to 
multiple sources of evidence, which can be of either quantitative or qualitative nature. The 
data collection here was based on mainly qualitative data accumulated from three main 
sources: primary data from observations and interviews with company representatives, and 
secondary data from public and proprietary company documents. The change process was 
studied over a period of 18 months, from February 1996 to July 1997. The main data were 
collected over a 12 month-period starting in March 1996. The intensive personal presence of 
the researcher was an important aspect to build not only a familiarity with the company and 
its operations but also with the people studied. It was an important prerequisite to engage in 
informal discussions about the change process with those affected by it.
An advantage in the data collection was the researcher's tacit knowledge (Dawson, 1997;
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Pettigrew, 1990; Yin, 1984/1989) or pre-understanding at first hand derived from her 
experiences as a HR consultant (Gummesson, 1991). Advocates of processual research see 
such prior knowledge as an essential requirement for fieldwork. Despite these previous 
experiences, an extended period of time was required to become familiar with the specific 
cultural context of the study, namely the different national, industrial and professional 
cultures. It also took considerable time to grasp the whole depth and meaning of 
relationships, actions and behaviour of the people involved**. The prior experience, however, 
facilitated the comprehensive data collection and analysis as well as the understanding or 
"output" (Gummesson, 1991) of the process under study.
Although the literature recommends conducting a case study with a team of two or three 
people (Pettigrew, 1973, 1990) in order to ensure greater objectivity, the data collection and 
analysis was carried out solely by the researcher. It was however possible to discuss the 
information and findings with a second, experienced researcher undertaking similar 
investigations in the company. He was more involved with senior managers of the company 
and thus gained a closer insight into decision-making processes at senior management level. 
The discussions with him provided an additional source of evidence for the data analysis.
2.4.2.1 Primary Data Sources
Data were collected from two primary data sources; participant observation and interviews. 
The method of participant observation enabled the researcher to gain a deep insight into the 
daily routines and subtle organisational phenomena that shaped the CE implementation 
process. The author was able to gain insight into the roles of people surrounding the 
implementation team as well as the formal and informal interaction of the team with other 
individuals, projects and departments. In comparison to action research based on interven- 8
8 Charlesworth et al. (1989) and Bucciarelli (1996) provide a detailed study of the numerous 
subcultures within a given culture, which are manifested in different vocabulary and goal 
orientation, different interests, beliefs, attitudes, and practices.
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tion (Gummesson, 1991), the role of participant observer restricted active interference in the 
change process. But participation in meetings and related work projects was still allowed. 
The approach enabled the observation of how the change process unfolded over time within 
its contextual framework (Dawson, 1997). It also facilitated interviews with "key" players, 
and the familiarisation with the organisational context.
The observation program consisted of regular visits to the company over a period of 18 
months. During the main data collection stage the company was visited for at least two days 
a week, totalling about 140 days. The author attended meetings of the CE Project Team 
(held twice a week) and related meetings and events (e.g. meetings of the CE Pilot Project 
Team, fortnightly meetings of the Engineering Department, etc.). A notebook was used to 
record events, activities, tasks, and to capture unforeseen actions. Contextual data such as 
behaviours, sequences, verbal and non-verbal expressions were also kept in the form of 
fieldnotes. Subsequently the notebook was used to construct a chronology of key events 
(Dawson, 1997), depict certain routines and capture the non-linearity of the change process 
(Dawson, 1994). It also helped to increase the awareness of the informal organisation of 
work and structure (e.g. power positions, political behaviours), and to discover discrepancies 
between the various accounts (i.e. interview7, observation, documentary).
The collection of observational data was complemented by numerous interviews as the 
second main source of primary data collection. The interviews were undertaken in order to 
gain a better understanding of how different actors contributed to and interpreted the change 
process. The guideline for the interviews consisted of a set of open-ended questions (see 
Appendix D). These questions enabled the author to explore particular issues in detail, to go 
beyond the activities observed and to corroborate information already obtained from other 
data sources. The processual character of the study made it possible to conduct a number of 
repeat interviews. They not only allowed the researcher to return to certain issues, and to 
clarify contradicting data, but also to translate certain discoveries (such as the non­
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involvement of the HRM department in the design and implementation of CE) into different 
sets of interview questions (Dawson, 1997). 39 formal interviews were conducted ranging 
from 30 to 120 minutes, with an average time of 40 minutes. The interviewees included 5 
representatives from senior management level (among them the two Managing Directors), 8 
people from middle management such as functional and project managers, and 13 people 
from staff level (see Appendix E for list of interviewees)9. Among the latter group were 
members from the CE Project Team and the Pilot Project as well as other employees 
involved in the design and development process. 13 interviewees participated in repeat 
interviews. One third of the interviews were taped. For the rest interview notes were taken.
In addition to the interviews, the author informally talked to people from all levels of the 
organisation throughout the entire study. These discussions lasted from 10 up to 60 minutes 
each and were subsequently captured in the research notebook. They were an additional 
source to verily information gathered through interviews, observations and documentary 
analysis. They also provided further background information about the company and the 
industry sector.
2.4.2.2 Secondary Data Sources
A comprehensive documentary analysis was the third main source of the data collection. A 
broad range of public and proprietary documents was analysed. They included company 
newsletters, CE newsletters, CE reports and papers (see Appendix F). The company also 
provided access to the results of a survey about employee satisfaction carried out by an 
external consultancy and the results of an AQA (Australian Quality Award) Self­
Assessment. Background information about the company and the industry sector were 
gathered from company reports, public documents, as well as organisational charts. Another 
data source was the internal e-mail system and the recently installed intra-net.
9 Non of the interviewees were hourly employees. No union representatives were interviewed (at the 
time of the case study trade unions were not formally involved in the company).
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2.4 .3  D a t a  A n a l y s is
An intensive analysis and evaluation of the information accompanied the data collection. 
There are no widely agreed upon standards for the conduct of processual research in terms 
of design, data collection and analysis (Ropo, Eriksson, and Hunt, 1997, p. 332). Some 
researchers describe the process as a craft involving trial and error (e.g. Daft, 1983). Others 
have started to develop more systematic methods that not only support the data collection 
and analysis, but guide the entire research process^. They thus defend qualitative research 
against the often used argument of poor validity, reliability and generalisability. The author 
accordingly decided to apply a more systematic method to ensure the quality of her research. 
The mainly qualitative data were subjected to a systematic qualitative analysis. This analysis 
consisted of "three concurrent flows o f activity: data reduction10 1, data display12, and 
conclusion drawing/verification" (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 10). The former two 
activities guided the verification process, enabled the researcher to discern patterns, 
explanations, possible configurations, which in turn directed the further data collection and 
data reduction and display in a continuous process. How the meanings emerging from the 
data were tested for their "plausibility" (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 11) is described in 
the following paragraphs, which also discuss how at the outset precautions were taken and 
certain tactics applied to increase validity, reliability and generalisability of the case study. 
There are three main types of validity, namely construct, internal, and external validity, 
which require different analytical approaches (Yin, 1998). Based on Yin (1998, 1984/1989)
10 Yin (1984/1989) for example provided a comprehensive framework for the conduction of case 
studies, Van Maanen (1988) developed a concept for reporting fieldwork results, Van de Ven and 
Huber (1990), and Fox-Wolfgramm (1997) provide a methodological framework for processual 
applications.
11 Data reduction comprised the selection and sorting of data, simplification of information, as well as 
the transformation of data from transcriptions and field notes. It also involved recording the decision 
process about what research question, case and conceptual framework to choose and, later on, 
writing summaries and memos, coding the information and organising the data in the form of 
clusters.
12 Data display comprised the compression of data and their display in the form of matrices, charts and 
networks (some of them are shown in other chapters of this thesis).
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three tactics were chosen to increase construct validity: the use of multiple sources of 
evidence, the establishment of a chain of evidence, and the review of the case study report 
by key informants. At least three independent sources of evidence were used in the 
collection of data: interviews, observations and documents. They enabled the researcher to 
contextualise, cross-check and cross-validate the gathered data (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
With the help of triangulation it was possible to interpret company documents as they are 
commonly biased, aimed for a particular audience or follow certain motives. It also allowed 
to corroborate information and clarify contradicting data from all data sources. The use of 
multiple data sources facilitated the construction of a chain of evidence (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994, p. 260f) "through converging lines o f enquiry" (Bums, 1994, p. 321). The 
data had been continuously analysed in relation to the initial research question and 
propositions up to the final conclusions (Yin, 1998, p. 249). In addition, the case study 
report was circulated among key informants. Their comments helped to avoid factual errors 
and the inadvertent release of sensitive commercial data.
Internal validity is concerned with the credibility or authenticity of the data. It can be 
ensured by examining the gathered data in a number of analytic modes (Yin, 1998; Miles 
and Huberman, 1994). The author applied a time series analysis. It led to the construction of 
a chronology of the CE implementation process (see chapter seven). It incorporated 
sequences and features of action, key transition points, the circumstances of the emergence 
of new ideas, new key players at a given time, as well as impacting events at other related 
levels of analysis.
External validity is concerned with the generalisability of the case study findings (Yin, 
1984/8). Single case studies are often criticised for a poor basis for generalisation. 
Processual research however confines itself to one or a small number of organisations 
(Dawson, 1994). Dawson (1997, p. 404) argues that "although general trends can be 
identified and typical responses recounted, under the processual framework, one [case] is 
significant". The investigation here also relied on the study of a single company. The study
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focused on the "circumstantial uniqueness" of the case and "not on the obscurities o f mass 
representation" (Bums, 1994, p. 326). The investigator did not emunerate frequencies 
(statistical generalisation), but expanded and generalised a theory (analytic generalisation) 
(McGuire, 1998). A set of empirical results was generalised to its theoretical propositions, a 
theorised pattern of results, which was identified and built up in the design phase. In this, 
the case study meets the requirements of generalisability and represents a significant 
contribution to knowledge and theory building. It increases the understanding about the 
particular area of research, and helps to refocus the direction of future investigations in the 
respective research field.
The use of a formal case study protocol and the development of a case study database 
(Bums, 1994; Fox-Wolfgramm, 1997, Yin, 1998) increased the reliability or replicability of 
the results. The case study protocol (a separate directory on the researcher's computer as 
well as a folder with a loose collection of printouts) contained the purpose of the study, 
selection criteria for the organisation, the introduction paper given to the company, 
operational procedures for the data collection (e.g. selection criteria for the formal interview 
partner, information sources, questions for the interviews), as well as relevant readings (see 
Appendix G).
The case study database was built up continuously, and data from all sources were organised 
within it (such as transcribed and annotated interviews, interview notes, fieldnotes and 
documentary data, and a bibliography with added comments of all reviewed documents). All 
original data was stored in a separate directory. The copies were reformatted with a margin, 
information coded and collected into different files. The coding system was made up of a 
number of main codes with sub-categories (such as company profile: mission/vision, 
organisational structure, employees, etc.; or environment: competitors, contractors, 
environmental changes) and a number of open codes (such as relationships and behaviour 
patterns, functional backgrounds and individual perceptions) (see Appendix H). An initial 
code list was identified through the literature review and the preliminary case study, which
32
was supplemented by additional codes as the data collection progressed and more ideas were 
captured. All information became subject to an intensive continuous content analysis in 
order to develop and refine concepts, which enabled the presentation of new accounts (post­
analytical descriptions).
2.5 SUMMARY
The aim of this chapter was to describe and justify the chosen research approach by relating 
it to the nature of the research question. It showed how the approach was reflected in the 
double-loop research process. The chapter discussed the theoretical, methodological and 
practical concerns that were driving the case study. It showed what methods were applied 
for the data collection, analysis and evaluation and that a more systematic approach was 
taken to improve the study’s validity, generalisability and reliability.
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3 CONCURRENT ENGINEERING
The aim of the following chapter is to locate Concurrent Engineering within the Product 
Innovation literature and to show how it relates to other literature on new product 
development. The chapter outlines what CE is, where it comes from, and what its recognised 
core elements are. It discusses the suitability of CE for different types of organisations, 
products and market approaches, and the problematic nature of the implementation of CE as 
well as ways to realise cross-functional integration. The findings from the literature analysis 
were summarised in a theoretical framework, the CE implementation framework, which 
guided the further investigation (see Figure 2).
Concurrent Engineering Implementation
Other
Approches
T
Sources: Zanko et al,, 1998; Schubert and Couchman, 1998 
Figure 2: Concurrent Engineering Implementation Framework
The framework starts from the assumption that manufacturing companies have to compete 
increasingly in terms of time-to-market and innovativeness of their products. CE is one
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approach to improved product innovation. A central assumption is that there is no "one best 
way" for implementing CE, and both organisational and technical enablers are necessary for 
successful CE implementation. Furthermore, from an organisational perspective the 
achievement of cross-functional integration is one of the most important aspects of this 
approach. It can be achieved through a variety of organisational arrangements. Cross­
functional team, however, are widely seen as central to CE, though such teams can vary 
widely along a structural and a process dimension. The individual elements of this 
framework are discussed in detail in the following sections.
3.1 PRODUCT INNOVATION AND CE
Manufacturing companies nowadays have to compete not only in terms of quality and cost, 
but increasingly in terms of time-to-market (Aaby and Discenza, 1993; Kumar and Motwani, 
1995; Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1994) and innovativeness of their products (Haddad, 
1996b; Kurth, 1994; Clark and Wheelwright, 1995). Effective product innovation processes 
have therefore become the focus of considerable interest. The wide range of literature on 
product development and innovation can be distinguished by their level of analysis13 as well 
as by their underlying perspective (see Table A). Three main strands can be identified 
regarding the underlying perspective of the literature on product development and 
innovation: Engineering Management (e.g. Solenhuis, 1992), Marketing (Aaby and 
Discenza, 1993, Cooper, 1988), and Business Management (e.g. Myers and Marquis, 1969; 
Craig and Hart, 1992).
13 Innovation research takes place at a macro- and micro level of analysis (Brown and Eisenhardt, 
1995). While both levels focus on the discovery and study of determinants of successful and 
unsuccessful product innovation, macro level research concentrates on the inquiry of cross-country, 
cross-sector differences and differences in the innovation potential within a particular sector (see for 
example Kato and Kato, 1992; Juergens, 1997). It also investigates the emergence and further 
development of specific technologies within particular timeframes. By contrast, micro-level research 
looks at how the product innovation process is organised, how particular products get developed and 
how the process is influenced and shaped by the various inner-organisation components, such as 
structure, strategy, etc.. A micro-level analysis was the chosen for the purpose of this thesis.
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Level of Research/
Inquiry/ Disciplinary Focus Representative
Underlying
Perspective
Macro-level
Fields (on)
Juergens, 1997;
Economics- Evolution of particular technologies over Kato and Kato, 1992;
Oriented time. Intrasector differences regarding Clark and Fujimoto,
Innovation innovation potential. Innovation patterns 1991; Womack, Jones,
Research and models across countries and and Ross, 1990;
industries. Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 
1995
Organisation- Inner-organisational innovation process Katz, 1982; Dougherty,
Micro-level Oriented (activities, structures, etc. that influence or 1990, 1992
Innovation
Research
shape the development process)
Engineering
Engineering
Management Design integration and support
Grady, 1994;
Kurth, 1994; Deitz, 
1995a; Salomone, 
1995; Morelli, 
Eppinger, and Gulati, 
1995
Marketing of New Determinants of new product success and Cooper, 1988, 1990;
Products or failure in the market place Cooper and
Marketing Rational Plan (rp) Determinants of the financial performance Kleinschmidt, 1987;
(success) of new products: success via Myers and Marquis,
superior product, attractive market, 1969, Rothwell 1972;
rational organisation. (Perspective is Rothwell, Freeman,
mostly a-theoretical and exploratory and Horsley, Jervis,
thus helps to broadly define the relevant Robertson, and
factors for product development Townsend, 1974;
research.) Rothwell 1992
Strategic Strategy development and implementation Wheelwright and
Management or regarding new product development. Clark, 1992a;
Disciplined The actual development process Craig and Hart, 1992;
Problem Solving (development team, suppliers, leaders, Imai, Ikujiro, and
etc.) Takeuchi, 1985
Business Organisational Appropriate organisational structures and Adler, 1995; Clark and
Manage- Design or management or Fujimoto, 1991;
ment
Disciplined The actual development process - success Womack et al., 1990;
Problem Solving via problem solving with discipline Hayes, Wheelwright,
(centres on the effects) and Clark, 1988b
Communication Effective inter- and intra-organisational Ancona and Caldwell,
Studies or communication or 1992;
Communication Narrow effects of communication on Allen, 1971;
Web project performance - success via internal Dougherty, 1990,
(cw) and external communication (theoretical 
perspective in the context of traditional 
research studies)
1992; Katz, 1982;
Table A: Innovation Literature: Level of Inquiry and Underlying Perspective
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The latter strand may be further subdivided into strategic management (e.g. Ansoff, 1965), 
organisational design (e.g. Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967b) and communication studies 
(Ancona and Caldwell, 1992).
Each research strand is characterised by a particular focus on product development as 
summarised in Table A. Brown and Eisenhardt (1995) offer a slightly different organisation 
of the vast and diverse literature on product development. They identify three research 
streams: product development as communication web, as rational plan, and as disciplined 
problem solving. Each of these streams focuses on different factors and relationships as 
contributors to product success. Regarding their underlying perspective, however, they can 
be organised within the above identified strands.
Beyond the distinction by their level of analysis and underlying perspective, two broad 
approaches were identified within the product innovation literature. One approach 
comprises the empirical research based literature (Juergens, 1997; Druecke, 1995; Adler, 
1995) and the other the more prescriptive literature (largely based on surveys) with a "how 
to do it" approach (e.g. Poolton, 1994; Coughlan, 1992; Cooper, 1988, 1990; Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt, 1987; Twigg and Voss, 1992; Page 1993).
While each research field emphasises different factors and relationships and suggests 
different ways of improving the innovation process, new product development is 
unanimously seen as a complex organisational process that cuts across many functions in a 
company. Dougherty (1997, p. 425) defines product innovation as "the conceptualisation, 
development, operationalisation, manufacture, launch, and ongoing management o f a new 
product or service". New in this context refers to the newness for the organisation and can 
include a new product technology, new uses, new customers, new distribution and/or 
logistics, or a combination of these factors (Dougherty, 1997).
While the product development process has been given considerable attention from various 
research streams, most of the studies are limited to the process itself or to particular aspects 
of the process. Only few studies have sought to explain the product development process in
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more than instrumental terms. Despite few attempts to grasp how engineers actually work 
and of getting insight into the "black box" of product development (Bucciarelli, 1996), the 
actual process of development remains largely unexplored. Aspects such as innovation 
routines, innovation creation, tacit knowledge, the different ways of problem solving of 
hard- and software engineers were not sufficiently explained.
For the conventional product development process four key problematic features have been 
identified and frequently documented in the research literature. First, the process tends to be 
carried out in a linear sequential way, with only few activities overlapping or taking place 
concurrently. Mistakes get handed over and changes take a long time to be built in. This 
phenomenon is often referred to in the literature as a "throw over the wall" or "relay race" 
process. Second, the various activities tend to be carried out by separate functions within the 
organisation (Lettice, 1995, p. 3). Ziemke and Spann (1993) found that the larger the 
organisation, the more structured are its activities. This in turn results in more specialised 
functions. The more specialised the function, the more formal and standardised are 
commonly the procedures it has to follow. This organisational phenomena of professional 
specialisation and organisational compartmentalisation is often referred to in the literature as 
"stovepiping" or "siloing" (Peters, 1987, p. 27; Winner et al., 1988, p. 55). It results in goal 
displacement and ineffective cross-functional communication. Third, the integrative 
mechanism employed to co-ordinate the overall development effort is frequently found 
inadequate. It is often featured by bureaucratic drawing approvals and engineering change 
management procedures as well as lightweight project managers who are confronted by 
strong functional managers with control over resources. Fourth, "downstream issues" (i.e. 
testability requirements) are often not considered at the beginning of a development project, 
which leads to shortfalls in performance and requires loops in the development process and 
post-release fixes to products. Dimancescu and Dwenger (1996, p. 6) report the findings by 
consulting company surveying a broad cross-section of product development efforts. The 
consultants found that "47 percent o f all product development work is repeated, due to
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upstream changes or late consideration o f requirements; a fu ll 51 percent o f product 
development activity consists o f fire-fighting, or unplanned activities; project hand-offs are 
often botched because o f poor communication
Companies in their new product development (NPD) process have adopted various 
approaches, practices and tools in order to address these problems. They range from 
methods that focus on individual project performance improvements to methods focusing on 
performance improvements across a portfolio of projects. They all have the potential for 
performance improvement. However, companies often have not achieved the expected 
improvements or have been unable to sustain them. Based on an in-depth investigation of 
seven organisation from various industries, McDonough and Griffin (1997, p. 3) conclude 
that the limited success has been "due to the incomplete deployment o f the practice, the 
inappropriate application o f the tool, or the fact that the practice or tool effects only certain 
parts o f the NPD system". Three practices, however, have been shown to have a more 
significant impact on NPD performance than others: 1) pursuing a formal new product 
development process (Griffin, 1997; Hustad, 1996; Cooper, 1990), 2) setting strategies for 
NPD (Griffin, 1997), and 3) the use of cross-functional teams (Hayes, Wheelwright, and 
Clark, 1988a; Henke, Krachenberg, and Lyons, 1993; McDonough, 1996). According to 
McDonough and Griffin (1997), the adoption of any one of these three practices was no 
guarantee for continuous high NPD performance. In some cases companies were able to 
generate high performance on a continuous basis, in other cases they did not achieve it. 
McDonough and Griffin (1997, p.5) conclude that sustained high NPD performance requires 
"the application o f several managerial practices simultaneously, ... the interaction among 
multiple practices rather than the implementation o f any one practice".
CE seeks to address the above four problems of the conventional process through three 
interrelated features of process organisation: functional integration, design integration and 
activity concurrence. It is considered to offer the potential to achieve sustained high NPD 
performance by applying the above three practices identified by McDonough and Griffin
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(1997) simultaneously. What CE is, where it comes from, and what its core elements are, is 
described in the next section.
3.2 CONCURRENT ENGINEERING
3.2.1 The Origin of CE
CE is one recent approach to improved new product development, which has been 
predominantly applied in industries such as especially in Aerospace, Automobile and 
Electronics Industries. It seeks to achieve a balance not only between organisational and 
technological but also human factors in the product development process. The concept of 
CE emerged in the USA in the 1980s. It is, however, based on perspectives within the 
disciplines of engineering and management that can be traced back to the early-20th centuiy 
(Gerwin and Susman, 1996; Smith, 1997; Ziemke and Spann, 1993). It reinvents 
perspectives from other intellectual domains, which addressed disintegration problems 
associated with functional specialisation *4. Earlier studies in CE particularly addressed the 
problems of specialisation and compartmentalisation associated with separate product 
design and manufacturing process design (Winner et al., 1988; Boothroyd and Dewhurst, 
1983; Ettlie and Stoll, 1990). Prior to 1992 little empirical research was conducted in the CE 
field and most of the literature on CE was anecdotal or conceptual (Smith, 1997). The rise of 
Japan's economic power, however, strongly encouraged further practical research on CE 
(Gerwin and Susman, 1996, p. 118). By now an increasing number of empirical studies have 
been conducted (Juergens, 1997).
Despite an increased attention to CE in research and practice over the last years, there is still 
no widely accepted definition of CE. Ambiguity and uncertainty surround the term CE. It is 
interpreted in different ways (e.g. as a technique, a philosophy, a paradigm, etc.) and, as a 14
14 See for example Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a, b) and their discussions about the main structural 
characteristics and conditions for the use of cross-functional teams in the product development 
process.
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particular approach to product development, it is closely related to other "new" approaches 
(such as Simultaneous Engineering, Systems Engineering15 or Life Cycle Design) (see 
Table B). Furthermore, the problematic processual and complex nature of CE 
implementation remains poorly understood and the requirements of successful CE 
implementation are largely glossed over in the CE literature. Given these features, CE may 
be considered even a "management fad"  (Abrahamson, 1996).
Different Terms for CE
Concurrent Engineering Gerwin and Susman, 1996; Hull, Collins, and Liker, 1996; 
Thamhain, 1994
Simultaneous Engineering
Yamazoe, 1990; Schonwald 1990; Eversheim, 1990; 
Wallace, 1990; Knight and Jackson, 1989; Cleland, 
Bidanda, and Chung, 1995; Shenas and Derakhshan, 1994; 
Ranky, 1994
Life Cycle Engineering Bylinsky, 1995
Parallel Design Engineering Ellis, 1992
Systems Engineering Grady, 1994; Kuhn and Garcia, 1994
Different Meanings of CE
A Concept Winner et al., 1988
A Philosophy Hull et al., 1996
A Distinctive and Systematic Approach 
to Product Innovation
Winner et al., 1988; Lawson and Miller, 1992; Lake, 1992
A Management Technique Thamhain, 1994
A Competitive Strategy Kannapan and Marshek, 1992; Moffat and Gerwin, 1994
Table B: Synonyms and Meanings of CE
15 While the terms Concurrent Engineering and Systems Engineering are used in some texts 
synonymously (Lake, 1992), other authors claim that despite certain overlaps, Systems and 
Concurrent Engineering differ in many respects (Gardiner, 1996). For Grady (1994), a major 
advocate of Systems engineering, CE is only one aspect of the integrated design and development 
process, and does not comprise the whole range of components and activities as Systems engineering 
with its requirement analyses and overall integration effort. Grady (1994) defines Systems 
Engineering as the process of integrated product development in which Systems Requirement 
Analysis (SRA) and Systems Integration (SI) form the "twin buttresses", the main pillars of support 
in the design process.
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3.2.2 T h e  C o r e  E l e m e n t s  o f  CE
Three main research perspectives can be distinguished within the CE literature: engineering, 
management and organisational. Many CE advocates, regardless of their perspective, agree 
that the philosophy of CE provides a "systematic approach to the integrated and concurrent 
design o f products and their related processes, including manufacturing and support" 
(Winner et al., 1988, p. v). CE looks at product development as a "unified whole" (instead as 
of a set of independently conducted but interdependent activities). The main focus in the CE 
literature is on the "design and development" component of the new product development 
process rather than on product strategy or new product marketing. CE aims to establish high 
levels of cross- functional integration, design integration, as well as high level concurrence 
between project tasks and processes. CE is thus largely seen as a way to overcome the 
traditionally segmented, functionally specialised and strongly sequential product 
development process. Within this context, functional integration means the establishment of 
appropriate cross-functional arrangements. Such arrangements are required to overcome 
functional silos and to ensure a high level of co-operation and communication between all 
involved with the development process and product life cycle functions. Design integration 
refers to the holistic design of the product. This can be ensured through the early (up-front) 
consideration of all product life cycle and associated design issues, including aspects like 
quality, cost, schedule, and user requirements (Winner, 1988; Albin and Crefeld, 1994). 
Concurrence means conducting simultaneously both the new product design and the 
manufacturing process design. Certain activities may be overlapped while others can be are 
carried out in parallel (Shina, 1991, 1994).
CE focuses on people, processes and tools within the development process. It appears, 
however, that the individual elements and relationships between them are given a different 
emphasis within the CE literature. The CE literature with an underlying engineering 
perspective emphasises tools (e.g. Kusiak, 1993; Ranky, 1994). Processes are the focal point
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of the CE literature with a management perspective (e.g. Fujimoto, 1997). The CE literature 
with an organisational perspective focuses on all three but with people as the primary 
element (Haddad, 1997). This is also reflected in the ways the CE literature suggests to 
realise integration. Three main classes can be distinguished. The first one comprises 
technological means ((e.g. Computer Aided Design (CAD), Computer Aided Manufacturing 
(CAM), Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM), Rapid Prototyping, Simulation), the 
second procedural means (e.g. systems approach, design rules, standards), and the third 
organisational means (e.g. matrix structures, different cross-functional arrangements). The 
first one predominates within the engineering field. The latter two are dominant in the 
managerial literature. By contrast, in the organisation literature organisational, procedural 
and technological means are used in a complementary rather than mutually exclusive 
manner.
3.2.3 CE from an Engineering Perspective
The engineering stream is of particular interest from the point of view that the first notions 
and conceptual ideas of CE as a distinctive approach were developed within this strand. CE 
research from an engineering perspective is predominantly concerned with the engineering 
activities that play a part in the design and development process. It seeks to identify ways - 
mostly in the form of technical solutions - to support and integrate these various activities 
(Smith, Tomasek, Jin, and Wang, 1995; Ranky, 1994). Such a "tool-oriented" approach is 
found in many CE publications with an engineering perspective (Boothroyd and Dewhurst, 
1987; Hales, 1994; Joines and Ayoub, 1995; Kurth, 1994). Deitz (1995b) for example shows 
that the increased use of sophisticated analytical tools and programs reduced the number of 
prototypes needed to evaluate a design's reliability. They also made it easier to consider 
downstream issues earlier in the design cycle, and thus shortened the development time. 
DFM (Design for Manufacturing), DFA (Design for Assembly) and DFT (Design for Test) 
and Design for Maintenance are just some of the often utilised analysis techniques. Joines
43
and Ayoub (1995, p. 43) however argue that these techniques, "although popular, have 
remained rather cumbersome". Other authors suggest networks and appropriate design 
verification tools. Much literature is found on CAD and CAM, CAE (Computer Aided 
Engineering), product data models (Kurth, 1994) and QFD (Quality Function Deployment) 
(Hales, 1994). Hogan (1994) draws attention to an integrated and central product 
information database, which simplifies design tasks. Khoshnevis, Park, and Sormaz (1994) 
developed and discuss a knowledge-based computer system using a hierarchical planning 
scheme and a multi-bank rule base as an effective concurrent engineering tool.
Despite the technical focus of the engineering based CE literature, many of its 
representatives recognise the cross-functional team as a crucial element for the 
establishment of cross-functional integration (Kurth, 1994; Joines and Ayoub, 1995).
3.2.4 CE from a Management Perspective
CE researchers from a management perspective tend to give rather universalistic 
prescriptions on how to implement CE. They offer a set of success factors in the form of 
universally-applicable "best practices" (e.g. Cooper, 1988, Hustad, 1996). This is 
particularly the case for cross-functional teams, which are seen as the best way to achieve 
functional integration (e.g. Trygg, 1993) (Couchman et al., 1999). They often focus on 
procedural means such as effective business planning and resource allocation in order to 
shorten development lead times (e.g. Fujimoto, 1997).
Other CE research, particularly from an organisational perspective, shows that these success 
factors are not equally important in all industries and for all products (McDonough and 
Griffin, 1997). Zirger and Hartley (1996, p. 143) for example found that only four of the 12 
"techniques purported to bring products to the market more quickly" they studied were 
significantly related with development time performance. King and Majchrzak (1996, p.189) 
report the results of a recent survey of the computer industry, whose findings indicate that 
the greater use of CE type tools and techniques "actually slowed the development process
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f or some product classes (generally those with greater environmental uncertainty)". A 
central argument of CE advocates of a contingency perspective is that there is no "one best 
way", no single solution for implementing CE (Poolton and Barclay, 1996; Componation 
and Byrd, 1999). Rothwell (1992, p. 223) notes that "there still exists no precise 
prescription or recipe fo r  successful innovation". The implementation of CE is product and 
process dependent (e.g. degree of complexity, degree of novelty). It is dependent on the 
industry sector (e.g. type of customer, market approach) as well as contingent on an 
organisation's strategy and structure (Couchman et al., 1999). These variables will lead to 
variations in the organisational arrangements for CE (Zanko et al., 1998).
3.2.5 CE from an Organisation Perspective
In many of the CE literature with an organisational perspective CE is particularly seen as an 
approach to overcome organisational barriers to integration. In contrast to the "tool- 
oriented" approach favoured by CE research with an engineering perspective, and the "best 
practice" approach of CE researchers with a management perspective, CE research from an 
organisational perspective applies a contingency approach. This approach is based on the 
assumption that the implementation of CE depends on various organisational and 
environmental conditions as well as on the product itself (e.g. Susman and Dean, 1992; 
Gerwin and Susman, 1996; Hull, Collins and Liker, 1996). Furthermore, the introduction of 
CE involves organisational, procedural and technological changes within a company (e.g. 
Haddad, 1996b; Gerwin and Susman, 1996). The achievement of cross-functional 
integration however, is seen as one of the most important aspects of this approach to new 
product development (Hauptman and Hiji, 1996, 1999; Susman and Rayl, 1999). While this 
involves breaking down the "silos" often found in functionally specialised organisations, re­
integration does not necessarily require the formation of teams. Other cross-functional 
arrangements are possible (see for example Adler, 1995; Liker et al., 1996). Representatives 
of organisational CE research emphasise that both organisational and technological enablers
45
are necessary for effective CE, but that technological enablers are, however, of secondary 
importance (King and Majchrzak, 1996; Lettice, 1995; Haddad, 1996b; Susman and Rayl, 
1999). This is based on the assumption that CE, despite the technical connotations of the 
term, is an organisational issue in the sense that its full effectiveness is only achieved and 
sustained in a company with appropriate organisational structures, a team-oriented culture 
and team-oriented HRM policies and practices (King and Majchrzak, 1996; Schubert and 
Couchman, 1998). This latter perspective has been adopted in this study.
3.3 SUITABILITY OF CE
There have been few studies to date of the appropriateness of CE for different industries, 
organisations, product types and national cultures (Poolton and Barclay, 1996). While an 
increasing amount of empirically based research has been conducted, including field surveys 
with reasonable sized samples conducted in many countries (Susman and Rayl, 1999; 
Hauptman and Hiiji, 1996; Liker, Sobek, Ward, and Cristiano, 1996; Hull et al., 1996; 
Zirger and Hartley, 1994), attention has been paid mainly to industries such as automobile, 
aircraft or electronics, which develop complex products and sell them to customers in 
markets (see Table C).
Few studies have focused on the development of complex products, but which were 
developed under contract for a single customer. These few studies however indicate that CE 
is applicable for companies with different market approaches or starting points of the 
development process (e.g. Winner et al., 1988). As shown in Figure 3, two main classes of 
market approaches can be identified: Processes that start off with a product made to order 
[contract type] and processes that start off with a concept for a certain market or product 
[concept type].
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Industry Product
Complexity
Literature
Aircraft Industry Complex
product
Cleland et al., 1995; Sabbath, 1996; Singh, 1992; Schräge, 1993; 
Hauptman and Hirji, 1999
Automobile Complex
product
Liker et al., 1996; Juergens, 1997; Shenas and Derakhshan, 1994; 
Haddad, 1996b; Walklet, 1989; Wallace, 1990; Yamazoe, 1990; 
Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Calabrese, 1999
Automotive 
Prarts Suppliers
Complex
Product
Liker et al., 1996
Computer
Industry
Complex
product
Druecke, 1993, 1995; Hauptman and Hirji, 1999
Machinery/Mac 
hine Building
Complex
product
Juergens, 1997
Electronics Complex
product
Zirger and Hartley, 1996; Dimancescu and Dwenger, 1996; 
Shina, 1991; Hauptman and Hirji, 1999
Defence Complex
product
Winner et al., 1988; M addux, M artin and Farrington, 1994
Cable
Manufacturer
Relatively 
simple product
Albin and Crefeld, 1994
Manufacturing
(generally)
Country Literature
Australia Hauptman and Hirji, 1996, 1999
Sweden Trygg, 1993
Germany Eversheim, 1990; Schonwald, 1990; Juergens, 1997
USA Haddad, 1996b; Hull et al., 1996; Cleland et al., 1995; Sabbath, 
1996; Schräge, 1993; Liker et al., 1996
Canada Hauptman and Hirji, 1999
Italy Druecke, 1993, 1995
UK Lettice, 1995; Smart, Lettice and Evans, 1995; Hauptman and 
Hirji, 1996
Japan Juergens, 1997; Fujimoto, 1997; Liker et al., 1996
Table C: Appropriateness of CE for Different Industries, Products, and Countries
The first class can be further divided into three sub-classes relating to the different types of 
customers: military systems customer, commercial systems customer, commercial 
downstream customer. The second class falls into two sub-classes, concepts for the 
consumer market (e.g. washing machines, automobile, consumer electronics) and concepts 
for the industrial market. In the latter subclass a distinction can be made between an 
endproduct (e.g. mining equipment), or component of an endproduct (e.g. compressors). 
Many investigations focused particularly on the second class and here again on concepts for 
the consumer market (Couchman, 1998).
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Appropriateness of CE
Company
Size
Complexity 
erf Product
M arket M anufacturing
Approach System
targe
mecSum
highly ccomplex
Concept for Certain M arket 
or Product 
(Concept Type)
(Contraci Type) individual job
Concept for Certain M arket 
or Product (Concept Type)
M arket
Approach
Product M ade to Order 
(Contract Type)
appropriateness bnoatfly empirically shown 
appropriateness for a number of cases empiricaily shown 
■  appropriateness not or not vridety empirically shown
Concepts fo r the 
Industrial M arket
Concepts for the 
Consumer M arket
Endproduct
Source: Couchman, 1998
Figure 3 : Appropriateness of CE
The contract type commonly starts off with a request for tender, followed by contract 
negotiations and the win of the contract (when successful). This phase is commonly referred 
to as bid-phase. The bid phase is followed by the actual design and development phase 
comprising stages such as preliminary design, detailed design, etc. (see Winner et al., 1988). 
The applicability of CE for companies of different size, with different manufacturing 
systems and differences in the complexity of their products is not equally investigated. 
Many studies focus on highly complex products and a mass-production type of 
manufacturing system. Hull et al. (1996, p. 135) show that CE has a greater impact on the 
performance of mass-production type in contrast to batch type of manufacturing systems. 
Lau's findings (1994), however, indicate that CE is also an appropriate approach for batch 
manufacturing. Bradley (1995) points out that the application of CE to bespoke product
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development is as relevant as applying it to volume or low production run products. Albin 
and Crefeld (1994) even assume that CE can benefit companies of any size regardless of 
their manufacturing system and the complexity of their products.
Based on existing research it appears that "although concurrent engineering is associated 
with leading-edge, large companies producing highly complex products like defense 
systems, aircraft, and automobiles", it is also applicable for medium and small-sized 
companies producing relatively simple products (Albin and Crefeld, 1994, p. 50), for 
companies with different market approaches and different manufacturing systems (see 
Figure 3).
Little has been found about the dependence of CE on organisational conditions. Despite a 
few studies of organisational barriers (e.g. Adler, 1995; Trygg, 1990) (often based on earlier 
organisational contingency research, e.g. Bums and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967b, Galbraith, 1973), it is not clearly understood whether and how the organisational 
structure of a company (i.e. flat vs. highly hierarchical organisations; functional, matrix, or 
project organisation) impacts on CE.
The review of the CE literature indicates that CE is appropriate for different conditions (i.e. 
market approaches, product complexity, company size, manufacturing system, 
organisational structure and strategy). Variations in these internal and external 
environmental factors, however, are likely to require different cross-functional arrangements 
or types of cross-functional teams for achieving effective integration (Zanko et al., 1998).
3.4 CROSS-FUNCTIONAL INTEGRATION IN CE
While the division of labour among departments is necessary to ensure expert knowledge, 
from a CE point of view it is an essential requirement to realise functional integration and 
unite the scattered functional expertise in order to achieve timely and cost-effective project 
outcomes. Addressing the issue of disintegration, the CE literature takes up perspectives 
from the earlier organisational literature (e.g. Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967a, b; Galbraith,
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1973) regarding the problems associated with functional specialisation and the main 
structural characteristics and conditions for the use of cross-functional teams.
It is widely agreed upon that cross-functional integration can be realised through various 
structural arrangements (Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967b). The organisation 
and CE literature suggests a variety of organisational arrangements. They include liaison 
roles, inter-departmental committees, integrating departments, and inter-departmental 
mutual adjustment (e.g. in-depth design reviews to assess DFA/DFM/DFT) (Durand, 1995; 
Ancona and Caldwell, 1992; Shenas and Derakhshan, 1994; Moffat and Gerwin, 1994; 
Zanko et al., 1998; Adler, 1995). A company can use different cross-functional 
arrangements for different types of projects and depending on its organisational conditions. 
Though cross-functional integration does not necessarily require the formation of teams, the 
cross-functional, collocated and project-dedicated team is widely seen as central to CE 
(Trygg, 1993; Nicholas, 1994; Lettice, 1995; Moffat and Gerwin, 1994; Clausing, 1994; 
Hauptman and Hirji, 1996).
The CE literature largely refers to the cross-functional team in very generic terms. It is 
mostly research from other fields (e.g. Ancona and Caldwell, 1992; Campion and Higgs, 
1995; Parker 1994) that addresses the effectiveness of project teams and that has detected 
that cross-functional teams can vary widely along a structural and a process dimension (see 
Figure 4), as discussed later. A number of typologies of cross-functional teams have been 
proposed. They take into account criteria such as leadership, decision making power, and 
functional representation (Clark and Wheelwright, 1992; Durand, 1995; Pinto and Pinto, 
1991; Thamhain and Wilemon, 1987). These typologies, however, lack the depth and 
flexibility to reflect the changing requirements in structure and integration in the product 
development process over time. The issue of different strategies of cross-functional 
integration in CE (with the cross-functional teams as only one particular form) at different 
stages/phases in the development process has not yet been investigated in detail (Adler,
1995).
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A number of aspects of the structural and process dimension of cross-functional teams are 
discussed respectively in more detail in the following sections.
Classification Scheme for Cross-Functional Teams
Structural Dimension
Leadership 
(Heavy-, Lightweight)
Process Dimension
Task Conditions
(e.g. Technical Risk, Complexity, etc.)
Team Composition Cooperation/Communication
(Representation of Functions, Customers, Suppliers) (Relation internal-external activities &
vertical-horizontal communication)Degree of Involvement
(Core-, Subteam) Empowerment
(Execution, Innovation, Governance)
(Number of Subteams)
interactions
Dedication 
(Full-, Part-time)
Location
(Dispersed, Collocation)
Integration within Organisation 
(Standalone Project, Project Environment)
Sources: Ancona and Caldwell, 1992; Campion and Higgs, 1995; Clark and Wheelwright,
1992
Figure 4: Classification Scheme for Cross-Functional Teams
3.4.1 T h e  St r u c t u r a l  D im e n sio n  o f  C r o s s -F u n c t io n a l  T e a m s
The structural dimension of cross-functional teams includes aspects of team composition, 
size, degree of involvement, dedication, location, leadership, and extent of integration 
within the organisation. Susman and Dean (1992) refer to the structural dimension as the 
integrative mechanism and define it as the policies and practices that facilitate CE within the 
product development team.
3.4.1.1 Leadership
Largely agreed upon, both in the CE literature and in other literature on project teams, is the 
critical importance of the team leader for the success of a development project (Hayes et al.,
51
1988b; Adler, Riggs, and Wheelwright, 1989; Bowen, Clark, Hooloway, and Wheelwright, 
1994a, b, c; Thamhain and Wilemon, 1987; Thamhain, 1994). Brown and Eisenhardt (1995, 
p. 369) assert that "even though the cross-functional team is the heart o f efficient product 
development, the project leader is the pivotal figure in the development process ... [and] 
critically affects both the process performance and the effectiveness o f the product". 
Bucciarelli, (1996), in his in-depth study of three design projects in three different firms, 
shows the importance of the project leader for building consensus within the team, and 
building and maintaining alliances within the company. Susman and Rayl (1999) argue that 
strong team leaders have a positive influence on project outcomes because they have the 
power, authority and respect to assure that project goals are balanced against function goals. 
The project leader is often seen as the linkage between the project team and senior 
management (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). S/he has to rely more on informal influencing 
strategies to motivate and inspire "followers" rather than on traditional formal authority and 
coercion (Buchanan and Badham, 1998, pp. 89-90). Based on their study of a product 
development project with a heavyweight project team in Motorola Telecommunications, 
Clark and Wheelwright (1992) distinguish between four types of product development teams 
with associated leadership styles: the functional, lightweight, heavyweight, and autonomous 
or "tiger" team, as summarised in Table D. A "heavyweight" leadership style is often seen as 
a guarantee for an integration of business strategy and product concept (Hayes et al., 1988a; 
Adler et al., 1989). This leadership style is connected with great power, sometimes even 
aggression as in autonomous, 'Tiger', or 'Wolfpack' teams (Clark and Wheelwright, 1992; 
Anonymous, 1994). Emphasised is the different nature of their work compared to those of 
traditional managers. Heavyweight project leaders carry out their role in a different fashion 
to lightweight project managers. They are described as champions of the basic concept by 
ensuring that those who work on sub-tasks of the project understand the project concept 
(Wheelwright and Clark, 1992a, b).
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Functional Team Lightweight Team Heavyweight Team Autonomous 
(Tiger) Team
People grouped by 
discipline, working under 
direction of specialised 
sub-function or functional 
manager.
Co-ordination through 
detailed specifications all 
parties agree to at the 
outset, and through 
occasional meetings 
where issues that cut 
across groups are 
discussed.
Over time, primary 
responsibility for the 
project passes 
sequentially from one 
function to the next - 
"throw over the wall".
Often in larger, more 
mature firms
Each relevant function 
appoints a liaison person 
to represent it on a 
project co-ordinating 
committee.
Project structure, but 
person belongs to 
function (have this role 
added to their other 
duties).
Representatives work 
with a "lightweight 
project manager" who co­
ordinates different 
functions' activities.
Approach often used 
supplementary to 
traditional functional 
organisation
Includes a group of 
core cross-functional 
team members who are 
dedicated (and usually 
physically collocated) 
for the duration of the 
development effort. 
Typically there is one 
core team member 
from each primary 
function of the 
organisation
Less frequently 
observed in practice 
though it has big 
potential for a wide 
range of organisations.
Individuals from 
different 
functional areas 
are formally 
assigned, 
dedicated, and 
collocated to a 
project team.
Leadership
Direction given by 
specialised sub-function 
or functional manager.
"Lightweight" in two 
respects:
1) generally a middle- 
junior level person who, 
despite considerable 
expertise, usually has 
little status or influence,
2) key resources 
(including engineers on 
the project) remain under 
control of respective 
functional managers (no 
power to reassign people 
or reallocate resources).
Typically, spend no more 
than 25% of their time on 
a single project - working 
at a desk to confirm 
schedules, update time 
lines, expedites across 
groups.
Direct access to and 
responsibility for the 
work of all those 
involved in the project, 
"heavyweight" in two 
respects:
1) senior managers 
with expertise, 
experience, 
organisational power; 
may even outrank 
functional managers.
2) primary influence 
over people working 
on the development 
effort and supervise 
their work directly 
through key functional 
people on the core 
teams.
Core group often full­
time dedicated and 
collocated
Project leader, a 
"heavyweight" 
in the
organisation, is 
given full 
control over 
resources 
contributed by 
the different 
functional 
groups.
Project leader 
becomes the 
only evaluator 
of the
contribution 
made by 
individual team 
members.
Source: Clark and Wheelwright (1992)
Table D: Types of Product Development Teams and Associated Leadership Styles
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Their task comprises the co-ordination of group activities, planning the work, organising 
resources, leading the personnel, and monitoring progress (French and Hellriegel, 1971; 
Rosenau, 1990, 1996). One of their most significant roles is the stimulation and facilitation 
of group internal and boundary spanning communication (Ancona and Caldwell, 1990b, 
1992), and thereby cross-functional integration (Buchanan and Badham, 1998).
Clark and Wheelwright (1992) found that heavyweight leaders spend little time at their 
desks, but communicate with all project contributors in order to ensure decisions are made 
and implemented whenever and wherever needed. In order to do so, Buchanan and Badham 
(1998, p. 98) assume, they have to be able to "work the bureaucracy" and play "positive" 
organisational politics16.
3.4.1.2 Team Composition and Degree of Involvement
A distinction between core and sub-team is often found in the literature regarding the degree 
of involvement of the various functions and people associated with the product development 
process. Clark and Wheelwright (1992) refer to the core team as the team that manages the 
total project and the co-ordination and integration of individual functional efforts, while as 
individuals, core team members represent their functions and provide leadership for their 
function's inputs to the project. Grady (1994) asserts that as a minimal requirement the core 
team should consist of three key functions: marketing, engineering and manufacturing17. 
They are to meet on a regular basis and co-operate, co-ordinate and communicate from the 
very start to the project end. They have joint responsibility to manage the project and 
authority to pull in resources as required. The representation of engineering and
16 In Kotter's view (1998, p. 99) "positive” organisational politics involves: creating visionary 
agendas and resource networks, collecting and using information (political diagnosis), monitoring 
relationships, identifying directions of mutual interest, developing good working relationships 
(different types of relationships with various groups), and establishing credibility.
17 The discussion here does not distinguish among the various categories of manufacturing employees 
(e.g. process engineers, production managers, quality personnel, assemblers and skilled trade 
employees). Such distinction may as well have influence on the team and thus be investigated by 
future research.
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manufacturing in the core team is largely agreed upon (Shenas and Derakhshan, 1994; 
Gerwin and Susman, 1996). In addition, a number of authors suggested having 
representatives from HRM, marketing (Aaby and Discenza, 1993; Kumpe and Bolwijn, 
1994), accounting/finance, and purchasing at the core team (Haddad, 1996b; Clark and 
Wheelwright, 1992; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). In several electronic firms, Clark and 
Wheelwright (1992) found core teams consisting of six functional participants, design 
engineering, marketing, quality assurance, manufacturing, finance, and human resources, 
with design occasionally represented by two core team members, one for hardware and one 
for software engineering. Sabbath (1996, p. 71-72) shows that the product teams in the 
Boeing 777 project had all the people "necessary to design the structure, design the tools, 
develop the manufacturing plan, write the contracts - everything is in that little company 
[team]".
According to Aaby and Discenza (1993) the human resources representative has to be 
particular active in the early stages of the development process when sub-team positions are 
defined and jobs posted. Then s/he adopts an important subsequent role in training and 
development. The accounting/finance person is seen as invaluable in "costing out" different 
options and performing detailed analyses of options and choices identified during the course 
of the project. The role of marketing they see in ensuring an effective and rapid 
commercialisation. The marketing representative has to ensure that "no surprises" occur in 
the transition from prototype to commercial product.
Some authors also recommend the involvement of company-external people such as key 
suppliers, sub-contractors and customers into the core team (Gerwin and Susman, 1996; 
Liker et al., 1996). The involvement of customer representatives would help to ensure the 
"voice o f the customer" is incorporated into the design (Eversheim, 1990; Wheelwright and 
Clark, 1992c). Other participants, especially from design engineering early on and 
manufacturing later on, are usually not part of the core team, even though they may 
frequently be dedicated to a heavyweight team for several months and over time develop the
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same level of ownership and commitment to the project as core team members. They work 
primarily within a single function or sub-function (Clark and Wheelwright, 1992)
"Effective product and process development requires the integration o f specialized 
capabilities" (Clark and Wheelwright, 1992, p. 9). For Brown and Eisenhardt (1995) 
functional diversity increases the amount and variety of information available for the 
product development process. It helps team members to understand the design process more 
quickly and fully from a variety of perspectives, and thus, improves the design process 
performance. But some researchers see functional heterogeneity as a disadvantage and 
source of conflict for CE teams (Nicholas, 1994; Amason, Hochwarter, Thompson, and 
Harrison, 1995). Diversity in the form of different "thought worlds" (Bucciarelli, 1996, p. 
76; Dougherty, 1992), but also different hierarchical levels and status, and different 
personalities may hamper the establishment of effective teamwork. Nicholas (1994) assumes 
that functional diversity is particularly critical for strong functional organisations because 
they commonly have strong functional subcultures.
Although problems of disciplinary specialisation (in terms of different orientations, goals, 
subcultures) have been acknowledged in the team literature (Parker, 1994), they have so far 
not been widely addressed in CE implementation concepts.
3.4.1.3 Location, Size and Dedication
Because of the complexity of product development projects (including CE projects) and the 
uncertainty and ambiguity of the innovation task, physical collocation is often recommended 
in the literature (Clark and Wheelwright, 1992, 1993, 1995; Bucciarelli, 1996; Componation 
and Byrd, 1999). Even when the best on-line communication is available, collocation is 
often considered to be preferable to a dispersed location or "physical distance" (Hauptman 
and Hirji, 1999). Grady (1994) views the "direct, face-to-face human interchange with 
verbal language" as the single most important communication channel within the product 
development process. Druecke (1993), however, warns that collocation is not automatically
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a guarantee for effective development work, joint ownership or identification with the 
project as a whole. He notes that the enthusiastic effect can easily wear off if not allowed to 
develop into effective collaboration. Other authors have shown that even a world-wide 
dispersed product development team can have a competitive advantage (Teresko, 1995). 
Such virtual teams are increasingly been used and feasible through the use of advanced 
computer and information technologies (Grady, 1994).
A general consensus exists in the literature regarding the size of cross-functional teams. It is 
widely agreed, that a cross-functional team is most effective when it is comparitively small, 
with up to ten (Parker, 1994; Campion and Higgs, 1995), or occasionally up to 20 members 
(Sabbagh, 1996, p. 71-72). For complex development efforts, which require many 
participants, Grady (1994) suggests a project team organisation with a core team and up to 
four different types of sub-teams.
Regarding dedication, the innovation and CE literature often recommends a full-time 
dedication of the core team members and their assignment to only one project (Clark and 
Wheelwright, 1992). In practice Clark and Wheelwright (1992) found, however, that core 
team members were often dedicated to two or more core teams. Sometimes this was due to a 
limited pool of relevant people in an organisation, sometimes because the need for a full­
time person from a function such as finance was not realised.
3.4.1.4 Extent of Integration within the Organisation
A CE Project can be carried out as a rather isolated effort in a strong functional oriented 
matrix organisation. It can also be carried within a matrix organisation that is team and 
project focused and has established respective structures18.
18 According to Grady (1994) a project oriented matrix organisation is characterised by functional 
departments led by a supervisory hierarchy, which provide qualified personnel, tools, and standard 
procedures to the project organisation. The project organisation on the other hand, is responsible for 
blending these resources into a set of effective product-oriented cross-functional teams and manages 
these teams to achieve project success in terms of customer satisfaction.
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Regardless of the type of matrix, the matrix organisation is described in many instances as 
an imperfect attempt to combine the advantages of a project and a functional organisation 
and avoid their negative aspects (Kurth, 1994, p. 164; Larson and Gobeli, 1987). The dual 
membership of functional experts to both a function and a project team is often seen as a 
problematic feature of matrix organisations. Kurth (1994, p. 164) however notes that the 
dual membership of CE team members is not a question of serving "two bosses" but a 
question of which boss is responsible for which activities. In a stronger function-oriented 
matrix, functional experts are stronger bound to their home function than to the project. 
According to Shenas and Derakhshan (1994) their "loyalty" is first to their department and 
only second to the team.
3.4.2 Th e  P r o c e s s  D im e n sio n  o f  Cr o s s -F u n c t io n a l  Te a m s
Not only do cross-functional teams vary according to their structure, they also vary 
according to a process dimension. The process dimension refers to the size and nature of the 
task upon which they are engaged (task conditions). Based on the Susman-Dean model for 
predicting design for manufacturability or CE effectiveness, Gerwin and Susman (1996) 
assume that a large technically complex project has a much higher need for effective intra­
group processes (supplemented by effective inter-group processes) than a small project with 
a simple product. In addition, the process dimension encompasses the team's capacity for 
problem solving and decision-making (degree of empowerment) and the way they 
communicate and co-operate within the team and with the environment, as reflected in 
Figure 4.
3.4.2.1 Communication and Co-operation
Communication and co-operation are highly important aspects of cross-functional team 
work and cross-functional integration, and thus CE teams (Haddad, 1996b, p. 128; 
Thamhain, 1994). Ancona and Caldwell (1992) distinguish between intra- and inter-team
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interaction in the communication and co-operation relationships of cross-functional teams. 
The inter-team dimension refers to the co-operation and communication of the cross­
functional team with multiple groups of others regarding information, resources, and support 
as well as the delivery of products and services to others. Some authors refer to it as 
boundary management or boundary spanning (Ancona and Caldwell, 1990b). Ancona and 
Caldwell (1992) assume that the type of communication development teams engage in with 
others, and not just the amount of communication, determines the performance of the team. 
They identified a set of 15 distinct activities19 and developed a typology of four main types 
of external interactions: ambassadorial, task co-ordinator, scouting and guarding activities. 
They found that external activity is related to internal cohesion and internal task processes. 
Moreover, they assume a direct link between external activity and internal processes. But 
because external activity affects internal processes through its impact on performance such 
direct link is hard to prove.
The intra-team dimension refers to the communication and co-operation between the 
functional experts in one particular product development project and how they link their 
actual work in time. This relationship shapes the nature of cross-functional integration 
(Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). Wheelwright and Clark (1992c) distinguish between four 
different modes or styles of upstream- and downstream interaction: the serial mode of 
interaction, the early start in the dark mode, the early involvement mode, and the integrated 
problem solving mode. Their key differential is the extent to which work is done in parallel. 
Table E briefly describes the pattern of work and communication of the upstream and 
downstream group in the four modes interaction.
In order to achieve integrative problem solving within the product development process, 
specific demands are placed on both groups. The upstream group has to meet performance
19 They comprise mapping, gathering information and resources, scanning, feedback seeking, opening 
up communication channels, informing, co-ordinating, negotiating, moulding, allowing entry, 
translating, filtering, classifying, delivering, and protecting.
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objectives in a way that complements downstream work and makes use of what the 
downstream group can do. Wheelwright and Clark (1992c) call it the design of "down­
stream-friendly" solutions, which requires: a) knowledge about downstream constraints and 
capabilities and skills, and b) capabilities that go beyond the narrow technical ability to 
accomplish the upstream task. The downstream group on the other hand needs to engage in 
early actions and an extensive dialogue with the upstream group. Such dialogue needs to 
include the frequent exchange of constraints, ideas and objectives in order to take early 
action to prevent costly mistakes downstream.
Furthermore, research shows that effective integration and problem solving not only requires 
basic changes in the way development works. It also relies on a specific set of capabilities, 
attitudes and relationships of both up- and downstream participants which management must 
enforce and build over time (Wheelwright and Clark, 1994; Ancona and Caldwell, 1992), 
and thus specific training and development requirements. People in the upstream group, for 
example, must be willing to share preliminary information early with their downstream 
colleagues and give up their rather isolated work style20. Likewise, people in the 
downstream must be willing to take risks based on their best forecast of the future. Both 
groups must feel comfortable in a very ambiguous environment, which requires mutual trust 
based on the mutual commitment to each other's success. Wheelwright and Clark (1992c) 
assume that without such commitment, engineers are less likely to expose themselves to the 
personal risks inherent in integrated problem solving. They would be hesitant to expose 
what actually goes on in their respective departments and to reveal weaknesses, mistakes 
and limits.
20 Druecke (1993) found that average designers spend up to 80% of their work time in front of the 
computer without talking to each other.
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Pattern of W ork Pattern of Communication Example/Beneflt
Serial Mode of Interaction
downstreamers wait until 
upstreamers have completely 
finished design...
that then is transmitted to 
downstreamers in a one-shot 
transmission of information
"throwing over the wall"
Early Start in the Dark Mode
links upstream and downstream 
group in time...
although downstream and 
upstream group work in 
parallel, and in this sense are 
"concurrent"...
... but continues to employ a batch 
style of communication
they still operate without 
information and the problem 
solving cycles in the two groups 
are not linked
occurs where 
downstreamers face a 
deadline and need an early 
start. But upstreamers 
communicate only at the 
end of its work, so 
downstreamers have to 
begin in the dark
Early Involvement Mode
move towards real integration
upstream group still involved in 
design well before downstream 
group begins its work ...
downstream group waits until 
design is complete before start 
problem solving in its own 
domain
upstreamers and downstreamers 
engage in two-way communication 
of preliminary, incomplete 
information
downstream group develops insight 
about the emerging design and 
participates through feedback and 
interaction in the design process
downstream group 
benefits:
- part design reflects better 
understanding of process 
and design;
- able to complete work 
with fewer delays and 
downstream changes
Integrated Problem Solving Mode
links upstream and downstream 
group in time
downstream engineers 
participate in ongoing dialogue 
with upstream counterparts and 
use that information to get 
flying start on their own work, 
what changes content of 
downstream work in the early 
phases of upstream design
links upstream and downstream in 
the pattern of communication.
changes likely to occur in the 
content of communication between 
the two groups
less design changes, 
greater timeliness, higher 
quality, better customer 
focus
Source: Wheelwright and Clark, 1992c
Table E: Pattern of Up- and Downstream Co-operation and Communication
3.4.2.2 Empowerment
A further differential feature of cross-functional teams and factor affecting team 
effectiveness is the degree of empowerment of the team (Holahan and Markham, 1996;
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Jassawalla and Sashittal, 2000). Badham (1999) distinguishes between three levels of 
empowerment: work execution, innovation and governance. In the first level the team has 
authority over the execution of certain work process and activities. It carries out day-to-day 
business decisions including the rate of productivity, quality, work methods. Lawler (1990, 
p. 24) found that this type of decision-making is often delegated to work teams in 
organisations with a participative management approach. Majchrzak (1988) assumes that a 
work group is more autonomous the more functions or tasks are integrated in its work 
process. In contrast to Majchrzak (1988), Badham (1999) looks at the importance of the 
tasks and to what extent the group is given accountability for it. At the innovation level, the 
team additionally influences (via suggestions) the change of certain work and work related 
issues and the creation of an appropriate work environment and climate. In the third and 
highest level the team has control and decision making power over the design and execution 
of work and work-related issues (processes, project management and people issues). It is a 
highly empowered team that has all the skills, information, tools and authority it requires to 
make the necessary decisions for the development process to proceed and to ensure high 
effective teamwork (Clark and Wheelwright, 1992; Haddad, 1996a, b; Kumpe and Bolwijn,
1994) . It can take the form of a heavyweight or an autonomous team. When the borders of a 
heavyweight team are not clearly defined and it is given insufficient direction by senior 
management it is likely to turn into an autonomous team (Clark and Wheelwright, 1992,
1995) . Haddad (1996b, p. 131) however found that cross-functional CE teams are often 
insufficiently empowered. Citing an engineer from her case study of a major U.S. 
automotive firm, she writes that the cross-functional team was often unable "to execute what 
was agreed to in the team because they [functional experts] would go back into their 
management, which is still in a different organization, and they get told that they could not 
do it this way and they had to do it that way. And sometimes for good reasons, budget 
reasons, time ..." She thus, concluded that the establishment of highly empowered 
development teams requires organisational changes (structural changes plus the adoption of
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a "human resource strategy - a revised performance appraisal system - that would support 
the new organizational structure") in order to allow the team a maximum control over its 
decisions.
Overall, it appears that the cross-functional team is a key success factor for consistent high 
performance in the new product development process (Jassawalla and Sashittal, 1999; 
Holahan and Markham, 1996; Drickhamer, 1999; Barber, Huselid and Becker, 1999). It is 
thus, not surprising that companies emphasised in theory and practice "actions which 
directly operate on improving team abilities" (McDonough and Griffin, 1997, p. 14). Often 
they focus on team training to build up broader and improved interpersonal skills and to 
establish team orientation. According to McDonough and Griffin (1997, p. 11) these team 
characteristics are however, only a "subset o f the set o f elements required to make teams 
truly effective". The other essential factors arise from the organisational context in which the 
teams are working and in which they are embedded. McDonough and Griffin (1997) argue 
that unless teams are placed in an organisational context with an appropriate infrastructure, 
consistent high performance in the development process can not be sustained and replicated 
organisation-wide. The infrastructure needs to enforce attitudes and behaviours required for 
teamwork, for example through appropriate HRM policies and practices, supportive 
managerial processes and an organisational culture built on trust (Hauptman and Hirji, 1999; 
Susman and Rayl, 1999).
3.5 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CE
While it has been claimed that CE has been widely adopted by companies in many 
industrialised countries, there are few detailed research accounts of the implementation of 
CE (e.g. Lettice, 1995; Maddux and Souder, 1993). Even though CE implementation is often 
described as protracted and difficult (Smart et al., 1995), most empirical studies have not 
adequately addressed this problem. Accounts of the problematic nature of CE 
implementation are mostly of general character. Existing research concentrates largely on
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prescriptive knowledge drawn from surveys (e.g. Levy, 1994; Coughlan, Voss and Hon, 
1992). Buchanan and Badham (1998, p. 122) note that "stories o f failures to achieve the 
predicted benefits o f implementing CE are widespread and regularly confirmed in surveys". 
A number of explanations have been offered for the high failure rates and limited 
effectiveness of CE. Most of them point to inappropriate organisational conditions (Liker et 
al., 1996; Holahan and Markham, 1996). Factors mentioned include lack of senior 
management commitment and the failure of senior management to support the establishment 
of a team-oriented environment and respective structures (Susman and Dean, 1992; Gupta 
and Wilemon, 1990; Fleischer, 1999; Hauptman and Hirji, 1999). Other explanations point 
to a lack of real empowerment of the project team (Haddad, 1996; Holahan and Markham,
1996), a failure to exploit the boundary spanning and integrative potential of new 
technologies and a narrow focus on cost cutting (Willcocks and Grint, 1997).
In order to realise the full potential of CE and achieve high levels of cross-functional 
integration, changes are required not only in the technical environment, but most 
importantly in the organisational context (Gerwin and Susman, 1996; Pullin, 1999). Haddad 
(1996b, p. 125) stresses that while technology can play an important role, cross-functional 
teams, organisational and human resources management changes are the more effective 
enablers and more critical to success (see also King and Majchzak, 1996). They "can serve 
either to block or enhance" the CE process (Haddad, 1996b, p. 125). Therefore Haddad 
developed a CE implementation model that centres on the establishment of product-focused, 
cross-functional platform teams. Its "effective operation" is supported by appropriate
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conditions in the form of organisational and technological enablers21. Table F gives an 
overview of some main organisational and technological enablers.
Enabler Characteristic
Organisational
The extent and scope of functional integration and membership pattern to achieve integration
Cross-Functional Arrangements 
(e.g. Cross-Functional or 
Platform Team)
product focused 
cross functional
responsible for all development functions 
manufacturing integration 
customer/supplier integration
Cross Group Communication meeting of technical specialists across platform teams; 
collocation
Decentralisation and 
Participation
staff engineer empowerment in decision-making; 
fewer levels of hierarchy;
early, substantive, involvement of downstream function 
employees
Human Resource Practices
organisational culture shifts; 
performance appraisal system; 
training matrix; 
cross functional job mobility; 
dual career ladders; 
modified incentive compensation
The extent to w
Technological
lich the latest technology is available and utilised
Building Design conference and meeting rooms with sufficient equipment 
promote collocation where possible
Computer Networking local area network; 
electronic mail
CAD
3-D solid figure creation/modification
availability of earlier versions promotes organisational learning 
accessible to all team members
Source: Haddad, 1996b, p. 126
Table F: Organisational and Technological Enablers of CE
21 Haddad (1996, p. 125) defines organisational enablers as the "changes in the organizational 
structure and practices that permit platform team to achieve functional integration, to share 
information across work group or status based boundaries and to collaborate across these boundaries 
to solve project problems by consensus. These changes include cross-group communication, 
decentralized and participatory decision-making, and human resource practices that encourage a 
breaking down of traditional knowledge boundaries and control". Technological enablers are 
defined as structural artifacts, equipment, systems [like communication systems and analysis tools], 
and physical space designs that support cross-functional team cohesiveness, information sharing and 
collaborative problem solving (Haddad, 1996, p. 125). Technological enablers also enable 
geographically separated individuals to access constantly changing information about design, 
manufacturing, marketing, materials, etc. (Albin and Crefeld, 1994).
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Susman and Dean (1992) offer a model for predicting design for manufacturability 
effectiveness. It contains three major categories: integrative mechanisms, group process, and 
codification/ computerisation, which are said to be the major independent contributors to 
project outcomes. The first two are largely identical with what Haddad (1996a, b) calls 
organisational enablers. The category "codification and computerisation" is more or less 
equivalent to Haddad's technological enablers. Gerwin and Susman (1996) introduce a 
fourth category to the Susman-Dean model: task condition. This category includes all the 
variables that moderate one or more of the relationships between the first three categories 
and project outcomes (e.g. technical risk and goal difficulty). The broadened model is 
summarised in Table G.
Integrative
Mechanisms
Group Process
(Behaviour/Attitudes)
Codification/
Computerisation
Task Condition
- team boundaries - ease of decision - common language - newness
(suppliers, making - design heuristics - riskiness
customers) - number of - virtual collocation - uncertainty
- fewer projects influences - interface - complexity
assigned - two way technology - interdepen-
- collocation communication - scope of design dence
- assign downstream - overlapping tasks rules - design
personnel upstream (pre-emptive, - speed of access to evolution
- goal setting and iterative, distributive) data - design
formal reviews - release and use - goal programming sensitivity
- performance of incomplete - computer - early/late
evaluation information integration product
- team-based rewards - set-based design
- activity concurrency
technology life cycle
Source: Gerwin and Susman, 1996, p. 119
Table G: An Organising Framework for CE Implementation
In addition to the above factors senior management was consistently found important to the 
success of a CE Project (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Dimancescu and Dwenger, 1996; Albin 
and Crefeld, 1994; Lettice, 1995; Kumpe and Bolwijn, 1994). CE requires far-reaching 
organisational changes. They are not feasible without the strong support of senior
management.
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The implementation of CE and with it the achievement of "high-performance new product 
development" is a complex undertaking. It requires not only "a series o f  single faceted  
efforts undertaken sequentially", but the improvement of various organisational aspects 
simultaneously (McDonough and Griffin, 1997, p. 15).
3.6 SUMMARY
This chapter located Concurrent Engineering within the Product Innovation literature. It 
showed that CE is one recent approach to improved product development, which seeks to 
achieve a balance between organisational, technological and human factors in the product 
development process. It also showed that CE does not have a unanimously agreed upon and 
coherent definition. However, the establishment of high levels of cross-functional 
integration, design integration and concurrence are seen as the core elements of CE by all of 
its proponents. Even though only a few studies have discussed the appropriateness of CE for 
different industries, organisations, product types and market approaches, most indicate the 
general suitability of CE. Different contexts may however lead to modifications in the 
means for realising cross-functional integration. While different cross-functional 
arrangements are possible, the cross-functional team is widely seen as a critical success 
factor for CE. Such teams can, however, vary widely along a structural dimension and a 
process dimension.
The chapter finally discussed the problematic nature of CE implementation. It showed that 
to date there have been few detailed studies reflecting the complex and problematic nature 
of the process. Despite the technical connotation of the term, CE is an organisational issue 
in the sense that its successful implementation essentially requires organisational changes.
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4 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CONCURRENT  
ENGINEERING
4.1 INTRODUCTION
While there has been an emphasis in the CE literature on technology (i.e. the technological 
tools and systems to facilitate cross-functional integration), it has increasingly been 
recognised that the organisational dimension is decisive for the successful implementation 
of CE (DeLorge, 1992). Dunphy and Stace (1994) claim that organisational changes (like 
CE) would not be effective unless accompanied by fundamental changes in a company's 
approach to HRM. Clark and Mallory (1996, p. 8) take a similar position. They assume that 
"there is little point in launching a culture change programme ... when reward systems and 
management systems fa il to reward behaviours consistent with [the new values] serving 
instead to demoralise employees". Yet, surprisingly, HRM (as a problematic concept22 and 
practice) has received little attention in the CE literature, or in the product innovation 
literature generally (Atuahene-Gima, 1996). Even in recent international studies comparing 
CE implementation processes in various countries, HRM is given only marginal attention 
(see e.g. Juergens, 1997).
While to date the role of HRM as a specialist function has not been addressed in the CE 
literature (Zanko et al., 1998), a number of HR issues have attracted attention. They have 
mainly been HR issues that are directly concerned with cross-functional integration, such as 
team building (Thamhain and Wilemon, 1987), team leadership (Gemmili and Wilemon, 
1994; Susman and Rayl, 1999), team processes and performance (Hauptman and Hirji, 
1996; Moffat and Gerwin, 1994). Gerwin and Susman (1996) argue that the establishment of 
cross-functional teams is no guarantee for cross-functional integration, if it is not buttressed 
by supportive recruitment training and other team-oriented HRM policies and practices.
22 See for example Legge's (1995a,b) analysis of HRM and Keenoy's (1997) "HRMism
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It appears that almost all aspects of managing the new product development process under a 
CE approach are linked to people management. This ranges from the selection of 
appropriate cross-functional integration mechanisms to the selection of supporting 
management and organisational arrangements. Holahan and Markham (1996) distinguish 
between factors relating to the organisational support for cross-functional teams and factors 
relating to the management of the team. The first category comprises appropriate HR 
policies and practices, including performance appraisal, career management, pay and 
promotion, as well as the organisational culture. The second one includes aspects of 
leadership, team size, team sponsorship, team member and leader selection, team training, 
and team empowerment.
However, it has been claimed that the HR issues identified in the above studies "are treated 
broadly in isolation from other HRM activities; no account is made o f the need for  
functional integration - where HRM program areas need to be treated and linked as a 
systemically related whole" (Zanko et al., 1998, p. 132). Moreover, HRM issues in the wider 
context of a CE integration effort have been broadly neglected. No detailed research has 
been conducted, for example, on the HR implications for functional areas with the 
establishment of cross-functional teams (such as the loss of expertise for the function, 
absence coverage, responsibilities for career management, or professional development).
On the other hand a broad range of literature, managerial as well as organisational, has 
emphasised the increasing significance of human resource management in contemporary 
organisations (Storey, 1995a, b; Clark, 1993; Guest, 1995; Guest and Peccei, 1994). This 
view is broadly based on the recognition of "people as the most valuable resource" in an 
organisation (Sims and Sims, 1994), with HRM enabling an organisation to develop 
company-specific competencies and skills that are difficult to copy and thus offer a 
competitive advantage (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992c; Atuahene-Gima, 1996). In many 
cases, however, this recognition is not consonant with organisational reality, despite the 
rhetoric of many company vision and mission statements (Schubert and Couchman, 1998).
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Furthermore, there is no consensus in the literature about HRM and its relationship to 
product development and CE. A variety of meanings and features are attached to HRM 
(Keenoy, 1997; Legge, 1995a,b).
Based on the literature analysis, this chapter provides an overview of two main views of the 
term HRM (HRM as synonym for personnel management and HRM as a broadened 
approach to personnel management) that are commonly used in the literature. The chapter 
also outlines why the author adopted the view "HRM as a broadened approach to personnel 
management". The findings from the literature are summarised in the HRM in CE 
framework (see Figure 5).
Human Resource Management in Concurrent Engineering
Organisational Enablers
k
Spedali st Firtcfion 
and
Organi sation-vàde Activity
Strategic
HRMl-RM
HRM for CE
using the performance­
enhancing potential of 
HRM
- different XF arrangements
- different XFTs
- different phases of NPDP
require different HRM policies & practice
Focus
Stakeholders 
Expertise 
Panning Horizon
r > ( Ç
Personnel
I
V
Sources: Zanko et al., 1998; Schubert and Couchman, 1998; Delery and Doty, 1996; Storey, 
1992;
Figure 5: Framework: HRM in CE Implementation
The framework reflects the view of HRM as a broadened approach to HRM and
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distinguishes between HRM as a specialist function and as organisation-wide activity. It 
indicates HRM's potential role in CE by establishing its contribution to organisational 
performance. The individual elements of the framework are discussed in the next sections.
4.2 DIFFERENT VIEWS ABOUT HRM
The notion of HRM originated in the USA in the early 1980s and appears to increasingly 
replace the term personnel management and industrial relations (Guest, 1987, 1995; Storey, 
1989, 1992, 1995a,b). Two main views of HRM as a management practice are commonly 
found in the literature: 1) HRM as synonym for personnel management, and 2) HRM as a 
broadened approach to personnel management (Legge, 1995b).
4.2.1 H R M  a s  a  Sy n o n y m  f o r  P e r s o n n e l  M a n a g e m e n t
HRM is sometimes applied as a synonym for personnel management. Guest (1987), Legge 
(1989), and Storey (1989) talk about a "modem-sounding" substitute for an "old-fashioned" 
term and see HRM in this sense as a passing fad. Legge (1989) points out that HRM in this 
view is no more than a rhetoric, which serves different groups of "stakeholders"23 of HRM 
to prove their "legitimacy" and masks the "intensification and commodification o f labour". 
(Legge, 1995a). Legge (1995a, p. 34) argues that although some changes "have taken place 
in the management o f the labour process and in employment relationships, this largely 
reflects a pragmatic response to opportunities and constraints in the present socio-politico- 
economic environment, rather than constituting expressions o f a coherent new employment 
philosophy".
23 Legge (1995a) identifies three groups as major stakeholders of HRM: academics, line managers and 
personnel managers.
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4.2.2 HRM a s  a  B r o a d e n e d  A p p r o a c h  t o  P e r s o n n e l  M a n a g e m e n t
In another view, HRM is used as a broadened or improved approach to personnel 
management, based on its welfare and professional traditions (Sisson, 1995). Storey (1992) 
distinguishes between two qualitative different approaches within this view: HRM as 
indicator for the more integrated use of the various "levers" of personnel management (such 
as reward, appraisal, recruitment, etc.), and HRM as indicator for a more business-integrated 
approach to labour management. Others see them as two distinct stages in the development 
of HRM. The first one comprises the development from personnel to HRM, the second one 
the development from HRM to strategic HRM24. Beaumont (1993, p. 10) describes this 
development as an evolutionary process in which employees are increasingly viewed "as a 
valuable resource (rather than a cost to be minimised) which, i f  managed, rather than 
administered, effectively from the strategic point o f view, will contribute significantly to 
organisational effectiveness, and thus will be a source o f competitive advantage to the 
organisation concerned". Advocates of the "broadened approach to personnel 
management" view talk about a broadened focus, expertise, stakeholder base and longer- 
term planning horizon with the development towards strategic HRM (see Figure 6).
The view "HRM as a broadened approach to personnel management" was adopted in this 
thesis as the author shares the view that "human assets, as opposed to others, can increase 
in value. An employee who develops skills and abilities becomes a more valuable resource" 
(Schuler, Dowling, Smart, and Huber, 1992, p. 53). In order to survive, companies need to
24 Beaumont (1993) identifies three ways the term "strategic" is commonly applied to HRM. 1) the 
organisational level at which key decisions are made (top level) and their planning horizon (long­
term) (suggesting that strategic HRM is strongly influenced by top management decisions, in a direct 
or indirect way, and HRM specialists are represented at the top level of a company. 2) the coverage 
of employees by HRM practices (including the abolition of the sharp distinction between blue and 
white collar employees and their different management). 3) the explicit (two-way) linkage between 
the substantive nature of HRM decisions and the substantive nature of the external, competitive 
strategy of the individual organisation (i.e. the strategic integration or "strategic fit" of HRM with 
business strategy, Guest, 1987; Legge, 1995).
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secure employees' knowledge and gain their commitment to which HRM and participative 
management approaches provide an important key.
With the emergence of new forms of partnerships, networks, strategic alliances and other 
boundary-spanning relationships not only employees of the home organisation but also 
employees of other companies contribute to the outcome and success of a project and thus, 
the organisational performance. Zanko et al. (1998, p. 134) refer to them as "cross­
organisational members" of the CE team, individuals under foreign "contracts fo r service”.
HRM - A Broadened Approach to Personnel Management
Personnel
l_______ -
HRM StrategicHRM
Employees of own company. ...................
..... Sharp dlstrictlon between blue/white
o f policy collar. Individual employee seen as cost 
& practice to be minimised.
Employees of own company (Incl. teams). 
Individual employee seen as resource, which 
contributes to organisational effectiveness, 
when managed rather than administrated.
Employees of own company, but also 
customer/supplier representatives involved 
in teams of own firm.
Single status.
HR seen as competitive advantage. 
Long-term planning horizon.
Areas of 
Expertise
Personnel Administration, W elfare 
Service & Industrial Relation 
Short-term planning horizon.
Unrelated HR functions put into relation to 
each other.
More individual employee-oriented practices 
and arrangements.
Strategic perspective/orientation introduced. 
Longer-term planning horizon.................
Distinction between HRM as specialist and 
generic organisation-wide activity.
HR M  Specialists: "architect" activities 
HRM  as organisation-wide activity:
HRM  line accountability with managers and 
teams supported by HRM  systems 
administrators and consultants.
Stakeholders Personnel Specialists "Clerks, Contract Managers'
HRM  Specialists
Functional Managers, Project Managers, 
(Project) Teams
HR M  Specialists ("Architects" represented 
at highest company level)
Functional & Project Managers, Teams 
Top Management
Integration with 
Business Strategy
Largely not 
considered.
Patchy and incomplete.
(Contributions to business strategy formulations.)
Integration achieved.
HRM  specialists involved with formulation 
of business strategy.
Two way relationship between business 
planning/strategy and HR planning/strategy 
consistence with "architect" activities.
Sources: Storey, 1992, 1995c; Sisson, 1995; Clark, 1993; Guest 1987
Figure 6: HRM - A Broadened Approach to Personnel Management
They may be representatives of suppliers, customers, or sub-contractors. Zanko et al. (1998) 
suggest that with the globalisation of co-operation and employment relationships the focus 
of conventional HRM policy and practice broadens. It increasingly embraces not only the 
internal environment (i.e. employees) but also the external environment (in the form of 
cross-organisational team members and other cross-organisational players). The external 
environment increasingly considered in the design of appropriate HRM policies and
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practices (i.e. implications for involvement in team building events, training, and rewards) 
that promote innovation and cross-functional teamwork.
With the growing significance of HRM, personnel matters are said to be not only a concern 
and task of HR managers, as discussed later. Some researchers see this trend as a threat to 
the HR function25. Others see it as a need to redefine the HRM function and its roles and to 
stronger differentiate between HRM as a generic organisation-wide activity and HRM as a 
specialist function (Tson and Fell, 1986). The HR literature offers a differentiation of HRM 
into three distinct HRM areas or functions: HRM strategy, HRM line accountability and HR 
systems (Boxall and Dowling, 1990; Wittingslow, 1997). This follows the common 
distinction between three levels of managerial work (strategic, managerial, operational 
level). Dunphy and Stace (1994) suggest a fourth function, a HRM change consultancy. 
Each area/function is the domain of one or more particular stakeholder groups and requires 
specific expertise. These main stakeholder groups are: HRM strategists, HRM change 
consultants, HR systems administrators, senior management, and line management (Russ, 
Galang, and Ferris, 1998; Boxall and Dowling, 1990; Wittingslow, 1997; Dunphy and Stace, 
1994). Table H summarises the roles and respective tasks of the stakeholders in each HRM 
area.
HRM strategists have been commonly described in the literature as a small but high 
influential group of HRM professionals (Dunphy and Stace, 1994; Boxall and Dowling, 
1990). They focus on HRM strategy formulation and adjustment, closely co-operate with
25 See for example Wittingslow's (1997) argument about HRM's risk of extinction as a traditional 
oriented and a controlling function, its decreasing impact on the survival of an organisation, which 
seem to be supported by trends towards a decline in staff of HR Departments (Brewster and 
Hegewisch, 1994; Sisson, 1995). Other authors perceive the rundown of personnel departments as a 
response to the integration of personnel matters into business strategies (see Purcell, 1995, 
Armstrong, 1989; Legge, 1989), and the diminishing need for traditional core expertise in collective 
bargaining (Guest; 1995) or explain the trend with the efficiency gains of information technologies 
and the data processing capability of modem HRM information systems, which enable companies to 
rationalise and simplify their data processing also in the personnel area and thus contribute to the 
reduction of staff in this area and the increased outsource of traditional HRM activities like payroll 
(Andrewartha, 1997).
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senior management and proactively influence business and change strategies.
FIRM Area/ 
Function
Stakeholder Group / Role Task
HRM
Strategy
senior management; HRM 
strategists - small high 
empowered group, actively 
involved in development of 
corporate business strategy, incl. 
overall HRM strategy
- environmental monitoring
- strategy formulation
- design of change programs
- development of HRM strategies
- design of organisational culture
- development of executive elite
HRM Line 
Account­
ability
functional managers, project 
managers, teams - carrier of 
HRM line accountability
- personnel selection
- work systems analysis, development
- employee development, appraisal
- application of policy systems
- team building, organisation development
HR Systems
HR systems administrators 
responsible for design, 
functioning and delivery of 
operational HR systems
such as
- personnel information systems,
- reward and incentive schemes
- superannuation schemes,
- performance management systems,
- workforce planning systems
HRM
Change
Consult­
ancy
HRM change consultants 
working with line and project 
managers and teams to reach 
agreed goals for change
- advisoiy/consultancy role in areas as work 
design, skills formation, training and 
development
- change catalyst/process facilitation
Source: Dunphy and Stace, 1994
Table H: Differentiation of HRM into Distinct HRM Areas or Functions
Thus, they have a significant impact on the survival and success of a company and its 
organisational performance (Boxall and Dowling, 1990, p. 195). Following Tyson and Fell's 
(1986) differentiation of HRM as a generic organisation-wide activity and specialist 
function, HRM strategists basically represent HRM as a specialist (function)26.
26 Tyson and Fell (1986) define HRM as a specialist function (respectively HRM specialists) as a 
function (or person) concerned with the development and implementation of a HRM strategy linked 
to the company's business strategy, as well as the elaboration and establishment of appropriate 
employment policies and practices that support the achievement of the organisational goals in 
conjunction with and through line managers and employees. The specialist function can be taken up 
by external or internal representatives, and does not necessarily fall together with the HR 
Department. Rather than having a centralised department and a HR director it is conceivable that the 
company's HRM strategy is formulated and driven from senior management (Mansfield, 1997, p.
15).
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According to Wittingslow (1997, p. 108), their ability to "generate new solutions” and 
influence change processes with their "level o f knowledge" will strongly determine the 
future reputation of HRM. Sisson (1995, p.100) however found that the HR function in the 
UK is still largely made up of "clerks o f works" and "contract managers" who perform 
relatively routine administrative functions. The number of "architects'^7 on the other hand 
remained relatively small. These findings were based on the three Workplace Industrial 
Relations Surveys (WIRS, carried out in 1980, 1984, 1990) and the two company-level 
industrial relations survey (CLIRS, carried out in 1985 and 1992). Moreover, the position of 
personnel specialists towards organisational change programs is often reactive. They do 
usually not instigate the programs. This in turn deprives them "of control over the nature 
and pace o f change" (Marks, Findlay, Hine, McKinlay, and Thompson, 1996, p. 2).
In contrast to HRM as a specialist function, HRM as a generic organisation-wide activity 
comprises an organisation's efforts, services and intentions, both explicit and covert, towards 
the management of its employees. It finds its expression through the HRM strategy, HR 
policies and practices, and is thus represented by all of the above HRM stakeholder groups 
(Tyson and Fell, 1986). With the development from HRM to strategic HRM (as HRM 
becomes strategically significant in an organisational sense), senior management is evolving 
as a particular significant stakeholder group of HRM. Beer et al. (1985) argue "that HRM is 
too important to be left to these [HR] specialists" (Guest and Peccei, 1994, p. 222). HRM is 
becoming "increasingly vested in senior and middle line management, not just as a delivery 
mechanism fo r new approaches in employee relations, but as 'the designers and drivers o f 
the new ways'" (Legge, 1995b, p. 133). Dunphy and Stace (1994, p. 8) talk about the need of 
"a better integration o f organisational effort so that the maximum synergy is achieved 
between business, change and human resource strategies". 27
27 See Tyson and Fell, 1986, p. 21-27, for a description of personnel roles: "clerk of the works", 
"contracts manager", "architect".
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This requires a close co-ordination and co-operation between HRM strategists and senior 
managers.
In addition, HRM accountability becomes more and more a responsibility of line 
management. According to a variety of surveys (Brewster and Hegewisch, 1994; Sisson, 
1995, p. 92) line managers are already spending a large proportion of their time on 
personnel matters and their qualification in this area has increased significantly. Line 
managers have become the initiators of many changes in current HRM policies and practices 
in many organisations (Storey, 1992). Legge (1995b, p. xv) calls it the "internalisation o f 
the importance o f human resources on the part o f line managers". Moreover, not only line 
managers, but also project leaders and teams, take increasingly responsibility and ownership 
of many HRM aspects at the operational level (Dunphy and Stace, 1994). Sisson (1995, p. 
106) however sees the devolution of HRM responsibility to line management, as the 
"corollary o f fundamental changes in working arrangements, rather than any inherent belief 
in the HRM approach itself.
According to Dunphy and Stace (1994), HRM consultants may support the carriers of HRM 
line accountability. HRM consultants may play an advisory or consultancy role in areas such 
as work design, skills formation, training and development. They also work as change 
catalysts or process facilitators, as line managers as a rule are not HRM professionals and 
thus do not have a great exposure to HRM concepts and methods. The differentiation 
between HRM strategists and consultants may be useful in larger organisation. For smaller 
companies it is conceivable that HRM strategists cover this area.
HR systems administrators, finally, constitute a group of few, very knowledgeable HR 
personnel, who are responsible for the design, functioning and delivery of operational HR 
systems. They also function as a point of contact particularly for the carrier of HRM line 
accountability as they have the knowledge about the formal requirements and procedures in 
all employment questions.
The above analysis of HRM as a broadened approach to personnel management and the role
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of the main HRM stakeholder groups guided the investigation of HRM in the CE 
implementation process in MILSYS. As mentioned earlier, it was necessary to distinguish 
between HRM as a specialist function and as an organisation-wide activity. The preliminary 
case study brought about that company representatives commonly equated HRM with the 
HR Department. But the HR Department does not necessarily fall together with HRM as a 
specialist function. A restriction of the investigation to the HR Department does not provide 
a full explanation of HRM issues, HRM policies and practices that play a role in the 
implementation of CE. It does not explain line managers', senior managers' and project 
teams' perception and understanding of HRM in the CE implementation process.
4.3 HRM AND ORGANISATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
An important issue in the discussion about the strategic significance of HRM is its impact on 
organisational performance and thus - in the context of this thesis - its impact on the 
performance of cross-functional teams in the product development process under a CE 
approach. People are increasingly seen as important source of sustainable competitive 
advantage and the effective management of human capital may be the ultimate determinant 
of organisational performance (Youndt, Snell, Dean, and Lepak, 1996). With its 
development from personnel management to strategic HRM, HRM becomes increasingly 
concerned with performance improvement. According to this view, HRM contributes more 
and more to the overall organisational performance and thus, the success of the company in 
the market place (Delery and Doty, 1996).
Despite the criticism of being too anecdotal and empirical, and being without a sound 
theoretical foundation, the literature on strategic HRM adopts three theoretical positions in 
explaining the relationship between HRM and organisational performance. They are referred 
to as the universalistic, the contingency and the configurational perspective (Delery and 
Doty, 1996, p. 802). Not all three approaches are equally appropriate for explaining the 
relationship between SHRM and organisational performance. Delery and Doty (1996) even
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argue that they do not necessarily exclude each other but may exist simultaneously as 
reflected in Figure 7.
Source: Delery and Doty, 1996
Figure 7: HRM and Organisational Performance
4.3.1 U n iv e r s  a l ist ic  P e r sp e c t iv e
Representatives of the universalistic perspective adopt a "best practice" approach. They 
claim that certain individual HR practices are more suited than others in achieving better 
organisational performance regardless of the kind of organisation, strategy or environment 
(Walton and Susman, 1987; Wright and MacMahan, 1992). Delery and Doty (1996, p. 806) 
identify seven key strategic HR practices that are consistently considered strategic important 
in a diverse literature, and viewed as "critical characteristics o f employment systems in 
organisations". They comprise training systems, internal career management, results- 
oriented appraisals, profit-sharing, employment security, employee participation, and job 
description. Various studies (see Becker, 1976; Huselid, 1995) support the direct 
relationship between HRM practices and organisational performance. They indicate that the
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"universalistic perspective is a valid theoretical perspective fo r  SHRM theories" (Delery 
and Doty, 1996, p. 807). Howes (1997, p. 45), on the other hand, agues that there is no such 
"best practice" model. He notes "while many trends are strong, there are notable 
exceptions". Research has shown that the appropriateness of these practices is dependent on 
certain strategic conditions (Delery and Doty, 1996), which is more consonant with a 
contingency perspective.
4.3.2 C o n t in g e n c y  P e r sp e c t iv e
In contrast to the linear, unidirectional view of the universalistic perspective, the 
contingency perspective is built on the assumption of a more complex, interactive 
relationship between HRM and organisational performance (Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick­
Hall, 1988; Sisson, 1995; Lawler, 1990). Its proponents claim that there is no "one best way" 
or set of "bestpractices" an organisation can readily adopt, because such a view does not 
take contextual conditions into account (Howes, 1997; Purcell, 1995). Any given business 
strategy requires certain HR practices in order to positively influence organisational 
performance (Youndt et al., 1996; see also Beaumont, 1993, Schuler and Jackson, 1987). A 
number of researchers (Dunphy and Stace, 1994; Beer and Spector, 1985) go a step further. 
They claim that the relationship between HRM and business strategy is not a direct one, but 
depends on the required degree of change. The business strategy affects the HRM strategy, 
but the organisational change strategy modifies the relationship. In line to the 
configurational perspective, they argue that "HRM strategies are much more strongly 
related to strategies for organisational change than to business strategies" (Dunphy and 
Stace, 1994, p. 118).
4.3.3 C o n f ig u r a t io n a l  P e r s p e c t iv e
Advocates of the configurational perspective apply a systems view. They argue that certain 
patterns (Wright and McMahan, 1992), configurations or bundles (MacDuffie,1995) or
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combinations (Ischniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi, 1994) of HR practices are more 
appropriate to certain types of business strategies than others. They also claim that the better 
the fit, the higher the performance gains. They use a holistic approach that is based on the 
definition of ideal types of HRM or employment systems. Their research is concerned with 
"how the pattern o f multiple independent variables is related to a dependent variable rather 
than with how individual independent variables are related to the dependent variable" 
(Delery and Doty, 1996, p. 804). They claim that organisational effectiveness can only be 
reached if the HRM system ensures horizontal (internal consistency of an organisation's 
HRM policies and practices) as well as vertical fit (congruence of the HRM system with 
other organisational characteristics such as firm strategy).
For Delery and Doty (1996, p. 828) all three perspectives are "viable and lead to different 
assumptions about the relationships among HR practices, strategy, and organisational 
performance". Some HR practices always seem to have a positive effect on organisational 
performance, while the relationship between some HR practices and organisational 
performance is contingent on a company's business strategy.
For the investigation of HRM in CE, Delery and Doty's (1996) research implies that the 
application of certain individual HRM practices, just as the application of HRM practices 
which are contingent on the organisation's business strategy, will have a direct impact on the 
performance achieved in product development projects under CE. It suggests that 
organisations can positively influence the achievement of high project performance in 
product development under a CE approach by establishing "internally consistent, mutually 
supportive HRM" and HRM practices consistent with the behaviours emphasised in CE 
(Zanko et al., 1998, p.132).
4.4 HRM IN CE
Organisational enablers play a decisive role in the implementation of CE and are comprised 
largely of HRM issues. As discussed earlier, many aspects of managing the new product
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development process under a CE approach are linked to people management (such as the 
selection of appropriate cross-functional arrangements or the selection of tools and 
techniques appropriate for cross-functional teamwork) (Zanko et al, 1998). They require the 
consideration of various HRM issues (e.g. team member selection, performance 
measurement and rewards, career management, team member development and team 
building) (Susman, and Rayl, 1999; Hauptman and Hirji, 1999; Barber, Huselid and Becker, 
1999). However, as also outlined earlier, the CE literature has not adequately addressed the 
importance of HRM. Although growing attention is paid by CE research to organisational 
factors and people management issues particularly for achieving cross-functional integration 
(Haddad, 1996a; Ruchala, 1995; Calabrese, 1999), no detailed empirical studies of the 
implementation of CE have so far analysed the role of HRM in this process (Atuahene- 
Gima, 1996).
Addressing the issue of cross-functional integration, CE research takes up perspectives from 
the earlier organisational studies literature (e.g. Bums and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967a, b; Galbraith, 1973). Lawrence and Lorsch (1967b) discuss integration28 as 
an overriding principle for an effective product development process. They argue that the 
segmentation into departments influences behaviour and performance because departments 
strive to reach the best possible result for their sub-function even if this leads to 
complications or problems for other functions or departments.
Based on a review of the product innovation, team, organisation and HRM literatures, the 
author identified a number of key areas where HRM policies and practices could support 
and facilitate CE and for which CE may have significant implications respectively. These 
areas are: performance measurement and reward, training and development, selection and 
staffing, job design, career management, and employee relations (Campion and Higgs, 1995;
28 Lawrence and Lorsch (1967b, p. 11) define integration as the "quality of the state of collaboration 
that exists among departments that are required to achieve unity of effort by the demands of the 
environment.
82
Holahan and Markham, 1996; Forrester and Drexler, 1999; Calabrese, 1999; Hauptman and 
Hiiji 1999). Research suggests that these areas are interrelated (Zanko et al., 1998), but an 
holistic strategic approach to organisational integration has not yet been developed. 
Although the interdependence of the various HR elements is recognised within HR research, 
it has so far not been applied to CE.
4.4.1 Performance Management
Performance measurement (Hauptman and Hirji, 1996, 1999; Thamhain and Wilemon. 
1987; Pullin, 1999) or performance appraisal (Holahan and Markham, 1996) or performance 
evaluation (Susman and Dean, 1992) for teams is widely discussed as a critical issue for 
effective teamwork (Katzenbach and Smith, 1993; Ancona and Caldwell, 1990a; Shaw and 
Schneier, 1995). However, team-based performance measurement systems are not widely 
applied and their linkage to compensation and rewards is not well established (Parker, 
1994). As numerous studies have shown, many organisations still manage teams as though 
the individuals were simply working on their own (Haddad, 1996a). Moreover, research and 
development and product development activities generally are seen as processes that are 
difficult to measure, and thus often get neglected. Cross-functional teams that rely on 
traditional performance measurement systems often fail to synchronise and link the different 
functional strategies and performance goals. They do not achieve the project goal because 
its team members tend to focus more on their functional responsibilities (Parker, 1994).
Team performance is not easy to measure. Team performance is the results or outcome 
achieved by the team but also the team process and the individual team members' behaviour. 
Ancona and Caldwell (1992) found that external activity, internal processes, and 
performance interact with and influence each other. They also found that the pattern of 
external activities is a better predictor of team performance than the frequency of 
communication. Beyond it they suggest that stages in the development of a team play a role 
in team behaviour. A strategy that works in the early life of a group may not support positive
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performance over time. Ancona and Caldwell point out that teams not only need to manage 
the work flow structure but also the power structure in order to maintain a high level of 
performance over time (see also Zurger and Modesto, 1990). In addition Cenek (1995) 
assumes that team member behaviour is an equally important measure of team performance. 
Measuring only outcome, or process or behaviour or two of them, he argues signals or leads 
to the recognition of wrong results, processes or behaviours.
A number of authors agree that an appropriate performance measurement process for teams 
is not limited to the actual performance measurement, or goal tracking (Ancona and 
Caldwell, 1992; Feldman, 1996; Campion and Higgs, 1995). It consists of a circle of 
activities with three related stages - goal setting, goal tracking and feedback. Goal setting 
requires clarifying who is responsible for setting individual and team goals, to determine 
what these goals are and how they are linked. It also requires to determine how the various 
factors are measured, who is measuring them and how often (Haddad, 1996b; Parker, 1994; 
Barber, Huselid and Becker, 1999). In the feedback process feedback needs to be provided 
to both the team and the individual. Team and individual goals are adjusted according to the 
respective stage of the development process and the progress in the team formation (Parker, 
1994).
4.4.2 R e w a r d s
The relationship between performance measurement and rewards is often discussed in the 
literature as another critical issue in establishing highly effective teams (Barber, Huselid and 
Becker, 1999; Clark and Wheelwright, 1992; Shaw and Schneier, 1995; Drickhamer, 1999). 
The reward system is an important determinant of behaviour in organisations and a 
motivational means in the sense that it guides people's beliefs about the consequences of 
their actions. According to Lawler (1990, p. 28) "people are motivated to perform an action 
when they perceive that the consequences o f the action are favourable to them". Rewards 
include remuneration as well as intrinsic and non-monetary extrinsic benefits. In the context
84
of CE many researchers view appropriate rewards for cross-functional development teams as 
an important enabler of CE (Gerwin and Susman, 1996; Haddad, 1996b; Nicholas, 1994; 
Ruchala, 1995). Hauptman and Hirji (1999) argue that a reward system for teams needs to 
reward joint outcomes rather than individual technical or functional excellence. They 
discuss group-based rewards as the proportion of influence of group outcomes both on the 
group members' rewards and on performance evaluations. Susman and Rayl (1999) talk 
about "project-based rewards" and argue that such rewards have a positive influence on 
project outcomes because they motivate team members to focus at least as much on project- 
based goals as on function-based goals. Feldman (1996, p. 216) however found that only 
few organisations have adjusted their reward and compensation systems in order to 
recognise team work appropriately. The reward systems in many organisations focus solely 
on individual behaviour and hence can obstruct teamwork (Parker, 1994, p. 118; Armstrong 
and Murlis, 1995). The development of group incentive plans, such as gainsharing, skill or 
knowledge-based pay and various group bonus schemes (see Appendix I), is seen as a 
possible solution regarding team rewards. Cleland et al. (1995) found that such plans have 
become more widespread. Most of these schemes, though, do not focus on service areas and 
are rarely operated among knowledge workers who form the majority of team members in 
cross-functional development teams (Parker, 1994; Feldman, 1996). More widely used are 
non-monetary rewards to recognise team efforts. Non-financial incentives in the form of 
awards of various kinds are used on their own as well as a complement to financial 
incentives. Despite the broader application of non-monetary rewards, their motivational 
value is frequently underplayed in practice (Feldman, 1996).
Parker (1994, p. 134) suggests a number of guidelines for the development of team reward 
systems. Firstly, the system needs to be well communicated and transparent. Secondly, team 
and individual awards must support the cross-functional team concept and emphasise the 
importance of teams for the company. The third point is that the rewards need to be clearly 
related to the team's performance (line of sight concept), but individual team members need
85
to be recognised as well. And fourthly, cash and non-cash rewards as well as informal 
methods for recognition should be used in a frequent manner. In addition, Feldman (1996) 
suggests that individual and team rewards for project teams should be balanced according to 
role of the individual in the team and the amount of time he/she spends on the team(s).
In an environment appropriate for CE, functional departments take on support character^. 
They will be responsible for maintaining the high and up-to-date knowledge base of then- 
staff members (through small improvements in training, tools, and procedures based on 
lessons learned from product development projects and the continuing study of available 
technology, tools, methods and the capabilities of competitors). They will also need to 
enable them "to apply department-approved standard best practices and tools in the 
development and production o f products" (Grady, 1994, p. 23). Grady (1994) thus argues 
that the functional management personnel should be awarded on the basis of then- 
contribution to the product development success. On one hand this contribution should be 
based on the aggregate performance of their personnel on development projects (in the form 
of major review results, budget and schedule performance, and noteworthy personal efforts 
recognised by project management). On the other hand it should include departmental 
conditions like toolbox excellence, and personal training program effectiveness.
So far it appears that the literature on rewards systems for teams has not specifically 
addressed reward schemes for cross-functional development teams (Lawler, 1990; Belcher, 
1991; Kessler, 1995), though appropriate reward schemes appear to be a critical factor for 
sustaining the long-term success of CE. 29
29 Grady's view is that functional departments provide personnel to development projects and monitor 
the performance of their specialists on the product development team. They provide coaching and 
on-the-job training. But they are forbidden to provide project work direction for those personnel in 
terms of what tasks to do nor when them to do (but may provide help and advice in how to do then- 
program tasks).
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4.4.3 T r a in in g  a n d  D e v e l o p m e n t
Working in a team requires other skills and behaviours both from employees and managers 
than working individually (Campion and Higgs, 1995; Kormos, 1998). Team training is 
thus, widely seen as a key issue in the successful establishment of cross-functional project 
teams and effective teamwork (Fleischer, 1999; Componation and Byrd, 1999). The 
literature strongly emphasises the importance of team building at the beginning of a project 
in order to overcome divergent expectations, reach consensus and agree to a common goal 
(Thamhain and Wilemon, 1987; Clark and Wheelwright, 1992; Grady, 1994). Different 
functional specialists have different functional interests, perspectives, different object or 
term worlds, and different ways of "work" (Dimancescu and Dwenger, 1996; Bucciarelli, 
1996; Kurth, 1994; Wheelwright and Clark, ). Druecke (1994, p. 241) argues that if a joint 
ownership of the project (in the form of a mutual agreement and common goa) is missing, it 
is very likely that team members "will continue to be oriented on the interests o f their 
(home) departments at the expense o f an optimisation o f the project as a whole". Clark and 
Wheelwright (1992) suggest the creation of a contract book on the basis of a team charter 
(provided by senior management) as one of the initial team building events. While the team 
charter lays out the team's mission in broad terms, the contract book defines in detail, the 
basic plan to achieve the stated goal. Componation and Byrd (1999) talk about the need for a 
Memorandum of Authority (MOA) which clearly defines roles and responsibilities and team 
leader authority, and deals with the team member different expectations.
Though the leadership of a team is crucial, as discussed earlier, it is important that 
everybody involved in the project team has an understanding of effective problem solving. 
Bowen et al. (1994a, b, c) argue that the way "the development team takes action ..., the way 
it frames and defines the problem, generates alternatives, organises and conducts tasks, and 
implements solutions, determines the speed, efficiency and effectiveness o f problem 
solving". This points to social and methodological skills training as a significant element of 
team training. Lawler (1990) and Wheelwright and Clark (1992c) suggest that team training
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should consist of problem analysis, decision-making and conflict management techniques, 
meeting and communication rules as well as interpersonal skills. These training components 
would enable problem solving and communication across traditional functional boundaries 
and qualify the team members to deal better with uncertainty, ambiguity, and confusion (see 
e.g. Hauptman and Hiiji, 1999).
4.4.4 Se l e c t io n
The selection of the team members was identified by the author the fourth key area where 
HRM policies and practices could support and facilitate CE. The composition of the cross­
functional team has a significant impact on a team's effectiveness and thus requires not only 
the consideration of technical but also interpersonal skills. According to Jassawalla and 
Sashittal (2000) this consideration is particularly critical in the selection of the project 
leader. The literature suggests the consideration of criteria such as status, hierarchy level, 
interpersonal attributes, knowledge and experience in the selection of employees for the 
cross-functional team. Haddad (1996b) and Nicholas (1994) assume that different status or 
hierarchical level of functional experts has implications on the teamw ork process and make 
cross-functional communication and co-operation more difficult.
Controversy exists about the required knowledge of team members (Klein and Maurer, 
1995). Parker (1994) takes the view that the cross-functional team requires specialists. He 
asks, "how can specialisation be out when at the same time cross-functional teams are 
composed o f experts. What else are experts than specialists?". By contrast, other researchers 
assume that the team members should be more generalists. According to Clark and 
Wheehvright (1992, p. 16) "the team achieves an effective system design by using generalist 
skills applied by broadly trained team members, with fewer specialists and, on occasion, 
less depth in individual component solutions and technical problem solving". Klein and 
Maurer (1995, p. 93) argue that it is necessary to "retain technical experts" but who also 
posses "integrative knowledge across multiple functions". Campion and Higgs (1995)
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discuss the employee's preference for a certain type of work as a critical selection criterion. 
Such preferences may influence an employee's reactions to a job and can impact on team 
effectiveness. Some employees prefer to work in teams and are good team players, others 
prefer to work alone and are better as individual contributors.
A number of authors talk about particular team roles that should be represented at the team 
and thus taken in consideration when staffing a cross-functional team (Belbin, 1981). 
According to Kormos (1998), a Canadian bus manufacturer turned to psychographic 
profiling (known as Belbin analysis) to help select CE team members. The analysis showed 
who was likely to be compatible with what kind of team-mates and would pull in the same 
direction as the rest of the group. Johne and Snelson (1988) identify three roles critical to 
product innovation: the creative scientist, the entrepreneur, and the project manager.
From the discussion it appears that the technical skills and expertise of a team member are 
not sufficient if not accompanied by interpersonal skills as well as the attitudes and values 
that support teamwork and integrated problem solving (Holahan and Markham, 1996).
4.4.5 J o b  D e sig n
Job design is discussed in the literature as another key issue of cross-functional team 
effectiveness30. According to Campion and Higgs (1995), job design in a team environment 
needs to consider aspects of participation, task variety, task wholeness and interdependence. 
Task interdependence is seen as the dependence of team members on one another in 
completing a project and sharing resources. Task variety includes the opportunity to engage 
in different team tasks, allows members to use a wider range of their skills and increases 
flexibility and understanding. Hauptman and Hirji (1999), for example, argue that job 
rotation is an effective way of lessening cultural tensions and overcoming language barriers 
in cross-functional teams. Task wholeness, the level of responsibility for an entire project,
30 These discussions are largely based on earlier research on job design, see for example Hackman 
(1979); Hackman R., and Oldham, G.R. (1980); Slocum and Sims (1980).
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increases motivation by enhancing each team members' sense of ownership and control over 
a meaningful piece of work. Participation refers to the empowerment of the team to make 
decisions that increase the team members' sense of responsibility and ownership towards 
team processes and results. Susman and Rayl (1999, p. 233) argue that "team-decision 
making" impact project outcomes directly "by motivating team members to act in the best 
interest o f the project without mediation by group process". Black and Gregersen (1997) 
assume that team-decision making has a positive influence on project outcomes because it 
broadens the team's problem-solving capability and encourages team members to internalise 
project-based goals.
As shown earlier, the issue of empowerment is given broad attention in the CE and 
innovation literature, (Badham, 1999; Clark and Wheelwright, 1992, Haddad, 1996a, b). 
Gerwin and Susman (1996, p. 118) argue that in order to realise the full potential of CE, 
changes are required in the organisational environment and its traditional power structure as 
decision making authority inevitably has to be transferred from functional managers to the 
project manager and CE team (see also Hauptman and Hiiji, 1999). This includes a 
redefinition of the role of functional departments and functional managers. As discussed 
earlier, functions will become the provider of support for projects, for example, in the form 
of qualified personnel. But the project leader, who is also responsible for the team budget 
and schedule, gives the direction for the project work and becomes responsible for project 
personnel. Componation and Byrd (1999) in this context talk about the need of modified 
personnel reporting procedures that allow the team leader rather than the functional manager 
to prepare and carry out team members' performance evaluations. The project leader 
however works closely with the functional managers regarding the performance evaluation 
of the team members. These data will then be integrated into the "department ranking and 
rating list used as basis fo r all administrative actions" (training needs, compensation 
adjustments, promotions, status quo, setback decisions, program assignment considerations) 
(Grady, 1994, p. 24).
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Another aspect of job design in a team environment, particularly in product development 
teams, relates to the balance between order and stability and creativity (Kumpe and Bolwijn, 
1994). Grady (1994) argues that a tight, hands-on management of innovation, rigid 
prescriptions and a lack of rewards for new ideas destroy creativity31. Disciplined reviews 
and formalised processes on the other hand are viewed as essential in order to ensure the 
timeliness and quality of the design process, to ensure that customer requirements are met, 
and to prevent that errors get passed on (Grady, 1994; Fleischer, 1999; Kormos, 1998). 
Purcell (1995) argues that it is the balance between creativity and discipline that ensures 
high performance and the desired innovation potential.
4.4.6 Ca r e e r  M a n a g e m e n t
The issue of career management in the context of cross-functional teamwork in product 
development has not been widely addressed in the literature. A number of authors suggest 
the establishment of a dual career path and a shift from predominantly vertical to more 
lateral promotions (Holahan and Markham, 1996). Haddad (1996a) criticised the traditional 
career system because it does no promote technical excellence equally to a managerial 
career. In order to be promoted past a certain point (and qualify for a higher compensation 
level and bonus), she notes, engineers become managers regardless of whether they have the 
inclination or talent for a managerial position. A dual career path system, by contrast, 
provides the opportunity to excel in either a management or a technical position. With the 
shift from predominantly vertical to more lateral promotions, team members have the 
opportunity to broaden their knowledge and expertise in other than the home area. Kumpe 
and Bolwijn (1994) argue that such a practice increases mutual understanding and fosters 
communication and co-operation within the team.
31 See for example Armabile (1998) for a detailed discussion about creativity.
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4.4.7 C u l t u r e  o f  Tr u st
For successful cross-functional teamwork in general and under a CE approach the literature 
repeatedly suggests a participative management approach, commitment, and the 
establishment of a culture of trust (Forrester and Drexler, 1999; Jassawalla and Sashittal, 
1999; Thamhain and Wilemon, 1987). A number of authors look at the issue of trust among 
team members, others discuss it as an interorganisational dimension.
Trust is a context specific and conditional relationship with mutual obligations and the aim 
to keep a balance over time between various partners. Thamhain and Wilemon (1987) found 
mutual trust within the cross-functional product development team as a "driver”32 to high 
team performance. Jassawalla and Sashittal (2000) found that "higher levels o f trust" 
attribute to a team climate, where members are more likely to admit mistakes when they 
occur, share and solicit information openly and are willing to participate in dialogues that 
reduce hidden agendas that impede product development activities. King and Majchrzak 
(1996) argue teams have to overcoming differences in professional status (i.e. between 
design and production engineers including differences in social and financial treatment). 
Other authors argue that the establishment of mutual trust is influenced by whether the 
different parties (i.e. up- and downstream groups) share a common vision and direction and 
how this vision is translated into clear, specific objectives (Susman and Dean, 1992); 
Katzenbach and Smith, 1993). Trust develops when all partners support these objectives, 
have a common time frame for achieving them and are provided with clearly identifiable 
benefits. They also need to be committed to a collaborative decision-making style that 
enables partners to identify synergies. Attitudes like finger pointing and blaming are 
counterproductive in establishing trust and thus, result in reduced commitment to the project 
and a less successful development process (Druecke, 1994).
32 Thamhain and Wilemon (1987) define "drivers" as factors associated with the project environment 
that are enhancing team effectiveness.
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Trust as an interorganisational dimension becomes increasingly recognised as a strategic 
tool and essential prerequisite for successful design processes (Sabbagh, 1996, p. 331; 
Bucciarelli, 1996, 144). Companies must learn to trust their people and encourage them to 
use neglected creative capacities33, argues Kanter (1989). As with far-reaching 
organisational improvement initiatives, building up trust requires time, hard work and open 
communication (Howarth, 1997; Cenek, 1995). Trust, as an organisational concept, requires 
other values, attitudes and behaviours on the part of the management than the conventional 
management approach with a "low trust relation". A crucial role in establishing new 
organisational values is played by senior management (Haddad, 1996a). Holahan and 
Markham (1996, p. 126) argue that senior management needs to clearly communicate the 
new values throughout the company (and reflect them in the organisation's performance 
appraisal, career development, and reward systems). Based on the assumption that 
"employees engage in behavior they believe will be rewarded and pattern their behavior 
after senior people in the organisation", they argue, senior management needs to "be a 
model multifunctional team i f  the values and attitudes needed for effective multifunctional 
integration are to become firmly established in the organization".
4.5 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This section finally brings together CE implementation framework from chapter three and 
the HRM in CE implementation framework from chapter four. The combined framework 
(see Figure 8) does not only reflect the complexity of the implementation of CE but also the 
assumed role of HRM in CE. As the combined framework guided the processual 
longitudinal case study, its main elements and relationships are briefly summarised again 
before discussing the main case study finding.
33 The literature on trust is large and diverse. Kramer and Tyler (1996) explore some of the 
dimensions of dependability in their book "Trust in organizations". Rogers (1994) and McCoy 
(1996) emphasise information sharing for responsible consistent behaviour in an organisation. 
Hackman (1990) discusses trust in the context of effective teamwork and their barriers.
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Human Resource Management in Concurrent Engineering
Figure 8: The Combined HRM in CE Implementation Framework
As discussed in chapter three, CE is one recent approach to improved product innovation. 
CE seeks to achieve a balance between organisational, technological and human factors in 
product innovation and aims to overcome key problems of conventional product 
development processes. It addresses these problems through three interrelated features of 
process organisation: functional integration, design integration and concurrence. There is no 
"one best way", no single solution for implementing CE. The implementation of CE is 
product and process dependent, as well as contingent upon an organisation's strategy, 
structure and the market it operates in. These factors will lead to variations in the 
organisational arrangements for CE.
Both, organisational and technical enablers are necessary for the successful implementation 
of CE. Organisational enablers, however, are of primary importance. To achieve the full
94
potential of CE, companies considering the introduction of CE, require an appropriate 
organisational environment, which fosters teamwork and cross-functional co-operation and 
communication. Their HRM policies and practices need to enforce desired attitudes and 
behaviours.
Almost all aspects of managing the new product development process under a CE approach 
are linked to people management. This ranges from the selection of appropriate cross­
functional arrangements to the selection of tools and techniques suitable for teamwork, the 
consideration of leadership, team sponsorship, team member selection, performance 
measurement and rewards, team training and development. Based on the performance 
enhancing potential of HRM, these issues point to the critical role of HRM in CE in 
realising cross-functional integration and high performance.
The introduction of CE involves organisational, procedural and technological changes 
within a firm, but from an organisational perspective the achievement of cross-functional 
integration is one of the most important aspects of this approach to new product 
development. While this involves breaking down the "silos" or "stove-pipes" often found in 
functionally specialised organisations, re-integration does not necessarily require the 
formation of teams. Cross-functional integration, as realised in lateral communication, co­
ordination, co-operation, can be achieved through a variety of arrangements, such as liaison 
roles, inter-departmental committees, integrating departments, or inter-departmental mutual 
adjustment. A company can use different cross-functional arrangements for different types 
of projects. Cross-functional teams, however, are widely accepted as central to CE. They 
play a number of important roles, such as mobilising the company's resources, capabilities 
and specialisation, and providing a medium through which different functional 
specialisation can communicate, share views and jointly make decisions. Cross-functional 
teams can vary widely along a number of factors. They basically fall into two dimensions, a 
structural and a process dimension. The different structural and process characteristics of 
the cross-functional team may change during the development process.
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CE, despite the technical connotations of the term, is an organisational issue in the sense 
that its successful implementation requires appropriate organisational culture, skills, 
structures, and interpersonal relations. It implies a major shift in an organisation's approach 
to HRM (in the form of changes in focus, expertise, stakeholder base and planning horizon), 
and the deliberate and systematic consideration of supportive HRM policies and practices. A 
distinction is made between HRM as a specialist function and as a generic organisation-wide 
activity.
According to the contingent nature of CE, there is no "one best set" of HRM practices for 
CE. HRM practices for CE may differ depending on the organisational arrangements for CE. 
Different cross-functional arrangements may require different HRM arrangements (Zanko et 
ah, 1998). The decision for a cross-functional team will be more complex, resource 
intensive and risky from a HRM perspective than a liaison role. But cross-functional team 
arrangements may differ as well (e.g. heavy- vs. lightweight team). They may require 
different HR practices (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992b) and vary in their capability for HRM 
influence. Even different phases of the development process may require different degrees 
and types of interdependence and co-ordination, and thus different HRM practices.
In the context of CE, HRM as a specialist function gets involved in both the implementation 
process of CE and the actual design and development process. In the implementation 
process HRM proactively influences the conceptualisation of CE and the design of the 
implementation concept. It ensures the translation of the overall business strategy into an 
appropriate HRM strategy and the design of environmental conditions (in the form of HRM 
policies and practices as well as an organisational culture) most appropriate to CE.
HRM as an organisation-wide activity in CE, on the other hand, forms part of the 
operational task of the project leaders, functional managers as well as the CE team itself. It 
involves the application and adjustment of HRM practices according to the cross-functional 
arrangement or type of cross-functional team chosen as well as the different stages of the 
development process. The individual areas of HRM and HRM practices are interrelated and
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form a systematic holistic approach to HRM within CE. Without the systematic application 
of supportive HRM policy and practices, it seems unlikely that a high-level of integration of 
departmental functions and product design would be achievable. Conventional personnel 
policies and practices tend to reinforce what CE seeks to change.
4.6 SUMMARY
The aim of this chapter was to investigate what research was available regarding HRM in 
the design, implementation and anchoring of CE within an organisation. First the chapter 
distinguished between two main views of FORM (as a synonym for personnel management 
and as a broadened approach to personnel management) in order to outline what constitutes 
HRM. HRM as a broadened approach to personnel management was adopted for this study 
and delineated as an improved approach to personnel management with a broadening focus, 
expertise, and stakeholder base with the development towards strategic HRM. A distinction 
was made between HRM as a specialist function and HRM as generic organisation-wide 
activity. The chapter then related the significance of HRM to its performance-enhancing 
potential. It identified three theoretical positions in this regard: the universalistic, the 
contingency and the configurational perspective, which however do not necessarily exclude 
each other but may exist simultaneously. The chapter finally suggests a number of HRM 
areas that could support and facilitate CE, namely performance management, training and 
development, rewards, career management and employee relations.
A number of theoretical and empirical knowledge gaps were discovered regarding the 
investigation of HRM in CE. The innovation literature has not adequately addressed the role 
of HRM in product innovation processes (Atuahene-Gima, 1996). Few studies have 
considered HRM in its double perspective as a generic organisation-wide activity and as a 
specialist function in product innovation. For CE this distinction has not been applied. The 
CE literature has not addressed the involvement of HRM as a specialist function in CE, 
more specifically its role in CE implementation. Furthermore, the role of HRM as
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organisation-wide activity in individual development projects under a CE approach has not 
been investigated in detail. This lack of attention to HRM in CE is not consonant with the 
claimed growing significance of HRM in contemporary organisations (Russ et al., 1998). 
Neither does the literature discuss any constraints that prevent HRM from supporting the 
product development process in a profound way, and no model or approach has been offered 
that indicates ways how HRM could work within the constraints.
Two further knowledge gaps were identified in this area. The operational aspects of the 
integration of HRM with corporate and business strategy at an inter-functional level 
(Beaumont, 1993; Beer and Spector, 1985; Schuler and Jackson, 1987) have not been 
discussed in detail, though the inter-functional level is of particular concern in considering 
organisational arrangements most suitable for implementing CE. While the HRM literature 
has focused on many aspects of cross-functional integration, this discussion remains 
fragmentary and a holistic strategic approach to organisational integration has not yet been 
developed. Moreover, although the interdependence of various HRM elements (such as 
training, job design, selection, recruitment, rewards, and performance) has been recognised, 
this recognition has not been applied to CE yet. It thus appears that HRM is the hidden 
agenda of CE.
The chapter finally brought together the two parts of the theoretical framework. The 
combined HRM in CE framework guided the case study in exploring the role of HRM in CE 
in MILSYS. Part two will discuss the case study findings. During the case study it became 
apparent, however, that this framework was insufficient. Organisational power and politics 
emerged as a key factor in the CE implementation process. How the play of organisational 
power and politics influences both the implementation of CE and the role HRM in this 
process is discussed in chapter nine.
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PART TWO
Part one introduced the conceptual framework and the methodology applied in this thesis. It 
also discussed the literature on CE and HRM in CE as well as the knowledge gaps that exist 
within this literature.
The purpose of the second part of this thesis is to present the findings from the longitudinal 
case study of a project which sought to introduce CE into an Australian manufacturer of 
defence electronics systems. The study covered the period between February 1996 and July 
1997. The case study investigates the conceptualisation and implementation of CE and 
explores the role of HRM in these processes. It also shows how organisational power and 
politics influenced the shape of the project and the role HRM played in this process.
In chapter five and six the context in which the CE Project was embedded is introduced. As 
outlined in chapter three, the context (both organisational and environmental) needs to be 
given thorough attention. It influences not only the implementation process and what 
organisational players are involved with it, but also the shape of the company-specific CE 
concept. First, in chapter five, a general profile of the company is presented. It includes an 
overview of the company's history and the industry sector in which MILSYS (as the case 
study company is referred to) operated. It is complemented by a description of the 
company's traditional development process, its organisational structure as well as the 
company's change program (of which the CE Project was one element). The role of HRM in 
MILSYS as a specialist function on one hand and as generic organisation-wide activity on 
the other is separately analysed in chapter six, though it forms part of the context of CE. 
Chapter seven discusses the actual CE Project. It provides an analysis of the structural 
determination of the CE Project Team, followed by an outline of the course of the CE 
Project and the introduction of the company-specific CE concept.
Aim of chapter eight is it to show how the conceptualisation and implementation of CE and 
the role HRM played in this process were affected by the play of political power and 
politics. Chapter nine, finally, summarises the research findings and points out several
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critical questions that remain unanswered, but for which the presented thesis provides a 
reference point for further research in this area.
5 THE CONTEXT OF THE CE PROJECT
5.1 INTRODUCTION
With increased competition in terms of time-to-market and innovativeness of products, 
effective product innovation processes have also become the focus of considerable interest 
of the case study company. MILSYS addressed this challenge through an organisation-wide 
change program. The initiation of the CE Project in 1995 was one part of the program, and 
the set up of the Innovation Project in 1996 another.
All system development projects at the beginning of the case study in February 1996 were 
marked by time and budget blowouts. Following a comprehensive business analysis by an 
external business consultancy in early 1995, the company identified a need to restructure its 
traditional design and development process in order to sustain and strengthen its market 
position. CE was recommended as a promising approach because of its potential to increase 
the timeliness and quality of development projects. In October 1996 the CE Project Team 
(established in February 1996) proposed its CE "solution set", which was applied on a CE 
Pilot Project. In February 1997, the CE Project Team and senior management resolved the 
CE Project's way ahead and agreed the next steps in the CE implementation process. Table I 
provides a comparison of the design and development process as it was before the 
implementation of CE, at the beginning of the CE implementation process (at the start of the 
Pilot Project), and provides an overview of the to expecting (planned) changes. This 
comparison guides the reader through the following three chapters.
Table I shows that with the introduction of CE, changes were proposed and introduced in 
varies areas relating to product development, particularly changes to the project team. A 
formal team structure was elaborated and team building training approved for new projects.
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Issues "as was"
(c o n v e n tio n a l d e s ig n  
&  d e v e lo p m e n t  
p r o c e s s )
"as is"
(s itu a tio n  a t  O c to b e r  
1 9 9 6 )
"to be"
(p la n n e d  c h a n g e s  a f te r  F e b ru a ry  
1 9 9 7 )
Project
Leadership
lightweight PM still lightweight PM 
but gaining power
more heavyweight PM
Team
Preparation
no occasionally structured team building
Team Structure
people got involved 
as project moved 
through various 
stages
elaboration of formal 
team structure
formal team structure; 
formation of core and sub-teams
Location dispersed dispersed partly collocated
Integration of
Customer,
Supplier
little customer 
integration
little customer 
integration
customer and main supplier 
integration
Integration of
Downstream
Function
no early information; 
occasionally early 
involvement
from right the beginning
Team
Responsibilities
purely task related;
no HRM 
considerations
task related, starting to 
consider process and 
HR issues (project 
leader becomes 
involved in appraisal 
for team members)
Responsibilities for
- product,
- process, and
-team (team training, goal 
setting, performance 
management, role 
determination)
Reward* on individual basis
individuals and teams - 
quiet or secrets reward 
system
individual and team - open 
reward system, linked to team 
performance
Relation to 
Function
function superior to 
project
function superior to 
project
project superior to function
Selection
Criteria
availability; 
selection carried 
out by functional 
manager
availability; selection 
decided by functional 
and PM
availability and team + task 
criteria; selection decided by 
functional and PM
Organisational 
Fit / Company 
Culture*
focused on 
individual, culture 
of blame
organisational change 
underway towards 
team orientation and 
open communication
integrated;
team oriented, open 
communication, culture of trust
Process disintegrated towards CE CE
* Issues predominantly addressed outside the CE Project by the OCC Project
Table I: Comparison of MILSYS' Design and Development Process "as was", "as is", 
"to be"
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More heavyweight project leadership was discussed (with the project leader becoming 
stronger responsible for decisions in the product development process), as well as stronger 
team responsibility for project aspects. Changes were also proposed regarding the 
integration of customers in projects and some HR policies and practices. How the changes 
were brought about and what they comprise in detail is discussed in the following sections.
Figure 9 illustrates the complex nature of the implementation process (Yin, 1993) by 
showing the various elements that influenced and shaped the implementation of CE in 
MIL SYS. For this analysis they are subdivided into three areas: environmental, 
organisational, and interpersonal and individual.
Figure 9: Influences on the CE Implementation Process
Environmental influences comprise elements such as the peculiarity of the industry sector, 
market conditions and the customers the company dealt with (see section 5.3). The
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organisational area is made up of elements such as the company's organisational structure, 
its traditional product development process, the company’s business strategy and culture and 
its relationship to the parent company (see section 5.4). The interpersonal and individual 
area reflects the attitudes, backgrounds, personalities, and interests of the key players in the 
CE implementation process and their interactions. The influence on the part of individual 
key players on CE like the CE Project Leader or the team members, the Technical Managing 
Director or the project champion, are described throughout the text, but are given particular 
attention in chapter eight. In that chapter a discussion takes place about the play of 
organisational power and politics as determining factor in the shaping of CE in MILSYS.
The various elements together set the internal and external context in which the CE Project 
was embedded (Pettigrew, 1973; Dawson, 1996). A particularly important factor in grasping 
the contextual conditions for CE, however was MILSYS' organisation-wide change 
program. A number of projects in the program were concerned with aspects that were also of 
importance to CE or closely related to it, like the creation of an innovation- and team 
oriented environment. These projects and their linkage to the CE Project are described in 
section 5.5.
The internal and external context was determined by developments in both past and present. 
The most important processes and activities with a direct or indirect impact on the CE 
Project that took place in the years before and during the case study are captured in Figure 
10, and are briefly discussed below.
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Company-Internal Processes And Factors Impinging Upon The CE-Implementation
process
Visit of Parent Company 
Representatives 11/96
TOP Pi l L J 1994
r yi4"| *  ° h Joint TOP Meetings, 5/1996
Business Analysis by 
Parent Company, 1993/4
TOP Discovery Phase, 
1-4.1995
TOP -  IT Strategy
TOP -  Organisational and Cultural Change
TOP -  Software Process Improvement
TOP -  Design Documentation and Control
TOP - Paperless Documentation System in Manufacturing
TOP -  Concurrent Engineering, 11/1995 -
Business Analysis by 
External Business 
Consultants, 
early 1995
Determination of 4 Core 
Competencies, 1995
Suggestion Scheme 
Initative, 1995/6
"A" Team 10/1996
Reorientation of Sales 
Dept. 1996
Remuneration Project Management
_______________________; Training, mid 1996
Business Analysis by 
Parent Company, 1991
1. AQA Self-Assessment Process 
________ (11/1995-9/1996)
1. Attitude 
Survey (5/1995)
Project Management 
Assessment 6/1996
Introduction of 
"Double Head" 
Structure. 1992
1.Presentation by MD to 
whole Company (5/1995)
Publication of Company 
Newsletter since 6/1995
Innovation Project 9/1996 -  1
INTRANET Project 
6/1996-3/1997
Initiation of Regular 
Departmental Meetings, 1995
From Project Areas in 1990 — ►to Business Units in 1992 /3------► [ Changes in Project Management ] — ► to a Project Group as such in 1995
From a Manufactunng Based Company in 1990 -------------- ► [ Business Reorientation ] ------------ ► to Systems House Type Company in 1995Æ
----------- ► [ Reduction of Staff ] ----------------------- ► to about 400 Employees in 1996From about 1000 Employees in 1990
Reduction of Hierachical Levels to 4 Levels in 5/1996 and Restructuring of Functions
Low Intervention by 
Parent
Strong Interve Imtion by Parent Easing Intervention by Parent
Subsidiary Takeover 2/1990 German Subsidiary
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2  3 4 5 6 7; 8 9 10 11 
1 995 1—  Mam Data Collection Penod —  igg7
__________________ ____________________ Extended Data Collection Period __I
Figure 10: Company Internal Processes and Factors Impinging upon the CE 
Implementation Process
5.2 BACKGROUND TO MILSYS
The case study focused on a medium sized company, which was established in NSW in the 
1950s. Prior to 1990, the organisation had been a wholly-owned subsidiary of a leading 
British multinational electronics and telecommunications equipment corporation. In the 
early 1980s the original company had been primarily involved in manufacturing telephone 
exchange equipment. Underwater systems for defence customers constituted the second 
main part of the business. The manufacturing of telephone exchange equipment was 
gradually wound up and all contracts in this area finished in 1985. The process was 
accompanied by major retrenchments. About 400 jobs were made redundant. Other aspects 
of telecommunication work were however continued, including communications systems for
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the defence industry. In 1987/8 the company merged with another organisation in the 
telecommunications business. Most of the remaining people involved in non-defence 
telecommunications moved off site to finalise the establishment of the new business (150 
people were transferred, and 50 people retrenched at this point in time). Of around 2000 
employees in the early 1980s about 1400 were left.
In 1988/9 the remaining part of the original business was split up again, and the take-over by 
two international concerns finalised in 1989. The defence communications operation was 
purchased by a German multinational. The underwater systems business went to a subsidiary 
of a British company. People working in underwater systems projects became employees of 
the British subsidiary, and those working on defence communication employees of the 
German subsidiary. People in service functions, such as Finance, HRM, Purchasing, and 
Insurance were split up between the two organisations. In March 1990 the two new 
organisations officially started their new businesses.
From 1990 on, the case study company, referred to as MILSYS, operated as a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of the German enterprise, becoming one of a number of the new parent 
company's subsidiaries in Australia. Defence electronics was MILSYS core business, and it 
became a member of the Defence Group of the parent corporation. MILSYS designed, 
developed, manufactured and supported complex electronic systems and equipment, 
particularly command and control, surveillance and electronic equipment, defence and 
government communication systems and air traffic control systems.
According to the Technical Managing Director of MILSYS in 1996, the German parent 
company did not exert a strong controlling influence over its new Australian subsidiary in 
the first two years after the take-over: "For two years they left us reasonably alone and we 
ju st went the way we thought they may want us to run [the business]".
From 1990 onwards, MILSYS shifted its strategic focus from manufacturing to systems 
development projects. This move was due to profound changes in the market and changes in 
technology (e.g. there was an increasing customer preference for COTS - "commercial off
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the s h e lf  systems and components instead of expensive in-house manufactured ones). It 
transformed from a manufacturing-oriented company towards a systems house type of 
business. Software and hardware development, installation work, and systems integration 
work became more important and manufacturing made up an increasingly minor part of their 
project work. This move was accompanied by changes in the composition of the workforce. 
In 1990 the organisation had about 1000 employees, with about 70% of them shop-floor and 
shop-floor related employees. By 1996 only about 36% of the 360 employees were factory 
staff.
MILSYS employed 50 contractors-^ besides the 360 permanent employees in 1996. 
Contractors worked in all different departments and were usually employed for a specific 
task (e.g. test engineering). Contracts varied from short-term up to two-year contracts. The 
involvement of contractors started in 1993 (due to a staff establishment restriction and an 
embargo on new permanent employment). In 1996 some contractors were given an 
opportunity to become staff members.
The reorientation towards a system house was accompanied by two main alterations in the 
business structure. First the business, which was initially concentrated around so called 
"project areas" (a small number of large projects) was restructured into business units. It 
was seen as an opportunity to take into account a broader spectrum of projects and to 
consider other opportunities outside a particular field defined by a big project. This move 
led to distinctly new projects for MILSYS. In 1995 however, the business unit structure was 
changed into a project group.
Until the mid-1990s MILSYS' business was based on few but large, and long-lasting 
projects. Apart from a few large contracts (referred to by interviewees as "cash cows 'j more 
contracts were then won in the "lower volume market sector, with customers typically
in contrast to permanent employees, contractors had a clearly defined temporary contract and were 
paid a fixed amount, they did not get any additional benefits.
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expecting to purchase only a handful o f systems as part o f any one contract" (Internal 
Document C3). The increasing demand for higher flexibility (smaller projects) as well as 
higher efficiency (as a result of increased international competition and preference of 
COTS) required a re-orientation of the organisation's work processes.
From 1992, and in contrast to the first two years after the take-over, the parent company 
started to exert a greater influence. The company had to undergo an intensive analysis 
earned out by its parent, and changes in its organisational and reporting structure were 
introduced. The introduction of the "double-head" structure in 1992 (discussed in section 
5.4.1), based on the so-called "four eye principle", was one visible indication of these 
changes. On the part of the Technical Managing Director the "double-head" structure was 
seen "a sort o f control mechanism. We all found this a bit de-motivating. It is like some 
people were observing what you are doing". Another indication of the stronger influence 
was the introduction of representatives from the parent company on the management team. 
One representative from the parent organisation was appointed Managing Director Business 
Administration, another Director of Manufacturing. Representatives from the Australian 
management team depicted the new situation as having a stronger business and more market 
focused approach, while at the same time having a more "patronising feel"  with the parent 
company now setting the main direction and rules. For MILSYS it meant decreasing local 
autonomy in terms of its geographic scope, choice of technology and capital expenditure 
(e.g. projects over A$ 20m had to be approved now by the parent company). According to a 
Project Manager (2) in 1996, MILSYS had to comply with market constraints from the 
parent company "concerning the markets in which we are allowed to compete". This 
concerned both the geographic and the industry market. The Technical Managing Director 
in 1996 was more precise. According to him, MILSYS was restricted to a "narrow market 
focus, in our case it is defence electronics", though certain technologies may have been 
"applicable to other areas" in which the parent company's subsidiaries were engaged. 
MILSYS tried to discuss such opportunities with the parent company. According to the
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Technical Managing Director, this was however perceived by representatives of the parent 
company's management team as "encroaching [someone else's] patch". Furthermore, the 
other subsidiaries of the German parent in Australia "very aggressively defend[ed]" their 
industry and product area. In addition, MELSYS had to comply with the parent company's 
bidding principles and pricing system. MILSYS had to "strictly bid [the parent company's] 
technology" and "price along to [their] principles, not marketing principles. We can't go 
lower than a certain value. I f  you go lower ... you have to make provisions ...so  stuff the 
market as you follow [their] principles. And we lost every time we bid [their] technology" 
(as it was very expensive).
In 1994, after a business analysis by the parent company, the close regulation eased and, 
according to the Technical Managing Director, the parent company "started to feel relaxed" 
that MILSYS co-operated with other companies and used technologies others than those of 
the parent company. They consented, for example, to proposals made by MILSYS to 
approach new markets outside the Defence sector. Also the decision how to improve its 
business within the framework of TOP, a corporation-wide efficiency program, was broadly 
given into MILSYS' authority. The implementation of the Time Optimized Processes (TOP) 
Program was one major development at the parent company from about 1993 onwards. Its 
main objective was to achieve significant reductions in the corporate costs in all areas. A 
key aspect of the program was to remove interdepartmental barriers and change the way in 
which core research was funded. Aim was also to improve the research focus and to 
dramatically reduce the time from the commencement of research to the practical 
application of technology. In order to achieve this goal, a cultural change component was 
included in the program two years after its commencement.
At the end of 1994 MILSYS initiated its own company-specific TOP-Program. It started 
with a "discovery phase" in early 1995 in which an external business consultancy analysed 
the organisation and carried out an employee attitude survey. Based on their findings the 
consultants came up with a number of recommendations. CE was recommended as a
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promising concept for restructuring the company's traditional product development process. 
It was said to be an approach, which would help to achieve higher quality and greater 
timeliness in development projects. They also suggested that immediate steps be taken to 
improve the internal communication processes. As a result of the consultants' 
recommendations 6 individual projects were set up under the umbrella of the TOP-Program. 
Complementing the TOP-Program a range of other initiatives and projects were brought into 
being. One was the formal specification of the four core competencies of MILS YS, another 
the initiation of the Australian Quality Award (AQA) self-assessment process. In 1996, a so- 
called Innovation Project was set up, which sought to identify how the innovativeness of the 
company might be improved. An INTRANET was also implemented and several structural 
changes finalised (e.g. restructuring of the Engineering Department). Both MILSYS' TOP­
Program as well as projects and initiatives outside TOP and their impact on the CE Project 
are discussed in more detail in section 5.5.
5.3 THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT: THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY IN 
AUSTRALIA
At the time of the case study, MILSYS was one of the main players in the defence 
electronics and communications industry in Australia. The Australian defence market, 
however, is relatively small and an insignificant player in the global arms market. Australia's 
defence expenditure put Australia 17th of the top 20 nations in 1991/2 (The Allen Consulting 
Group, 1992; Department of Defence, 1992b), with a total Defence export income of $54.5 
million. This accounted for only 0.13% of the world total in 1995-96 (Hawkins, 1997)35. 
Most defence exports came from aerospace and electronics and communications companies.
35 For more details on Defence exports see Department of Defence (1992b) and Department of 
Defence (1998).
109
Despite the ease of cold war tensions36 and the expected fall of expenditure in NATO 
countries and Eastern Block nations, Australia's Defence expenditure remained high. The 
changes in the global environment, however, led to a Government Defence reform in 
Australia. Its aim was to "structure Defence for war while adapting it fo r  peace ", resulting 
in a smaller but more efficient Defence organisation (Department of Defence, 1998, p. 2)37, 
The Defence production and export were not very significant internationally, and the design 
and development proportion was even smaller. Only about 2.3 per cent ($250 million) of the 
Defence outlays in 1997/8 was allocated to the Defence Science and Technology 
Organisation (DSTO), Australia's second largest research organisation (Joint Standing 
Committee, 1998). However, due to efforts of the Defence Science and Technology 
Organisation and innovations, Defence expenditure from 1982 to 1992 was reduced by $2,6 
billion. It also led to the placement of major Defence procurement contracts with the 
Australian industry (Department of Defence, 1992d).
Defence co-operated with a large number of companies and spread its expenditure over 
many different sectors. Companies in the Defence electronics and communications sector 
conducted a broad range of specialised research and development activities (see Table J).
36 For more details about the implications on Defence and Defence industry with the end of the cold 
war period see Keller (1995) and Krause (1992) with their analysis of the global arms trade; see 
Coopey, Uttley, and Spinardi (1993) for discussions about the relationship between Defence and 
civil industry in a mostly British context; see O'Neill and Homer (1982) for an analysis of the 
Australian Defence Policy of the 1980s, and Sanford (1997) for trends in the American Defence 
Industry (many of which are also observable in Australia, such as the attempt to enter commercial 
markets, create mergers, and to become more efficient by increasing flexibility); see Jennings (1994) 
for an analysis of the changing nature of warfare and its implication on Australia's defence policy as 
well as a critique of Australia's current defence policy.
37 In 1998 for the first time a strategic approach has been taken to Defence industry policy directly 
addressing a range of issues raised by industry and defence. Some of the expected benefits were an 
earlier and better consideration of industry' issues in the capability development process, a greater 
industry involvement in defence decisions that affect industry, and a procurement reform 
(Department of Defence, 1998, p.iii). For each of the three aspects the paper discusses a number of 
key initiatives. With this policy was also aspired to establish the knowledge edge as the highest 
capability development priority by exploiting information technologies, whereas intelligence, 
command and its supporting systems including communications were said to be particularly 
important (p. 2).
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Air traffic control systems Nobeltech; Rockwell Systems
Airborne early warning systems Ericsson Defence Systems
Antenna systems CEA Technologies
Communication systems and equipment British Aerospace; 
CEA Technologies
Electronic warfare AWA; Nobeltech; 
CEA Technologies
Fire control systems EOS; Nobeltech
Gas detection systems Gas Tech (Australia)
Infra-red technology British Aerospace
JORN systems ATS (AOTC)
Local area networking AWA
Message switching Compucat
Micro-circuit design AWA
Radar and surveillance systems CJ Abell;
CEA Technologies
Microwave components Mitec
Ship command systems Nobeltech; Rockwell Systems
Signal processing British Aerospace; AWA; 
CJ Abell; GEC Marconi
Simulation and guidance systems Auspace; Compucat
Submarine detection (sonar buoys) AWA; GEC Marconi
Source: The Allen Consulting Group (1992) Defence and Australian Industry. 
Report to the Department of Defence
Table J : Defence Electronic and Communications Research and Development
Activities
Many of these research and development activities were related to Defence requirements for 
specific technologies. 32% of the expenditure of the Defence Industry Development (DID) 
program was allocated to communications (Department of Defence, 1992c). The Allen 
Consulting Group (1992, p. 118) noted that Defence not only drew heavily on but indeed 
shaped the defence related electronics and communications sector. Most of Australia's 
medium to long term technologies to meet Australia's special defence requirements are 
developed in this sector.
"Defence Projects are big business and the business is getting bigger. Every
year about $2.5 billion is earmarked for Defence procurement programs. .. .A
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big slice o f Defence Reform Program savings across the next decade is likely to 
be added to the acquisition program in accordance with the government's 
determination to build up Defence's sharp end." (O'Connor, 1997, p. 21)
Nonetheless, mega-projects on the scale of the submarine project, the ANZAC frigate or the 
Raven project (see Figure 11) have become rare.
Source: Department of Defence, 1998, Defence & Industry: Strategic Policy Statement, p. 
18
Figure 11: Approved Major Capital Equipment
The 1990s were marked by a major shift away from large-scale production programs 
towards a greater number of smaller projects.
112
Forward planning38 provided for some $ 6 billion for new decisions on capital equipment to 
the turn of the century. But major new projects such as the minehunter coastal and new 
helicopters only accounted for some 25% of the $6 billion (Dibb, 1992). Most companies in 
the Defence sector, including the case study company, were not able to rely any longer on 
winning multi-million Dollar projects. MILSYS won its last two large contracts in the early 
1990s. From then on, and in line with other companies in the sector, MILSYS was 
increasingly forced to get involved in smaller projects.
The reliance on smaller projects implied changes in the market and business approach of the 
company and forced it to greater market awareness. According to a Project Manager (1), in 
previous years the company had been able to rely on large-scale defence production projects 
to compensate for periods of less active project activity:
I f  your business is fundamentally doing projects and you don't keep winning 
them, then eventually your business closes down. ... We have been lucky, we 
had this manufacturing line, ... that kept the business ticking along. "
In order to win new, also small contracts MILSYS was required to better respond to 
customer requirements (e.g. in the form of lower costs). The greater cost awareness was 
reflected in the increasing use of COTS ("commercials o ff the s h e lf  systems) in contrast to 
fully customised systems (developed and made specifically to meet a particular customer's 
requirement). MILSYS, in line with other companies in the sector, had to increasingly 
consider systems already developed (or systems made up of commercially-available 
components), in order to reduce development efforts and subsequently costs and time. The 
move towards COTS and the associated reduction in development costs and time strongly 
influenced the position of manufacturing in MILSYS. Manufacturing was reduced to a
38 Two most commonly identified areas for improving Defence relations with companies in this sector 
related to tender and contract administration processes (reduce tender costs, establish fixed tender 
time-frames, pre-qualification of bidders and reduction in changes to tender specifications) and 
Defence planning /collaboration with the companies in this sector (Allen Consulting Group, 1992).
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minimum, even faced with the possibility of closure, as the following quote by the HR 
Manager reflects:
"We did face a situation only a few  months ago that i f  we had not been able to 
achieve the [nerw] project, we would have had to diminish our manufacturing 
capability. Still, there is a little bit o f a difficulty at this point in time in being 
able to keep people actively employed [in manufacturing]."
Despite the growing prospect of projects by customers other than the Australian government 
and the Australian armed forces (e.g. foreign governments), MTLSYS1 main customer has 
remained the Australian Government. Whereas in the past, MILSYS' main competitors were 
Australian companies, with the increasing globalisation and complexity of the market, 
however, increasingly MILSYS had to compete against foreign companies (as it was the 
case in one of its recent project wins). This was a challenge to MILSYS and other 
Australian companies, which they did not face in previous years, when the Australian 
Defence industry produced for a protected home market39.
With the pressure to continuously compete for new, predominantly small projects (in 
contrast to the reliance on few large long-term supply contracts as in the early 1990s), 
MILSYS started to consider markets outside the Defence sector and Australia. It began to 
analyse its products, which were traditionally developed and produced exclusively for the 
Defence sector, regarding their sales conditions in the civilian market. But the high cost
39 As outlined in various documents (e.g. Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce, 1992, 
Defence and Industry Policy) the government industry policy over the past two decades shifted from 
an essentially inward orientation based on barrier protection, to an outward looking approach which 
exposes industry to international competition in order to internationalize and globalize Australian 
industry. 'Integral to this has been the growing recognition that the international competitiveness of 
Australian industry will be largely dependent upon their ability to develop better linkages and 
networks through international partnerships and joint ventures.... An example of this new approach 
is the Partnerships for Development Program which was announced by the Government in 1987. 
Under the program, transnational corporations commit to achieving increased levels of exports and 
R&D within Australia, in return for exemptions from civil offset obligations. The use of offsets in 
the Defence context has also been reduced as Defence procurement policy developed through the 
late 1980s, especially following the 1987 Defence White Paper" (Dept, of Industry, Technology and 
Commerce, 1992, p. 2).
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factor (partly caused by large overhead costs and also by the requirements of Defence 
procurement contracts) made it difficult to approach markets outside the military sector. A 
Project Manager (2) described the problem as follows:
"Our ability to enter markets other than Defence is constrained by our cost 
structure. ... We are not a low-cost operation. The overheads in this place are 
huge."
Another factor accounting for the high costs of MILSYS' products was seen by interviewees 
in the defence requirement expectations of Defence customers (in terms of quality, 
performance, customisation, etc.) which required comprehensive quality systems. The 
commercial market in comparison, despite growing quality awareness, was largely lacking 
such a high quality orientation, and thus not willing to bear the related costs. By 
comparison, however, the paramilitary area, the Civil Defence, police, fire fighting, 
ambulance or the geological sector (such as oil exploration companies) were subject to the 
same or similar quality requirements as the military. While these sectors in general were 
more cost sensitive and did not have the huge expenditure of the Defence industry, they 
were seen as potential new markets for MILSYS, particular if approached globally. The 
approach towards new markets, however, was partly restricted by constraints set by the 
parent company, as noted previously. Table K summarises the barriers experienced by 
MILSYS and other companies in this sector in finding civilian markets for Defence 
products.
Another development in the Australian defence area in recent years has been the significant 
achievement in companies' expertise in electronics and the integration of various systems. It 
has been seen as an important advance for Australia, because the development and 
maintenance of a Defence systems capability was critical for the local Defence industry. 
This shift has reflected a departure from the traditional understanding, where the user was 
seen responsible for maintenance (Defence Industry and Logistics Program of the ADFA,
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1997, p. 17). The new approach was reflected in MILSYS among others in its move from a 
manufacturing based company towards a systems house type of organisation.
Barrier Description
Industry Structure
Civilian industry may offer no profitable opportunities 
Defence companies with high overheads cannot compete in 
price-sensitive industries
Different Specification Products designed to military specifications are over-engineered 
for civilian markets
Marketing Skills Selling to civilian markets requires different skills
Licence Limitations Overseas licence holders preclude commercial development
Security Controls Many state-of-the-art defence products may not be made 
commercially available for security reasons
Source: The Allen Consulting Group (1992) Defence and Australian Industry. 
Report to the Department of Defence
Table K: Entry Barriers for Defence Products in Civilian Markets
Despite these gains in expertise, the Australian Defence Studies Center (ADSC) of the 
Defence Force Academy found that most organisations in the Defence sector had room for 
improvement (Defence Industry and Logistics Program of the ADFA, 1997). Its analysis of 
j Q projects conducted in the 1980s and 1990s revealed that many projects suffered from 
problems like a lack of strategic control and development. Projects failed to develop a 
detailed operational requirement document that rigorously set the aims and scope of the 
project. Numerous projects were marked by too many design changes that increased the cost 
and time frame in a mainly uncontrolled and undisciplined manner. In addition, numerous 
projects struggled with over-specification of requirements that frequently led to limited 
choices, disproportionate costs and escalated risks during production.
At the beginning of the case study in 1996, projects in MILSYS generally shared these
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characteristics. All projects were overrunning their schedule and budgets. MILSYS realised 
that, in order to sustain or improve its market position, it needed to get involved in Defence 
Projects early, preferably at the requirements identification stage, and had to put forward 
more cost-effective innovative solutions. With MILSYS' traditional approach to product 
development this was difficult to realise, and thus led to the consideration of improvement 
initiatives such as CE.
The above section described the environmental context, the conditions MILSYS faced as a 
company in the Defence industry in Australia such as the competition against foreign 
companies in a formerly protected market and a shift from large-scale production programs 
to smaller capital equipment contracts by Australia's Defence, MILSYS' main customer. The 
challenges in the market place as well as the higher demands on the part of the customers 
were a main driver for the restructuring of the development process in MILSYS. The 
internal factors that contributed to the restructuring decision are discussed in the next 
section.
5.4 THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT
This section outlines the organisational determinants of the company, such as MILSYS' 
organisational structure, its culture and business strategy. It also describes the traditional 
design and development process. Although the company's approach to HRM is also part of 
the organisational context, it is analysed separately in chapter six as it is of particular 
importance for the discussion of the role of HRM in the implementation of CE in MILSYS.
5.4.1 O r g a n isa t io n a l  St r u c t u r e
MILSYS was a matrix organisation with strong functional emphasis, as illustrated in Figure 
12. In 1996 it had six major departments: Engineering, Sales and Projects, Manufacturing, 
Material Planning and Control (MP&C), Quality Assurance, and Business Administration. 
The HR Department was not one of the main departments. This was reflected in its position
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within the organisational structure below the six main departments. The role of the HR 
Department in MILSYS is discussed in chapter six.
Organisational Structure 
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Figure 12: Organisational Structure, June 1996
Project-based lateral arrangements were used in MILSYS' design and development process 
(the project organisation is discussed in detail in section 5.4.4). This structure was broadly 
consistent with Larson and Gobeli's (1987) project matrix management structure. The 
function of Project Management was in a subordinate role to the functional management and 
consolidated in the Sales and Projects Department. The acquisition of projects and project 
management until the contract award (bid phase) was assigned to the Sales Department. The 
management of the projects after the contract award was assigned to the Projects 
Department, in which the Project Managers were based.
MILSYS changed from a multi-level, rigid hierarchy into a flatter organisation with four 
hierarchy levels in 1996. One of the last structural changes in this period was the
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consolidation of previously nine Engineering Departments into five in May 1996. As the 
Business Administration Manager of the Engineering Department explained, this structural 
change was undertaken to ensure a better interaction between administration and technical 
management.
Formally each function and project was jointly managed by a Technical Manager and a 
Business Administration Manager. As noted above, this construction was called a "double­
head" structure, which had been imposed on MTLSYS by the parent company in 1992. It 
was accompanied by the introduction of a second managing director, a representative from 
the parent company, filling the position of the Managing Director Business Administration. 
The second Managing Director had a deputy status. The final decision-making power rested, 
as before, with the de facto CEO of the company, the Technical Managing Director. 
According to the Director of Quality Assurance the two Managing Directors were "partners 
in a sense. [The Technical Managing Director] looks at new business acquisitions, and how 
we do business today. [The Managing Director Business Administration] looks at finance 
and administration. They are a pair. But it does not mean because they are a pair they are 
o f same rank. ... At the end o f the day [the Technical Managing Director] is the CEO o f this 
organisation".
The new structure rested on the "four-eyes” principle. This principle was based on the 
assumption that there was a clear agreement about the division of responsibility for work 
(technical vs. commercial/business) and the need to jointly review and approve decisions 
that were made in the separate areas of responsibility. According to the Managing Director 
Business Administration "the main consideration behind it was th a t... team work basically 
leads to better results than individually isolated performance. ... The four eyes principle is 
to ensure that business activities make sense from a technical point o f view and from a 
commercial point o f view". The Business Administration Managers of the four main 
technical departments (Engineering, Manufacturing, MP&C, Sales and Projects) reported to 
the Managing Director Business Administration. The Technical Managers of those
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departments reported to the Technical Managing Director. The Technical Managers of the 
four main technical departments were directors of the company. At the time of the case 
study (1996/7), the Sales and Projects Department was headed by the Technical Managing 
Director. A so-called Projects Executive was responsible specifically for the design and 
development projects, and was reporting to the Technical Managing Director (in his position 
as head of the Sales and Projects Department). The individual Project Leaders reported to 
the Projects Executive. The head of the Quality Assurance Department and the head of the 
Finance Department were also directors, though the Finance Department was subordinate to 
the Business Administration Department.
All directors were members of the Executive Committee (EC). In 1996/7 the Executive 
Committee was consequently made up of the Technical Managing Director, the Managing 
Director Business Administration, the Engineering Director, the Director of Quality 
Assurance, the Manufacturing Director, the Director of Material Planning and Control, and 
the Finance Director in his role as Company Secretary. Sales and Projects were represented 
in the Executive Committee by the Technical Managing Director. Neither the Projects 
Executive nor any individual Project Manager was a member of the Executive Committee. 
The head of the HR Department was neither a director nor a member of the Executive 
Committee.
According to the Director of Quality Assurance, the Executive Committee met reguiarlv on 
a fortnightly basis in its role of managing the company, to "review what we have achieved 
and what needs corrections and adjustments". In addition, the Executive Committee had an 
annual strategic planning meeting, where it "would go off site fo r  a couple o f days and 
review how well the company is performing, what does the future hold, and what do we need 
doing to ensure we own the future". Beyond it, it met on a "needs basis". The Director of 
Quality Assurance recalled that
"With TOP we [the Executive Committee] met far more often, had many extra
curricular type meetings ... [and] long sessions o f planning and running
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through the tools and techniques to drive ideas out. Brainstorming sessions. ...
First o f  all trying to get the grips what we needed to do. The TOP-Program 
became a series o f projects then. And each project needed management by a 
person appointed."
In the preliminary design phases of the TOP projects the Executive Committee had the role 
of setting targets for the projects. It was a sounding board for the ideas the Project Managers 
had come up with. It was also the panel who discussed and approved the budgets proposed 
by the Project Managers. After the budget approval, the Project Managers of the individual 
TOP projects reported to the Executive Committee on a quarterly basis by presenting their 
project status.
Decisions were commonly made by consensus. But there were other ways as well. 
According to the Director of Quality Assurance, it occurred that when the Technical 
Managing Director "could not get consensus, then he had the obligation to sometimes make 
decisions and we had to stick with that". Sometimes he made decisions in an authoritarian 
style "saying I  don't care what you are saying, that is what we are going to do". However, 
"more often than not it was towards a democratic end than an authoritarian end", explained 
the Director of Quality Assurance.
In addition to the formal organisational structure, MILSYS possessed a strong informal 
network in the form of a larger group of long-serving employees. The influence of those 
people was not always visible in their official position in the hierarchy and the importance 
of their job was "not always reflected in the organisation chart” (Hofstede, 1994, p. 134). It 
was based among other things on their knowledge and their experience within the 
organisation. They "manage[d] to get things done not so much through the official channels 
but through knowing the right people" explained a Project Manager (3). An indicator for the 
informal position and influence of a person was also his/her involvement in the 
organisation-wide change program. In projects initiated by the Technical Managing Director 
he himself chose the people for the respective project teams. This was done on the basis of
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personal favouritism and regardless of their involvement in other teams.
5.4.2 Cu l t u r e  o f  t h e  Or g a n isa t io n
The culture of an organisation can be perceived "as something emerging from social 
interaction - something an organisation 'is'" (Legge, 1995b, p. 186). It is a determinant of 
change processes (Dierkes, 1997) like the implementation of CE in MTLSYS Moreover, 
following Meek (1988) and Whipp, Rosenfeld, and Pettigrew (1989), culture is seen as 
both the shaper o f human action and the outcome o f a process o f social creation and 
reproduction" (Legge, 1995b, p. 186). In this sense, culture can not be created or destroyed, 
only be altered in the process of social reproduction (Meek, 1988). But it does not mean that 
senior management can not influence the culture of the organisation. It needs to know 
however "what aspects o f organisational life cause, comprise or are manifestations o f 
organisational culture" (Legge, 1995b, p. 187).
Schein's (1985b) model of culture provides a useful starting point for the examination of an 
organisation's culture. The model distinguishes between three levels of culture and their 
interaction. On the surface level it consists of visible artifacts and creations that are "easy to 
identify but difficult to interpret without an understanding o f the underlying logic" (Legge, 
1995b, p. 189). The second level consists of values that govern the behaviour and explain 
why groups behave in a particular way. The third level is made up of basic or taken-for- 
granted assumptions, which determine the perception, feeling and thinking of group 
members.
Applying this model to the case study company, it was possible to identify at least three 
observable, partly interrelated phenomena, certain patterns of behaviour apparently 
informed by a particular attitude with influence on the CE implementation process. One was 
an organisational behaviour described by company representatives as "laid a bit backwards, 
living still a bit in the past" (Business Administration Manager of the Engineering 
Department). The attitude that informed this behaviour derived from the time (1980s, early
122
1990s), when MLLSYS could rely on multi-million dollar projects. Back then the company 
did not have to be overly concerned with cost and schedule over-runs. Further, it could rely 
on manufacturing to compensate for periods of less active project activity and operated in 
well-protected home market. In 1996 this attitude was reflected in poor control of MILSYS' 
development projects. It was also manifest in the many design changes that increased the 
cost and time frame as well as the risks during production. Despite substantial gains in 
expertise in electronics and systems integration, the traditional understanding, where the 
user was seen responsible for maintenance was still dominant in the thinking of many 
engineers and managers. Consequently, little emphasis was given to product life cycle issues 
and customer involvement. Also downstream issues such as testability, manufacturability, 
assembly were still more an afterthought than an issue considered at the early stages of a 
project. Downstream functions were usually not involved in the early stages of the product 
development process.
This attitude was accompanied by a focus on individual performance in contrast to 
teamwork. In addition, many managers did not recognise people management as a critical 
part of their responsibility or employees as the main key to organisational performance and 
success.
Another prevailing behaviour pattern was a so-called culture of blame. This could be seen in 
the low tolerance towards failure, and was another barrier in the implementation of CE and 
the overall change process. It prevented mutual trust and commitment to each other's success 
and discouraged risk taking and shared ownership. Functional representatives in projects 
reported that they were hesitant to expose themselves to the personal risks inherent in 
integrated problem solving. They did not want to lay open to function-externals what 
actually went on in their respective departments or reveal any functional weaknesses. Many 
employees interviewed criticised managers at all levels for making individuals solely 
responsible for mistakes or misjudgements. "There is very much a blame mentality still, ... 
very much focusing on the low level people not doing their job properly. I  think, this is the
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prevalent culture among the executives" claimed the CE Project Leader. But even managers, 
who criticised this practice, were exercising it, as a number of incidents during the case 
study revealed (see for example the Incident Report in chapter eight).
Many managers were not aware of the consequences of the "blame mentality" and the 
impact it had on their employees. Employees were upset about the practised "culture o f  
blame" and the little or no recognition for additional efforts and were thus hesitant to get 
involved in teams or to take up new or additional responsibilities. Managers did not analyse 
this hesitation and reactive behaviour towards change. They did not recognise that people 
were afraid of change, because in the past changes in the company had often been harmful to 
the interests of individual employees (e.g. in the form of dismissals, loss of power or status). 
It was common practice to confront people with a final concept or solution and expect from 
them to accept and follow it without further discussion. Beyond this, managers 
underestimated the time and effort it takes to achieve cultural change. Many managers 
expected rapid changes in the attitudes and behaviour of their employees, even though they 
had not changed themselves. Many of them were still caught in old behaviour patterns and 
attitudes (e.g. placing blame, not devolving responsibility, seeing people as a "trouble 
factor , giving little recognition of team efforts, etc.). The HR Manager [and some senior 
managers] however speculated that "most people would support the changes, in particular i f  
they can see tha t... the company tries to accommodate people in the course o f the changes 
rather than discard them".
A  number of the above described attitudes and behaviours can also be traced back to 
MILSYS' traditional, Tayloristic organisation of work, where work was broken down into 
simplified tasks and areas of responsibility (Druecke, 1995). The product development 
process was largely carried out in a sequential manner {"throw over the wall,r). 
Communication and co-operation was mediated through highly departmentalised functions 
{"stove pipes"). This resulted in uncooperative compartmentalisation and prevented 
identification with the overall development task and the final product.
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The strong engineering background of many managers and employees in the company was 
another factor that determined MILSYS' culture. About one third of the overall staff in 
MILSYS in 1996 (and most managers) were professional engineers. It was mostly 
technologists, who acted as change agents in MILSYS, Their training and experience were 
largely based "on technical and economic factors, with little i f  any recognition o f the human 
and social implications" (Bailey, 1993, p. 190). People with a "technical mindset" tend to 
solve problems by technical means (i.e. the introduction of new tools and techniques) and to 
resort to universally applicable "bestpractices" (Couchman et al., 1999), which corresponds 
with their engineering or similar technical education and work experience. In MILSYS this 
was reflected in the scope of the change program in general and of the CE Project in 
particular. The introduction of the INTRANET and the focus on new and revised manuals 
indicated that faster and more efficient electronic communication and computer technology, 
combined with better procedures were perceived by the management as most likely to lead 
to better communication and higher degrees of integration. Organisational enablers (such as 
HR practices, cross-group communication) were not recognised as critical to change by 
them. Hence, little or no emphasis was given to the design and promotion of constructive 
interpersonal relationships, which engenders communication, trust, teamwork, and personal 
growth. Issues such as how to support people through the change, how to match then- 
aspiration with the need of the business and how to ensure their ownership of the new 
processes, were not considered.
5.4.3 Th e  C o m p a n y ’s B u sin e ss  St r a t e g y
Another component of the organisational context, in which the CE Project was embedded, 
was the company's business strategy. MILSYS' business strategy was formalised in the so 
called "Blue Book", the organisation's 5 year plan. In 1994 the focus of MILSYS' business 
strategy shifted from a quality-oriented to an innovation-oriented company, and this led to a 
reformulation of its business objectives. MILSYS' new business objective was stated to be
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to supply communication equipment, systems, and support to the information market that 
meet our customers' needs in the most cost-effective and technically innovative manner" 
(Internal Document C4).
With the initiation of the company-wide change program in the same year, the company 
started to identify ways to ensure its transformation towards an innovation-oriented 
company. One initial step was the specification of a small number of core business skills, as 
it was impossible to "equally concentrate on so many skills" explained the Technical 
Managing Director. From an initial catalogue of 24 significant skills, four skills were 
selected that, according to the Technical Managing Director, were thought to contribute 
most significantly to "success in the future". Marketing, Bidding, Project Management and 
Systems Engineering were the skills selected, while Manufacturing, for example, was not 
seen as crucial. The Technical Managing Director described the selection process as 
follows:
For a core skill to qualify we used several filters. The hardest filter to survive 
was the customer filter. For instance Production, which is an important part o f 
the company, did not survive. So Production is not a core competency. ... The 
customer does not really care whether the green boxes we make are 
manufactured here as long as the customer gets what he wants with the quality 
and [it is] on time. But things like Project Management and Systems 
Engineering became core competencies because the customer is interested that 
you do things on time and within budget. "
Systems Engineering was seen as an essential core competency for the organisation, as it 
aimed to establish an integrated product development process. This competency was based 
on the rigorous process execution and reviewing process required by military standard 
{"MilStand") (Grady, 1994), which coincided with MTLSYS plans and requirements. 
Systems Engineering was perceived as having a "significant overlap in terms o f practice and 
tool approach with CE" as the Managing Director Business Administration explained. The 
decision for Systems Engineering as one of the four future core skills, resulted in the
126
establishment of a Systems Engineering Department and with it the appointment of a 
Systems Engineering Manager.
In addition, marketing and innovation were seen by the Technical Managing Director as "the 
only profitable businesses" for a company, "the rest are all costs". Marketing, therefore, was 
decided a core competency, and the Sales and Marketing Department was given a stronger 
strategic focus. Up to 1996 the Sales and Marketing Department was largely engaged in 
building up and sustaining good customer relations, particularly during the bidding process. 
Its role was to identify customer needs and wants in different market segments, and to 
ensure that contracts met those needs. From 1996 onwards the Department became more 
marketing-oriented. It gradually took on board other tasks like the search for new markets as 
well as the development of market and product strategies. The information about new 
opportunities was captured in the company’s newly developed "Opportunity Database". This 
was a comprehensive database, which was seen as an important instrument to guide and 
support marketing decisions and thus, ensure MtLSYS' strong market focus.
The new character of marketing was also visible in the company’s altered approach to 
bidding. Bidding was selected a core competency, because the way the organisation 
approaches bidding was seen as a major success factor in winning contracts, and thus crucial 
for the survival of the company. MILSYS appointed a so-called "A-Team" within the Sales 
and Marketing Department that was solely responsible for the bidding stage. Previously, 
bidding was scattered over various departments. The Technical Managing Director 
described the change as follows: "We invented a new way o f bidding. We have a core team 
that does nothing else but bidding. We reduced bidding from the old upheaval process, 
where everybody had to help".
The "A-Team" managed the entire project planning in the pre-contractual phase. This 
approach was taken to ensure bids and projects were highly customer-oriented and 
documented in a consistent manner. Previously, department managers within the functional 
areas were responsible for producing estimates for cost accounts as subsets of project scope,
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schedule, and budget during the bid phase. The Technical Managing Director was assured 
that if MILS YS was the "best in industry" in those four competencies (Project Management, 
Systems Engineering, Bidding and Marketing), it "will survive".
The shift in MILSYS' business strategy more towards innovation was also reflected in the 
Technical Managing Director's vision in 1996 of "becoming a knowledge-based company "4̂  
and in changes in existing HRM policies and practices. The Organisational and Cultural 
Change Project, one of the projects of the TOP-Program, was primarily responsible for the 
design and implementation of changes regarding organisational culture and HRM to 
promote innovation-orientation and teamwork.
The shift in the company's business strategy in 1994, and its accompanying and planned 
changes in the overall running of the organisation, appeared to be an ideal premise for the 
implementation of CE. The company realised that its shift to an innovation orientation could 
not only be enforced via technological enablers but also needed to be supported by far- 
reaching organisational and behavioural changes. This could have opened up a significant 
role for the HR function. But the HR function did not evolve as a key player in any change 
initiative in MILSYS, as discussed later.
5.4 .4  Th e  Tr a d it io n a l  P r o d u c t  D e s ig n  a n d  D e v e l o p m e n t  P r o c e s s
While the preceding section gave a short summary of recent changes in MILSYS' business 
strategy and the main considerations behind it, the following section outlines MILSYS' 
traditional product development process. It also analyses the perceived necessity for its 
restructuring. 40
40 There is no consensus whether knowledge management is a new emerging field of management 
practice or a new management fad. For a detailed discussion on knowledge management and case 
examples on how to create a knowledge based company see for example: Field (1998), Allee (1997), 
Computerwoche Special (1999).
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5.4.4.1 Project Structure
The majority of development projects in MILSYS were focused on communication 
equipment. Only a small number of projects were concerned with other areas of business, 
such as command control systems. The nature of MILSYS' marketing approach and the 
market sector it operated in - defence electronics - was reflected in the basic structure of its 
projects. MILSYS designed and developed complex products under contract for a single 
customer, mainly the Australian Government. This required the company to comply with the 
Australian Defence Procurement Process4  ̂ and the basis for all project planning and control 
in MILSYS was governed by requirements of the Australian Department of Defence41 2. At 
the highest level it required the development of an adequate basis for responsible decision 
making by both MILSYS and the Customer.
In compliance with the Australian Defence Procurement Process, MILSYS' development 
process was very structured with various customer driven and internal reviews. All projects 
were typically subdivided into two main phases: a bidding or tender phase, and a design and 
development phase, which commenced with the awarding of the contract. In the tender
41 The Australian Defence procurement policy developed through the late 1980s, especially following 
the 1987 Defence White Paper (Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce, 1992, Defence 
and Industry Policy). The Australian Defence procurement process is designed to meet Defence's 
special requirements within an overall government purchasing framework which embraces a wide 
range of policy aims in areas such as industry development and purchasing. In order to meet its 
requirement within this framework, Defence purchasing has evolved particular procurement 
structures. For example, for high value procurements it demands a centralised, for capital equipment 
acquisitions a highly centralised process. The highly centralised process includes an approval 
process, requests for tender, invitations to register interest, requests for proposals, procurement 
process and project management (see The Allen Consulting Group, 1992, p. 14). In 1998 for the 
first time a strategic approach has been taken to Defence industry policy directly addressing a range 
of issues raised by industry and defence (Defence's procurement practices for example were 
criticised by industry representatives as excessively project-based, which frequently worked against 
the substance of indigenous industry capability. Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade, 1998, p. 88). A procurement reform was one of the expected benefits. The 
Defence procurement reform among others strives to establish a systematic approach and achieve 
international best practice to its procurement process; will use partnering relationships - embrace 
industry as partners in developing, manufacturing and supporting Defence's capabilities; minimizing 
time and cost for projects (Department of Defence, 1998).
42 like DEF (AUST) 5655 - Australian Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria; Standard. DEF 
(AUST) 5657 - Australian Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria Implementation Guide. DEF 
(AUST) 5658 - Australian Cost Schedule Status Reporting (CSSR) Specification and 
Implementation Guide.
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phase the company responded to a Request For Tender (RFT). The procurement process, 
however, in most cases commenced already before an RFT, with activity occurring for both 
parties, MIL SYS and its customer. For MILSYS it involved concept exploration and 
definition and the preparation of a business case [Feasibility Study; Environmental Impact 
Study; Obtain Approval and Funding for Phase 1]. In some cases it involved preparatory 
research and development, or discussions between prospective suppliers and the customer to 
refine the request specifications. The proposal was considered by a number of committees 
within Defence. It was followed by the tendering and contract formation phase [Preparing 
RFT; Tender Evaluation; Contract Negotiation; Responding to RFT]. After winning the 
contract award, the actual design and development process commenced. It commonly moved 
through the formal stages: concept (or systems) design, detailed design and development, 
manufacturing and deployment, as portrayed in Figure 13.
Baseline 
(E ach  sta ge  o f 
dev e lop m e n t has a 
corresponding  
configuration baseline)
Provisional 
Functional Bt Functional BL > Allocated BL ,  Product & Support 31
for C o n cep t D esign fo r C ustom ised fo r Subsystem  & for D etailed  D esign  
S Planning: D esign a Planning: M odul Design: & D ev e lo p m e n t
D eterm ine provisional D eterm ine system D eterm ine subsystem D eterm ine
system  level level req. a design a m odule req. m anufacturing drawings
requirem ents a design a design & support package
RFT Request for Tender 
SRR Systems Requirement Review 
SDR Systems Design Review 
PDR Preliminary Design Review 
CDR Critical Design Review
Source: Internal Documents C4, A6
Figure 13: Product Development Process Before Change
Concept design comprised, among others things, Technical Design, System Design, Systems
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Analysis and Control [including Configuration Management], Project Management 
[including Project Staffing and Project Planning] and Management of Design Changes. In 
this phase a systems specification (top-level design) was created based on the customer's 
requirements, which was used to identify the Configuration Items43 (CIs) as basis for a Cl 
list. The Project Engineering Manager created a project Work Breakdown Structure44 
(WBS) equivalent to the top-level design. The customer driven Systems Requirement 
Review (SRR), which approved the top level specification and top level design, completed 
this phase, and once this approval was obtained the detailed design phase would be initiated. 
Depending on the scope of the project, the detailed design phase included various design 
tasks, different production, prototyping and testing tasks. The specification and design 
developed through successive layers of detail. Components of the system were designed and 
built according to the lowest level of specification, then the components were integrated and 
tested to verify the sub-system and system level performance met requirements. Typically 
three major reviews were carried out during this phase. The Systems Design Review (SDR) 
approved the subsystem specification and design. It was followed by the Preliminary Design 
Review (PDR), which approved the module specifications and the block level design. When 
the design was completed and all modules developed, the Critical Design Review (CRD) 
took place the design was released to production if the customer approved of the final 
detailed design.
In the manufacturing phase the system or product, which was delivered to the customer, was 
produced. The phase comprised volume system assembly, site assembly and installation, and 
factory acceptance testing. Deployment commonly involved packing and shipping as well as 
on site acceptance testing.
43 The Term "Configuration Item" was defined as "an aggregation of modules or sub-systems that is 
designated for separate configuration management", an aggregation of software or hardware, each of 
which satisfies a particular user need or requirement (Internal Documents Al 1, A17).
44 A project Work Breakdown Structure was defined as a bundle of tasks in form of a generic 
checklist (Internal Document C4).
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5.4.4.2 Project Management
MILSYS' project planning and control system was a formal Cost/Schedule Control System 
consisting of a structured series of policies, processes, procedures and instructions, and 
computer-based systems. The system of management provided the basis for organising, 
planning, authorising, monitoring, controlling, and reporting project work. As shown in 
Figure 14, the Cost/Schedule Control System (C/SCS) comprised thirteen processes within 
five formal C/SCS categories (Organisation, Planning and Budgeting, Accounting, Analysis, 
and Revision and Access to Data).
In 1996 MILSYS was running about 20 projects of various sizes, which were handled by 10 
Project Managers. According to a Project Manager (1) "big projects have one full-time 
Project Manager. With small projects, one Project Manager can handle two to four 
projects". But even the big development projects did not have a permanent project team, 
only a project management group. Staff was drawn into the process when required for a 
clearly defined task. Even then they were often only part-time dedicated to the project. A 
project team existed only informally. The team members were commonly one homogeneous 
bunch under the Project Manager.
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Cost/Schudule
Category Process
Project
Phase
Organisation
Planning & Budgeting
Accounting
Analysis
Revision & Access to 
Data
Internal Project Planning
Work Definition and Assignment
Planning and Scheduling
Estimating and Budgeting
Detailed Planning
Work Authorisation
Data Accumulation & Reporting
Subcontract/Materials Mgt.
Indirect Costs and Rates
Variance Analysis
Corrective Action Planning
Baseline Maintenance
Bidding
J
Project Initiation
Doing the Work
Monitoring
Performance
Estimates at Completion
Realigning the 
Project
Source: Internal Document C4
Figure 14: M ILSY S' C ost/Schedule C ontrol System , 1995
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Figure 15 shows the typical organisation structure of a Project Management Group in 
MILSYS in 1995.
Project Organisation in MILSYS, 1995
Engiieering
Director
Quafity Assurance 
Director
Quality Assurance
Projects Director
T
Project Manager
▼
Technical Functions
Director
Business Administration
Project Business 
Administration Manager
Business Administration 
Functions
En gin eering
Commercial
ILS
Financial
Configuration Management
Accounting
Planning & Scheduling
Security
etc. as required
Administration
etc. as required
The above 'functions' did not necessarily imply specific positions within a M ILSYS project team.
One or more functions could be handled by one individual, depending on the size of the project and the nature of the work involved.
Source: Internal Document C4 
Figure 15: Project Organisation, 1995
Formally, corresponding with the overall company structure, each project was jointly 
managed by a Project Manager (Project Leader) and a Business Administration Project 
Manager. The Project and Business Administration Project Manager worked together in 
planning and budgeting the project. Project planning was largely the domain of the Project 
Manager, and budgeting that of the Business Administration Project Manager. However, it 
was the Project Manager, who was primarily responsible for the project. The Project 
Manager was nominated by the Projects Executive. But the fmal decision rested with the 
Technical Managing Director. For larger projects a Project Engineering Manager was 
appointed as well. The Project Engineering Manager was usually nominated by the Project 
Manager in consultation with the Engineering Director. In one project in 1996 (which later 
became the CE Pilot Project), however, a Project Engineering Manager was nominated
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before the Project Manager. The Project Engineering Manager ran the project until a Project 
Manager was appointed. Other positions in the Project Management Group included those 
of the Cost Account Managers), the Project Scheduler, Project Accountant, and the Project 
QA Manager.
Functional managers made decisions about many aspects of the projects, such as the 
selection of staff, timeframes, and departmental budgets. Within the bid phase, functional 
managers were responsible for project estimates. After the contract award functional 
managers became responsible for planning, authorising and controlling all aspects of then- 
cost accounts. In addition, they provided functional support, personnel and equipment to the 
various project management groups. Their high level of responsibility7 for many aspects of a 
development project but also the linear sequential way of the conventional development 
process is portrayed in the classical responsibility assignment matrix in Figure 16.
Responsibility Assignment Matrix - Classical 
MILSYS, 1995/6 Project
Configuration Cl 2 Cl 3item (Cl) 1 I__
Source: Project Management Course Notes For CE, 1996
Figure 16: Example for a Classical Responsibility7 Assignment Matrix
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The classical responsibility assignment matrix represents the narrow functional focus of the 
organisational elements charged with project activities. Projects shared common corporate 
resources that were organised in functional areas "by the mechanism o f functional cost 
accounts at the intersection o f organisation breakdown structure and project work 
breakdown structure" (Internal Document A17). Although the Project Manager was the 
focal point for directions and control of the project, he/she had little authority and 
responsibility over the people involved in the project. The project members mostly remained 
locally and administratively located in the home department. Functional managers were 
generally responsible for providing the right people for the project. The Project Manager as 
a rule determined what skills, background and experiences were needed for a project (e.g. 
what computer programs needed to be known). S/he^ could also indicate from what 
disciplines s/he liked people from and their degree of experience. But it was the functional 
manager who made the final decision about who was selected for a particular project. 
Besides the formal criteria set by the Project Manager, it was the resource availability 
(decided by the functional manager) that was a major factor in the final selection process. 
Aspects like a person's ability or desire to work in a team were usually not taken into 
consideration. It was possible for people to raise their hands to work on a particular project, 
but very few people tried to do that. Most of them who tried that were successful in getting 
into the project they wanted. In 1996 projects were predominantly staffed with permanent 
employees. Before 1995/6 it was common to resort to contract workers (in 1996 MILSYS 
employed 50 contractors in addition to 360 permanent employees). With a much tighter 
work situation, managers were then "discouraged to use contractors except for very 
specialised tasks" (e.g. where no in-house know-how was available). According to a Project 
Manager (2) "you have to give preference to people who are already within the 
organisation. ... But invariably there are positions you can't fill. ... [Then] you can use 45
45 One of the 10 Project Managers was a woman.
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contractors".
Computer software played a significant role in project management in MELSYS and were 
seen by those project and functional managers interviewed as an important means for 
communication. For the bid preparation either Micro-frame Project Manager (MPM), 
Microsoft Excel or Access were used. Pariss Enterprise (PE) or Viewpoint (VP) was applied 
for project scheduling. Controlling and planning was supported by CINCOM 
Manufacturing/F inancials, including PCC (Project Cost Control), and MRPLi
(Manufacturing Requirements Planning and Control). Key milestones were used to measure 
actual project achievements against the planned schedule. The design of systems and 
components, particularly software design, however, was treated as an art, a creative process 
that can't be fully controlled. According to a team member of the CE Pilot Project "Design 
Engineers take as long as they need to solve a problem". Thus, schedule overruns in projects 
were veiy common.
5.4.43 Discovered Problems
The above described design and development process had significant deficiencies, as the 
findings from the analyses by the CE Project Team ("As is" Analysis and Cost-Benefit 
Analysis in 1996) and an earlier internal analysis by the former Director of Engineering (in 
1994/5) revealed. As typical for traditional Tayloristic organisations, MILSYS’ development 
process was not treated as a single co-ordinated effort by a single unified team. It was 
marked by a lack of integrated thinking and action. Prior to 1995, product development 
projects were being conducted in a conventional way. This was reflected in a strong linear- 
sequential project process. Work packages were handed over as "hand-offs" from 
department to department. Activity concurrence, however, was realised as a result of a rigid 
project procedure and the strict external review process the company was subject to as a 
firm in the defence sector. The stringent review process ensured customer involvement 
though only on a basic level. Suppliers were commonly not directly involved in projects,
137
although, according to the Managing Director Business Administration, up to ”50 to 60 % o f 
all costs are driven from outside. Therefore it is absolutely important that people 
understand the consequences o f making certain decisions in term o f components, parts, 
whatever". His expectation of CE was "that those who have to live with the result o f the 
design are involved in the design from right the beginning. Not ju st manufacturing, but also 
our suppliers".
The horizontal break-down of tasks resulted in departmental "egoism" and status thinking, a 
"throw it over the wall" behaviour, often without much interest as to what happens next. 
This conception was shared by many employees, as indicated by Figures 17, 18 and 19, 
which show illustrations of MELSYS' conventional design and development process 
produced by participants in the CE Introduction Training.
The drawing in Figure 17 is an illustration of the problem of poorly defined customer 
requirements in MILSYS. The customer was not involvement in projects. As a result, 
customer requirements were often not met. The customer ended up with something that was 
not exactly what he had in mind.
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Source: CE Introductory Training, Pictorial Representation of MILSYS' 
Traditional Product Development Process
Figure 17: Illustrations of Departmentalisation in MILSYS (1), 1996
The drawings in Figure 18 were an indication of the breakdown in communication between 
the departments (and the customer) in the development process. The individual departments 
(as well as the customer and senior management) were presented by the participants as 
isolated islands (sometimes referred to as "islands o f excellence"). It occurred that 
development problems were left unsolved, as they did not reach the right person, team or 
department ("message in the bottle'). In order to integrate the individual departments in the 
product development process the project manager had to navigate the project through a 
dangerous ocean full of sharks in form of departmental egoism and a "don't care what 
happens next" attitude, with individual departments pursuing different goals and interest 
without much consideration of the overall project goal. The individual person was caught 
between the interest of the home department and those of the project team.
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Source: CE Introductory Training, Pictorial Representation of MILSYS' 
Traditional Product Development Process
Figure 18: Illustrations o f  D epartm entalisation in M ILSYS (2), 1996
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The drawings in Figure 19 illustrate the problems with MILSYS' sequential development 
process as seen by the training participants. An integrated approach to the design task was 
not given. The "engineering train" rolled from department to department with little or no 
cooperation and communication between the departments and with the customer. The "voice 
o f the customer" was not consistently and effectively captured. Customer wants and needs 
were perceived as "the customer rolling boulders on" MILSYS. Downstream issues were 
not considered upfront. The horizontal breakage of work resulted in a throw it over the wall 
behavior and uncooperative departmentalisation. Mistakes got handed over from department 
to department and "fix-it" loops (presented as a "vicious circle'") were required as a result. 
Somebody else was always to blame for project failures and mistakes.
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Source: CE Introductory Training, Pictorial Representation of MILS Y$' 
Traditional Product Development Process
Figure 19: Illustrations of Departmentalisation in MILSYS (3), 1996
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According to a Project Manager (2) "upstreampeople don't really have an understanding o f  
what happens downstream. And downstream people don't have a real desire to know what 
upstream people d o .... They see themselves as alienated, as the total victim o f what happens 
upstream, and all they can do is complain rather than take part in the solution". Moreover, 
there was a resistance to information and knowledge-sharing, and a resistance to exchange 
problem-solving strategies and solutions. An example was provided by the CE Project 
Leader: "Take Material Planning and Control, they have this system fo r ordering parts ..., 
but they don't really explain what it means to anybody else". The CE Project Leader noted 
that in 1993 when he joined the company "there was very little discussion at all between the 
groups, not ju st between up- and downstream groups, also little discussion between the 
various design groups". The experiences gained in projects/by project teams were neither 
recorded nor passed on. The individual and team knowledge accumulated at both great 
personal and company cost often simply dissipated. As the result of this conventional 
approach to projects, downstream issues were not sufficiently considered during the early 
project phases and time-consuming "fix-it" loops were often required due to the handed over 
mistakes. This invariably led to over-run of project schedules and budget blowouts in all 
projects. Also, customer focus was progressively lost as specialist departments concentrated 
on their individual work packages. According to the Director of Quality Assurance "the 
customer focus is high at [the upper] two levelsf^ because they are the ones who have most 
to deal with the customer. Down here is mainly ignorance. They are just not aware what is 
happening with our customer".
According to the findings from the "As is" (1996), Cost-Benefit (1996) and earlier analyses 
(1995), MILSYS did not address all the customer's requirements, and appropriate functions 
and people were not involved in important phases of the project. The "As is" analysis report 46
46 With the upper two levels the interviewee referred to the senior and middle management level 
including the Projects Executive and the Project Leader.
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summarises it as "poor specification and contract writing", a "poor selection and control o f  
subcontractors" and a "poor requirements analysis". The "As is" analysis also found that the 
development process suffered from "poor planning and scheduling", "poor estimates" and a 
"poor estimating method", with the latter not reflecting risk and learning curve sufficiently. 
One reason for these problems was seen in the lack of a standardised Work Breakdown 
Structure (WBS) and the absence of any analysed historical data how long it takes to 
perform certain tasks, which could have provided more accurate estimates. The functional 
WBS was also unable to accurately determine the overall effort it would take to produce a 
new product. MILSYS also had a deficiency of Systems Engineering. According to an 
Internal Document, (C6, 1995), MILSYS had:
"significant deficiencies in the current tools available for complete system 
engineering. ... We have no requirements analysis/tracking tools, and there is 
disparate support for the stages prior to detailed design. ... Detailed design 
(both hardware and software) is well supported with tools, but there is next to 
no integration between tools; let alone any integrated configuration 
management of the data they produce."
Other problems were seen in the lack of personnel, a lack of training and awareness in 
MILSYS' practices, inappropriate company procedures and insufficient design 
documentation to support downstream functions.
As a consequence of the matrix organisation with strong functional emphasis, Project 
Managers played only a "lightweight" role (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992b). They had to 
constantly negotiate with more powerful functional managers over budgets, timeframe, and 
staffing to achieve project objectives. Despite the formal authority and importance of 
projects for the company, functions were not limited to a support role, but dominated over 
projects. According to a Project Manager (2) "in this company ... the direction is given by 
the functional managers, bu t... should be given by the Project Managers".
Project Managers had only a marginal authority and limited responsibilities for the people in
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their projects. A Project Manager (3) claimed that "there [was] a fairly significant 
limitation placed on what a Project Manager can do in terms o f setting reward structures, 
terms and conditions. And you don't equally have 'carte blanche' [unlimited authority] in 
terms o f setting ... hours o f work, ... and you don't always have complete freedom to set up 
the environment the way you might like to". Project Managers expressed frustration about 
the limitations placed on them to reward 'star performers' on their team, otherwise motivate 
the team, or discipline poor performers. They criticised the inflexibility and limited nature 
of existing HR policies and practices, but also that those policies and practices did not 
support teamwork and the development of team behaviour.
While functional managers were looking after many project-related HRM issues, Project 
Managers did not utilise the full range of opportunities and tools available to them. This was 
particularly apparent with regard to people management. HRM was considered of little 
importance to most Project Managers in early 1996. They underestimated the importance of 
HRM and did not see themselves as being widely responsible for people management issues, 
or for broader HR issues encroaching on the project team operation.
Project Managers largely accepted the decisions of functional managers without trying to 
make them part of their own responsibility or to at least negotiate with them. "Project 
Managers aren't filling their apparent authority, their eligible authority" claimed the CE 
Project Leader. He continued: "It always surprises me that Project Managers let functional 
managers get away with their announcements". The inferior position of Project Managers 
relatively to functional managers was also reflected in the fact that there was no Project 
Manager as a member of the Executive Committee.
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Despite the emergence of new approaches in other defence contracting companies47, the 
development process in MILSYS remained largely unchanged until the 1990s. Then, with 
increasing pressure to reduce lead times and cut the costs of developing new systems, 
MILSYS' senior management considered the redesign of the traditional development 
process. In early 1995, external business consultants, brought into the company by MCLSYS' 
senior management, analysed the design and development process and identified 
requirements for a new product development process. They found a high percentage of "no 
value" adding processes and a lack of discipline in following existing procedures. An 
important issue was the minimisation of post-contractual changes by spending more time in 
the early stages of a project. This included the consideration and comparison of alternative 
products, processes, and approaches before signing a contract. It also required a thorough 
calculation in the requirements identification and planning phases. These activities would 
help the development project team (and the customer) to understand how the cost varied for 
alternative solutions and would help avoid re-engineering the product at a later stage at 
larger cost.
The analysis led to the restructuring of the bidding phase and the appointment of the "A- 
Team" in October 1996, and the initiation of the CE initiative. How CE was conceptualised 
and implemented within MILSYS will be described in chapter eight.
The previous sections have summarised the organisational conditions and peculiarities of 
MILSYS, its prevailing culture and the company’s traditional product development process.
47 According to an Internal Document C3, in the early eighties a UK based subsidiary of the parent 
company initiated a process, called 'First-Off Build", which strongly drew on principles embodying 
what is known today as the CE concept. It included a strong emphasis on cross-functional 
integration and communication. A cross-functional team was appointed with clear role identification 
and goal setting and a strong team leader. The team was partially collocated. Limitations of this 
approach, according to this document, were the lack of fundamental process-re-engineering and the 
strong dependency on charismatic leadership. A second approach in the late 1980s in the same 
organisation was termed "Concurrent Product Development" and involved the establishment of a 
more diverse collocated core team and the testing of 'people ownership' issues encountered under the 
first approach. The team was given authority to "establish its own procedures " resulting in "a new 
set of procedures which significantly attacked the inefficiencies" of the former way.
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The following section provides an overview of the repeatedly mentioned organisation-wide 
change program. The restructuring of the traditional development process was one of its 
sub- targets, the development and establishment of an appropriate organisational and 
cultural framework for greater team- and innovation-orientation, another.
5.5 THE CHANGE PROGRAM
In 1994, under a corporation-wide efficiency program called TOP {"Time Optimized 
Processes") initiated by its parent company, MILSYS was given the opportunity to initiate 
its own change program. The TOP program was seen as a major initiative by the parent 
company. The objective of the TOP-Program was to significantly reduce corporate costs in 
all areas. It aimed to overcome inflexibility and increase competitiveness through cutting 
down process and cycle times, reducing the time-to-market for new products, removing 
interdepartmental barriers, and changing the way in which core research was funded. The 
program also sought to improve customer focus and market orientation and to develop 
mechanisms to support continuous process improvement. The program was modified in 
1995, two years after its commencement to include a cultural change component in order to 
help achieve its goals. All strategic business units were asked by the parent company to 
create a "climate o f  innovation". They were challenged to "leave well-worn paths" and to 
"risk new approaches" by giving "orientation to processes instead o f to functions", by 
"trusting] employees to be 'responsible'" "instead o f interfering" and by "keeping] the 
customer in the fie ld  o f vision instead o f looking inwards and upwards" (Internal Document 
C l4, 12/1995). Each subsidiary was given a specific improvement target. According to the 
Director of Quality Assurance, the parent company "set very challenging targets for every 
one o f their businesses around the world". It was the responsibility of the individual firms, 
however, to determine how to achieve these goals. The co-ordinators of the individual 
company programs were required to report on progress to the parent company.
In addition to the company-specific TOP-Program, MILSYS initiated a range of other
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change projects and initiatives, which complemented the TOP projects, but emphasised 
aspects that were not particularly targeted in the TOP-Program.
The overall change program was seen by the executives as an opportunity for employees to 
become involved in business improvement processes. They also saw it as an indicator for a 
stronger team emphasis in the company. At other levels of the organisation it was however 
criticised that (a) only particular people were working in the individual projects and (b) 
initiatives and the project outcomes were limited due to a lack of training in teamwork. 
These issues were also raised in the AQA Self-Assessment, as discussed later.
Many managers expected immediate results from the change program and were disappointed 
about its slow pace, which they partly attributed to the ignorance and lack of interest of 
employees. They did not understand that it usually takes time to establish new attitudes and 
behaviours. A major barrier in the change process was the missing or weak link between the 
individual projects. Beyond this, there was still no "appropriate recognition fo r  
involvement" in teams, nor enough "formal team processes" as employees and managers in 
the AQA Self-Assessment criticised. The aspired attitude change was not realised yet. It 
would be hard to achieve as long as the company was still dominated by a culture of blame 
and HRM policies and practices that did not clearly reflect the importance of teamwork for 
the company.
5.5.1 M ILSY S' T O P -P r o g r a m
Towards the end of 1994, and after a business analysis by representatives of the parent 
company, the "very broad mandate to improve [MILSYS’]  profitability" led to the initiation 
of MILSYS' own TOP-Program. In 1995 an agreement between MILSYS and its parent 
company was signed targeting a 50% cycle time reduction and 30% cost reduction by
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199748. In a 3 to 4 months "discovery phase" in early 1995, external business consultants 
carried out a detailed analysis of the company's work processes (see above). In addition, an 
attitude survey, conducted in May 1995, in which 350 out of 500 employees participated, 
pointed to serious communication problems between management and employees. It was the 
first attitude survey carried out in the company's history.
Based on their analysis, the external consultants recommended a number of areas for 
improvement and restructuring. The suggestions were accepted by senior management and 
subsequently led to the initiation and "kick-off' of 6 individual TOP projects: the CE 
Project, the Design Documentation and Control Project, the Software Process Improvement 
Project, the IT (Information Technology) Strategy Project, the Organisational and Cultural 
Change Project and a project called Paperless Documentation System in Manufacturing (see 
Table L.
The CE Project (which was the main focus of this investigation) was formally given the task 
of developing a concept for the restructuring of the design and development process based 
on CE principles. Other projects and initiatives within and outside the TOP-Program, 
however, also touched on issues that were important for the introduction of CE, as shown 
later. They included the Organisational and Cultural Change Project, the "A-Team" and the 
Innovation Project.
MILSYS' TOP-Program was co-ordinated by the Managing Director Business 
Administration who was appointed by the parent company. One of his main tasks in this 
context was to bring together the individual TOP projects and to minimise the conflict 
between people's involvement in the TOP-Program and their everyday workload. People 
from inside and outside the TOP-Program were not satisfied with the co-ordination effort.
48 At the end of the case study (mid-1997) the Director QA assumed that TOP was not successful in 
financial terms as the goal "to half the time of every process obviously was not achievable in every 
sense ... Largely because we did not have an enormous amount of wastage to begin with. There was 
not a lot to save.". In many other ways, he claimed, TOP was successful as the "potential for savings 
in the future is certainly put in place ".
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TOP Project & 
Timeframe
Key Features of TOP Projects
Design
Documentation 
and Control 
Project
Aim was to find a software which facilitates concurrence in design and 
development. Looked at the tool side of the design process. Current tools 
(software) only supported a serial approach.
The project in its original concept was put on hold as no suitable software package
mid-1995 - on was found to match MILSYS' requirements. However, potential suppliers were 
hold by end of die identified and it was decided to wait until their products were as mature as
case study in 
7/1997
MILSYS required.
Leader: Manager Technical Computing
Software Process
Improvement
Project
mid-1995 - 
ongoing by 
7/1997
Aimed to improve software programming, software coding, the methodology of the 
concept. Software projects lost too much money, and thus were a threat for the 
long-term financial reliability of MILSYS.
New manuals were written, but the application of manuals was still problematic. 
Managing Director Business Administration: "It is now important that it does not 
become an academic exercise. ... that those who are doing it apply what is in these 
manuals."
Leader: Manager Process/Software
IT Strategy 
Project
mid-1995 - 
ongoing by 
7/1997
Aim was to "overcome the problem o f serial engineering" and bridge "islands o f  
excellence" (Managing Director Business Administration). Looked at information 
technologies that support communication and information exchange.
Approval of ca. A$ 2 million to put in place a new so called "middleware 
software", which was found an appropriate tool to foster concurrency of design and 
development. Benefits out of this implementation were expected for the year after 
the initial implementation.
Leader: Manager Organisation, Info-Processing
Concurrent
Engineering
end 1995 - 
ongoing by 
7/1997
Aim: Increase the amount of teamwork in planning, design and development, and 
provide techniques and resources to properly co-ordinate that team involvement.
Main improvement areas: project planning, system level design, detailed design, 
business planning.
Leader: Manager Systems Engineering 
Sponsor: Engineering Director
Paperless 
Documentation 
System in 
Manufacturing
mid-1995 - end 
1996
Aim: Replace all paper work at the shop-floor. 
Leader: Lead Auditor
Organisational 
and Cultural 
Change Project
mid-1995 - 
ongoing by 
7/1997
Aim: Creation and establishment of a company structure and culture most 
appropriate to accommodate MILSYS' business reorientation.
Its four main issues: leadership, culture, organisational structure, and people 
management.
Leader: Business Administration Manager Engineering Department 
Sponsor: Technical Managing Director
Table L: TOP Program Projects and Initiatives
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They said that people involved in TOP were overloaded and projects were not properly 
linked. Further, and despite the informally recognised interdependency of the various 
projects, project leaders and members did not sufficiently co-operate or exchange 
information nor did they initiate joint actions.
While the TOP-Program comprised 6 individual projects, only the Organisational and 
Cultural Change Project is outlined here in greater detail, as it was of particular relevance to 
the CE implementation process.
5.5.1.1 The Organisational and Cultural Change Proj ect
The Organisational and Cultural Change (OCC) Project sought to create a company 
structure and culture most appropriate to accommodate MILSYS' new business 
reorientation. The OCC Project was co-ordinated and led by the Business Administration 
Manager of the Engineering Department and sponsored by the Technical Managing 
Director. It had no actual project team. The OCC Project Leader undertook most tasks 
himself and rarely consulted or worked together with other staff. His expertise regarding HR 
and related issues was based on his own experiences and understanding of HRM rather than 
on knowledge gained through training or education. With the emphasis on teamwork and the 
design and implementation of innovation-oriented HRM policies and practices, the 
Organisational and Cultural Change Project was a potential partner for the CE Project. Co­
operation between the two projects, however, did not occur.
A few months into the project, in Marchl996, the OCC Project Leader submitted a first 
strategy paper to senior management. It identified four main project objectives: culture, 
organisational structure, leadership, and HRM. It summarised the main ideas and thoughts 
concerning these topics and outlines the activities and suggested changes in each of the four 
areas.
The OCC Project Leader saw creating an open and productive atmosphere as an important 
condition for a successful cultural change. He emphasised that it was necessary to create an
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environment where complaints were possible and treated confidentially. Culture, in the 
context of the TOP, was determined by the OCC Project Leader as a "very open definition" 
as "a living thing within the organisation, .. .a  certain way, a kind o f agreement, how to do 
things". Within the culture category, an initial task for the project was to pick up the issue of 
communication raised by the first attitude survey. The results of the first attitude survey, as 
mentioned earlier, showed severe problems in MILSYS' communication processes. Many 
employees were dissatisfied with the communication process in the organisation, felt poorly 
informed about the change program and not involved in the ongoing changes. According to 
the Director of Quality Assurance, MILSYS':
"communication is going well from the top to middle management, perhaps 
even to lower level management. At that level information is being edited and it 
is almost as so, saying those people don't need to know this, ... they wouldn't 
understand anyway ... But information is coming down. But it is stopping at a 
point and not going further."
Based on recommendations of the external business consultants and the OCC Project 
Leader, senior management immediately acted to overcome these communication problems. 
In May 1995 a first company-wide presentation to all employees by the Technical Managing 
Director was organised. According to the OCC Project Leader "all employees o f the 
company were invited to hear about the business direction, competitors, products, 
productivity and targets". A general problem that occurred in this context was the amount of 
information provided. "Some employees wanted more information, while others got 
confused by the quantity that was offered", he continued. The OCC Project picked up this 
issue and initiated a number of different actions.
One of the actions involved the publication of an internal newsletter that was published on a 
monthly basis from June 1995, in an attempt to keep employees informed about the main 
changes going on within MILSYS. The information provided about the various change 
projects and initiatives, though, was not comprehensive. The CE Project Team later decided
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to publish its own newsletter.
The OCC Project also suggested regular presentations or meetings at the departmental level. 
The idea was that the manager of the department, in addition to the discussion of work- 
related issues, keeps all departmental staff informed about the ongoing change and discusses 
with them the implications for the department. These activities were seen as a way to 
improve the information and communication flow, to improve co-operation among people 
within departments and to raise awareness of the various projects run by the respective 
department. Initially, in mid-1995, a number of departments followed this suggestion. In 
mid-1996 only the Engineering Department was still holding such meetings (weekly to 
fortnightly, up to one hour) on a regular basis. These meeting followed a routine with a short 
presentation by the Engineering Director (which gave the meeting a high importance), 
followed by a discussion about various work-related topics (e.g. the acquisition of new 
contracts and from it resulting work packages for the department; the delegation of 
departmental staff onto projects).
Good organisational communication was seen by both Managing Directors as a major 
requirement to ensure employee involvement in organisational processes. It was seen as a 
means to strengthen commitment by building up a common vision and understanding across 
the company. Strong commitment embodied in proactive behaviour in turn was seen as of 
primary importance to create a "truly knowledge-based company" (Technical Managing 
Director). "What is better communication? ... It is knowledge sharing" summarised the 
Managing Director Business Administration.
While the OCC Project initiated the above-described activities, other initiatives also aimed 
to improve organisational communication. One such initiative was the implementation of an
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INTRANET49, which was stimulated and supported by the CE Project, another the 
Australian Quality Award Self-Assessment (see section 5.5.2.2).
All these activities contributed to better communication within the organisation by the end 
of the case study in mid-1997, and the impact of the numerous change efforts started to take 
form. According to an interviewee from staff level in 1997 ''communication is better than it 
was before. We are generally told what is going on". The results from the AQA Self­
Assessment also reflected an improved communication and information process. According 
to the Director of Quality Assurance:
"people are basically saying now that since then [start o f the change program 
at the end o f 1994] communication has improved dramatically. It doesn't mean 
it is as good as it could be, but we have improved. "
Despite first visible improvements, more deficiencies had to be overcome. The "top down" 
communication was sufficient, supported by a powerful e-mail and INTRANET system, but, 
according to the AQA Self-Assessment report, middle managers criticised that a formal 
"bottom up" communication other than project reporting was still missing. At the staff level 
people criticised that information was often only accessible over the computer (INTRANET, 
e-mail). Employees who did not work on a computer or did not know how to use it (e.g. 
many shop-floor workers) were largely excluded from the information and communication 
process. The Manufacturing Director criticised that:
"Involvement o f staff hasn't filtered down to all levels yet. Lower levels are 
often not given the opportunity to be involved in change projects. "
49 The INTRANET was described as a "system based on the architecture of the well-publicised 
INTERNET, except that it is totally contained to [MILSYS]" (Internal Document A10). It used a 
common web browser to navigate the web (information) pages of MILSYS and a search engine to 
search information. Information was accessible from any platform, and e-mail was integrated in the 
system. The INTRANET was given high importance by the Technical Managing Director and seen 
as a "prerequisite" in the improvement of organisational communication. He explained: "Though the 
e-mail is not all that bad, it is too cumbersome. The INTRANET is more conducive for the 
occasional asking questions. The INTRANET will be less formal”.
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As a result of the broad change process, employees at the staff level and managers built up a 
higher expectation regarding involvement in change processes that was difficult to fulfil by 
senior management. Senior management assumed that they have created the framework and 
provided the "prerequisites" for the change, and now people need to change their attitude to 
make it work, as the following quote by the Director of Quality Assurance indicates:
"The executives say, we have already put this and this in place. Why haven't 
you seen it yet? The staff on the other hand says, but you have not implemented 
it yet."
The disparity between senior management and staff showed that this was only the beginning 
of the transformation into a knowledge-based company.
Another task suggested by the OCC Project Leader (within the culture category) was the 
establishment of a measurable basis for employee satisfaction. In the second half of 1996 
MILSYS intended to update its first attitude survey from May 1995, and cany out such a 
survey each year. The results were meant to serve as a basis to measure the progress of the 
change program, adjust strategies and derive further improvement initiatives. For this 
purpose, the OCC Project Leader suggested that the survey be customised to take into 
account the specific nature of the organisation. But the survey was not repeated as initially 
planned. Instead, MILSYS cancelled this initiative in favour of an AQA (Australian Quality 
Award) Self-Assessment project, and this was to become the basis for a new attitude survey. 
Company representatives, for example, the Director for Quality Assurance and the OCC 
Project Leader saw the Self-Assessment as a better tool to obtain a comprehensive and 
profound picture of the organisation. The aim and results of the AQA Self-Assessment are 
discussed later.
Besides improvements in MILSYS communication process, the OCC Project proposed a
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number of alterations to the organisational structure, personnel policies and practices as well 
as the leadership style that were meant to strengthen teamwork, customer focus and 
innovation orientation.
The two most visible alterations to the company's organisational structure, suggested by the 
OCC Project, were the merger of previously nine Engineering Departments into five in May 
1996 (see Figure 20) and the establishment of a permanent bidding team. The Systems 
Engineering Department, which did not exist beforehand, was one of the five engineering 
sub-departments. The permanent bidding team, the so-called "A-Team" was set up as a 
separate department within Sales and Projects Department in October 1996. While its 
establishment influenced the nature of the development process with the determination of 
the pre-contractual phase, the CE Project Team was not consulted regarding the structure 
and scope of the bidding team.
Figure 20: New Structure of the Engineering Department, June 1996
With the restructuring of the Engineering Department in early 1996, a distinction was made 
between technology management and people management. People management was given 
formal recognition, as the following quote by the Business Administration Manager of the 
Engineering Department shows:
"We have taken away the technical focus offunctional managers to make them 
more people managers rather than technical managers. And we have within
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those groups individual technologists. We tried to distinguish between ... the 
people that do the people management, and the people that do the technology 
management.”
According to the Business Administration Manager of the Engineering Department, he and 
the Engineering Director were jointly responsible for HRM. Jointly they ensured that the 
function had the "the right people, that they have the right skills, the right succession plans, 
and that they are getting the right training".
The five functional managers below were "responsible fo r  their function, the people, and the 
resources within those different groups" (Business Administration Manager of the 
Engineering Department). They were responsible for performance reviews, the counselling, 
and the mentoring of the people within their area.
The Business Administration Manager of the Engineering Department called the staff within 
each of these 5 areas the "technologists". They were the experts in a particular field (for 
example radio-communications) and "responsible for the day to day management o f the 
technology and tools o f that particular discipline to satisfy the projects".
Though the OCC Project proposed these alterations to the company structure, it made no 
attempt to shift the emphasis within the matrix structure from functions to projects. The 
matrix structure with strong functional emphasis, which led to the "lightweight" role of 
Project Managers, remained untouched. The OCC Project Leader made no suggestions to 
devolve authority and responsibility from functional areas towards project teams, or to 
empower project teams more broadly than before.
Leadership was the third main focus of the OCC Project. In this area the OCC Project aimed 
to define criteria for good leadership in a situation of ongoing change and a stronger 
emphasis on teamwork. It was planned to determine the knowledge, skills, and personal 
attributes required for an appropriate team leader, and also for all other managers. 
Communication was found to be an important aspect of leadership. In this context the OCC
157
Project Leader formulated a number of questions, for which an answer was sought in the 
course of the OCC Project: "Are communication problems based on individuals?”, "What 
has to be done i f  a leader himself has communication problems?", "What are the 
requirements fo r  a good leader?", "Are these requirements the same at different levels?". 
These questions were meant to guide further actions by the OCC Project Leader.
One activity in the context of leadership was the initiation of an intensive, 6 day customised 
management training course. An external training provider conducted it in May 1996 outside 
the company premises. 65 people from middle management up to senior management, 
including the two Managing Directors, participated. The broad objective of the course was 
to "improve and enhance our management skills" as the OCC Project Leader summarised it. 
According to the Managing Director Business Administration, it also served as to build up a 
"common understanding" of the target of the change process. It was also meant "to prepare 
people for change" as they do "not necessarily enjoy change". The course covered aspects 
of conflict management, team development, people management and communication. It 
addressed issues such as the implementation of and adaptation to change. Emphasis was 
given to topics like the effective management and motivation of staff, the conduction of 
effective meetings, employee development. A number of training participants, however, 
argued that what they had learned during the training was too hard to implement. The OCC 
Project Leader was aware that it was difficult to measure whether the training course had 
indeed triggered changes in the approach to management and in the leadership style or not. 
There were, however, developments he attributed to the training course:
"Some o f the things that I  can certainly see, people seem to do a bit more 
planning fo r meetings, people seem to do a bit more planning in their work­
space. Some people are spending more time with their staff. Some people have 
given their staff more responsibility. I f  you ask the staff they may say they have 
got extra work."
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The participants and the OCC Project Leader saw the training alike as a means of raising 
managers' awareness for people management, teamwork, and cultural change issues, and to 
prepare them for the management of change. It was seen as the foundation for more specific 
training and further actions like project management assessment.
The training was also used by the OCC Project Leader to determine a new company vision 
and mission with the help of the training participants. The OCC Project Leader saw the 
formulation of a new vision statement as an important cornerstone for the establishment of a 
new leadership style as the following quote reflects:
"A proper vision, mission and value [statement] that the Managing Director 
can present to people, have people thinking about, have people following, is 
some indication o f future leadership."
A vision-mission statement had been formulated shortly after the take-over by the German 
parent. The OCC Project Leader's intention was it "to get rid o f [this] and to come up with 
something... more focused, something that people can relate to".
The growing importance of communication and HRM in the context of leadership became 
also visible in the introduction of the "360-degree feedback" in 1996, which is discussed in 
the next section.
Another target of the OCC Project was the inappropriateness of a number of personnel 
policies and practices, which needed to be modified so as to accommodate MTT.SVS' new 
business reorientation. This led to the proposal for changes in the HRM area. The aim here 
was to establish HRM policies and practices that reflected the company's greater emphasis 
on teamwork and innovation, and which would strongly support the leverage of knowledge. 
The OCC Project also stressed the importance of a strategically-oriented HRM specialist 
function. While such a function would link HRM and business strategy, it would also act as 
an internal consultancy to senior and line managers regarding all HRM and related issues.
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The OCC Project Leader recognised that such a transformation required new skills and 
experiences on the part of the HR Manager and the staff in the HR Department. No actions 
were however agreed upon or carried out to pursue these identified changes.
Changes were proposed and partly realised in a number of other personnel policies and 
practices, however. One was the introduction of the "360-degree feedback” r e v i e w 5 ^. In 
1996 the OCC Project Leader, with input from the HR Department, worked out a 12 criteria 
catalogue5 ̂  for such an assessment. At the end of 1995 the assessment was pilot tested on 
the assessment of the Technical Managing Director. It was planned to conduct the 
assessment on a yearly basis, and at the end of 1996 a second assessment was carried out. 
The comparison between the two assessments showed an improvement in certain areas, as 
the OCC Project Leader reported. An extension of the "360-degree feedback" to functional 
managers (with feedback from superior, customers, peers, subordinates) was considered. 
The responsibility for the broader application was given to the HR Department, which 
intended to consider it by mid-1997. By mid-1997, however, no further activities had taken 
place in this area.
Another issue that was addressed by the OCC Project under the HRM topic was the linkage 
between performance and rewards. MILSYS did not have a formalised bonus scheme. 
Bonuses were awarded in an ad hoc manner for outstanding performance (mainly to 
managers or R&D people) in the form of additional payments measured by the percentage of 
cost reduction or increased profit achieved. According to the OCC Project Leader bonuses 
were not awarded for "constantly good performance that did not achieve outstanding results 
but formed the basis fo r  efficiency and good co-operation". The OCC Project addressed the 
need for a greater variety of bonuses and different criteria for different performances. But by 501
50 For more detail on the origins and method of the "360-degree feedback" process see for example: 
Hedge and Borman (1995); Edwards and Ewen (1996); Rands (1998).
51 The 12 criteria catalogue included criteria such as: establishing clear objectives, delegating 
responsibility, participation in decision making, discussion of performance, information exchange, 
promotion of new tasks, frankness in assessment, salary related to performance, training 
opportunities.
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mid-1997 no specific changes had been proposed.
The OCC Project also looked for an appropriate incentive scheme to address the needs of 
teams. A concept was examined that linked rewards to team performance and measured it 
against certain criteria, such as project completion on time or within budget. In the end, 
however, the OCC Project Leader dismissed this concept as being too expensive for 
MILSYS. As no other satisfying solution could be found, this part of the project was put on 
hold, with the option to take it up again at a later point in time.
The OCC Project Leader also recommended improvements in the performance management 
area. He suggested consciously linking performance appraisal with training and 
development as well as career management and succession planning. Although the 
company's budget for training was "three times higher than the demanded training levy" 
(OCC Project Leader), training was conducted randomly and often with little co-ordination 
to career plans and departmental needs. Many managers were also hesitant to openly 
introduce and discuss succession plans. Based on these circumstances, the OCC Project 
Leader proposed and triggered some departmental efforts. One was the development of a 
training register and training needs database by the Engineering Department, the Quality 
Assurance Department with support from the HR Department.
The OCC-project tackled a broad number of issues of strategic importance. It proposed 
several changes affecting most if not all people in the company. The OCC Project Leader 
realised that organisational and cultural change was a comprehensive and an ongoing matter 
and would require many years. The activities in the four areas described above and the 
results that were achieved, he explained "only just scraped the surface, there is a lot more 
work on those to do in the future".
In comparison to the CE Project, neither the work nor the results of the OCC Project were 
broadly communicated. Although one of the project goals was to improve the 
communication process, no means were activated (for example a company-internal brochure
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about the project, an INTRANET web-side or the company newsletter) to achieve this. It 
was a conscious decision on the part of the OCC Project Leader not to inform people widely 
about the organisational and cultural change process. He explained that he did not have the 
time and people and did not want "to drown people with all these ideas" that otherwise were 
doomed to "fail".
Thus, it is not surprising that the majority of people interviewed were not aware of the 
significance of the project. Many employees, including those involved in other TOP 
projects, had only a vague idea of the scope of the OCC-project. They were not familiar with 
the proposed changes and other outcomes of the project and related the OCC Project largely 
to the comprehensive management training. They assumed that with the completion of the 
training, the OCC-project had completed its task. Moreover, even though the OCC Project 
dealt with issues that were crucial for CE and important to other proposed changes, co­
operation between the different change projects and initiatives did not take place. Neither 
was their co-operation demanded by the TOP co-ordinator, the Managing Director Business 
Administration, or the sponsor of the OCC Project, the Technical Managing Director.
5.5.2 P r o je c t s  a n d  In it ia t iv e s  C o m p l e m e n t in g  t h e  T O P -P r o g r a m
Complementing the TOP-Program, a number of additional projects and initiatives were 
brought into being. In line with the TOP projects they aimed to increase MTT.SYS' efficiency 
and innovation potential. They included the Australian Quality Award (AQA) Self­
Assessment, the establishment of a so-called "A-Team", the Project Management 
Assessment, and the Innovation Project (see Table M). In 1995/6 "lots o f people started 
projects. ...In  some ways there were lots o f activities, in some ways there was not much at 
all" claimed the CE Project Leader. The efforts from the various change initiatives and 
projects including those of the TOP projects were not bundled. The projects were running 
largely independently from each other, though they partly dealt with overlapping issues. The 
Managing Director Business Administration was the co-ordinator of the TOP projects.
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Change Projects 
& Initiatives 
Complementing Key Features of Change Projects & Initiatives Complementing TOP
TOP & 
Timeframe
Suggestion 
Scheme Project
Aim: Develop and implement a formal process for getting ideas regarding work 
and workplace improvements
end 1995 - 
ongoing by 
7/1997
Leader: Manufacturing Director
AQA Self­
Assessment
Aim: 1) Provide a measurement on how competitive and successful MIT .SYS was 
in comparison to other businesses within the corporation as well as other
end 1995 - (Self­
Assessment: 8- 
9/1996) - ongoing
by 7/1997
companies in Australia. 2) Identify and measure improvements in management and 
other overall organisational processes brought about by the change program that 
were intangible and difficult to quantify. 3) Address areas that were not yet covered 
by the already existing TOP projects or other initiatives.
Leader: Manager Strategy and Planning 
Sponsor: Director of Quality Assurance
Remuneration
Project
Aim: Introduction of more flexibility into remuneration arrangements at the shop- 
floor.
end 1995 - put on 
hold by end 1996
Scope broadened to include other areas. As no appropriate solution was found, 
project was put on hold.
Leader: Manufacturing Director
A-Team
setup in 10/1996 
- ongoing by
Aim: Set up of a team, which manages the entire project planning in the pre­
contractual phase to ensure bids and projects were documented in a consistent 
manner and as customer oriented as possible.
7/1997 Placed within die Sales and Marketing Department
Project
Management
Assessment
Skill assessment of all Project Managers, Business Administration Managers, 
project scheduling- and, project systems management services people in 9 key 
areas of project management expertise
6/1996 Conductor: AGSEI (Australian Graduate School of Engineering Innovation) 
Sponsor: Projects Executive
Innovation Project 
9/1996 - ongoing
Emphasised "innovativeness". Aim: Increase the company's innovation potential 
and find ways to react faster and better to customer requirements.
by 7/1997 Leader: former Engineering Director 
Sponsor: Technical Managing Director
Systems
Engineering
Aim: Process optimisation and best possible positioning of the new established 
function.
Project Leader: Systems Engineer
end 1995 - 
ongoing by 
7/1997
Sponsor: Systems Engineering Manager
Table M: Change Projects and Initiatives Complementing TOP
There was no co-ordinator for the projects complementing the TOP-Program. The TOP co­
ordinator provided little co-ordination and sponsorship, also for projects covered by TOP. 
Apart from few inter-project meetings, co-operation and communication between the
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individual projects did not take place or remained informal and dependent on informal 
liaisons between the individual Project Managers.
Out of the projects and initiatives complementing the TOP-Program, the Innovation Project, 
the Australian Quality Award Self-Assessment and the Project Management Assessment 
will be outlined in more detail in the following section.
5.5.2.1 The Innovation Project
The Innovation Project was brought into being at a relatively late stage of the overall change 
process. The first meeting of its project team took place in September 1996. The project was 
initiated by the Technical Managing Director. Its project leader was the former Engineering 
Director, who resigned in 1995 but joined MILSYS again in 1996 specifically for this task. 
The project was given high priority, and the Technical Managing Director himself 
functioned as project sponsor. It was provided with large resources in terms of people, time 
and finances. The Business Administration Manager of the Engineering Department selected 
the nine team members, after discussions with the Technical Managing Director. They were 
the "front runners" as the Technical Managing Director called them, the best people in the 
company, predominantly young engineers. Their selection was part of the Technical 
Managing Director's so called "strategy alignment". In some cases the selection took place 
at the cost of other projects (e.g. the CE Project). Team members were taken from other 
projects and were not always replaced. Some more experienced volunteers like the 
Engineering Director supplemented the Innovation Project team.
The Innovation Project team was tasked to find ways of increasing the company's innovation 
potential and ways to react faster and better to customer requirements. These issues were 
seen as a key to future competitiveness. According to the Technical Managing Director "the 
power o f imagination, vision, and thinking laterally about how to do business differently to 
meet customer needs ... will differentiate between [MILSYS] and our competitors". As the 
project aimed at improving innovativeness in the company, and not at product or process
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innovation, the name of the project was misleading. One of the first proposals the team came 
up with was a plan to provide people with sufficient time to be innovative and to follow up 
their own ideas. The Technical Managing Director approved "thousands o f hours in the 
budget" for this purpose.
The innovation team effectively used the newly implemented INTRANET to provide other 
employees with information about the Innovation Project. But again the team did not co­
operate with other change projects. By early 1997 the innovation team had not achieved any 
major results.
5.5.2.2 The Australian Quality Award Self-Assessment
The Australian Quality Award (AQA) Self-Assessment52 53was indirectly suggested by the 
parent company, which took part in a comparable quality initiative in Europe5-*. The project 
was brought into being in November 1995. The Director of Quality Assurance became the 
sponsor of the project, the Manager Strategy and Planning the project leader. The project 
pursued three major goals. Firstly to provide a measurement on how competitive and 
successful the company was, not only in comparison with other subsidiaries in the 
corporation but also with other companies in Australia. In addition, MTT.SYS "wanted
52 The Australian Quality Award (AQA) Self-Assessment is a comprehensive, systematic and 
repeatable review of an organisation's activities, where the results are referenced against a model of 
business excellence. The business model concept originated coincidentally in Australia and the USA 
in 1988, Europe following in 1992. It was derived from extensive reviews of successful companies. 
There are seven criteria (1 Leadership: 140 points; 2 Strategy, Policy and Planning: 80p.; 3 
Information and Analysis: 80p.; 4 People: 200p.; 5 Customer Focus: 180p.; 6 Quality of Process, 
Product, Service: 200p.; 7 Organisational Performance: 120p.), which break out into 21 sub-criteria. 
The points available from the criteria add up to 1.000. The organisation is seen as an integrated 
system with all components required to function together. The model describes the relationship 
between the assessment criteria and categorises elements of the system as drivers (1,5), enablers, 
which mobilise the full potential of the organisation to achieve its objectives (2,3,4), key processes, 
which are focused on how business and operational results are achieved (6), and outcome (7). The 
process allows an organisation to discern clearly its strengths and areas in which improvements can 
be made and culminates in planned improvement actions which are then monitored for progress. On 
the basis of its self-assessment a company may decide results to enter the Award program and 
submit itself for an external assessment. A score of >450 is required to be considered for an external 
award. Source: Australian Quality Council (AQC).
53 The European Quality Award (EQA) was established in 1992. The model is very similar to the 
Australian model.
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something ... which would cope with the fact that the company's business was changing ... 
from  a product oriented company... to a more system-integration company" and thus had a 
"changing baseline in the balance sheet" explained the Director of Quality Assurance. 
Secondly the project set out to identify and measure improvements in management and other 
overall organisational processes (e.g. training) brought about by the change program that 
were intangible and difficult to quantify. Finally the project wanted to address areas that 
were not yet covered by the already existing TOP projects or other initiatives.
The Director of Quality Assurance chose a guided self-assessment54 for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, it was chosen for its low cost, secondly its fast execution. A third reason 
was the high level of understanding of the AQA process the self-assessment generates would 
enable MILSYS to eventually do its own assessments. A fourth reason was the high 
involvement of the executive management, other managers and staff to ensure the ownership 
of the process and the outcomes. The guided self-assessment, facilitated by a representative 
of the Australian Quality Council, involved 12 senior executives, 43 managers and 90 
employees in a series of workshops and focus groups.
MILSYS was assessed on seven main criteria: Leadership; Strategy, Policy and Planning; 
Information and Analysis; People; Customer Focus; Quality of Process, Product, Service; 
and Organisational Performance. The overall score they achieved "was 415 out o f a possible 
score o f  1000", which put MILSYS "in the moderately high range compared to other 
organisations imdergoing this type o f assessment. ... The 'Process' category was the leading 
scorer followed by 'Measures o f Performance' and 'Customer Focus'. The 'People' and 
'Planning' categories were the lowest rated. " (Internal Document C8).
The results of the self-assessment were translated into "strengths" and "opportunities for  
further improvement". In addition, according to the Director of Quality Assurance, "a firm
54 Other assessment options evaluated were: independent assessment; internal assessment; survey; 
matrix; awards simulation; management workshop.
166
commitment [was made] to the people" to inform everybody who contributed to this 
process about the results of the AQA Self-Assessment. All executive and middle managers 
received a copy of the self-assessment report and a summary report was given to every 
employee. The report was also put on the INTRANET and made accessible for everybody 
with computer access.
On the basis of the assessment results the AQA Project leader recommended a number of 
key actions. Most of them were approved by senior management. They included the 
definition of performance indicators (both individual, department and project) across all 
levels of the organisation. Another approved action was the establishment of a project 
launch protocol that included the increase of staff awareness of company goals, project 
goals, objectives and practices and the contract requirements. Another assessment was 
proposed for the end of 1997.
The results from the self-assessment, particularly relating to HRM issues influenced the 
work of the CE Project Team and contributed to their later emphasis on HRM. Further, the 
AQA Project sponsor discussed the results in more detail with the CE Project Team and 
supported the CE training activities.
5.5.2.3 The Project Management Assessment
During the management training in May 1996 it was argued by the participants that Project 
Managers needed more training in order to be better prepared for the ongoing and upcoming 
changes. In the result, the OCC Project Leader recommended a Project Management 
Assessment. He saw the assessment as a further step towards becoming an innovation- and 
team-oriented company. Senior management accepted the proposal and the Projects 
Executive organised the assessment.
The appraisal process was conducted in June 1996 in co-operation with the Australian 
Graduate School of Engineering Innovation (AGSEI). All Project Managers, Business 
Administration Project Managers, project scheduling people, people from project systems
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management services were assessed in relation to the standard set by the Australian Institute 
of Project Management55. The assessment process consisted of interviews and a PMC 
(Project Management Competence) Self-Assessment. The assessment results showed 
weaknesses particularly in risk management and HRM. "We are good in managing the 
numbers, but not the people, and this is reflected in the assessment report", explained a 
Project Manager (2). Based on the results, MILSYS intended to tailor further training and 
staff development actions to the needs of these people to help them to overcome the 
observed weaknesses and fortify the identified strengths.
5.6 SUMMARY
MILSYS was a profitable enterprise in the sense that it performed well in its market and 
kept winning bids. However, the profit margin had decreased over time. As this section 
showed, MILSYS' conventional product development process was no longer tenable, 
particular regarding the changing industry MILSYS was operating in, with less funding 
available and increasingly international competition for projects in a formerly protected 
market. An opportunity to restructure arose under an efficiency-improvement program 
initiated by the company's multi-national parent. As part of the analysis conducted by 
external consultants under this program, it was suggested that CE offered considerable 
promise for the company. This was accepted by the company’s Executives, and a CE Project 
Team, lead by the Systems Engineering Manager, was appointed.
The change program, of which the CE Project was one part, provided a good basis for the 
implementation for CE. It focused not only on technological changes. It also looked at 
organisational changes in the form of team-oriented HRM policies and practices and the
55 The assessment was based on the competency standards published by the Australian Institute of 
Project Management (AIPM) in 9 key areas of project management expertise: Project Integration; 
Scope Management; Time Management; Cost Management; Quality Management; Human Resource 
Management; Communications Management; Risk Management; Procurement Management. The 
standards specify what individual project managers and project team members can be expected to do 
in their work.
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establishment of an innovation- and team-oriented organisational culture.
Despite the close relation of various projects, co-operation or communication between them 
took hardly place, as outlined earlier. The different projects were not integrated and instead 
run on parallel paths. Although some inter-project meetings took place, co-operation and 
communication remained informal and dependent on ongoing relationships between 
individual managers.
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6 HRM  IN M ILSYS
The aim of this chapter is to analyse MILSYS' approach to HRM and to provide a more 
detailed picture of HRM as a specialist function and HRM as an organisation-wide activity 
within the company. This is of great importance for the discussion of the HRM role in the 
conceptualisation and implementation process of CE in MILSYS and the significance HR 
issues were given in the CE concept. At first a brief historical outline of the development of 
HRM in the company is provided. This is followed by an analysis of the HRM Department 
regarding meeting the requirements of a HRM specialist function. The third part of this 
chapter examines HRM as generic organisation-wide activity. It analyses the 
"internalisation o f the importance o f human resources on the part o f  line managers" (Legge, 
1995b, xv) in MILSYS.
6.1 THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF HRM IN MILSYS
Looking at HRM in MILSYS from a historical perspective (see Figure 21), the appointment 
of a new HR Manager in 1990 had a strong impact on HRM as a specialist function. The 
appointment occurred in connection with the take-over by the German parent company. The 
former HR Manager met the criteria of a "contract-manager", partly even those of an 
"architect"56. The new one fitted more those of a "clerk o f works" (Tyson and Fell, 1986) as 
discussed later. The former HR Manager, university educated, was member of the Executive 
Committee. He acted as advisor to middle and senior management, and was actively 
involved in organisational processes, as long-serving senior managers reported. With the 
take-over, he took the opportunity to retire.
170
H RM Development in MILSYS
TOP Program 
Start, end 1994
1. AQA Seäf-Assessment 
Process, 11/1995-9M99S
Remunerajon 
Project 1995/6
OCC Project 
TOd 1995
From about 1000 Employees in 1990 [ ReducSon of Staff] to about 400 Employees in 1993
BnüsfT 
Sue sciarvi Takeover 2/1» German Subsidiary
1993 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 9 10 111995 1996 1997
1. Enterprise 
Agreement 1992
•ricero si HR Appoèrrtment of Trad/scna- 
Sceaa.'s; Oriented HR Manager, 1990
1. Strategy Paper 
Submitted by OCC 
Project 3/1996
Modified Enterprise 
Agreement 1997
Formai Ressors»;,t/  for 
Srategc HRM 
Taken Up by TMD. 1990
TMO - Tscrn car Managing Direc&r 
OCC - O p an, sac era' & Cufiurai Charge
■ ImSvkiuä Certerec Catture - Raising of Team Awareness —----------------------------------------------------------- »
First Changes in HR Policies and Practices RefiecSng Sponger Team Emphasis, 1995/96
1994
Figure 21: HRM Development in MILSYS
The appointment of the new HR Manager was meant to serve as a stopgap until an 
appropriate new candidate was found, in order to maintain the day-to-day operation of the 
HR Department. The current HR Manager was suitable for this task, as he knew the 
company and its administrative operation well. However, no efforts were made later to 
replace him with a manager meeting the criteria of an "architect” (Tyson and Fell,. 1986). 
The appointment of the current HR Manager - termed a "historical accident" by a member 
of the Executive Committee - led to a permanent restriction of the department's scope and 56
56 HRM strategists or "architects" are often identified in the literature (e.g. Tyson and Fell, 1986; 
Boxall and Dowling, 1990: Sisson, 1995; Marks et al., 1996; Wittingslow, 1997) as a small but high 
influential group of HRM professionals, who focus on HRM strategy formulation and adjustment 
mid closely cooperate with the top management. They are enabled to proactively influence business 
and change strategies and are involved with their formulation, and thus have a significant impact on 
the survival and success of a company and its organisational performance. HRM strategists are 
separated from most operational HRM responsibilities. For more detail on roles in personnel see 
chapter four.
171
influence on organisational processes. It was a step back in the positioning and importance 
of HRM within the MILSYS. It was in the Technical Managing Director's power to change 
this situation, but he did not enforce any action. With the appointment of the then new HR 
Manager, more strategic aspects of HRM (like the development of an HRM strategy, the 
initiation of changes in HR policies and practices, HRM planning) became the responsibility 
of the Technical Managing Director. With the initiation of the TOP-Program, however, a 
move towards greater emphasis of teamwork and an emphasis on employees as a valuable 
resource did become visible. This could be seen in the establishment of the OCC Project, 
which focused on teamwork and the improvement of the communication process within the 
organisation.
Two other developments in the HRM field in the mid-to late 1980s and early 1990s were the 
changes in the composition of the workforce and the establishment of an enterprise 
agreement in 1992 under what was the new industrial relations legislation57. In the early 
1980s, the company had experienced major layoffs particularly in manufacturing. Union 
representatives were also affected by the layoffs. What had been a strong trade union 
influence diminished, and from 1985, trade unions were no longer formally involved in the 
company. In the 1990s "there [was] no union influence in this place at all" (Director of 
Quality Assurance). With MILSYS' shift of strategic focus from manufacturing to systems 
electronics the composition of the workforce continued to change. The number of shop-floor 
and shop-floor related employees was further reduced while the number of engineers 
increased. In 1996 MILSYS had about 360 permanent employees. Only about 35% of these 
were shop-floor people (compared to 70% in the mid-1980s), and about one third were 
professional engineers.
While MILSYS' shop-floor organisation was not involved in unions, the company "still
57 For more information on Enterprise Bargaining see for example: Callus (1997), Hawke and 
Wooden (1998), Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) (1996).
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needed some sort o f  arrangement between that group o f workers and the company so that 
you have stability" explained the Director of Quality Assurance. The first Enterprise 
Agreement was established at a time when the organisation was "transiting between a union 
based environment with a closed shop, where HR had to tell people applying fo r a job here 
'unless you are prepared to join union you couldn't work here', into a new era". The idea of 
an Enterprise Agreement was raised by the HR Manager in 1991, then discussed and 
approved by the Executive Committee. The HR manager "was told to organise for the shop- 
floor people to establish a committee". Shop-floor people elected about 6 representatives 
from various areas onto the committee. The committee met regularly with the HR Manager 
and jointly they established certain goals and agreements. The Executive Committee 
authorised the Agreement in 1992. The Agreement covered payroll and working conditions 
(such as hours of work, a rostered day off approach, evening shift conditions, conditions for 
exercise activity and background music). The Agreement was seen by company 
representatives as "a step forward from having something which was externally set to having 
a company award which was an agreement between the company and the employees". The 
Enterprise Agreement covered shop-floor people only. It did not involve clerks, 
administration, or engineering employees, who were covered by individual employment 
contracts. Towards the end of the case study, in mid-1997, the company was about to 
embark on another enterprise agreement.
With the initiation of the TOP-Program MELSYS' strategy towards employee relations 
moved from "traditional" towards a more "sophisticated human relations" approach58 
(Purcell and Gray, 1986). Employees were increasingly represented as the company's most 
valuable resource. Though MILSYS offered an "only average" pay (Project Manager 2), it 
emphasised internal recruitment ("weprefer to make internal appointments", HR Manager)
58 See Purcell and Gray (1986) and Purcell (1987) for a typology of management style/strategy in 
employee relations.
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and maintained an internal grievance procedure which operated without the involvement of 
trade unions. According to the HR Manager, the company "addressed issues with people 
within the company rather than have them relying on the need o f a trade union to represent 
them". The Director of Quality Assurance explained that "the idea [was] to allow our 
people to fully involve themselves in the organisation because they are part o f it. Not that it 
is them and us, but we are all in it together". As mentioned earlier, high levels of funding 
were provided for training and development. In 1995, MILSYS initiated what were to be 
regular attitude surveys and focused on the improvement of the communication processes 
with employees, as outlined earlier. The set up of the OCC Project, sponsored by the 
Technical Managing Director, indicated that HRM issues were given a high profile by senior 
management in their general deliberations on business strategy.
At the end of the case study in mid-1997, MILSYS had introduced a number of changes to 
existing HR policies and practices. The individual areas of HRM and HRM practices, 
however, were not interrelated and did not form a systematic holistic approach to HRM. 
Attitudes and behaviours towards HRM (also those of senior and middle managers) had not 
substantially changed despite the rhetoric59, and the time and effort it takes to implement 
organisational and cultural changes was still being underestimated.
6.2 THE HRM DEPARTMENT - A HRM SPECIALIST FUNCTION?
6.2.1 T h e  HR D e p a r t m e n t  - St r u c t u r e  a n d  C o m p o sit io n
This section describes the structure and composition of MILSYS' HR Department and
59 This was reflected in the management of the CE Pilot Project and some incidents during the CE 
training sessions, see chapter nine.
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analyses whether or not it was meeting the criteria of a specialist function60.
The HR Department in MILSYS had a low status. In MELSYS' organisation structure the 
box for the HR Department was arranged below the boxes for the five main functions 
(Engineering, Material Planning and Control, Quality Assurance, Manufacturing, Sales and 
Projects). The HR Manager was not a Director or member of the Executive Committee. The 
HR Department was largely occupied with providing routine administrative services to line 
management and welfare provision to employees. It had a short-term planning horizon, a 
low level of discretion and was subservient to line management. It was not represented in 
the Executive Committee. The HR Department was made up of 8-9 staff including the HR 
Manager. It was subdivided into four areas of responsibility: Recruitment and 
Administration (four staff), Recruitment and Training (one staff), Occupational Health and 
Safety (one staff), and Site Security (two staff) as pictured in Figure 22. In mid-1996 a new 
appointee was given responsibility for recruitment and training. In accordance with the 
internal recruitment, he was hired from inside the company.
Non of the HR staff members had a bachelor or masters degree in personnel or HRM. Some 
of them had acquired TAFE diploma. Hofstede's (1994) argument that the qualification of 
the HR Manager tends to give an indication of the department's priorities seemed to be 
endorsed in MILSYS. The background of the HR Manager was an administrative one. His 
position was best described as "clerk o f works" (Tyson and Fell, 1986), administering basic
60 Based on Tyson and Fell (1986), Storey (1992) and Dunphy and Stace (1994), HRM as a specialist 
function (respectively HRM specialists) was defined in chapter four as a function (or person) 
concerned with the development and implementation of a HRM strategy linked to the company's 
business strategy, the elaboration and establishment of appropriate employment policies and 
practices that support the achievement of the organisational goals in conjunction with and through 
line managers and employees. According to Mansfield (1997), the specialist function does not 
necessarily fall together with the HR Department, but can be taken up by other external or internal 
representatives. As further established in chapter four, the differentiation between HRM as a generic 
organisation-wide activity and HRM as a specialist function is accompanied by a redefinition of 
HRM roles with at least three distinct HRM areas or functions and respective stakeholder groups 
with specific expertise: HRM strategy (with HRM strategists, change consultants and the top 
management as stakeholders), HRM line accountability (with line managers, team leaders and 
increasingly teams) and HR systems (with HR systems administrators).
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Figure 22: Organisational Structure of the HR Department
routines and providing welfare and routine administrative services. As suggested by Legge 
(1995b, p. 46), these included the recording of information required under relevant 
legislation and the maintenance of systems in order to provide staff establishment and 
payroll data. The HR Manager was not a member of a professional HRM organisation like 
AHRI (Australian Human Resource Institute), nor were any of his other staff members. As 
suggested in Tyson and Fell's (1986) definition of the "clerk o f works", MILSYS' HR 
Manager moved into this role on promotion from a clerical position. His experience was 
based on a long administrative career within the company (about 20 years of service) as an 
accountant and salary administrator. The limited experience of the HR Manager was seen by 
many managers as a main cause for his limited ability to apply a strategic focus to HRM.
The development of employee commitment and the management of cultural change are 
usually seen as two major concerns of HRM (in contrast to a Personnel function- Guest, 
1987). MILSYS' HR Manager and the other HR staff members, however, showed no 
aspiration to move towards this change-maker role. Neither did they emphasise a strategic 
pursuit in personnel matters. The lack of aspiration may have been due to a number of 
reasons such as the nature of their routine workload and operating style (routine 
recruitment, administering basic routines), the financial orientation of the system (provide
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head count, payroll, performance against budget data), their education and work experience 
(clerical career, mostly junior level of staff) (Legge, 1995b, p.45-47; Tyson and Fell, 1986, 
p. 24), the level of resources, but also the Technical Managing Director's approach to HRM, 
as discussed in chapter nine. The HR personnel were neither equipped nor encouraged to 
take on a change-maker role, they slotted in to clearly -defined roles and procedures.
The nature of the HR Department's routine workload and operating style becomes apparent 
in the next quote. During 1996 and early 1997 the HR Department was largely occupied 
with the retrenchment of manufacturing staff and the recruitment of engineers in response to 
the company's business reorientation to a systems house. The HR Manager explained his 
role as follows:
"We [MILSYS] have just been through some changes in manufacturing. We had 
to seek some volunteers for retrenchment.... I  was involved in communicating 
this information to the people and seeking the volunteers and providing 
information to people as towards what their benefits were, ... doing their pay 
calculations for their entitlements,... andfinal letters and certificates o f service 
and this sort o f things. ... On the other hand [I am] now looking for a number 
o f engineers in other areas to work on other projects. From my point o f view, 
our approach to things is more traditional. That may be based on my own 
experiences over the time I've been on the site here, what is now about 20 
years."
The new staff member employed in 1996 did not bring any new expertise and strength for 
the HR Department. He was an older, long-serving employee with experience in 
administration and training in manufacturing. Similar to the other staff in the function, he 
had no formal tertiary education in HRM nor did he belong to any relevant professional 
organisation. He seemed satisfied with his move and glad to have escaped the layoffs in 
manufacturing. He showed little interest in taking over a more proactive role in MILSYS' 
change process. The Department's resources remained too limited to adequately engage 
within change initiatives.
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The HR Manager and other staff in the HR Department were recruited and organised to play 
a particular "clerical" role (Legge, 1995b). The Technical Managing Director consciously 
limited the HR Department to operational duties and welfare provision and saw "HRATs role 
... more in the soft factors, to look after them [employees]".
The HR Department was not part of senior management team and thus, excluded and 
sidelined from MELSYS' change program. Those tasks resided with senior management and 
selected line managers. The HR Department provided only limited support to the individual 
change projects. This consisted mainly of administrative support for training (e.g. as in the 
case of the CE Project), or advising on the legal aspects of personnel management and 
providing information about legal frameworks (e.g. as in the case of the Remuneration 
Project).
The HR Department did not even meet limited expectations of change project leaders and 
managers regarding its contribution to certain HRM issues within the change program. 
Middle managers had expected the HR Department to be more involved in the change 
process, as the AQA Self-Assessment indicated, and were disappointed with the 
Department's insignificant contributions to individual projects. The OCC Project Leader for 
example complained that regarding the restructuring of the remuneration package "they 
came up with something. But for the average man or woman in the company, it will not 
mean much. ... Not very much has progressed on that [the remuneration package]”. The CE 
Project Leader saw the jobs of the HR people as "very bounded. It is hiring and firing. They 
don't have the background really to be able to help". Other managers shared this attitude 
towards the HR Department. As a result, line managers themselves became initiators of 
changes to HRM policies and practices.
6.2.2 HRM  AS A SPECIALIST FUNCTION
As suggested by Mansfield (1997) and discussed in chapter four, HRM as a specialist 
function does not have to fall together with the HR Department. This was the case in
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MILSYS. The HR Department was not a specialist function in the sense that it was 
concerned with the development and implementation of a HRM strategy linked to the 
company's business strategy or the elaboration and establishment of appropriate employment 
policies and practices. The Business Administration Manager of the Engineering 
Department in his role as leader of the OCC Project largely took up these issues. The 
Technical Managing Director’s vision of creating "a truly knowledge-based company" was 
the driving force behind several initiatives and activities within the change program in 
general and the OCC Project in particular. He dominated and drove the company's 
knowledge management concept and the way the company went about it, as his next quote 
reflects:
"You leverage the knowledge o f professionals by finding a system that a 
person, a younger engineer, who is still way behind an experienced one, can 
tap into, learn quickly and catch up with the better one by not having to bother 
him. ... I f  you are truly a knowledge-based company, you should go straight 
into the INTRANET or e-mail and [find] somebody in this company or sister 
company ... who has done this [problem] before ... I f  three or four people do 
this, chances are that the person who asked this, will have in no time 80% o f  
what he requires. So he will put in a much more superior submission to the 
customer, in a much shorter period o f time and can go on with the job or with 
the next job elsewhere. That is what leverage knowledge means. You live on 
each others experiences and brains and knowledge and everything else. And 
that is starting now."
In early 1997, the transition towards a knowledge company was still "at the beginning and 
not as fa r  advanced" as the Technical Managing Director had anticipated. "If we had an 
honest knowledge-based company" he claimed "people would volunteer [to leverage 
knowledge]". The limited achievements may have been due to the protractedness of such 
complex change, but also to the limited time and resources made available for the OCC 
Project and a lack of specialist HRM knowledge and expertise. Though a number of 
scattered efforts had been made by the OCC Project Leader (e.g. several changes to existing
179
personnel policies and practices, mostly in the area of performance appraisal, training and 
development), in early 1997 they were not fully implemented nor had they been widely 
discussed. Many people knew about the aspired transition into a knowledge-based company, 
but knew little about the details of the planned changes. The changes did not make up a 
holistic, organisation-wide approach, they did strongly enforce the attitudinal and 
behavioural changes required to realise a knowledge based company and CE.
6.3 HRM AS AN GENERIC ORGANISATION-WIDE ACTIVITY
With the initiation of MILS YS' change program in 1994, HRM was increasingly viewed by 
the management team as a shared responsibility of senior management, line managers, 
employees and teams. These were all seen as playing a role in planning and implementing 
HR policies and practices that would enable the effective utilisation and development of the 
company's key resource and the establishment of a "truly knowledge-based" organisation. 
From 1994/95 on MILSYS also devolved more HRM accountability to line management^. 
This section shows what HR responsibilities were devolved to line management. It discusses 
how functional managers coped with their HRM accountability and in what areas line 
managers evolved as initiator of changes to existing HRM policies and practices. 
Traditionally functional managers looked after some aspects of HRM for their subordinates 
(e.g. performance appraisal, training and development, selection of staff for projects). With 
the initiation of the change program in 1994/5, Project Leaders, Business Administration 
Managers and teams also started to take responsibility and ownership of certain operational 
HRM aspects. Line management dealt with more and more HRM issues. Legge (1995b, p. 
xv) calls this phenomenon the "internalization o f the importance o f human resources on the 
part o f line managers". At the beginning of the change process, HRM activities were still of 
low importance to many line managers. They had not recognised the value of HRM nor their 61
61 If not otherwise specified line management comprises functional managers, business administration 
managers and project managers.
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own responsibility for it. They had little or no training or qualification in HRM. 
Nevertheless they felt confident to deal with HR issues and considered their efforts in this 
respect as sufficient, as interviews and informal talks indicated. The AQA Self-Assessment 
and Project Management Assessment results identified HRM as one of the weakest 
managerial areas and showed that most managers in MELSYS largely underestimated HRM 
in its complexity and difficulty.
Consequently, the company provided various training sessions on HRM and related issues, 
and stimulated a continuous discussion of various HR topics. In early 1997, the awareness of 
line managers for HRM processes was raised. Line managers were more actively involved 
with the initiation and management of the organisational and cultural change process. They 
also became aware of the complexity of HRM and their often limited ability and expertise in 
this area. Though functional managers were still spending a larger proportion of time on 
personnel matters than Project Managers, Project Managers started to consciously take up 
HRM responsibilities. They co-operated with functional managers in assessing project 
members. They recommended training, stimulated communication processes and recognised 
team members for their project achievements.
A step towards the greater devolution of HRM accountability to line management was the 
restructuring of the Engineering Department in 1996, as described earlier. This included a 
redefinition of the tasks and responsibilities of the various managers in this area and a clear 
distinction between people and technology management took place, as outlined earlier. 
According to the Business Administration Manager of the Engineering Department, 
MILSYS also made efforts to depart from the traditional practice of promotion by seniority 
and aimed to establish a dual career ladder62.
62 A proposal for a dual career ladder was made by the former Engineering Director in late 1994 and 
its main ideas summarised in the paper 'Engineering Career Structure and Competency Standards". 
The system was based on a multi-level scheme. After passing three basic levels (and gaining 
respective experiences, skills and competencies) an orientation towards a more technical or 
managerial career was intended/possible. Both paths were subdivided into three, respectively four 
levels, with each level requiring particular skills and competencies.
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"We are trying to get away from promotion by seniority. That we don't say, you 
are the oldest, the next most senior, therefore you are the person that heads up 
a group o f people, whereas he headed up a technology before."
Prior to 1994/5 (and typical of engineering-dominated organisations) it was a common 
practice that long-serving technical specialists were appointed to managerial positions even 
though they had neither managerial experience nor good people management skills. In 1996, 
a number of management positions were still filled with technical experts rather than 
management experts. "Our managers are probably stronger on the technical side o f things. 
That is a legacy that we have within the company", claimed the Business Administration 
Manager of the Engineering Department. It was more likely to be promoted into a senior 
management position from a functional position than those of a Project Manager. "When you 
are working in a really project oriented rather than a functional oriented organisation, than 
the leaders o f the organisation are chosen from among the ranks o f the Project Managers 
rather than from the functional department managers. This is not happening here yet", 
explained a Project Manager (3). In addition, most functional managers hesitated to engage 
in succession planning. They felt uncomfortable in identifying a possible successor for a 
particular position. According to the Business Administration Manager of the Engineering 
Department succession they saw planning as a source of disturbances within the department 
which often lead to unnecessary resignations in cases where people felt deprived of then- 
prospects of promotion.
Another activity that showed line management's involvement in the change process, was the 
design of the earlier mentioned training register and training needs database in early 1996. It 
was a joint undertaking of the Quality Assurance-, the Engineering and the HR Department. 
The aim was to establish a systematic approach to training and development. On one hand 
the database looked at the provision and quality of training courses, on the other hand at the 
training and skills needed for certain positions or jobs. Prior to 1996, MTT.SYS mainly
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focused on technical training. According to the Director of Quality Assurance "a lot o f 
training [was] initiated by the arrival o f a glossy brochure in someone's mail, rather than ... 
planning it, structuring it and ensuring that everyone, who is doing a similar sort o f job, has 
the same level o f  training". Managers typically approved training as long as an employee 
was able to prove its relevance to work tasks. According to a Project Manager (2) the 
decision to approve training was not a matter of whether the company was able to "afford it" 
or not: "It is purely a question o f whether it is justified. I f  it is justified then we can afford 
it". But internal skill development, where people gathered experiences in other than the 
home department, was not a common practice. It was occasionally practised at the 
instigation of an interested employee. Managers admitted that a number of people, who had 
worked in a different department, were as a rule better team players and co-operated and 
communicated more effectively across functional boundaries.
With the training register, the company aimed to streamline the provision of training and to 
improve the quality of the training offered. First successes included the identification of 
more appropriate and high quality computer courses. MILSYS standardised on certain 
courses, e.g. in document writing and procedure writing. With the initiation of the change 
program many training initiatives were also approved that aimed at changing attitudes and 
behaviours. Technical skill training, however, remained an important category.
In the development of the training needs database, the representatives of the three 
departments determined the competency standards for every generic position within their 
departments. Every person in that position was then assessed to see what competencies and 
skills were missing. This gap analysis was meant to serve as the basis for a training budget 
review and more focused expenditure. Until early 1997 however, the data were not used for 
these purposes.
Managers of the Quality Assurance and Engineering Department considered the training 
register and training needs databases a helpful tool in staff development matters and the 
selection of appropriate project staff. It fell into disuse, however, because its maintenance
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required a lot of time. According to the Director of Quality Assurance they "gathered a lot 
o f data in it, but never went any further with it". The initiative had no champion to enforce 
its continuous application, or as the Director of Quality Assurance put it there was "no one 
in the driver's seat fo r  it".
Line managers also initiated changes in the area of performance appraisal. Prior to 1995 
performance appraisals were carried out by functional managers even when an employee 
was assigned full-time to a project. The appraisal process was carried out annually. It was 
used to identify training needs and discuss individual staff development actions. Employees 
and managers, however, criticised the appraisal process saying it was too sporadic and 
needed "more regular application" and that agreed actions were often not followed up. In 
many cases it depended on the persistence of the individual employee whether any further 
steps were taken and the agreed training and development activities realised. According to 
the Director of Quality Assurance, the performance appraisal was "rarely looked at 
progressively throughout the year. It tend[ed] to be something where many managers pull 
the things [records] out o f their drawers after the year got by, asking, how well did you 
perform against that, rather than being a progressive measure ".
In 1995, with the company's stronger emphasis on teamwork, some functional managers 
started to involve Project Managers in the assessment process. The Technical Managing 
Director explained the new approach as follows:
"The appraisal is predominantly done by the functional heads, because they 
understand it better. ... The Project Manager knows whether [a person] 
performs well in the project or not. But whether [this person] is a first class 
engineer is very important fo r us too. So the chief engineer [functional 
manager] appraises those people with the Project Manager."
The Technical Managing Director took the view that functional managers have not only the 
freedom but also the obligation to customise the performance appraisal process to their 
departmental needs, as the next quote indicates:
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"If some people don't like the current appraisal forms and systems, it is up to 
them, what they make with it. ... I  expect totally different answers from a 
marketing manager compared to an accountant." Technical Managing Director
The Engineering Director and Business Administration Manager of the Engineering 
Department followed this request and modernised the performance appraisal for the 
Engineering Department. A set of performance objectives63 was formulated on the basis of 
so-called "SMART" criteria64 and was applied in the appraisal process of managers of the 
Engineering Department. It was expected that these managers would apply this process with 
their subordinates. It was also expected that the managers would co-operate with Project 
Managers when their staff members worked on projects. The new performance objectives in 
the Engineering Department were still not particularly team orientated, but some of the 
objectives promoted teamwork.
MILSYS did not have a formal reward scheme65. Rewards were determined in an informal 
and subjective matter by the Technical Managing Director and other senior managers, as the 
next two quotes reflect:
"If there has been a considerable good performance in particular areas, for  
example a very dedicated team o f engineering and marketing staff developed a 
product, we give them a spontaneous bonus. . . .I t  could be something like an 
additional month's salary. ... There is no procediere that says, this is the way it 
works." Business Administration Manager of the Engineering Department
"There is no formal [reward] structure. But we [MILSYS] recognise 
immediately. We have special bonuses. ... I  call them in here, both sometimes
63 Performance objectives for engineering managers: job knowledge, training and preparation, 
problem solving ability, creativity, leadership of staff, development of staff, responsibility, 
reliability, ability to get results, profit cost awareness, exchange of knowledge, relationship and 
contribution to the management team.
64 SMART stands for Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, and Time-constrained objectives.
65 It is referred here to rewards and bonuses over and above the remuneration system.
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individuals and sometimes teams, depending on the task. ... I f  you have a team 
that beat the world ..., I  know the people who contributed. I  live in this 
company, so I  call them in here. Then I  give them the bonus and that is it. We 
don't put it on the wall or say that person got 7000, this person got 10000 
Dollars." Technical Managing Director
Individuals as well as project teams were able to quality for a reward within the "quiet 
bonus scheme" as the Technical Managing Director referred to it. However, it was the 
prevailing practice to reward individuals. Only in rare circumstances teams were rewarded. 
Rewards, both for teams and individuals, were usually financial bonuses. Non-monetary 
forms of reward and recognition (such as mentioning a person's name in the company's 
newsletter or a notice at the home department's notice-board) were not widely used. 
Managers rarely gave credit for good performance or a good idea or the participation in an 
initiative. This was reflected in the discussions of numerous CE training sessions as well as 
the attitude survey and the AQA Self-Assessment. These revealed that employees, including 
managers, felt inadequately valued for their contributions, particularly those accomplished 
in teams. According to the CE Project Leader, MTLSYS had "no tradition or policy here to 
recognise people". Another employee noted that MILSYS is "not a company for giving pats 
on the back" (CE Pilot Project member). The distribution of rewards in MILSYS 
inadequately reflected the importance of teams and the growing value of teamwork. The 
position of some executive managers, for example the Managing Director Business 
Administration, may have contributed to this practice:
"I would not necessarily see a reason for rewarding people working in a team, 
because, team work is either successful and enjoyable by those who are 
participating, or not. You can not substitute the fun people are having in their 
work by paying them extra money." (Managing Director Business 
Administration)
He did not see the necessity for team rewards. He perceived the opportunity to work in a
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team as a reward in itself.
6.4 SUMMARY
This chapter showed that with the initiation of the change program in late 1994, MILSYS 
started to focus on people as a means to achieve productivity gains and to safeguard its 
business reorientation. People's knowledge was increasingly realised the key to the 
company's competitive advantage, and a team-oriented HRM the way to manage and extend 
this potential. The Technical Managing Director claimed HRM to be of highest importance 
to the company and saw himself as a main stakeholder of HRM, though he did not always 
act as such.
The chapter also showed that MILSYS' HR Department was limited to the provision of 
welfare and administrative services. It had only limited resources in terms of time, funds and 
relatively low status staff, and was not involved with the initiation and management of 
organisational and cultural changes. The initiation and management of organisational and 
cultural changes resided largely with senior managers and selected line managers and was 
formally assigned to the leader of the OCC Project. Beyond it, the chapter revealed that the 
existing HRM policies and practices did not promote the new emphasis on teamwork and 
innovation. It also showed that, by early 1997, many line managers had not fully grasped the 
importance of HRM for the success of the company nor their own responsibility and 
accountability for HRM. Although some changes to the existing HRM policies and practices 
were proposed and realised since the initiation of the change program in 1994, they 
remained fragmented and limited in effect. By mid-1997, an integrated HRM concept had 
still not been developed. It was however, realised that the implementation of teamwork does 
not only require a restructuring of the technical division of labour, but "has to be 
underpinned by normative and behavioural changes" (Marks et al., 1996, p.17).
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7 THE CE PROJECT
7.1 INTRODUCTION
While the last two chapters outlined the context, both environmental and organisational, in 
which the CE Project emerged, this chapter outlines the actual CE Project.
The CE Project was brought into being by the end of 1995. According to the Business 
Administration Manager of the Engineering Department, senior management classified the 
CE Project as a "first priority", in comparison to the OCC Project, which was rated a 
"second priority". In the course of the project it appeared, however, (and is another example 
of rhetoric vs. reality) that the CE Project was not treated as a "first priority" project in 
terms of senior management commitment.
The CE Project encompassed both the design of a company-specific CE concept and the 
implementation of that selected "solution set". The proposed "solution set" and the course of 
the project are presented below. First the nature of the CE Project Team is discussed, 
followed by an outline of the course of the CE Project and a discussion of the main events 
and decisions during the design of the company-specific CE concept and its beginning 
implementation. The chapter finishes with an analysis of the prospects for a full success of 
CE in MILSYS and its organisation-wide implications.
7.2 THE CE PROJECT TEAM
The product development process is often seen as the domain of engineers and other 
technical personnel for companies66. Thus, it is common to appoint engineers to develop 
concepts for restructuring this process (Bailey, 1993). In MILSYS a similar situation was 
observable. The CE Project Team was largely made up of people with a technical 
background, and the proposed CE concept, as discussed later, clearly reflected the team's
188
strong focus on technical solutions to realise integration and concurrence. The CE Project 
Leader was an engineer and, as shown below, reinforced the team's technical emphasis.
7.2.1 Th e  CE P r o je c t  L e a d e r
The CE Project Team was headed by the Systems Engineering Manager, whose department 
(Systems Engineering) and position had been created in the course of the change program. 
He was recruited from outside in late 1993, and had both defence force and industrial 
experience. By 1996, his department was not well established. Systems Engineering was an 
upstream service and support department. His appointment as leader of the CE Project did 
not reflect the high priority the CE Project was formally given by senior management. One 
CE Project Team member assumed that "somebody from a performing department would 
have been good [as Project Leader],... somebody from manufacturing or the design stream, 
... having a true appreciation o f the process. He would be very familiar with the process and 
would also have some responsibility fo r the costs and the costs overruns”. He thought that 
such a person would have been probably more suited for this task.
The Systems Engineering Manager was enthusiastic about CE and had volunteered to head 
the project. He saw CE as "an opportunity to try something new. I'd always had a lot o f 
ideas [regarding] the way we managed projects. I  saw the CE initiative as a chance to test 
some o f those. ...It was a chance to tackle some o f the problems, which worried me for some 
years". He concentrated on tools, techniques and procedures6 7. Little emphasis
66 For a more Marketing-oriented approach to new product development see e.g. Cooper, 1988; 
Crawford, 1997.
67 See chapter three: different research streams (engineering, managerial, organisation) tend to give a 
different emphasis to the three elements of the CE model (people, processes and tools) and the 
relationships between them. A similar phenomenon occurs in practice. Engineers and people with 
comparable technical background (engineering perspective) are predominantly concerned with the 
engineering activities that play part in the design and development process. They seek to identify 
ways, mostly in the form of technical (e.g. CAD/CAM, CIM), and procedural (e.g. systems 
approach, design rules, standards) solutions to support and integrate these various activities (Smith 
et al., 1995), not so much with organisational means (e.g. matrix structures, different cross­
functional arrangements).
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was given to the organisational and HRM implications of CE, though other team members 
repeatedly raised such issues. He gave little consideration to people issues such as common 
goal setting, open discussions, good communication and information processes, or 
recognition. This was also reflected in his (authoritarian) leadership style, which lacked 
team orientation. He treated team members as subordinates and did not develop his team 
members appropriately. He dominated the team and did not easily delegate responsibility. 
He sidelined people who held a different view from him, both within the team and with 
project partners like those from the University. "He made it fairly clear, it is his project. We 
don't even get a mention anywhere. We don't get introduced nor do people get introduced to 
us ... It is symptomatic o f the way he thinks", described an External Consultant this practice. 
From observations and interviews with CE Project Team members it appeared that issues 
raised by the project participants were often not put on the agenda, were set aside and then 
forgotten or simply not discussed. Further, in the initial stages of the project the discussions 
and decisions of the team meetings were not captured. The team did not have any written 
agendas or minutes.
7.2 .2  Th e  T e a m  M e m b e r s
The initial project team comprised five, later six members including the team leader (see 
Table N). The team members represented only a few downstream and upstream functions 
and all members had a technical background. They were mostly junior employees or 
contractors. They were "not high profile people, just people the company thought it could 
spare" described a member the CE Project Team. The team members worked part-time on 
the project and were not collocated. At later stages, a representative from Test Engineering 
and a representative from Marketing complemented the team. On the other hand it was 
weakened through the withdrawal of one of its more proactive members in October 1996. In 
February 1997 the project had to face the withdrawal of its project leader and one member, 
who both left the company. Though a new CE Project Leader was appointed soon after, he
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was, similar to the initial one, new to the company and Manager of the Systems Engineering 
Department.
Position in 
CE
Project
Team
Member­
ship
Period
Home
Department/
Unit
Position Disciplinary'
Background
Time
Dedication
(planned)
Project
Leader
11/1995-
2/1997
Systems Engineering Manager Systems
Engineer
75%
Member 2/1996 - 
10/1996
Systems Engineering Engineer 
(with 5 or less 
years work 
experience)
Systems Design 
Engineer
50%
(4-7/96)
then
20%
Member 2/1996 - 
ongoing 
by 7/1997
Software Engineering Contractor Software
Engineer
50%
(4-7/96)
then
20%
Member 2/1996 - 
ongoing by 
7/1997
Quality Assurance Engineer QA Engineer 50%
(4-7/96)
then
20%
Member 3/1996 - 
2/1997
Manufacturing/ 
Industrial Engineering
Engineer 
(with 5 or less 
years work 
experience)
Industrial
Engineer
50%
(4-7/96)
then
20%
Member 7/1996 - 
ongoing by 
7/1997
Sales and Projects,/ 
Projects
Project 
Manager 
(joined 
company in 
6/1996)
Electronics
Engineer
20%
Member 9/1996 - 
ongoing by 
7/1997
Engineering/ 
Test Engineering
Engineer Engineer not defined 
(called in when 
required)
Member 11/1996 - 
ongoing
Sales and Projects/ 
Sales and Marketing
Engineer Engineer not defined 
(called in when 
required)
New
Project
Leader
3/1997 - 
ongoing by 
7/1997
Systems Engineering Manager Systems Design 
Engineer
not defined
Table N: Composition of the CE Proj ect Tearn
The work on the project was not widely viewed as rewarding by its team members. It 
involved additional work but the team had little authority to enforce changes and there was 
little management support. At times the project work led to conflicts between the team
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members and their home functions regarding the time commitment. Neither the team nor 
individual team members received much recognition or reward for their efforts.
No initial team building training was offered to the team nor requested by the CE Project 
Leader (e.g. in order to avoid problems of different departmental cultures and languages, to 
sufficiently clarify the role and responsibilities of the team and the individual team members 
and to determine a common goal and the scope of the project). Meetings, though they took 
place on a regular basis (initially once a week, later twice a week, and then again once a 
week), were not used to fully resolve the conflicting understandings of CE between the CE 
Project Leader and the team members.
Strategic alliances with other stakeholders were rarely established and if they were, they 
were mostly mediated by the CE Project Leader. CE got "the most support from the least 
powerful people in the Executive Committee" claimed a CE Project Team member. The 
Manufacturing Director for example openly welcomed the implementation of CE and was 
willing to introduce a number of CE training sessions. He strongly emphasised the 
importance CE at these and other occasions. Other senior managers were less supportive of 
CE. In some cases support was denied. The Director of Material Planning and Control, for 
example, did not participate in any CE training events, nor did she send a representative of 
her department onto the team.
7.3 THE COURSE OF THE CE PROJECT
This section discusses the course of the CE Project (see Figure 23) with its main decisions, 
activities and outcomes. The project was triggered by an organisational diagnosis in early 
1995, as outlined earlier. The results of the analysis culminated in a decision to restructure 
the traditional design and development process. Concurrent Engineering was recommended 
as a promising concept and a CE Project set up accordingly.
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The CE Implementation Process
Business Analysis 
(1-4/95
Collaboration with University of Wollongong (2/96-7/97)
CE Implementation plan - project 
proposal (10,11/95)
Set up of CE strategy 
team (12/95-2/96)
QFD/CE/DFA  
Workshop with UCW  
(5/96)
CE Workshop with 
UOW  (2/96)
Workshop with Departments to 
develop common understanding 
of NPDP (7/96)
Sponsor resigned, 
12/95 INTRANET (6/96-2/97)
Analysis of MILSYS' design, development & 
production activities (2,3,4/96)
Assessment of Boothroyd/ 
Dewhorst DFA tool (10/96- 797)
New Sponsor, 
1/1996
Case study of success­
ful project 6-7/96 CORE - assessment impiementation 10/96 - 3/97)
CE Cost Benefit 
survey (3/96)
COSAT workshop 
(3/96)
Focus-Groups
(2/96)
Strategic framework for CE (sub­
project planned in 6/96, ...aborted)
Development of team structure for future 
projects, 7-8/96
Preparation training 
sessions, 9-10/96
Design & Development 
Process Manual - 2nd 
modified edition (5/97)
Workshop to review
Info-session to 
functions (4/96)
Training: Introduci d>n 
_  to CE (10,11/96)
Train the trainer for 
CE Team (8/96) Training: Project 
. Management in CE 
(11/96)
CE Training for Hardi- 
ware design (10/96)
Training Systems 
Engineering (10/96)
existing results of ; j CE(2/97)
Team leader 
resigns (2/97)
Appd>intment new 
team leader (2/97)
PM & Product Ufe-cyde 
rocess handbook 
(proposal: 7/97)
Presentation of CE 
implementation plan 
by new leader (4/97)
procedures (5-11/96) resigns (5/97) I
Metrics System(8-10/96)
PM representative on 
team nominated new 
PM for Pilot (6/97)
Pilot project (CE team involvement from 10/96 onwards)
TeamBuüdng Training 
(proposal: 7/96 - only pianneri)
CE best-practice 
brochure (7/96)
CE information 
paper, 2/96
CE newsletter, 
4/96
CE newsletter, 
7/96
CE newsletter, 
11/96
Team recognition 
lunch, 11/96
CE newsletter, 
1/97
1. CE presen- 2. CE presen- 3. CE presen- 4. CE presen-
tation (11/95) tation (3/96) tation (9/96) tation (2/97)
Nov Dec Jan Feb March Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb March Apr May June July Aug
Main data e je c tio n  period 1996 j -----------■ 19g7
Extended data collection period
PM of Pilot
Figure 23: CE Project Internal Activities and Events Determining the CE Implementation 
Process
The newly appointed Systems Engineering Manager was nominated the leader of the CE 
Project and was tasked to develop a project proposal with an initial CE implementation plan 
and identifications of required resources. In late November 1995, after two months of 
intensive work, he presented the project proposal to the Executive Committee, which agreed 
to the proposed milestones and the requested resources. The project proposal contained a
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vision and mission statement68, the goals of the CE Project69, and main project tasks70. The 
goals and initial activities were identified by the CE Project Leader in co-operation with the 
external business consultants. The Engineering Director was appointed the sponsor of the 
CE Project. He saw CE as a great advantage for the company and also fostered University 
linkages to help to develop the project.
Under the approved project proposal, the first project task was the initial planning and 
preparation of the project, which was solely carried out by the CE Project Leader. The task 
comprised the establishment of the project budget, the identification of areas that required 
consultancy support and the preparation of a 'CE text and reading' file. It also involved 
negotiations with functional managers to release personnel to the CE Project Team.
In December 1995, the project's original sponsor resigned from the company. In January 
1996 the newly appointed Engineering Director was assigned as sponsor of the CE Project. 
In contrast to the initial sponsor, the new sponsor showed much less interest in the CE 
Project, its course and results. "He was not proactive at all. He did not show any interest, 
did not turn up to any meeting, did not comment any report except fo r spelling mistakes" 
claimed the CE Project Leader.
In February 1996 the CE Project Team was appointed and the project officially launched. 
The CE Project Leader communicated the launch to MILSYS' employees through the first
68 Mission of CE Project: "To develop concurrent design, production and management processes to 
deliver systems solutions faster, at a lower life cycle cost, and in a predictable manner. " (Internal 
Document Al).
69 General goals of the CE Project: "get products to market in a shorter time; raise predictability (of 
design); reduce rework in manufacture; produce more new products more often; incorporate more 
features at less cost; standardise design practices; increase team effort; reduce current levels of 
production support, product testing and; improve overall downstream process performance" 
(Internal Document Al).
70 Tasks of the CE Project: "Initial planning and preparation; Form team and detailed planning; 
Determine current situation; Determine CE 'best practices'; Determine provisional 'preferred' CE 
process; Establish procedures and set up tools to support pilot project and; future tasks" (Internal 
Document Al).
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CE Newsletter71. The CE Project Leader introduced the four initial team members to the 
project's vision, mission and goal and the project schedule. They commenced their work by 
refining the project tasks and schedule for the next part of the project. They also reviewed 
some of the available literature on CE selected by the CE Project Leader (e.g. Grady, 1994; 
Salomone, 1995, which reflected a strong Systems Engineering focus).
Also at this stage, an agreement with the University of Wollongong was finalised providing 
support for the CE implementation process. One of the first activities resulting from this co­
operation was a workshop on CE in 2/1996. It was run by the University partners for the CE 
Project Team, and strongly emphasised the organisational dimension of the CE concept.
In February 1996, the team set up focus groups within MILSYS in order to determine how 
departments interact over the entire product development process. It also wanted to identify 
the main problems experienced by the various groups and departments72. Twenty-three 
focus group meetings were held. Each group involved between three and ten staff members 
from the various departments associated with the product design and development process. 
In addition, the CE Project Leader reviewed several of MILSYS' recent product design and 
development projects and analysed their actual time and budget requirements. Without any 
consultation he designed a questionnaire for a CE cost-benefit survey to be employed in a 
so-called "Delphi-Study". The survey was carried out by the CE Project Team in mid-March 
1996. Over 40 project personnel completed the questionnaires. The survey results were 
summarised in a CE requirement and feasibility study and presented to senior management 
in the second CE Project presentation by the end of March 1996.
The feasibility study first of all provided an assessment of the design and development
71 The CE Newsletter briefly explained why CE was adopted by MILSYS and its basic concept, 
introduced the CE Project Team, the general aims of the project and initial tasks (such as the focus 
group meetings to identify main deficiencies in MILSYS' product development process).
72 More than 200 problems were identified by the Focus Groups, which were grouped into 40 problem 
categories and then ranked following certain criteria (such as frequency of the problem; relative 
value of the phase in which problem was experienced; elapsed time between the process that the 
problem is experienced and when it is caused) (Internal Document A6); see also section 5.4.4.
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process at the time ("as is" analysis)73. Secondly, it discussed the need for a sub-project on 
strategic planning aspects under a CE approach74 756. Thirdly, it introduced a model that 
expressed] the current duration o f the design-to-delivery cycle in a way that allow[ed] 
extrapolation to future projects" (Internal Document A6) and attempted to quantify the costs 
and benefits of the implementation of CE73. It finally proposed four initiatives (in the area 
of project planning, systems level design, detailed design, business planning) to overcome 
the main problems identified in these areas7(\  In order to measure their effect, the study 
recommended the institutionalisation of quantitative measures in the form of key 
performance indicators (i.e. cycle time, number of design changes, customer and 
downstream department satisfaction).
In retrospect, some team members and the project partners from the University judged that 
the diagnosis was not appropriate. A team member claimed "We never got really good 
information out o f th a t... We did not get into the heart and soul o f the main processes. I  
think, we could have actually gone and observed what's going on, rather than simply ask 
them [functional representatives in focus groups] questions".
The feasibility study aimed to convince senior management to fully support and commit to 
an accelerated and full implementation of CE. The team also wanted to ensure the support
73 Some of the 15 most important problems and issues identified were: lack of communication, poor 
planning and scheduling; lack of personnel; poor estimates; lack of training and awareness in 
MILSYS' practices and procedures; poor requirements analysis, poor specification and poor contract 
writing; difficult data share between software packages).
74 The aim of the sub-project "Strategic Framework for CE" was the development of a model to 
predict the number of projects MILSYS can handle simultaneously with a given staffing level, which 
would then support organisational and strategy recommendations.
75 The study predicted that CE would significantly reduce MILSYS' manpower costs (up to 55,000 
man/hours savings across many functions over 18 months - by the end of 1997/8).
76 Aim of Initiative 1 - Project Planning: More realistic plans, schedules and estimates. Initiative 2 - 
System level design: Reduce delays in acceptance due to unfeasible specifications and delays in 
development where designers fail to reflect the contract specifications. Initiative 3 - Detailed design: 
Reduce delays in development caused by rework of the design during later development, and delays 
due to insufficient design data to support purchasing, manufacturing, and ILS development.
Initiative 4 - Business Planning: Reduce the problem of lack of staff for projects.
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from all departments involved in product development. In April 1996 the results were 
presented to, and discussed with, the participating departments. With the involvement of 
many people in the survey and in the focus groups as well as the broad communication of 
the results, the CE Project Team tried to raise awareness for CE and signal changes in the 
design and development process.
In March 1996 a workshop took place where the CE Project Team was familiarised with 
COSAT (Cross Organizational Step Adoption Tool), a management tool and guide for 
introducing CE, which focuses on the organisational side of the implementation process. 
Another event at this stage was the QFD (Quality Function Deployment), DFA (Design For 
Assembly), CE workshop in May 1996, which was organised and carried out by the 
University partners. It again emphasised the organisational dimension of CE, but provided 
also an overview of QFD and DFA under consideration of their organisational requirements. 
At a later stage the team investigated the QFD and DFA methods in more detail and 
evaluated a particular software for DFA.
From April/May 1996 on the CE Project Team worked on the four initiatives proposed in 
the feasibility study. In Project Planning they aimed to develop a checklist of relevant 
functions to be involved in various planning activities. They aimed to revise the procedures 
for scheduling, estimating, and managing risk in order to reflect a more systematic team 
approach. Finally, they intended to train facilitators familiar with the revised procedures to 
assist Project Managers. In System Level Design they wanted to assess and possibly 
introduce QFD (Quality Function Deployment) as a means of identifying and managing 
customer needs. They also aimed to improve the application of Systems Engineering as a 
means of ensuring customer requirements were fully met through procedures, training and 
tools. For Detailed Design they intended to engage in four activities. One was the 
development of a checklist of relevant functions to become involved in the various design 
activities. The second one was the introduction of more comprehensive DFMA (Design For
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Manufacturing77 and Assembly) and DFT (Design For Test) procedures to reduce 
development time. The third activity comprised the revision of the reviews and procedures 
for design planning to allow a more systematic team approach. The fourth task was the 
development of facilitators familiar with the revised procedures to assist Project 
Engineering Managers. Finally, in Business Planning they wanted to develop a model for 
optimising the staffing for different types of projects.
While the completion of the fourth initiative was planned for 1997, the CE Project Team 
aimed to have the new procedures drafted by July 1996, and to start a suitable Pilot Project 
soon after. Due to the complexity of the task and other work commitments of the CE Project 
Team members, the CE Project Team was unable to keep to their plan. Most of the work 
until August 1996 concentrated on the writing and re-writing of the company's design and 
development manuals and procedures to reflect the requirements for CE.
In June/July 1996 the CE Project Leader analysed one of MILSYS' recent and very 
successful product development projects to identify its success factors. The findings were 
summarised in an internal case study report. They showed a strong effort on the part of the 
Project Leader to apply teamwork principles and to integrate downstream function from an 
early point in the development process. For the CE Project Team this corroborated the 
approach they had chosen. The CE Project Team used the findings to identify MILSYS' 
"bestpractices". They formalised and extended them in a statement of CE "bestpractices" 
to allow their application in a Pilot Project and later on all product development projects. In 
this context, the CE Project Team discussed the possibility of visits to other project-based 
companies for benchmark purposes.
In June 1996 one CE Project Team member started to investigate the requirements for an 
INTRANET implementation, which the CE Project Team had suggested as an additional
77 DFMA - a method of design with the goal of understanding the product’s future manufacturing and 
assembly processes during the design stages (Internal Document A 17).
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communication source within the company.
The efforts of the CE Project Team also aimed to overcome the deficiencies in the current 
tools available to support systems engineering. They identified a need for appropriate 
requirements analysis and tracking tools, which would offer support across all stages. Such 
tools were needed to allow integration between the various tools and an integrated 
configuration management of the data they produce78. In October 1996 one CE Project 
Team member therefore started to investigate the Boothroyd and Dewhurst software for 
DFMA79 (which was purchased for trial in December 1996). Another team member began 
to analyse CORE, a database, which can be used to record systems and product specification 
as well as test and verification information (which was implemented by early 1997).
The sub-project "Strategic framework for CE", which was meant to look at the criteria for 
an ideal project mix for the company, was aborted in June 1996. The CE Project Team did 
not have access to appropriate people for the task. The necessity of the project was also 
questioned because it was recognised that the company was not in a situation to freely 
choose its projects, but had to take the projects that came up.
With the intensified negotiations between senior management and the CE Project Leader for 
a CE Pilot Project from June 1996 on, the CE Project Team paid more attention to aspects 
such as team formation, team building training, the definition of team objectives and goals 
and the design of a team charter. The CE Project Team proposed a new project team 
organisation. It was based on Grady's (1994) model of project teams in a Systems 
Engineering environment. Under this, a development team was seen in relation to the size of 
a project, which determined the team structure and the formation of its components such as 
core-and sub-teams. Figure 24 shows the CE Project Team proposed for small projects,
78 Two types of software were considered here: 1) software to support Systems Engineering (customer 
requirements analysis and specification management), and 2) software to support Design and 
Development activities (notably DFA).
79 Boothroyd and Dewhurst DFMA: A computer based technique to support DFMA analysis and to 
provide early cost estimates for manufacture; techniques can also be applied manually; software 
consists of various separate modules (e.g. design for manual assembly, PCB assembly, etc.).
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Team Structure for Small Projects
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Figure 24: Team Structure for Small Projects
Team Structure for Large Projects
PM G
PIT DPT
IDT 1 IDT 2 IDT i n
Project Management Group
- Project Mgr. (PMG-Leader) 
(fast Marketeer, then a 
member of PM Dep.)
- Project Business Admin Mgr.
- Project Scheduler
- Project Accountant
- Project QA Mgr.
- Project Admin. Assistant
PSET PITProject WegraSon Team
- Project Engine ersi g Mgr (TL)
- Systems engineers
- (System) Test Engineers
- Project Configuration Manager
- (Customer Represe ntatve)
DPT
Downstream Planning Team
- Project Engineering Mgr. (TL)
- Configuration ControBer
- Project ILS Manager
- Prod u ctô n Représentât ve
- MP & C representative
- Installation & comssioning 
manager
- Design teaming partners 
represe ntaSves
- Customer representafve
Smalt project 1 Cl (configuration iem) + number of 
people involved > ...
Large project: more than 1 Cl and number of people 
involved < _
PMG Project Management Group
IDT Integrated Design Team
DPT Downstream Pfenning Team {= internal
customer, coop. w®i IDT on baste of regular 
meetings. DPT has to be proactive)
PSET Project Seed ally Engtneertrg Team 
PIT Project Keg ratkwiTearn
IDT 1
Integrated Devotopraert Team
- Principal Technical Specialtet (TL) _
- Hardware Eng rears  (Elec. & 
Meets.)
- Software Engineers
- She Designers
- Key component suppfers
(ai as appropriate)
IDT 2 IDT #n
PSET
Project Spec'aîty Engineering Team
- Drawing office
- Logistics
- Test engineering 
(Test support)
- Industrial engine e rr  g 
(Cal. Lab.: Model shop)
Source: Internal Document A ll
Figure 25: Team Structure for Large Projects
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Figure 25 the proposed structure for large projects.
The new project team organisation was introduced in August 1996 in the form of a 
specification to be included in the company's new and revised design and development 
manuals and procedures. While the CE Project Team defined the responsibilities and 
composition of each individual team, it did not define all individual team roles and 
responsibilities (see Appendix J). For a number of team member positions it was also left 
open whether they would be involved in the project full- or part-time. It was not clarified 
whether they would be on the project team from concept design to the end or only at a 
particular stage. Integration issues between up- and downstream groups and with customer 
representatives or key suppliers were not adequately addressed either.
Also in July, the CE Project Team came up with a draft for a team building event for cross­
functional teams in new design and development projects in general and the CE Pilot Project 
team in particular (planned as a two-day off the company premises event run with the 
support of the University partners). However, for the CE Pilot Project team senior 
management, as discussed later, did not approve such an event.
Another major event in July 1996 was a workshop held by the CE Project Team with 
representatives of all functions involved in the product design and development process, 
explaining the CE Project Team ideas regarding CE to the functions. The main upcoming 
changes in MILSYS' design and development process were also summarised in a brochure 
(the CE Project Team had designed) and circulated to all departments at this occasion. The 
brochure summarised the need for changes, it addressed the areas of change (under the 
headings: better teamwork, better techniques, better tools, and better product planning) and 
introduced the recommended CE "bestpractices" for each area (see Appendix K). It also 
briefly outlined the "way ahead" including an overview of the scheduled training courses 
and contained a reference to the relevant contact people. The workshop was also used to 
develop a common understanding of the process of designing, developing and producing 
systems to enable all functions to work together more effectively to deliver systems faster.
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Based on their already developed ideas, the CE Project Team and the functional 
representatives jointly developed a scheme of the new design and development process. In 
contrast to the traditional process, this scheme reflected greater concurrence and team focus. 
The scheme was further refined by the CE Project Team and later integrated in the new and 
revised design and development manuals and procedures.
In July 1996 the third CE Newsletter was issued. Under the heading "[MILSYS] to launch 
CE in September", it reported that the new and revised manuals and procedures "will be 
used on all design and development projects commencing in September 1996" (Internal 
Document A3, 7/1996). The July newsletter also provided for the first time a more specific 
goal of CE: "The Concurrent Engineering changes aim to reduce the cost o f design changes 
in production by 20% by July 1997”. The newsletter also talked about the CE Project Team's 
effort to establish a set of company specific CE "best practices", and how the changes 
would be implemented.
The main events and activities up to this point are summarised in Table O.
Topics Discussed By 
CE Project TEAM
CE Project Activities, 
Events
Outcomes
Relevant 
Events 
Outside CE 
Project
1995
0
ct
- Appointment of CE Project 
Leader
- Elaboration of CE Project 
proposal
N
0
v
Benefit of CE for 
MILSYS; Resources 
for CE Project; 
Milestones
- Elaboration of CE Project 
proposal
- 1. CE presentation to 
Executive Committee
- Appointment of Project 
Sponsor
Project Proposal Start of
AQA
process
D
ec
Required project 
budget and personnel;
Initial project tasks and 
milestones
Resignation of initial project 
sponsor;
Initial planning and 
preparation of CE Project
1996
Ja
n
What is CE - general 
concept?
Required project 
budget and personnel;
Initial project tasks and 
milestones
New sponsor assigned; 
Initial planning and 
preparation of CE Project 
(e.g. negotiations with 
functional managers for CE 
Team members)
'CE text and 
reading' file
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F
e
b
What is CE - general 
concept?
How to apply CE in 
MILSYS?
Deficiencies of 
MILSYS' design and 
development process.
Establishment of CE Project 
Team;
Refining die project tasks and 
schedule;
Analysis of current 
development process in focus 
groups;
Review of CE literature;
CE Workshop with UOW
CE Project Team; 
CE Project Launch;
1. CE Newsletter;
Agreement with 
University Partner 
(UOW);
"Problem- 
catalogue" (from 
focus groups)
M
a
r
c
h
How to improve NPD 
process with CE?
Need of procedures as 
cornerstone for process 
improvements.
How to optimise 
project mix?
CE cost-benefit survey; 
Comparison of development 
projects;
Preparation of CE status 
report;
2. CE presentation;
COSAT workshop;
Paper: Results of 
Cost- benefit 
analysis;
'CE Requirement 
and Feasibility 
Study1
OCC
strategy
paper
submitted
A
Pr
il
How to raise 
organisation-wide 
awareness of CE?
How integrate 
downstream functions?
Presentation of'CE 
Requirement and Feasibility 
Study1 to departments;
Engage in four initiatives: 
Project Planning, System 
Level Design, Detailed Design 
and Business Planning;
CE Newsletter
M
ay
Functional Integration. 
Criteria for Pilot 
Project.
Benefits of CORE, 
QFD, DFMA. 
Facilitator Training
CE, DFM, QFD Workshop 
with UOW;
Engage in four initiatives: 
Project Planning, System 
Level Design, Detailed Design 
and Business Planning;
TOP forum 
(all TOP 
projects 
present 
except for 
OCC)
Ju
ne
Training Preparation; 
Indicators of successful 
team-work;
Benefits of 
INTRANET;
Writing and re-writing of 
design and development 
manuals and procedures 
Internal case study of 
successful development 
project;
Start investigation of 
INTRANET;
Case Study Report;
Sub-project 
"Strategic 
framework for CE" 
aborted;
Ju
1
V
Benchmarking v»ith 
other companies;
Team building; 
Conditions for CE roll­
out;
Communication of CE 
effort;
Representative from Project 
Management joins team;
Work on manuals and 
procedure continued;
Workshop with departments; 
Negotiations for Pilot Project;
Work on structure for future 
development project teams
CE Newsletter;
Paper: "CE and 
Communication" (+ 
INTRANET 
proposal);
Outline: "Team
building
workshop";
CE "Best Practice" 
Brochure;
Project Mgt. 
Assessment 
(Competenc 
y Survey)
Table O: Summary of Main CE Project Events and Activities (October 1995 - July
1996)
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As outlined above, the actual CE Project started with the formalisation of a project 
agreement with senior management and the determination of the staff resources for the CE 
Project. The CE Project Team then identified the resources for the planned activities and 
worked on the completion of (and mostly completed within schedule) its first phase goals. 
These goals comprised the determination of 1) the current situation in MILSYS' product 
development process, 2) CE "bestpractices", and 3) a provisional "preferred" CE process. 
A fourth goal was the establishment of procedures and the identification of tools to support 
the CE Pilot Project. Until mid-1996 the CE Project Team, dominated by its leader, 
however, largely ignored HR issues in the context of CE. The CE Project Team did not co­
operate with the OCC Project, which was looking at organisational and HRM issues of 
change. The input by the University partners with their strong organisational focus was 
largely neglected. According to an external consultant "early on the attitude was, we need to 
do some training. We need to improve procedures. We need to buy a couple o f tools. That 
was seen as the solution to the problems they had identified". For about six weeks in May 
and June 1996 the CE Project was jointly managed by its team members during the absence 
of the Project Leader, who had to meet other business obligations. One of the first meetings 
during this time was used to analyse the project progress up to this stage. The CE Project 
Team concluded that the success so far was limited and the direction of the project needed 
to be adjusted. The members agreed, that up to that point the CE Project Team had not 
developed a set of CE "best practices" and had neglected organisational and HR issues. A 
possible Pilot Project had not been identified, and organisation-wide awareness for CE had 
not been achieved. The next four meetings were used for intensive brainstorming on how to 
change this situation. In the course of these meetings they came up with ideas for the 
implementation of CE that were of a more organisational nature. According to an external 
consultant "they [the CE Project Team] made a quantum leap. ... Suddenly there is the 
design team, there is the emphasis on up-front planning". For the first time since the project 
started, the CE Project Team also produced and circulated written minutes of the CE Project
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Team meetings. With the absence of the Project Leader, the CE Project Team took the 
opportunity to give more consideration to organisational issues. Two of the five CE Project 
team members in particular were active in this regard. The CE Project Team presented these 
conclusions to the Project Leader on his return, and thus (in conjunction with input from the 
University partners) contributed to an attitude change on his part from then on. The focus of 
the CE Project shifted towards a greater awareness of the organisational dimension of the 
CE concept. The growing awareness of the organisational dimension of CE till the end of 
the case study is discussed below.
For three months in August to October 1996 the CE Project Team representative from the 
Quality Assurance Department was involved with the development of a performance metrics 
system. The metrics system was meant to enable the company to measure and evaluate 
project performance under CE. In the CE concept an organisation is viewed as a system of 
interdependent resources. Its strategies, actions and performance measurement systems must 
be linked to each other and its performance measures must be aligned to the company's 
business goals. The system the CE Project Team representative from the Quality Assurance 
Department came up with - influenced by recent developments within Systems Engineering 
(INCOSE Technical Board, 1995) - did not satisfy these requirements. It did not sufficiently 
define detailed measures for project performance under CE. Thus, it did not enable to collect 
and analyse appropriate data in order to track performance over time and support continuous 
improvement. Neither did it address behavioural aspects of performance measurement and 
management under CE. The proposed performance metrics system found no consensus 
among the CE Project Team. Due to time constraints and lack of expert knowledge its 
further development was aborted.
Another activity in August 1996 was the "Train the Trainer" seminar conducted by a 
representative from the HR Department for the CE Project Team members. It aimed to 
advise and prepare the CE Project Team members in the design of a training plan and course
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material and in leading a CE training session.
In September 1996 the CE Project Team informed the various departments about the 
preliminary completion of the new and revised manuals and procedures80 and how they 
were accessible. They also informed them about their intention to introduce the manuals and 
procedures in a series of training sessions. The departments were asked to determine an 
appropriate time for the training and put together a list of training participants. The 
departments were also asked to comment on the proposed changes and recommend further 
improvements. But only few functional staff members took this opportunity.
The next two significant events were the introduction of the training concept at the third CE 
presentation to senior management in September 1996 and the nomination of the CE Pilot 
Project in October 1996. During the period September to November 1996, the CE Project 
Team spent preparing and delivering CE training. This consisted of a half-day CE overview 
course, a five-day Systems Engineering training, a two-day project management course, and 
a one-day hardware design course (focusing on DFMA principles).
The CE overview course "Introduction to CE” was carried out first (twelve sessions, each 
with up to 20 participants). The participants came from all departments and levels of the 
company. But not all employees participated. While some avoided attending the course, 
others, like many shop-floor workers, were not given the opportunity. According to their 
manager, this course was not relevant for them, as they were not involved in the design and 
development process. The CE introduction course had at least three objectives. One was to 
familiarise the participants with the CE principles. A second one was to make them 
understand the benefits of CE for MILSYS. The third objective was to show them how 
MELSYS would practise CE and discuss how their work practices would change under CE.
80 Draft: Design and Development Process Manual, Systems Engineering Handbook, DFT/DFM 
Handbook, Manufacturing Logistics Planning Work Instruction.
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The course contained two participatory elements, a group drawing exercise and a group 
design exercise. The first one was used to encourage participants to critically reflect on 
MELSYS' existing design and development process. The results led to a discussion of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the process and the benefits of CE for MILSYS. The purpose of 
the group design exercise was to foster recognition of the characteristics of a successful 
cross-functional team. The participants were expected to identify the behaviours that assist 
or hinder cross-functional teamwork, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the cross­
functional design and development team.
In the three specialised training courses only people from relevant departments or positions 
participated. The objective of the "Project Management for CE" course was to reinforce the 
aims of CE in MILSYS with particular emphasis on the project management aspects of CE. 
The course also sought to provide the participants with the knowledge and skills to manage 
projects in accordance with the proposed design and development process. It introduced the 
new project team structure, the integrated project planning process, the work definition, 
scoping and authorisation process, planning and performance measurement, and risk 
management.
The aim of the Systems Engineering training course was to familiarise the participants with 
the new rigorous project execution and reviewing process with a particular focus on 
integration and concurrency. A target was to enable the participants to integrate the product 
components and the process components into a system solution by ensuring that hardware, 
software, and human systems components interact effectively. This integration effort was 
seen as a critical condition in order to achieve the system purpose and satisfy the customer's 
need.
The "CE fo r Hardware Design" course had two main objectives. One objective was to 
provide insight into issues and general approaches to the application of the DFM/DFA 
methodology. Its second target was to introduce some common DFM/A techniques, 
guidelines, and checklists (including the Boothroyd and Dewhurst DFMA technique).
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Beyond it, the course introduced the proposed team structure and explained in detail the 
tasks of the IDT (Integrated Development Team) and the SET (Speciality Engineering 
Team).
The numerous training courses and seminars brought about a lot of action, but were limited 
in their success. A number of questions remained unanswered and not all doubts about the 
feasibility of the new approach were addressed. One reason for the limited success was seen 
in the time factor. The training was conducted at a stage when a Pilot Project had not yet 
been nominated. The CE Project Team had not tested its proposed CE concept and therefore 
had no experience with its actual application. In addition, senior management and the CE 
Project Team were still struggling to build up a coherent vision of CE, a common 
understanding about what CE meant for MIL SYS. The CE Project Leader viewed CE as a 
concept, which enabled the company to reduce the lead-time for product development by 
streamlining the individual design and development processes. For the Technical Managing 
Director CE was "not a process [but] an attitude, a culture". Accordingly he saw the scope 
of the project mainly as a matter of changing attitudes.
The CE Project Leader had initially planned the training for a later stage in the CE Project. 
The delivery of the training at this point in time "was probably the biggest mistake o f the 
project", he later believed:
"We did not intend to roll out before we had done a Pilot Project. But the 
[Technical] Managing Director insisted that we do it. Fd wished, I  worked 
harder to talk him out o f it. I  think, i f  we had done the training after the Pilot 
Project, and after we had demonstrated in practical terms to people the 
benefits o f what we were talking about, then it would have been a bit more 
concrete in peoples' minds and therefore easier to get CE going."
Also, the message of the training was not clear enough in terms of how individual 
employees were affected by CE, and how the overall organisation was about to change. 
Many organisational and HR related issues were raised in the training such as the future role
208
of functional managers, but remained unanswered. "We are just starting to think about a 
project team organisation. We haven't really addressed the issue, what the functional 
department managers are going to do in the future" explained a team member and 
continued: "I think, their role is very much guidance and policy". While some organisational 
aspects (such as team formation and a team charter) had been discussed before the training, 
a coherent organisational approach to the implementation of CE could not be presented to 
the training participants. The training, however, contributed to the growing awareness for 
CE and the new emphasis on teamwork.
After the completion of the training period in November 1996, the CE Project Leader 
invited the CE Project Team members to a team recognition lunch. It was the first event of 
its kind. It was greatly appreciated by the participants, as it was the official recognition of 
their efforts in the CE Project by the organisation.
In early November 1996, after a year of activity and extensive consultation within the 
company (and after giving the departments the opportunity to comment on the proposed 
changes and recommend further improvements), the CE Project Team announced the launch 
of the new and revised design and development manuals and procedures. These formalised, 
refined and complemented the "bestpractices" exhibited by MELSYS' successful projects to 
allow their application on all projects. According to the CE Newsletter, the major changes 
were: (1) a "design and 'downstream' process which will be developed in parallel as a 
matter o f  course"81, (2) a flexible design process82, (3) a comprehensive specification where 
downstream process goals will be quantified and placed in the technical specification so that 
all project goals are captured in one document, and (4) the conduct of audits rather than 
reviews to ensure that the recording of analysis in support of design decisions will be more
81 For example, a review of an R&D project will consider both technical performance and production 
concept.
82 It means the design process will not follow the classical 'waterfall' model, but mix high level and 
detailed design in each phase.
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formalised. Consequent changes were announced for the way projects are staffed and 
organised ("Teamwork"), in the design and planning methods ("Techniques'"), in the 
software packages used ("Tools"), and the business planning process ("Business Planning"). 
The changes would be implemented through a combination of new and revised manuals, in­
house training, the provision of CE mentors to new design and development projects and 
process audits of projects by the Quality Assurance Department.
An outline of the proposed new design and development process is summarised in Figure 
26. The figure shows the nine phases of a system's life cycle encompassed in MILSYS' 
Design and Development Process. They were split into two groups of phases: the 
Decomposition and Development Phases, and the Production and Use Phases. The second 
group was outside the scope of the Design and Development Process Manual and thus, 
neglected by the CE Project Team.
Source: Internal Document A11, A13
Figure 26: Scheme of the Proposed New Design and Development Process - Overview
210
The new process indicated a stronger focus on up-front planning, rigorous Systems 
Engineering, and functional integration through cross-functional teamwork and the early 
involvement of "downstream" functions in the project team.
The design and processes (i.e. the processes of development, production, integration, 
operation, and support) of a system were seen as intimately linked and needed to be 
developed in parallel. The key methods of ensuring parallel development of design and 
process were seen in (1) requirements specification that include both technical design and 
process requirements, (2) a formal process description, and (3) an integrated project 
planning method that acknowledges the importance of design and process development in 
the WBS and project management plan. How the parallel development of design and process 
was supposed to be managed in the new approach is exemplified in the following four 
figures. The new development process scheme illustrates the activities in each of the four 
main phases of the design and development process. The activities were assigned to seven 
particular areas: Marketing and Selling; Team Activity; Requirements Analysis and System 
Design; Module Design and Development; Project Management; Systems Integration, 
Verification and Validation; Downstream Planning. This formal structure gave all in the 
development process involved people and functions a clear idea what was expected of them 
and what they could expect from the other participants at any particular point in the 
development process.
Figure 27 portrays the concept design and planning phase, which is the starting point for the 
cross-functional project team. In this phase the cross-functional team is formed and 
undergoes a 2-3 day team building training, which is also used to pass a project charter and 
to define its first phase goals. The CE Project Team saw clear meaningful goals as an 
important feature of successful cross-functional teamwork. A phase goal was defined as a 
set of objectives that the product development team must satisfy to progress to the next
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phase of development, and consisted of "SPARC,/83 sub-goals. This goal had to be agreed by 
senior management and the product development team at the start of each phase and to be 
recorded in the project charter. The specification of the phase goal was seen as one of the 
main team activities. Other team activities were to include joint planning meetings, joint 
design meetings, progress meetings as well as end-of-phase and other reviews, as shown in 
Figure 28, Figure 29, and Figure 30. The end-of-phase-review was proposed to be an 
internal review conducted by senior management to ensure that the product development 
team has achieved the respective phase goals.
Description: 
Commences with;
Team
activity
Concept Design &  Planning
This is where the top level design and downstream plans for a product are developed to a suffiderrt level to perform earty marketing and planning. 
T h e  phase com m ences with the approve* of t ie  Product R A D  O d e r  or aw ard o f t ie  fe a s W ity  study contract
-  The Project team  is formed with start of this phase.
• 2 -  3 days team b u ffin g  activity frvd. determination of first phase g o a l agree Project Charter)
-1C1- -  Joint p ianring  m eetings, joint design meetings, progress meetings . phase reviews
Seeing -  understand average custom ers need -  n tu e n c e  customer's spec. -  influence customer to buy the product (wffl continue beyond this phase)
Requirement 
anaiyses 4 
systems design
-  understand the average customer's need -  allocate requirements
-  develop operational context -  vetify system behaviour
-  idenf fy key requirem. & issues -  evolve system architecture
-  derive system threads -  analyse candidate solutions
Project
management -  com m ence In tegrated Project Ptanning -  develop the phase goal -  m anage project team  -
Si-stems m tegr. 
verrfc. 4  va idat -  verify system behaviour, ind . test of 'p roof of concept’ demonstrator
Module design 
4 development -  complete a sutfSedent module design and developm ent to develop 'proof of con c e p f demonstrator
Down sir earn 
ptenrirg -  develop ILS concept -  develop manufacturing concept
Output Phase completes with Executive's approval of t ie  design co ncep t
Outputs: -  provisional systems specfficabon. -  provisional systems design docum ent -  concept demonstrator. -  
provisional m antiacturing  concep t -  provisional ILS concept
Approved Product RAD order
^  „  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------* -  Design Concept
Custom  ef ton ded fess$>i ty study 
contract
R ia s e  revipw
ProvKaonaJ km ctionai baseSne: determine provisional system level requirements and design
Source: Internal Document A11, A13
Figure 27: The Proposed Concept Design and Planning Phase 83
83 The acronym SPARC used for five sub-goals in each phase goal: Schedule. Performance, 
Attractiveness (what benefits will be delivered to customer and MILSYS), Risk, Cost.
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Customised Design and Planning
Description: T h is  is th e  p h a s e  w here a te n d e r is w on an d  the specification  and  the top le ve l design is a g re ed  with the c u s to m e r , and the budgets fo r the rest of 
the des ign  and  d e v e lop m e n t effort are es tab lished .
Commences with: Th e  p h a s e  co m m en ce s  with the an tic ipation  of a p articu lar R F T .
Team  activity
M arketing/Seifing
£  C ross-functional Pro jec t T e a m  (P M T , P IT , ID T , D P T , S E T )
C o o pe ra tio n  with A -te am  (4 -5  p eo p le  from  m a rk e t d e p t )  during tendering  period to p rep a re  tender, 
r p  A fte r con trac t aw a rd  cu s to m e r re pres . m a y jo in the p ro ject tea m  (P IT o r  D P T )
_______D eterm in atio n  of p h a s e  g o al, p rogress m e etin g s, jo in t design m e etin g s, jo in t p lann ing  m e etin g s , p h as e  and  other review s
- un d ers ta n d  p artic u lar cus tom er’ s n ee d  -  in fluence selection  decision
Req.analyses & 
systems design m odify ea rlie r re qu irem e n ts  ana lyses an d  system  design to su it p artic u lar cu s to m e r re qu irem ents
& tevelopmerrt ’  c rea te  suffic<ent m odu le  design  an d  dev e lop m e n t to a lo w  ac cu ra te  costing
m anagem ent " d e v e k )P Phas e  goals - m a n a g e  the pro ject te a m , -  p roduce pro ject m a n a g e m e n t p lans incl. p ro ject s c h ed u le  an d  S E M P  
Systems integr.. „  . . . . _ . . .  . , . .
verilc. & valid. '  v e n iy system  beh a v io u r of m odified design - de te rm in e  validation  and verification m eth o d  for all specification
Downstream
Planning
- d evelop  opera tions concep - develop  ILS co ncep t
O u tp ut
P h a se  co m pletes with cu s to m e r ag re e m e n t of the system  re qu irem ents  and  system  design , typ ically a t  a S D R  and  S R R
O u tp u t  -P ro je c ts  C ontract, -  S ystem  sp e c  (a g re e d  with cu stom er -aw e ), -S u b -s ys te m  b rea kd o w n , -P ro je c t p lans covering  the re m ain d e r of the
p ro je c t  -  S y s tem  design (aw e ), -  T e s t p lans (aw e ), -  O utline o pera tions c o n c e p t , - O u tlin e lS L  c o n c ep t (aw e)______________________________________
R F T  i f * ' T e n d e r  * ' 4  
subm ission
Establish
baseline
'W in'*4’ Contract' ..........SRR' "  i
A w ard  a c ce p te d  '
Functional bas e lin e : determ ine system  leve l requ irem ents  and  design
Source: Internal Document A 11, A13
Figure 28: The Proposed Customised Design and Planning Phase
Subsystem and Module Design
Description: Specifications a re  p roduced fo r ail configuration item s, and for sub -system s as necessary  to su p p o rt deta iled  d e v e lop e m en t
Commences
with: T h e  p h as e  com m en ce s  with the estab fishm ent o f an agreed system  design an d  system  requ irem ents .
Team  activity
JEQ  ” ------------------- - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
m uT D e te rm in e  p h as e  goal, jo in t des ign  m eetings, jo in t p lanning m e etin g s, progress m e etings, p h as e  an d  other rev iew s
Requirement 
analyses & 
systems design
F o r each su b system  and m o du le ia llocate  requ irem ents (from  h igher level s p e c .), derive  system  th reads , derive  requ irem .en ts , verify  sub-system  o r  
m odu le  b ehaviour, evo lve sub -sy s tem  or m odule arch itecture ( in d . site surveys), ana lyse ca n d id a te  des ign  so lutions (in d . trade off ana lysis ). 
R ev ise  h igher leve l design  and s p e d tica tlo n  as a co n s equence o f extra know ledge from  low er level des ign  activities
Module design 
& development Sufficient m o d u le  design & dev e lop m e n t to allow  ac cu ra te  costing, design and specification .
Project
management D e v e lo p  p hase g o a l, m a n a g e  pro ject te a m , revise p ro ject m a n a g em e n t plans (in d . p ro je d  s c h ed u le  and S E M P )
Systems irrteg., 
vérifie & va iida t
V e rify  th a t the su b -system  and m odule designs and s p e c .’s are in harm ony with system  design  an d  s p e c . . 
D eterm in e  va lida tion  & verification  m ethod for all su b -system  and  m odule s p e c .’s.
Downstream
planning D ev e lo p  opera tions concep t an d  ILS concep t for each  sub-system  an d  m odule
Output:
T h e  phase com pletes with th e  es tab lis h m en t of ag re ed  subsystem  and m odule designs and sp e d fica tio n s , accom pE shed through a series  o f P D R s  
O u tp u t  a g re ed  subsystem  4  m odu le  d es igns, -  agreed subsystem  4  m odu le  spec.s , -  a g re ed  subsys. 4  m o d u le  te s t p lans, -  operations concept 
for ea c h  subsys. 4  m o d u le , -  ILS co ncep t fo r each subsys. 4  m odule
A pproved  
m odu le sp e c  4
A p proved  b lock -level design
su b-sy stem  sp e c  ---------------------------
& design  _ _ _  „ .
A pproved  -------------------------------- M  1 __________________  P D R  #1
- top leve l spec S u b -s . 1 — -  In tern a l _____ r T ---------  ,
- top level des ign  ___________________  M 2
S R R ~ S u b -s . 2  ---------------^  P D R  # 2
1 ■*- M o du le  d '
S ub s ys te m  3 '------
P D R  # 3
A llocated  baseline: d e term ine subsystem  and m odule requ irem ents  and d es ign
Source: Internal Document A l 1, A l3
Figure 29: The Proposed Subsystem and M odule Design Phase
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Detailed Design and Development
Description:
C om m ences with:
Team  activity
Req. analyses & 
systems design
M odule design 
& development
Project
managem ent
SI, verification & 
validation
Downstream
Planning
Output
Detailed
design
This is where the software is designed and coded, and the hardware is designed sufficient to allow production. Training & user documentation are 
developed. Site design is conducted. Systems Integration and testing occur in this phase.
This phase commences with the establishment of agreed subsytems and module designs and specifications
jjjjj^|j - develop phase goal, - joint design meetings, - joint planning meetings, - progress meetings, - phase and other reviews
revise design and specifications as a consequence of extra knowledge from detailed design and development activities
completed design and development of all modules
develop phase goal, - revise project management plans, incl. project schedule and SEMP, - manage project team
- verify that module designs satisfy their specifications - develop detailed test specs for systems, sub-systems & modules
- verify performance of prototyp system, sub-systems and modules
- complete materials requirem. planning - complete production routing
- complete deployment plan__________________- complete ILS production plan
The phase completes with the issue of a Design Release Certificate for the entire system or product., indicating the production package satisfies all 
technical, ILS and operations specifications
Output: Hardware production drawings, Hardware production special-to-type tooling, jigs and fixtures, Hardware production special-to- type-test 
programs and equipment, Hardware production plans, Executable SW and source code listings, Site installation design drawings, System, subsystem 
and module test specifications, A prototype system, ystem, subsystem and module test results, ILS solution
Approved
schematic
Approved
production
design
CDR #1 Development & 
prototype testing
Another
review
Product and support baseline: determine manufacturing drawings and support package
Source: Internal Document A11, A13
Figure 30: The Proposed Detailed Design and Development Phase
The scheme of the proposed new design and development process clearly laid out the highly 
complex multi-layered product development process and formalised functional involvement 
with the formation of the project team. The early involvement of downstream functions was 
meant to enforce the earliest consideration of downstream issues such as testability, 
manufacturability, assembly, and the early development of a detailed operational 
requirement document. The integration of function and design was expected to result in 
better planning and scheduling, better estimates and more cost-effective and innovative 
designs. It was also hoped that it would result in better control and a significant reduction of 
the number of design changes, and consequently reductions in risks during production.
The CE Project Team intended to test the draft procedures in a CE Pilot Project. From as 
early as May 1996 the CE Project Team had been negotiating for a suitable project with
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which they could pilot test the new procedures and systems. The CE Project Leader 
considered a project initiated in September 1996 appropriate, but senior management 
refused to approve this. The project was said to be too important and under too much time 
pressure to serve as a trial for CE. Senior management was not fully convinced about the 
predicted time savings with CE. They believed project lead-time would increase because 
Project Manager and project personnel would have to deal with new, unfamiliar conditions 
(new team organisation, new manuals, procedures, etc.). It was not until October 1996 that a 
Pilot Project was nominated. This resulted from a request of the Project Engineering 
Manager of a particular project to use his project as trial for CE.
The Project Engineering Manager (new in MILSYS, but project experienced) of the 
nominated CE Pilot Project perceived CE as a promising concept. He was keen to enforce a 
greater team emphasis in his project and to achieve a greater integration of up- and 
downstream functions. The project, however, was not an ideal case to trial the CE concept. 
The project was already at a stage where the conceptual design was mostly completed. Thus, 
the "CE solution set" could not be frilly applied, particularly in terms of initial team­
building, common goal setting or formulating a team charter. Senior management did not 
approve a team building event for the project. It was seen as inappropriate because the 
project had been underway for some time. The CE Pilot Project was a smaller project with 
minor importance to company. It suffered from management problems. The Project Manager 
had been nominated after the appointment of the Project Engineering Manager, who led the 
project in its initial phases. In contrast to the Project Engineering Manager, the Project 
Manager was not eager to run the project differently to the traditional way and her 
leadership style was not conducive for team work principles (egocentric, blame mentality). 
From November 1996 on, a representative of the CE Project Team participated in the main 
meetings of the CE Pilot Project. His task was to discuss the application of CE "best
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practices" in the CE Pilot Project84 and to review their progress. The Project Engineering 
Manager and Project Manager of the CE Pilot Project occasionally participated in CE 
Project meetings. In December 1996, the CE Project Team recommended a new project 
team organisation for the CE Pilot Project85 (based on their proposed team composition for 
larger projects), that was accepted by senior management, the Project and Project 
Engineering Manager.
The January 1997 CE Newsletter concentrated on reporting the "CE lessons learned to date 
on the [Pilot] Project". It reported that the weekly meetings were used for "lots o f inter­
team communication". The Project Integration Team (PIT) had continued the use of the 
database CORE (supported by the CE Project Team) to record the systems and product 
specification and begun to incorporate test and verification information. The Project 
Management Group (PMG) was now properly staffed. The Newsletter also noted that 
progress had not been made in all areas. Despite the CE Project Team's effort in identifying 
"downstream" departments to include in the CE Pilot Project Team, the need to include a 
particular department was overlooked and caused a delay in the development process. Also, 
the project schedule was not revised during 1996 due to a lack of project management 
personnel.
The Project Engineering Manager put a big effort into the integration of "up- and down­
stream" functions in the project team. Despite the formal project team organisation and joint 
team meetings, he was unable to significantly change their pattern of work and
84 Some of die discussed CE best practices' for the pilot project in the area of Project Management 
included risk management, team effectiveness, and scheduling; in Product and Business Planning: an 
as early as possible draft of the product schedule; in Industrial Engineering and MP&C: a standard 
parts library, the development of trade-off models, the trial of Boothroyd and Dewhurst DFA 
software; in CM Management, Systems Engineering and Technical Management: the support of 
CORE, the development of the product specifications in a preferred format and its distribution 
afterwards.
85 PMG, PIT, DPT, SET, 5 IDTs with 2 to 4 members. In PMG: Project Manager, Project BA, Project 
Analyst, Quality Assurance; In PIT: Project Engineering Manager, Systems Analyst, Verification 
Testing, CM; In DPT: Project Engineering Manager, MP&C, Production, Customer Service; In 
SET: Industrial Engineering, Drawing Office, Logistics, Engineering, Test Engineering.
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communication86. Only to a limited extent was he able to stimulate greater proactiveness on 
the part of downstream functions and more co-operative behaviour on the part of up-stream 
functions (such as the early release of preliminary, incomplete information).
This was not surprising, as changes in the communication and co-operation pattern require 
behavioural and attitudinal changes. They commonly take a longer time to establish and 
require to be supported by organisational changes and changes to conventional HRM 
policies and practices. The team members of the Pilot Project (in November 1996, about 30 
people from various departments) were only part-time dedicated and dispersed around the 
company. Team meetings were not used to resolve conflicts or to improve the team climate 
by overcoming taboos, a culture of blame, and the low proactiveness. A problem was also 
that the Project Manager played only a lightweight role. She had little authority over project 
personnel and resources. Moreover, the functional representatives on the CE Pilot Project 
Team were not always given the necessary authority to make decisions that were project 
critical. This was illustrated, for example, when a decision made by the MP&C 
representative was overridden by his department manager and this led to delays in the 
project schedule.
The CE Pilot Project was a compromise to a new "clean sheet" development project, which 
because of business reasons did not eventuate at this point in time. Due to the described 
difficulties, it was difficult to assess the effectiveness of CE approach and the proposed new 
"solution set".
Parallel to the involvement with the CE Pilot Project the CE Project Team further evaluated 
and prepared the implementation of the INTRANET (which was approved and implemented 
in Februaiy 1997). It also continued the assessment of the Boothroyd and Dewhurst software 
for DFMA (Design For Manufacturing and Assembly) and CORE (which was approved and
86 See Clark and Wheelwright 1992.
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implemented in the first quarter of 1997). For the DFA/DFM software a decision had not 
been finalised by mid-1997. Moreover, with the withdrawal of the manufacturing 
representative from the CE Project Team, a promoter for this aspect was lost and difficult to 
replace.
In February 1997 the CE Project Team convened a workshop in order to review its 
achievements in which also representative from the CE Pilot Project participated. It wanted 
to analyse what went well and what did not and why, and to co-ordinate the CE progress 
report to the TOP-Program in March 1997. Another important issue on the agenda was to 
resolve the CE Project's way ahead. The CE Project Team needed to decide what initiatives 
and activities were necessary in the next 6 months and what was the best way to implement 
them. The CE Project Team concluded that the outcome of the CE Project was rather 
modest, as the proposed "solution set" had not been broadly applied within the company. 
Reasons for the limited success were widely seen to be insufficient senior management 
support, inappropriate project leadership and the neglect of a broad range of organisational 
and HRM issues. Though the CE Project Team was given the resources to design an 
implementation CE strategy and to conduct CE training, senior management did not actively 
sponsor CE. This translated into the lower status of the project. The CE Project Leader in 
particular was sceptical regarding the institutionalisation of CE. He assumed that unless 
senior management showed a stronger commitment to the project, CE would not be 
successful. These issues were taken into consideration in the development of the "CE 
Implementation Plan fo r the period March - September 1997". This plan was presented to 
and discussed with senior management at the formal presentation to the Executive 
Committee in February 1997.
The "CE Implementation Plan" described the organisation and management processes 
required for the institutionalisation of CE. Four issues in particular were addressed, that 
were crucial for the CE Project in order to be more effective than in previous phases. It was 
necessary (1) to "increase the amount o f explicit support fo r CE by senior management", (2)
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to increase the understanding and skills of the "project leadership pool" with the proposed 
"solution set" and to convince them of the benefits and priority of the CE "best practices", 
(3) to ensure the CE [Project Team] had sufficient labour resources", and (4) to "improve 
the expertise o f the CE [Project Team] on change management" (Internal Document A23). 
With regard to the first point, the CE Project Team suggested regular consultation and 
effective communication with the Executive Committee. They also recommended the 
preparation of a program of actions by the Executive Committee to illustrate its support for 
the changes to the rest of the company. Thirdly they suggested the preparation of detailed 
instructions to allow the Executive to conduct effective "End-of-Phase Reviews" of projects. 
Concerning the second issue, the CE Project Team proposed to prepare a detailed guide to 
allow more effective selection and establishment of project leadership and to offer improved 
training of the project leaders. It was also proposed to conduct a trial of the 360-degree 
feedback system for project managers to provide them insight into their leadership style. 
Another recommendation was to complete the Generic WBS (Work Breakdown Structure)87 
and instructions sufficient to allow its application on new projects, and to continue 
harmonising functional processes within the overall design and development process by 
establishing an action committee of process co-ordinators from each division. With regard to 
the labour resources for the CE Project Team, the project sponsor was asked to identify 
long-term dedicated staff for the CE Project Team as soon as possible. With respect to the 
CE Project Team's expertise on change management the CE Project Team wanted to acquire 
the expert assistance they require by April/May 1997.
In early-1997 (at the end of the main data collection), due to the long-term nature of 
organisational change processes, it was still difficult to predict the prospects of full success
87 According to Internal Document A 23, MILSYS "had already completed some elements of such 
system, namely: the Software generic WBS, and the ACCESS estimating database. However, poor 
estimating and WBS preparation on recent projects ... illustrate there is much room for 
improvement."
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for CE (i.e. the institutionalisation of the CE concept within the company, in contrast to a 
partial success with only some elements of the CE concept adopted) and the adoption of a 
strategic HRM approach in the context of CE. On the one hand, those prospects did not look 
good in the foreseeable future. The CE Project experienced high pressure of other business 
in a highly competitive industry (work tasks of the CE Project Team members in home 
functions often took priority) and suffered from the turnover in key managerial staff. At the 
end of February 1997, the CE Project had to cope with the loss of its Project Leader and a 
further team member (both left the company). Most development projects were still 
managed following a more traditional approach. Even in the CE Pilot Project little change 
was visible in the pattern of work and communication between the up- and the downstream 
group. And although Project Managers were increasingly involved in the appraisal of the 
product development team members and decisions about their training and development, 
their overall status and authority had not largely changed.
On the other hand, senior management had made a big effort in early 1997 (after a period of 
low commitment during 1996) to keep the CE Project running. The job advertisement for the 
new Systems Engineering Manager indicated that the successful applicant would have the 
responsibility for improving CE in the company. In March 1997, a new Systems Engineering 
Manager was appointed, and was made the new leader of the CE Project. Though the second 
Project Leader was new to the company, he was more broadly experienced than his 
predecessor and familiar with the basic concept of CE. Approval was given by senior 
management to the new CE Project Leader to continue the remaining CE Project Team's 
activities. From the initial six team members only three were still on the CE Project Team in 
Februaiy 1997. By mid-1997 the core CE Project Team was made up of five members 
including its leader. They came from Systems Engineering, Software Engineering, Project 
Management, Quality Assurance, and Industrial Engineering. The new CE Project Leader 
reviewed what the CE Project had achieved. He consulted with the remaining team members 
as well as various departments and Project Managers. He found that, although most
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development projects still followed a more traditional approach, the new and modified 
manuals and procedures and the CE "best practice " concept were increasingly being used as 
guidelines by the product development teams. He also found that Project Managers paid 
more attention to their ratification, and downstream functions became earlier involved in the 
design and development process than previously.
The new CE Project Leader worked out a continuation plan for the CE Project, which was to 
be presented to senior management by April 1997. One aspect of the plan was the closer co­
operation with relevant initiatives such as the OCC Project. Another aspect was the 
reorientation of the CE Project Team from a focus on design and implementation to a focus 
on CE support. The remaining team members had already taken up the support task by 
assisting and advising the still running CE Pilot Project. For the future it was planned to 
extend the support to all development project start-ups. The CE Project Team saw its role as 
providing support during the initial phases of each project. They aimed to assist with the set 
up of the cross-functional team, the team building training, the determination of a common 
goal, and the integration of downstream functions. Senior management formally approved 
the timeframe and budget for team training at the start of each new product development 
project. In May 1997, the new CE Project Leader introduced a modified edition of the new 
design and development process manual. It placed a stronger emphasis on the design and 
development process with regards to risk management, generic WBS and product life cycle 
issues. In July 1997 the CE Project Leader submitted a proposal for a Project Management 
and Product life-cycle process handbook in order to address a broader approach to design 
and development. Also in May 1997, the Project Leader of the CE Pilot Project resigned. In 
June 1997 senior management appointed the Project Management representative on the CE 
Project Team the new leader of the CE Pilot Project.
In July 1997 (at the end of the case study), it looked likely that the CE Project would 
survive. With a new CE Project Leader and a new focus for the CE Project Team (from a 
design to a support team), the CE Project Team was more empowered to actually implement
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and enforce its proposed changes. Senior management made a clear commitment to establish 
new projects following a CE approach. The changes to the various manuals and procedures 
were accepted and said to be applicable to all projects. The new tools were applied in the 
Pilot Project and said to be used in other projects soon after. Complemented by the 
achievements of the change program and the OCC Project (its emphasis on creating an 
appropriate organisational and cultural environment to accommodate the ongoing changes 
and the establishment of a knowledge-based company), there was likelihood for a successful 
CE institutionalisation. The company-wide application of CE on all development project 
start-ups and the establishment of an organisational structure (e.g. heavyweight project 
managers) and HRM policies and practices that support cross-functional teamwork, 
communication and co-operation (and enforce required behaviours) would decide about the 
ultimate success or failure of CE in MILSYS.
The main events and activities from August 1996 till end of July 1997 are summarised in 
Table P.
Topics Discussed By 
CE Project TEAM
CE Project Activities, 
Events
Outcomes
Relevant 
Events 
Outside CE 
Project
A
u
g
Risk management; 
Selection criteria for 
Pilot Project;
Performance 
Measurement in CE
Identification of appropriate 
performance metrics for CE;
Negotiations for Pilot 
Project;
"Train the trainer" seminar
Proposal: Team 
Organisation
Intensive
Mgt.-
training
(initiated by
OCC
Project)
S
e
P
Appropriate 
requirements analysis 
and tracking tools.
Training preparation and 
execution
How to measure success 
of training
3. CE Presentation; 
Negotiating a Pilot Project;
Developing performance 
measurement system;
Preparation and conduct of 
information sessions to 
departments (about new and 
revised manuals and 
procedures and upcoming 
training);
Start investigating CORE;
Start investigation Boothroyd 
and Dewhurst - software
Minutes of team 
meetings;
Preliminary 
completion of new 
and revised 
manuals and 
procedures 
(departments have 
opportunity to 
suggest changes);
Innovation
project
initiated
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0
c
t
Training execution; 
Support for Pilot;
Preparation and conduct of 
CE training sessions; Team 
member withdrawn from 
team; Negotiations for Pilot 
Project;
Nomination CE 
Pilot Project;
Draft: Performance 
metrics system;
A-Team
appointed
N
0
V
How to support CE Pilot 
Project;
DFMA;
CORE;
CE Project Team 
representative attends CE 
Pilot Project meetings; 
Representative from 
marketing joined CE 
meetings;
CE Pilot Project applies new 
team organisation;
Team recognition lunch;
New and revised 
manuals and 
procedures;
Paper: CE Pilot 
Project Team 
organisation;
Visit of 
parent 
company 
represen­
tatives
D
ec
How to support CE Pilot 
Project
-> team agreed to send a 
representative to all CE 
Pilot Project meetings. 
How to measure success 
of CE implementation.
Supporting the CE Pilot 
Project in applying CE 'best 
practices'
Purchase 
Boothroyd and 
Dewhurst - 
software;
CE Pilot Project 
Best Practice 
Paper;
CE Pilot Project 
progress reports 
(fortnightly);
1997
Ja
n
DFA;
CORE;
Support CE Pilot 
Project;
Preparation of DFA 
assessment;
Participation on CE Pilot 
Project meetings, support CE 
Pilot Project;
CE Newsletter
F
e
b
DFA;
Survival of CE Project;
Future implementation 
steps;
Project Performance 
Measurement
Workshop to discuss 
achievements and way ahead; 
4. CE presentation;
DFA assessment session; 
Further team member and the 
project leader resign;
INTRANET
implemented;
CE implementation 
plan for 3-9/1997;
Former
Engineering
Director
nominated
leader of
Innovation
Project
M
a
r
c
h
How to institutionalise 
CE? How to ensure 
senior management 
support/commitment? 
How to train project 
management pool?
New CE Project Leader 
appointed;
Refining actions agreed to in 
the updated implementation 
plan;
TOP­
Program
Progress
Meeting
4
5
Project Manager of CE Pilot 
Project resigns
Design and 
Development 
Process Manual 
(2nd edition)
6
7
support offered by team; 
optimisation of pro­
cesses; broader approach 
to design & development
PM representative on CE 
Project Team nominated new 
PM for CE Pilot Project
Proposal: Project 
Management and 
Product Life-cycle 
process handbook;
Table P: Summary of Main CE Project Events and Activities (August 1996 - July 1997)
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In summary, it appeared that the CE Project Team was able to significantly increase the 
organisation-wide awareness for CE since August 1996 (due to the numerous training 
sessions, the broad communication of its efforts and results) and was given broad support by 
the CE Pilot Project Team. The CE Project Team also survived initial staff turnover. But 
probably the most important result was the establishment of a company-specific "best 
practice solution set" integrated in the new and revised development manuals and 
procedures (although it reflected a more technical bias). It focused on both technical and 
organisational issues and recognised communication and co-operation as important factors 
for achieving integration. The technical side, however, remained the dominant one and 
emphasis was given to procedures, systems and tools (such as CORE, software for DFMA, 
the INTRANET). In August 1996, the CE Project Team still largely neglected HRM issues 
in relation to CE. Organisational changes and changes to HRM policies and practices were 
seen as outside the scope of the CE Project. The CE Project did not specify organisational 
requirements (such as the shift from a functional to a more project-oriented matrix 
structure). Although the new development process assumed a more "heavyweight" Project 
Manager than the conventional process, it only implicitly addressed the restriction of 
functional departments to support functions for projects. The months from January to March 
1997, however, were used to discuss a larger range of organisational and HR issues (e.g. a 
stronger empowerment of Project Leaders). A deeper understanding of the organisational 
dimension of CE evolved, and the CE Project Team realised the importance of a stronger 
HRM-CE alignment for the success of CE.
7.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This chapter discussed the actual CE Project. It introduced the CE Project Team, its leader 
and team members and found that the CE Project Team was inadequately resourced and 
insufficiently prepared. Furthermore, it outlined the course of the CE Project, starting with 
an organisational diagnosis, in the result of which senior management decided to restructure
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MILSYS' conventional product design and development process. The chapter discussed the 
main activities and decisions that lead to die proposal of a new design and development 
process based on CE. It summarised the CE Pilot Project that was used to trial run the 
company-specific CE concept. Finally the chapter discussed planned activities for 
implementing CE and the prospects for full success of CE in MILSYS at the end of the case 
study.
Drawing on the above findings, it could be concluded that the CE Project was not fully 
successful. At the end of the investigation in mid-1997, it had not achieved the anticipated 
high-level of integration of departmental functions and product design. A number of factors 
contributed to this outcome.
One factor can be seen in the composition and preparation of the CE Project Team. As 
outlined earlier, the CE Project Team was made up of few, mostly junior employees with 
limited experience. They were all engineers. They only represented a limited number of 
relevant functions. Moreover, the CE Pilot Project Team had not been sufficiently prepared. 
It was not provided with any team-building training nor was it appropriately empowered.
A second factor can be seen in the insufficient attention the CE Project Team paid to HRM, 
organisational and cultural change issues. HRM issues were largely seen as outside the 
purview of the CE Project. Although the CE Project Team started to grasp the relevance of 
HRM for CE towards the end of the main data collection (February 1997), it made no 
attempts to align HRM and CE (e.g. in the form of new and modified HRM policies and 
practices that would support cross-functional teamwork) as part of the CE concept.
Inadequate senior management support and commitment was a further obstacle for the 
success of the CE Project. Despite the resources given to the CE Project in the form of time 
and people, senior management was not committed to CE. Its second rate treatment by the 
executives was implicitly recognisable throughout the organisation. The CE Project did not 
have a powerful champion. Members of the Executive Committee did not 'walk the talk'.
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Organisational change issues were not addressed by them or simply avoided and the project 
was not linked to other change project and initiatives (such as the OCC Project). The 
nomination of a Pilot Project was delayed and no appropriate project made available for this 
purpose.
It is a central argument of this thesis that CE is not simply amenable to a technical fix (e.g. 
in the form of CORE, DFA/M, INTRANET). Its successful introduction involves 
organisational and cultural changes, which are most often difficult to realise. MILSYS' CE 
"solution set", however, was largely superimposed on the traditional organisational structure 
and culture. Traditional personnel policies and practices were not widely altered or replaced 
to accommodate the proposed changes and to enforce the desired behaviour and attitudes. 
The CE Project Team did not address CE as a complex organisational issue in the sense that 
its successful implementation required an appropriate organisational structure and culture, 
and appropriate HRM policies and practices.
The nature of the CE concept as a management "fad", notably its interpretative flexibility 
(Abrahamson, 1996), may have further contributed to the limited success of CE in MILSYS. 
In interviews at the end of the investigation, it appeared that different groups and individuals 
still had diverse understandings of CE. They ranged from the view that CE merely requires 
an attitude change to a perspective which saw CE as largely identical to Systems 
Engineering. Even differences in the understanding of CE between the Technical Managing 
Director and the CE Project team remained unresolved during the course of the project. 
Furthermore, insufficient attention was paid to organisational politics. Support for the 
proposed changes was not effectively mobilised, nor was any opposition neutralised by 
either the CE Project Team or the project sponsor. The CE Project Team did not adopt a 
comprehensive implementation strategy or plan to address these sorts of issues and thereby 
missed to ensure that the required actions were taken.
Although the success of the CE Project was limited and CE had not been fully applied at the 
end of the investigation (mid-1997), the concept of CE within MILSYS had gained
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momentum. The proposed concept conveyed a vision o f the future development process that 
corresponded with MELSYS* business reorientation, an orientation towards teamwork and 
innovation.
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8 ORGANISATIONAL POW ER AND POLITICS IN THE  
IM PLEM ENTATION OF CE IN MDLSYS
8.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the role of organisational power and politics in shaping and 
implementing CE. It is now widely acknowledged that organisational change is an 
essentially political process, involving conflict, struggles, negotiation, bargaining, 
compromise, and the "play o f power" (Buchanan and Boddy, 1992). The introduction of CE, 
which requires substantial organisational change, is no exception. Yet, the CE and the 
management literature generally do not adequately explore the shaping role of political 
behaviour in organisational change (Buchanan and Badham, 1998). Sankar (1991) assumes 
that the more complex an organisational change the more difficult it is to successfully 
institutionalise the change due to the political difficulties inherent in major change 
initiatives. Simple changes, introduced slowly and incrementally, do not typically cause high 
degrees of conflict (Badham et al., 1997). In contrast, a complex change like the 
implementation of CE - which requires rapid and radical changes in the behaviour of people 
and threatens vested interests and privileges of individuals and groups - is highly vulnerable 
to political disruption, and thus more likely to fail.
Jones and Stevens (1998) argue that not only external political influences such as 
government policies and the leverage of "special interest groups " influence the new product 
development process. They assume that micro-politics or internal politics (such as political 
struggles for access resources or to improve career prospects) have a strong impact on the 
innovation process. Successfully implementing CE involves developing high levels of 
collaboration across departmental and disciplinary boundaries, usually via the medium of 
the cross-functional project team (Clark and Wheelwright, 1992, 1995). Accompanying this 
formation of more autonomous project-focused units within the organisation, is the 
establishment of a team-oriented environment including appropriate HRM policies and
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practices. Along with these changes there should be devolution of authority and 
accountability (e.g. over budgets, schedules, the management of risk, and resources) from 
functional managers to the project teams (Gerwin and Susman, 1996; Haddad, 1996b). Such 
changes will inevitably involve power struggles between different groups and individuals, 
some of whom will be seen as "losers" and others as "winners" from change (Schubert and 
Couchman, 1998). Such changes also cause "tension between old and new" that the whole 
organisation must be capable of balancing in order to be innovative (Dougherty, 1997). A 
major challenge for companies implementing CE therefore is their ability to design and 
clearly spell out perspectives for the "losers" of such changes (i.e. groups and individuals 
who are required to give up their traditional responsibilities and authorities). By providing 
such perspectives, management is more likely to avoid rejection, refusal or an undermining 
of the change process.
Change processes involve a "plurality o f actors or players", who act as a so-called "change 
agency" (Buchanan and Storey, 1997) with distinctive roles and behavioural repertoires88. 
Change agents can play more than one role at the same time (Hartley, Benington, and Binns, 
1997). A decisive role in the change process is played by the company's CEO or managing 
director (Bums and Stalker, 1961). The top manager, through his or her organisational 
authority and decision-making capability, can determine the direction, intensity and degree 
of success of change (Bums and Stalker, 1961).
Change drivers89 have a significant shaping and steering role in the organisational change 
process (Thomas, 1994). This is also the case in the implementation of CE. A clear vision of 
what they want to achieve sets the direction of the change process. Broken down into 
manageable steps and actions, such a vision not only provides orientation and facilitates co­
88 For analytic purposes, Buchanan and Storey's (1997) identify a number of potentially distinct roles 
within the 'change agency': initiator, sponsor, driver, subversive, passenger, spectator, victim, 
paramedic.
89 Following Buchanan and Storey (1997), change drivers (which are only one of the change agency 
roles) are seen here as organisational players who promote, implement and deliver change 
initiatives, and are often the process or 'project manager* of these change initiatives.
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ordination, it also stimulates motivation and helps to narrow down uncertainty and to win 
stakeholders' support. Buchanan and Badham, (1998, p, 4) claim that change drivers "who 
have the ability to reduce uncertainty can gain significant reputations and positions o f  
considerable influence". However, the success of change drivers in complex change projects 
- such as the implementation of CE - is not only dependent on a combination of personal and 
local factors (such as the adequate knowledge and skill in the organisation, "people skills" of 
change agent, level of resistance by particular individuals and groups, senior management 
commitment). It strongly depends on the change driver's political skills (Hartley et al., 
1997).) Buchanan and Badham (1998) claim that change drivers have to be politically 
sensitive rather than politically neutral or "apolitical" (see e.g. McDonough and Griffin, 
1997) because complex organisational changes rely on the contribution, compliance and co­
operation of a range of groups and departments with different values, perceptions and goals.
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All these considerations suggest that the play of organisational power and politics is indeed 
a determinant of the outcomes of the CE implementation process and the role that particular 
groups (including HRM) play in die conceptualisation and implementation of CE. It appears 
essential to incorporate the play of organisational power and politics into any framework, 
which claims to give a realistic account of the introduction of CE. Consequently the author 
modified her initial conceptual framework (which is summarised in chapter four) to take 
into account this perspective. The modified conceptual framework is pictured in Figure 31.
Before discussing how organisational power and politics influenced die conceptualisation 
and implementation of CE in MILSYS, the following section provides an outline of the 
theoretical concepts of power the analysis is based on.
8.2 CONCEPTS OF ORGANISATIONAL POWER
The literature on organisational power and politics is diverse and different views exist of 
what constitutes power. One view is to look at power as a resource or a property an 
individual or group possesses. A distinction is made between individual and structural 
sources of power (Pfeifer, 1992b). A related concept views power as a property of the 
relationship between a person and others. It identifies up to eight different power bases, in 
the sense of tools available to influence others: reward, coercive, expert, authority, referent, 
information, affiliation, group power (French and Raven, 1958; Benfari, Wilkinson and 
Orth, 1986). These concepts are not entirely sufficient for the purpose of this study, as they 
do not reflect the complexity and embeddedness of power and politics within an 
organisation (Buchanan and Badham, 1998).
Concepts that view power as an embedded property of the structures, relationships, norms 
and regulations of an organisation, can be distinguished into three sub-concepts. Lukes 
(1974) talks about one-, two-, and three-dimensional views of power with regard to their 
different emphasis on the outcome and players of decision-making processes, and the
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occurrence of conflict. Representatives of the one-dimensional view focus on specific 
outcomes of decision-making processes (e.g. reaching consensus on critical business issues). 
Their findings are based on concrete, observable behaviour, often with the underlying 
assumption of the existence of observable conflict of interests. The two-dimensional power 
concept expands the one-dimensional view by including non-decision making in its 
reflection. A decision is basically seen as "a choice among alternative modes o f action" 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, in Lukes, 1974, p. 39). Non-decision is described as "a 
decision that results in suppression or thwarting o f latent or manifest challenge to the 
values or interests o f the decision-maker" (Lukes, 1974, p. 44). Non-decision-making is seen 
as "a means by which demands fo r change ... can be suffocated before they are even voiced; 
or kept covert, or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; or, 
fa iling all these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementation stage o f the 
policy process (Lukes, 1974, p. 44). For proponents of the two-dimensional view, the 
"control over the agenda o f politics and o f the ways in which potential issues are kept out o f 
the political process" is the critical issue of power. They assume that the conscious or 
unconscious (due to a bias of favour) creation of barriers is used to suppress certain conflicts 
and decisions while others are exploited (Lukes, 1974). The one- and two-dimensional 
views are based on behavioural theory and thus, fail to include social forces in then- 
explanation. They fall short in conceptualising organisational power and politics in then- 
complexity and embeddedness within an organisation, and their dependence on structures, 
cultures, norms, expectations and the historical context (Buchanan and Badham, 1998; 
Thomas, 1994).
By contrast, the three-dimensional view of power goes beyond the reductionism inherent in 
the behavioural {"too individualistic" Lukes, 1974) accounts and focus of the one- and two­
dimensional views of power. As reflected in Table Q, the three-dimensional view offers a 
sociological perspective for investigating decision- and non-decision-making power and the 
various, often complex and subtle, ways of suppressing latent conflicts within a particular
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social context. It includes individuals as well as collectives (e.g. in the form of social forces 
or institutional practices) in explanations about decision-making and control over the 
political agenda. The three-dimensional view thus offers a model to explain how political 
systems prevent demands from becoming political issues or from being raised. Decision­
making and control over the political agenda (not necessarily through decisions) can take 
place in the form of observable (overt or covert) and latent conflict of subjective and real 
interests (Lukes, 1974). This makes it possible to focus on the processual component of the 
"play o f power" or as Buchanan and Badham (1998, p. 50) call it "the substantive, 
unavoidable and necessary shaping role ofpower and politics in change".
3-Dimensional View of Power
; ' ■ ’ í . .
Decision-Making Non-Decision-Making
POWER
Exercised Consciously or Unconsciously through:
Individuals 
Individual's Decision
Collectives
- Social Forces
- Institutional Practices
Occurrence In :
Observable
(Overt or Covert) Conflict
Latent Conflict
Source: Lukes, 1974
Table Q: The 3-Dimensional View of Power
For the purpose of this study Lukes' three-dimensional view of power was employed, as it 
has not been fundamentally challenged apart from minor additions (see e.g. Fulop and 
Linstead, 1999). It was also chosen for its ability to analyse how individual and collective 
forces of the change process determined the conceptualisation of CE, its translation into a
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workable solution and its subsequent implementation. The findings of this analysis are 
discussed in the next section.
8.3 POWER AND POLITICS IN MILSYS 
The CE implementation process in MILSYS was shaped by the actions and interactions of a 
whole "cast o f characters" (Hutton, 1994), i.e. different groups and individuals within the 
company (see Figure 32) and outside the company90.
Figure 32: The Exercise of Organisational Power and Politics in MILSYS in 
Implementing CE
90 Different groups and individuals outside MILSYS (e.g. the parent company, the university partners, 
external consultants and training providers, Defence) also influenced the implementation process of 
CE. However, due to a lack of data these external influences are neglected here, which accounts as a 
limitation of this thesis. Future research needs to establish how the power relationships with external 
groups and individuals influence the implementation of CE.
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The lines between different groups and individuals are an indication of the power exercised 
in the conscious or unconscious assertion of their individual or collective interests. The lines 
also reflect the engagement of different groups and individuals in organisational politics and 
power struggles to either defend and retain or amend and improve their position in the 
context of implementing CE.
The CE Project Leader, the CE Team members and the Technical Managing Director (the 
"man at the top") were some of the "characters" that played a key role in this context. Other 
important individuals were the Engineering Director (sponsor of the CE Project), the 
Business Administration Manager of the Engineering Department (Leader of OCC-Project) 
and the Managing Director Business Administration (Co-ordinator TOP-Program), as shown 
below. CE was also shaped by the various groups in the company such as the group of 
functional managers, Project Managers, Business Administration Managers, and the HR 
Department personnel. The group of engineers and people with comparable technical 
background made up another important and numerically large group in MIT.SYS The 
actions of the individuals were partly determined by their belonging to the one or other 
group.
The following sections seek to explain how professional and occupational values guided the 
thinking about what constitutes CE. They also seek to explain how concerns about social 
status influenced the position and actions of the various groups and individuals in the CE 
implementation process. What, from a micro-level perspective, looks like an individual 
making the decision and shifting the process into a certain direction, is also based on the 
interests of one or more particular groups with particular sub-cultures, ways of thinking, etc. 
(Thomas, 1994; Markham and Holahan, 1996). The following sections show that the 
cultures, norms, expectations and interests of the different groups in the organisation as well 
as their traditional power position have a strong impact on the CE implementation process. 
These aspects basically constitute the third dimension of organisational power and politics. 
For the further analysis three individuals were chosen out of the cast of characters, who, in
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the author's view, most significantly influenced the CE implementation process. They were 
the CE Project Leader, the OCC Project Leader and the Technical Managing Director. Their 
positions and actions are examined along the three dimensions of power. In addition the 
author focused on three groups regarding their position towards CE: 1) the CE Project Team 
(as the group most directly involved with CE), 2) technical managers (as one of the most 
influential groups within MILSYS), and 3) Project Managers (as a group in the process of 
gaining power as a result of CE).
83.1 T h e  CE P r o je c t  Te a m
The CE Project Leader and the CE Team members were all engineers. As representatives of 
the large group of engineers in MILSYS they were subject to the conscious or unconscious 
exercise of power through the collective forces and institutional practices of engineers. The 
market MILSYS was competing in required engineering excellence. About one third of the 
overall staff in MILSYS were professional engineers, and 80% of the project's staff were 
typically engineers. Their training and experiences were largely based "on technical and 
economic factors, with little i f  any recognition o f the human and social implications" 
(Bailey 1993, p. 190) and the performance enhancing potential of HRM91. This was clearly 
illustrated in the work of the CE Team. For example, the CE Project Team focused on 
technical problems (e.g. tracking requirements), and recommended technical solutions to 
identified problems (e.g. CORE). It found problems with the design for manufacturability, 
and suggests purchasing the Boothroyd and Dewhurst DFM/A Software. That Systems 
Engineering was not applied in a systematic and disciplined way, may be changed by writing 
new and rewriting existing procedures manual and providing more training. Better 
communication was sought to be achieved by implementing an INTRANET. Consequently, 
the CE concept (introduced in October 1996) reflected the technical mindset of the CE
91 The low recognition of HRM by functional and project managers was for example reflected in the 
results of the AQA self-assessment and the Project Management Assessment, as discussed earlier.
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Team members. It was giving primary focus to technical and procedural solutions to 
problems like communication, co-operation and integration while paying insufficient 
attention to HRM, organisational and cultural change, as shown earlier. Faster and more 
efficient electronic communication and computer technology and more relevant procedures 
were perceived as automatically leading to better communication and higher degrees of 
integration.
The technocratic position of the CE Team members (who were all male) was reinforced by 
the "feminine" (hence downgraded) image attributed to personnel specialists because of the 
welfare origins of their occupation (Legge, 1995b, p. 20). Their service role (in contrast to 
other management functions with their central "male" activities such as Production, 
Engineering, and Finance) "could be said to mirror the conventional domestic division o f 
labour, since the status o f the (male) organisational breadwinner is elevated above the 
'improductive' (female) welfare and administrative function" (Collinson, 1991, in Legge, 
1995b, p. 22). MILSYS itself could be considered a patriarchal society. It had a 
predominantly male workforce^, the Technical Managing Director was not sensitive to 
gender issues in the workplace, and MILSYS' personnel specialists were restricted to 
administrative and welfare tasks.
Moreover, HRM issues were largely seen by the CE Project Leader as outside the purview 
of the CE Project (though this changed at a later stage). An illustration of non-decision­
making was the suppression of the CE Project Team members' demands for change (raised 
in the form of various HR and organisational issues such as the future scope of functional 
managers or team rewards) by the CE Project Leader. These HR issues were not included 
into the minutes, agenda, project tasks or the CE Project proposals. The CE Project Leader 
discussed the project proposals with senior management. As they only contained issues 92
92 29% of MILSYS' overall staff were women. In the Engineering Department they only made up 
8.4%, the HR Department had 77.7% women, Manufacturing 65.6%. In Senior Management women 
were represented by 2.5%, in Management all together by 8.4%. MILSYS did not have a formal 
Affirmative Action Program, but said to encourage females, particularly within engineering.
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accepted by the CE Project Leader, he acted in a gatekeeper's role, and so exercised control 
over the agenda, keeping potential issues (e.g. future role of functional managers) out of the 
political process (Lukes, 1974).
In addition, the CE Team members did not fully appreciate the human and social 
implications of the implementation of CE (this changed over time especially as a result the 
continued input from the University partners and suggested readings such as Wheelwright 
and Clark, 1992b). Apart from HRM issues such as team structure, team training, and team 
meetings, the CE Team did not consider other HRM issues in depth (until February 1997). 
Because of the strong engineering culture they just did not occur. Little or no emphasis was 
given to the design and promotion of constructive interpersonal relationships. Issues such as 
how to support people through change and ensure their ownership of the new processes 
found little attention. The CE team did little to overcome the 'Svait and see" attitude^ of 
many employees towards CE. This attitude was based on past experience with change in 
their organisation. Many employees had long years of service and had worked in the 
company before part of it was taken over by the German corporation. They had witnessed a 
number of changes and change initiatives with different results. According to the HR 
Manager, most of these changes had been presented as fait accompli with little or no 
attempts by the company "to accommodate people in the course o f the changes". Many of 
the major changes in the past were accompanied by massive dismissals. But the CE team 
failed to clearly spell out and discuss the implications of implementing CE for the individual 
employees and the various groups affected (such as functional managers or Project 
Managers). CE w ith its strong emphasis on cross-functionality may have been perceived by 
the functional management, for example, as an advance against their strong vested rights and 93
93 Despite the opportunity and request to comment proposals, to come up with ideas or suggestions, 
die CE Project Team received very little feedback. People did not ask for additional information, 
showed little interest in CE or offered voluntary work. In informal talks people expressed their hope 
that the change process will "soon be over and everything goes back to normal". Similar statements 
were found in the AQA self-assessment They also showed that people did not think that their 
contribution or initiative can contribute to change.
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power. Various materials produced by the CE Project Team pointed to a reduction in the 
influence of the functions in projects and their reorientation tow ards a supporting role in the 
development process94. Functional managers repeatedly asked (e.g. in the CE introduction 
training, and in meetings of the CE team with functions) about their future roles and 
responsibilities. Some functional managers as shown later, refused to support the CE Team 
and acted to protect their territories. The CE Team did not seem to be aware (too junior in 
status perhaps and without relevant experience) that these individual and collective attitudes 
were endangering the successful implementation of CE.
Most of the CE team members, on the other hand, were representatives of specific functional 
departments. They consciously or unconsciously asserted the collective interests of their 
home functions. One indication may have been the avoidance of any discussion of the 
devolution of authority from the functional to the project management. Due to their 
functional bias they may have lacked the vision of howr a strong project organisation 
operates. The material produced by the CE Project Team provided few clear statements of 
this required shift. The clearest account was produced by the project management 
representative on the CE Project Team. In the CE training for Project Managers he 
introduced the concurrent responsibility assignment matrix (see Figure 33), winch was not 
shown in any of the other training sessions.
This concurrent responsibility assignment matrix indicates devolution of authority' and 
accountability from functional managers to project teams and a concurrent approach to 
design and development (see Figure 16 for comparison). The Project Leader becomes 
responsible for planning, authorising and controlling all aspects of the project (including 
project personnel), and the project team creates a top-level specification, which leads to the 
identifications of the CIs. This in turn generates the top level WBS for the project, w ith a
94 See for example the comparison between the classical and the concurrent responsibility assignment 
matrix (Figures 16 and 31); or the proposed project team structure including the definition of roles 
and responsibilities of the individual teams and team members.
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Concurrent Responsibility Assignment Matrix 
MILSYS, 1996
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Source: Project Management Course Notes For CE, 1996
Figure 33 : Concurrent Responsibility Assignment Matrix
focus on the delivery of the CIs.
This section made an attempt to trace back the CE Project Teams emphasis on technical 
solutions to what were essentially organisational problems, and broad neglect of HR issues 
to their engineering background, MELSYS' patriarchal society, the dominance of their 
Project Leader and their integration in functional departments.
The next section outlined the position of the groups of technical managers and Project 
Managers regarding CE and their influence on the conceptualisation and implementation of
CE.
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S 3.2  The Groups of Technical and Project Managers
The technical managers (including the Technical Managing Director and the Directors of the 
technical departments) were the probably most powerful group in MILSYS because their 
resources and representation on committees and thus their influence on the change process. 
They not only had the strategic decision making power through their membership on the 
Executive Committee, traditionally they also dominated the decision-making process in 
projects. According to Dougherty (1997, p. 428), the power in traditional organisations 
"reinforces segmentalism became it is attached to existing boundaries and established 
routines. The power o f resources that is embedded in funds, expertise, information, and 
credibility is in the hands o f managers who are not part o f the innovative initiative, so it 
smtains current activities". The CE Project Leader claimed that "if you compare functional 
directors ... and Project Managers [in MILSYS], Directors certainly have a higher 
hierarchical position, more power and influence". Functional managers decided over many 
aspects of the projects as outlined in chapter five. Project Managers only acted as 
"lightweight" managers, and had to constantly negotiate with more powerful functional 
managers to achieve their project objectives, and to get the necessary resources and support. 
They were "always begging and pleading" described the Director of Quality Assurance the 
position of Project Managers, and continued:
"prior to CE the Project Manager often had to almost go on his hands and 
knees to get more resources. He would have situations where the Engineering 
Director would like to have this guy [from a project] back to do something else 
now. And then there is this big hole and nobody is doing his work anymore.
And the Project Manager had no means to stop that."
According to the CE Project Leader, the direction in MILSYS was "given by the functional 
managers". But he claimed that "the directions should be given by the Project Managers". 
He also argued that
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"there is every opportunity fo r  the Project Managers to have power status. 
Unfortunately a lot o f our Project Managers don't seem to take this 
opportunity... This is why the functional managers fill  the gap. ... There is a 
leadership void ... Project Managers aren't filling  their apparent authority, 
their eligible authority. ... It always surprises me that Project Managers let 
functional managers get away with their announcements. "
Many Project Managers lacked the knowledge how to strengthen their position. They w ere 
inexperienced in the play of organisational power and politics in achieving an organisational 
change agenda and not proactive enough to seize power. All Project Managers in MIT SYS 
(including the Project Management representative on the CE Project) were qualified 
engineers. Many of them were ex-defence forces. Most of them had been in the company for 
more than five years. They operated within the established institutional framework of 
MIL SYS. They were neither trained nor rewarded or encouraged to do otherwise. Due to 
their cultural integration in MIL SYS and their experience in the defence forces (a strong 
hierarchical body with a culture that one is told w hat to do), they may have lacked a vision 
of a strong project and team culture. Due to their orientation and experiences they may not 
have recognised the significance of the human factor in an integrated product development 
effort. The Project Manager (2) assumed that "with a stronger personality Project Managers 
might be able to push this process o f getting into a more powerful position". He continued 
"the speed with which we can turn this functional organisation into a project culture based 
organisation is dependent on the personality o f the Project Managers involved". This quote 
points to the personality' factor of individual Project Managers and their skills and ability as 
a group to determine the pow er shift process. But functional managers may have prevented 
the recruitment or appointment of strong personalities as Project Managers or becoming a 
Project Manager was not perceived as challenging career and thus did not attract high 
profile people.
Project Managers were also inferior to technical managers, as they were not directly
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represented on the Executive Committee. According to the Technical Managing Director 
"functional managers play an important role to support the way o f thinking here in the 
company". The Executive Committee, as outlined in chapter five, was the most important 
decision-making panel in the company. It was the forum through which CE issues like the 
devolution of authority could have been discussed. No detailed discussion of topics 
endangering the " tu r f of functional managers at the meetings of the Executive Committee 
was, however, reported by interviewees or recorded in the minutes. This may not be 
surprising as the composition of the Executive Committee clearly showed that it was a 
domain of the functional (technical) managers^ (perhaps they may have foreseen 
implementation of CE as empowerment for the project organisation and interpreted 
themselves as losers of this process).
In different ways, a number of functional managers and Directors consciously and 
unconsciously undermined the implementation of CE and cross-functional and team efforts. 
A number of departments did not provide a functional representative for the CE team, even 
after the repeated requests by the CE Project Leader (e.g. no representative from MP&C) or 
only at a later stage of the project (e.g. Project Management, Sales and Marketing). Some 
technical managers and Directors did not participate in important CE meetings or training 
sessions nor send a respective substitute (e.g. MP&C, Sales and Marketing). In other cases 
functional managers did not enforce the participation of their subordinates on CE training or 
did not sufficiently empower the functional representative on the Pilot Project (e.g. MP&C). 95
95 Chapter five provides more detail on the Executive Committee. The EC was made up of the two 
Managing Directors, the Directors of die Engineering, Manufacturing, Quality Assurance, and 
Material Planning and Control and the Finance Department The Sales and Projects Department (and 
thus project management) was represented by the Technical Managing Director, a proponent of 
strong functions.
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As it is in the vested interest of traditional (Tayloristic) functional departments96 to weaken 
cross-functional orientation (in order to stay in control and maintain their power position) 
(see e.g. Juergens and Malsch, 1994; Druecke, 1995; Kern and Schuman, 1985), their 
protective behaviour was not only directed against project management but also against 
other departments. An indication of this attitude was given by the leader of the CE Pilot 
Project in describing the difficulties in building up cross-functional integration in the Pilot 
Project. He was wondering how he should possibly "resolve differences between the 
departments in this project when at the highest level o f the company [the Directors] are 
fighting each other". He drew up a diagram of the functional structure with the functional 
directors shooting at each other. The Director MP&C was particularly negative. She did not 
see CE as relevant for her department and perceived the CE Project as a purely engineering 
project. With the increased use of COTS (Commercials Off The Shelf), the MP&C 
Department had gained greater importance. The Director MP&C defended her status and 
department by repeatedly directing and redirecting blame for mistakes and failures to other 
departments (e.g. for unsuccessful bids or project delays). She also refused to share 
information (e.g. about the way a particular order system in MP&C worked, or about terms 
of delivery for COTS). She did not sufficiently empower the employee who represented the 
function at the CE Pilot Project (e.g. in the form of authority to provide information about 
the new order system in MP&C or to decide the order of parts). This caused confusion in the
96 Behaviour and thinking typical for tayloristic design of work: control bureaucracy (rules), hierarchy 
(interventions from above); uncooperative departmentalisation; stringent division of planning and 
disposition tasks, on one hand, and executing/doing tasks in the development process; authority and 
decision making power for project resides in hands of senior functional managers not directly 
involved in project; non-transparent project management - functional managers decide of many 
aspects of project (including resources, targets) and do not need to justify to project personnel 
reason for changes; communication/cooperation mediated through the hierarchy; delegation and 
control play most important role in the relationship between subordinates and superior; culture of 
blame; big status differences.
Behaviour and thinking typical for cross-functional teamwork in product development: promotion of 
constructive interpersonal relationships, which engenders communication, participation, trust, 
teamwork, empowerment, personal growth and pride in performance; power in hands of highly 
authorisiesed project teams; lateral (between projects) and vertical (with management) coordination 
of resources, targets, priorities; small status differences.
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Pilot Project Team and led to delays in the project course (due to missing information about 
lead times for certain orders and the late order of parts). The person was not able to make 
any decisions, which impeded the teamwork process and co-operation. The Director of 
Quality Assurance presumed that "empowerment is often driven by the comfort factor o f 
relevant managers ".
How this applied to the Technical Managing Director is discussed in the next section.
8.3.3 Th e  M a n  A t  Th e  T o p
8.3.3.1 The Power Position of the Technical Managing Director
The CEO of a company, as mentioned before, has a strong impact on the scope and success 
of organisational change through his or her official top position (Bums and Stalker, 1961). 
In his reflection on power, Weber (1947) distinguishes between power that is intrinsic to an 
individual and power that is intrinsic to the "office" a person holds, derived from its official 
post. In the case of the Technical Managing Director of MILSYS, who was the company's 
CEO, the two aspects coincided and intensified his powerful position and influence on the 
overall change program. The Technical Managing Director not only had the organisational 
authority and decision-making capability through the superior position he was holding, but 
also through his strong personality and broad experience.
Bom and raised in Germany, his father Russian, his mother German, he proudly described 
himself as "a mixture o f the biggest troublemakers o f the 20th century". He started his 
career in the 1960s as design engineer in Australia in the company from which MTT.SYS 
originated. In order to gain broader experience, he worked in a number of different 
companies, businesses and countries. For example, he worked as an application engineer in 
the computer and instrumentation division of a renowned international consumer goods 
corporation, and in the American finance industry, dealing with mergers, acquisitions and 
corporate advice: "I did this to learn more about finance. Now I  know more about finance 
than my financial people. They ju st never had any o f this exposure I  had". However, as his
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ultimate goal was not to become a successful merger banker, he went back to manufacturing 
industry and Australia. He worked in a financial role for a major cable manufacturer, then 
became its Managing Director. In 1985 he became the Managing Director of the 
organisation where his career began. He described his aim in this role as "merging 
engineering... with strategic thinking".
The Technical Managing Director was an "entrepreneurial hero" (Buchanan and Badham, 
1998, p. 98) in the way he was able to set a vision for the company, mobilise people and 
obtain the active contribution of the diverse groups within the organisation. He was widely 
accepted as well experienced, knowledgeable, strong-willed and determined. One Project 
Manager (3) described him as "very clearly focused on the market, ... he understands very 
clearly what our cost drivers are, how the organisation works, what sort o f business the 
organisation needs to keep going and what kind o f profit margin we have to make". The 
Director of Quality Assurance talked about a certain rule the Technical Managing Director 
followed. He claimed "he did not believe that you sit around and wait fo r the future to 
happen. You had to actually make the future happen in the way you want it to happen". 
Looking back at the time of the initiation of the TOP-Program, the Director of Quality 
Assurance recalled that in the way the Technical Managing Director acted he was "almost 
like a religious person. He made us all believe in these things [TOP, organisational change, 
knowledge management]. It was exciting. Lots o f nights I  did not like going home. I  ju st 
wanted to keep doing what I  was doing here. It was so much fun". The Leader of the 
Innovation Project claimed that regarding the Innovation Project the Technical Managing 
Director "believe[d] in it with religious zeal. He did not conceive the idea but when it came 
up to him, he quickly embraced it and pushed it forwards”. His determination was also 
reflected in the decision making process of the future core competencies of the company. 
His position was that "the only two profitable things you can do fo r any company, ... are
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marketing and innovation. The rest are all costs'/97. He strongly brought his influence to 
bear to determine marketing as one of the company's future core competencies. A number of 
activities were immediately initiated and directly promoted by the Technical Managing 
Director to stress marketing’s importance. Among these was the development of an 
opportunity database" (see chapter five). It was run by the Marketing Department and "will 
be run stronger still by me, changing the marketing role" as the Technical Managing 
Director emphasised.
He recognised employees as the company's key source of competitive advantage: "Human 
resources are the only resources you really have. ... To succeed out there you have to decide 
what kind o f company you want to have, ... it really comes down to people". His underlying 
attitude, however, was "when you employ people, you employ problems" (see also Footnote 
95). This was revealed in interviews with him and in his occasionally aggressive stance 
towards managers and employees when faced with criticism or differing opinions. An 
example for the latter is provided in the incident report below.
He occasionally pursued an authoritative decision-making style. A middle manager from the 
Engineering Department described him as "dictatorial. ...H e  will tell you what to do and 
you have do it in a particular way". According to the Director of Quality Assurance a 
number of decisions in the Executive Committee were made in an "authoritarian style, with 
[the Technical Managing Director] saying I  don't care what you are saying. That is what 
we are going to do". The Technical Managing Director himself explained that "in the Anglo­
Saxon world you want a leader. Somebody ultimately has to run the ship".
He exercised a "strong favouritism ... towards certain people" (External Consultant) and 
was condescending towards others. The OCC Project Leader for example "seem[ed] to 
make the going". According to an external consultant the OCC Project Leader was one of 97
97 This attitude was an indication that his attitude towards HRM had not substantially changed - 
employees were still seen as a cost than as key source of competitive advantage (disparity of 
management rhetoric and practice).
247
the "rising stars" in the company benefiting from the strong favouritism by the Technical 
Managing Director. The Technical Managing Director adopted a more pejorative position 
towards the Managing Director Business Administration. Despite the formal status attached 
to this position (as described earlier), the Technical Managing Director stressed that
"while the kaufm an^ would emphasise ... this is a peer group, we are both 
equal, it is not so. ... I f  he doesn't do well, I  fire  him, not he me. There is a peer 
no. 1 and there is a peer no. 2. ... [But] I  don’t have to concentrate now on 
everything, ...all the boring s t i f f  I  can give to him. I  can concentrate on 
marketing, engineering and project management."
He was rather autocratic with regard to his contribution on the success of the company and 
often handled HRM matters in an informal and arbitrary way, as the next quotes show. On 
the other hand he seemed to be easily offended by criticism about the company (see incident 
report).
"We are ahead in the area how we are moving towards becoming a knowledge- 
based company. Why is this? Predominantly because I  am driving it."
"I can talk on these things [organisational change program] forever. I'm  
running the show, so I  have probably much more to say than you have ever 
heard elsewhere."
"I know the people who contributed [in major developments], I  live in this 
company. ...T o  recognise a hero takes a hero."
He might not have been aware of the effect of his capriciousness on managers and other 
employees in the organisation. His attitudes and behaviours ran counter his organisational 
goal to "build up a truly knowledge-based company" (Technical Managing Director) and 
hindered the establishment of an environment required for successful CE. In the case of the 98
98 The term "kaufman" was repeatedly used by the CEO when he talked about the Managing Director 
Business Administration (used in a pejorative way: the bureaucrat the money grubber).
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CE Project Leader it contributed to his resignation from the company (he believed that his 
further career development was limited in MILSYS because of the incident described 
below).
Incident Report
The incident occurred at one of the several half-day introductory training sessions for CE. 
At this particular session about 20 employees and managers of the company participated. 
One of them was the Technical Managing Director.
The CE introductory training generally started off with a discussion about the strengths and 
weaknesses of MILSYS' traditional product development process. Similar to other introductory 
sessions, critical comments were made but also a number of strengths pointed out by the participants in 
the training session, in which the Technical Managing Director participated. The training then moved 
into the team game stage (LEGO design game). Three teams were formed and each player was given a 
particular role. The task was to design a truck as attractive, cheaply and fast as possible following a 
number of requirements. The exercise was designed the way that this team would win, which paid 
attention not only to the actual design requirements but also aspects such as costs, and involvement of 
downstream functions.
The full cost of the truck was calculated as the sum of the costs of the components plus the sum of the 
costs of assembly. Only one person, the designated production manager of the team, knew the costs of 
assembly. His/er task was to build seaplanes (simulated production line), for which the team also 
earned a number of points per seaplane. One aim of the game was to illustrate the need for up-front 
involvement of downstream functions, for functional integration. The team was supposed to clarify the 
roles of each player and to find out what information each of them got. Most of the teams did not meet 
this requirement, among them the team to which the Technical Managing Director belonged.
The Technical Managing Director was designated the role of the truck designer. Right from the 
beginning of the game he was desperate to win and showed a real aggressiveness. He constantly 
interfered with the job of the Project Manager and pushed the team to come up with a solution. They 
quite quickly came up with a design of a prototype.
The CE Project Leader and an external consultant played the role of the customers and assessed the 
various solutions. In terms of the mandatory design requirements the Technical Managing Director's 
team offered an acceptable solution. But to win the points for 'first to market', they also had to come up 
with assembly instructions. The team had the prototype, but they did not have the assembly 
instructions. The designated customers thus decided that the Technical Managing Director's team was 
not ready to go to the market yet.
The Technical Managing Director started to get agitated and tried to argue with them. But they insisted 
on the rules of the game. After the failed attempt to convince the 'customers', he lost interest. The rest 
of the team carried on. The designated Project Manager took over his actual role. In the meantime, 
however, they were beaten by another team, which came up with both the prototype and the assembly 
instruction. The Technical Managing Director's team came second, which he was not impressed with.
The training then moved into its final stage. It was explained what CE is and what benefits it would 
bring for MILSYS. The benefits were explained by reflecting on the weaknesses identified in the first 
part of the training and the observed behaviour patterns in the team game. The CE Project Leader gave 
an assessment of the company's traditional project development process. He summarised the strengths 
and pointed out that some of the projects unconsciously already use a number of CE principles. He 
then addressed the problems the CE Project Team identified and how they intended to overcome them. 
He introduced the team's proposal for a new project team structure, and he talked about the proposed 
implementation process: the training, the revised manuals and mentoring. It followed the scheme: that 
was the way it works today, here are the proposed changes, building on existing strengths, here is how 
we will achieve them. It was an interactive session because people picked up problems, asked
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questions, which the CE Project Leader tried to answer.
At this stage the Technical Managing Director got very agitated and blurted out that die CE leader was 
painting too negative a picture of the company and demanded that people, who come up with criticism, 
exactly point out what project this applies to. He criticised the whole course for being too negative and 
not drawing enough on the positive side, the achievements of the company. The systems were in place, 
he insisted, it is just people's attitudes that stop them from working effectively. He obstinate!}7 
persisted in his complaints and hindered the CE Project Leader to bring the training session to the 
planned close. ~
Right after the session a couple of participants came to the CE leader and made a very7 public display 
of satisfaction with the training in front of the Technical Managing Director. One guy shook the CE 
Project Leader's hand and said, thank you very much and congratulations.
While the other participants went away, the CE Project Leader, the Technical Managing Director and 
the external consultant stayed behind. The CE Project Leader was very7 perturbed. He saw7 the 
Technical Managing Director’s behaviour basically as sabotaging the training and pulling the rug from 
under his feet. He openly' raised the question, whether the Technical Managing Director w as really7 
supporting the CE Project Team in what it was trying to do. The Technical Managing Director, on the 
other hand, was very angry and paced up and down. For the next hour the CE Project Leader 
supported by' the external consultant tried to placate the Technical Managing Director. But die 
argument went round and round in circles.
But the Technical Managing Director did not seem to criticise the substance of what the CE Project 
team was proposing to do. He criticised elements of the training session, which, in his opinion, 
portrayed the company in a too negative way (though the criticism came from the training participants 
themselves, not from the course content). He used words like: There is nothing wTong with our 
systems, its the people.’ 'What is required here is nothing more than an attitude change. There are no 
Chinese walls in this company. Those walls only exist in people's minds.' These drawings are all 
wrong (see Figures 17-19). The systems and processes are in place.’ They would work if people w ould 
allow them to. People don't have die right attitude.'.
Another point he raised was that the CE Project Leader placed too much emphasis on systems and 
procedures and not enough on changing the way people think and behave. But because he was 
speaking in a very emotional way a lot of his arguments got lost. He said, training is not enough to 
change die attitudes and that the team had not paid enough attention to the people side. He also got 
very personal and accused the CE Project Leader for sabotaging one of the company's bid attempts 
because of a somew hat negative interaction between him and one of the other people involved in the 
affair. The argument carried on. They finally disbanded but without any agreement how7 to proceed or 
solve the conflict.
Other managers (such as the Director MP&C) may have felt encouraged to pursue their 
traditional leadership style with little devolution of authority to subordinates, little 
orientation towards teamwork and a strong "blame mentality". Similarly, his position 
towards the HR Department strongly determined the department's role in MIL SYS' 
organisational and cultural change process. It may have also influenced the recognition of 
the significance of HRM by line managers and the consideration of HRM issues in 
individual change projects, as discussed in the next section.
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8.3.3.2 The Technical Managing Director and HRM
The Technical Managing Director determined the HR Department's reactive position to 
change. One such step was the appointment of the new (traditional oriented personnel) HR 
Manager in 1990. The Technical Managing Director had the power to change this situation, 
but no attempts were undertaken to recruit a broader experienced and more knowledgeable 
person. This led to a permanent restriction of the department's scope and influence on 
organisational processes, as discussed earlier. More strategic aspects of HRM (like the 
development of an HRM strategy, the initiation of changes to HR policies and practices, 
HRM planning) went into the responsibility of the Technical Managing Director. But until 
the initiation of the TOP-Program in 1994 he was not active in this regard. One reason may 
have been the Technical Managing Director's low recognition of HRM before 1994 in terms 
of HRMs contribution to the success of the company (perhaps due to his training and 
experiences based on technical and economic factors (Bailey, 1993)).
Only with the initiation of the TOP-Program in 1994, the Technical Managing Director 
showed an increased interest in HRM. It was particularly reflected in the establishment of 
the OCC Project whose sponsor he became. It is interesting to note that the corporate TOP­
Program had been modified in 1995 with the addition of a "cultural change component in 
order to help achieve its goals". This may have been a trigger for the initiation of the OCC 
Project in MILSYS, and the attention given to it by the Technical Managing Director.
With the initiation of the TOP-Program and the OCC Project a more strategic pursuit in 
MILSYS' approach to HRM became apparent as well as a move towards more a 
"sophisticatedhuman relations" style (Purcell and Gray, 1986), as discussed in chapter six.
He used the OCC Project to realise his vision of MILSYS becoming knowledge-based 
organisation. The Technical Managing Director assumed that if MILSYS was a "knowledge 
based company, people would vohmteer [to spread knowledge]". Thus, the OCC Project 
was asked to redesign the appraisal system. According to the Technical Managing Director, 
starting in 1997 "people will be assessed on how they spread knowledge" and will get
251
"rewardedfor spreading knowledge" (but he did not say how this would be assessed).
His engagement with the OCC Project indicated that HRM issues were not only given a high 
profile in his general deliberations on business strategy, but also that personnel policy itself 
had been taken over by him in order to directly influence the development of employees and 
thus the transition towards a knowledge-based company. Yet, and possibly due his technical 
mindset and his limited knowledge of HRM, he seemed to perceive behavioural change as a 
simple cause-effect relationship rather than a complex and longitudinal process. He tended 
to favour technical solutions to organisational problems, in contrast to, for example, face to 
face communication (e.g. quick approval of INTRANET, quick approval to purchase a so- 
called "middle-ware" software to support communication and information exchange, quick 
approval to purchase CORE, but no approval for team building training in the Pilot Project 
or the CE Project Team).
Despite the beginning of an organisational and cultural change process in 1994 and a move 
towards a more "sophisticated human relations" style, the Technical Managing Director 
restricted the HR Departments activities. He justified this situation as follows:
"He [the HR Manager] can’t be the front-runner. He ju st wouldn't know, what 
is the sharp end o f our business to succeed in the marketplace. I f  he knew that, 
he would not be personnel manager, or human resources manager. ... What 
kind o f company you want to have really comes down to people. That is the sort 
o f thing that has to come from  here [points to himself]. You can't leave it to 
your kaufman or your HR man or whomever."
He claimed that the HRM Department did not influence or co-ordinate the change
process or was seeking to. He explained that this role largely resided with him:
"What we call the strategy alignment, is done by me. I  am the sponsor and [ the 
OCC Project Leader] is the manager. To make certain that people know where 
the company is going, what our mission is, ... that is what strategy alignment is 
.... That is not run by the HR Department. And I  don't see that it can be done by 
them. Because I  don't want him [the HR Manager] to know as much as I  do. ...
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To make sure that people go in the right direction and all thinking in a similar 
way is my role. It is not HEM’S role. HRM s role is more on the soft factors, to 
look after them [employees]. Strategy alignment - this is my role. ... I f  HRM  
could do it, I  could go home. ... I f  they'd do it, we'd duplicating functions."
He strongly emphasised that he was running the company and that he decided over 
MILSYS' employees:
"You think the HR Manager runs the company. No. Wrong. The resources we 
have - we are selling brains, we are not selling products. We sell solutions ...
And therefore I  have to hone the people to become what I  want them to become, 
to be successful out there. And i f  I  don't do this, then you give me a reason why 
I'm here. Therefore I'm ultimately [responsible fo r] Human resources."
He even claimed that it was his responsibility to create the appropriate HRM policies 
and practices to accommodate MILSYS' business reorientation:
"Even sorting out an adequate reward or punishment system is not theirs [HR 
Department]. It is my role. I f  people have done well in engineering ... Do you 
think [the HR Manager] knows what technically that meant. I  know what it 
means. ... I  go to HRM a n d ... say, I  want to pay [these people] a bonus o f so 
and so much. How does a HR man know, whether this technical product is 
world class or ju st made it. What do you want this poor man to be? 
Everything? "
With the increasing importance of people and HRM and a growing dependence of 
companies on employees' knowledge, a dominant, strategic oriented HRM Manager would 
necessarily hold an influential position. The above quotes seem to indicate that such an 
influential HRM Manager was perceived by the Technical Managing Director as threat to 
his own position {"If HRM could do it, I  could go home. ... I f  they'd do it, we'd be 
duplicating functions"). It could have been the reason why he avoided a more progressive 
appointment. He consciously excluded the HR Manager from the organisational and cultural 
change process {"Idon't want him [the HR Manager] to know as much as I  do") and did not
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demand from him to broaden his knowledge. At the same time he justified this exclusion 
with the limited expertise of HR Manager and other HR staff {"He ju st wouldn't know, what 
is the sharp end o f our business to succeed in the marketplace"; "I don't see that it can be 
done by them [HR representatives] ").
The OCC Project Leader, on the other hand, may not have been perceived as a threat. He 
was the Technical Managing Director's "protégé". Moreover, his position as leader of the 
OCC Project was only an additional temporary task to his position as Business 
Administration Manager of the Engineering Department, not a formal structural position. He 
was seen as an ally, as a person who worked out the transformation of the Technical 
Managing Director’s vision into reality {"strategy alignment, is done by me. I'm the sponsor 
and [the OCC Project Leader] is the manager").
8.3.3.3 The Technical Managing Director and the Change Program
The Technical Managing Director strongly influenced the overall organisational change 
program. He brought his pow er to bear regarding what projects were initiated and supported. 
Projects in his immediate interest were sponsored by him personally, like the Innovation 
Project and the OCC Project. They were given the best people - the "front-runners" - as well 
as the time and financial resources the}' asked for.
The Innovation Project, for example, was given a full-time dedicated, influential project 
leader (the re-employed former Director of the Engineering Department). The selection 
process of the Innovation Project team members was part of the Technical Managing 
Director's "strategy alignment". They were selected by the Business Administration 
Manager of the Engineering Department and then personally approved by the Technical 
Managing Director. They were "predominantly young engineers ... people who are the front 
runners". According to the Technical Managing Director, their main target was to fmd ways 
to improve innovativeness in MILSYS. "Who will be innovative? We don't know yet. But the 
important thing is, one can teach innovation. And this team is working on these things". The
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nomination of the Innovation Project Team members took place sometimes at the expense of 
other projects. The CE Project for example lost a valuable team member to the Innovation 
Project without getting a replacement. The Technical Managing Director acted as the 
sponsor for the project and ensured that the project had the necessary resources in terms of 
people, finances and time.
The Technical Managing Director was less supportive towards other projects, such as the 
CE Project, as outlined later. Other projects were staffed with less experienced or qualified 
people. They had less powerful project leaders, and were restricted in their time and 
financial resources. They were disadvantaged in comparison to the favoured projects. 
According to McDonough and Griffin (1997, p. 4) "no amount o f team training or 
management support can turn a group o f less capable team members with no resources into 
a ... powerhouse". It was therefore not surprising, that a number of the projects and 
initiatives outside the Technical Managing Director's interest had to be put on hold or lost 
momentum. In contrast, the projects sponsored by the Technical Managing Director were 
successfully continued beyond the end of the case study in mid-1997.
In addition, the efficiency of the projects was hampered due to a lack of co-ordination, as 
outlined earlier. The Managing Director Business Administration "who was meant to 
provide overall co-ordination, showed no interest at all in providing any sort o f ongoing co­
ordination. In the course o f the 12 months, I  think... I  had four meetings with the gentleman.
... [In one o f these meetings] I  suggested putting together a TOP-newsletter fo r  the company 
where we could report things ... [which] is outside the scope o f my responsibility. Again, he 
wasn't interested", explained the CE Project Leader. Within the change program a number 
of projects and initiatives dealt with overlapping issues. Despite few inter-project meetings, 
little synergy was achieved. Co-operation and communication between the individual 
projects did not take place or remained informal and dependent on informal liaisons between 
the individual managers, and the Technical Managing Director did nothing to counteract.
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83.3.4 The Technical Managing Director and the CE Project
The CE Project was one of the projects outside the immediate interest of the Technical 
Managing Director. External business consultants recommended CE as o f considerable 
promise to MILSYS. The Technical Managing Director accepted the recommendation, and a 
CE Project was initiated. From its inception and despite the formal high priority, the 
Technical Managing Director treated the CE Project, however, as of secondary importance. 
This was reflected in the selection of the CE Project Leader and of the CE Project Team 
members. The CE Project Team members were mostly junior employees with one more 
experienced contractor. They were allotted to the project by their respective functional 
managers. Though all main functions were asked to send a representative onto the CE 
Project Team, only three main departments responded immediately, as discussed earlier.
The CE Project Leader was fairly new to the company and headed the smallest sub­
department within Engineering (with only 7 subordinates). He had no direct influence on 
development projects and the product design and development process. He had not yet 
established a strong personal and professional reputation. The appointment of a project 
leader with a strong reputation, according to Buchanan and Badham (1998, p. 21), carries 
"more weight and influence than one held in low regard". This was particularly visible in 
comparison between the CE and the OCC Project Leader. The nomination of the Systems 
Engineering Manager indicated that the expectations of the Technical Managing Director 
were not particularly high in regard to the enforcement of change. A CE Project Team 
member claimed that the CE Project Team w as "not in power to make anything happen. It is 
a systems group". He believed that if it should have been different, it would have needed 
"somebody- like [the Business Administration Manager o f the Engineering Department], 
who actually causes consequences to happen. ... I  think it was not the mandate o f the group 
to push harder ...to  get more power to influence processes”.
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The Technical Managing Director did not become the sponsor for the CE Project, and its 
senior management sponsor, the Engineering Director, was little interested in the CE 
Project The CE Project was given resources in the form of people's time to develop a CE 
concept and to conduct training. But (until February 1997) the Technical Managing Director 
and other senior managers did not actively support the conceptualisation and 
implementation of CE and the more far-reaching changes that were proposed by the CE 
Team. The CE Project remained very much an Engineering project (focused on design and 
development within projects).
The Technical Managing Director seemed to disagree that MILSYS had problems with the 
way it executed development projects. During the CE training sessions and interviews it 
appeared that he seemed quite satisfied with MfLSYS' development process and the 
procedures in place. For him it was the people who caused problems (see incident report), 
because they tended not to follow procedures and were not willing to co-operate closely. In 
his perception, the major target of the CE Project should have been to achieve an attitude 
change in the people involved in the development process. Thus, he saw little need for 
structural change.
Despite his understanding of CE as an "attitude” and "culture’’ change, that ’’continuously 
[requires] various exercises, training, teaching", he did not require any co-operation 
between the OCC and the CE Project. He did not seem to fully realise that for such an 
attitude change to happen, certain organisational conditions had to be fulfilled (such as the 
establishment of a culture of trust; HRM policies and practices reinforcing the required 
attitudes and behaviours; accountability and decision-making pow er for projects allocated to 
Project Managers). His limited experience with strong project matrix organisations may 
have caused his bounded vision of CE. He gained his experiences and advanced his career 
predominantly in strong functional organisations.
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83.4  The OCC Project Leader
8 3.4.1 The Power Position of the OCC Project Leader
The OCC Project Leader was another important change agent in the company. He had a 
strong impact on the implementation process of CE and the role of HRM in the overall 
change process. An accountant, he joined the company after the take-over by the German 
parent in 1991. In 1992, with the introduction of the double-head structure he was appointed 
the Business Administration Manager of the Engineering Department. Though this was a 
senior management position, he was not a member of die Executive Committee. But 
organisation charts do not always expose the full power structure of an organisation. "Power 
is also embedded in other less visible features" (Buchanan and Badham, 1998, p. 36). The 
OCC Project Leader profited from particular circumstances (Hardy and Clegg, 1996) such 
as the enforced changes by the parent company (i.e. introduction double-head structure), the 
initiation of the TOP-Program as well as the Technical Managing Director's vision of 
becoming a truly knowledge-based company. He emerged as winner of the various change 
processes and was able to steadily increase his sphere of influence. According to the 
Business Administration Manager of the Engineering Department, he and the Engineering 
Director were:
"jointly responsible fo r the whole function. ...W e clearly run this [department] 
together. I ’m very interested in the technologyf... I'm very interested in ensuring 
that we have the right people and processes in place to achieve the contract 
deliverables. A t the same time I  have to construct the financial results fo r  the 
group. But I  don't ju s t say, Ilo o k  after the number side o f things and don't give 
a damn about when we deliver something or the fa c t that we don't have the 
right tools or the right people."
The final decision-making power, however, rested with the Director of the function. 
According to the Technical Managing Director there was "one function, one man". The
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OCC Project Leader had "a lot o f ambitious plans" (Director of Quality Assurance). He was 
one of the 'rising stars" and one of the "widely acknowledged movers and shakers" in the 
company, and "seem[ed] to make the going" as an external consultant put it. He benefited 
from the strong favouritism on the part of the Technical Managing Director. Beyond this, he 
was widely respected by the employees and had a high reputation for getting things done 
and being proactive. A CE Project Team member described him as
"very efficient and task-oriented. I f  he is given a task, he finds all the data he 
needs and does not stop until he figures out a way to solve the problem. . . . I f  
somebody like him was appointed the team leader or at least member o f the 
[CE Project] team, we would have had a much higher reputation."
Though the OCC Project was officially of secondary' importance, his selection attached a 
high importance to the project. He possessed great authority and, through his own senior 
management position, he had easy access to senior management, to information, and other 
resources. In the face of opposition and resistance, such power helps in the pursuit and 
achievement of valuable social and organisational objectives (Buchanan and Badham, 
1998). The status of the project was even more heightened with the Technical Managing 
Director becoming the sponsor of the OCC Project. This underlined once more the OCC 
Project Leader’s official warrant for change. It provided the OCC Project Leader with 
valuable resources in terms of time and finances, and enabled him to enforce the proposed 
changes within the organisation.
83.4.2 Vision and Political Skills
The OCC Project Leader had a comprehensive vision of what he wanted to achieve with the 
instigated organisational and cultural change process. His ideas were captured in the OCC 
Project concept as outlined in chapter five. Some aspects the OCC Project focused on 
coincided with CE (such as teamwork, innovation orientation, and communication). While 
the OCC Project Leader was not concerned with the restructuring of the traditional product
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development process, he realised that the new type of business required a new type of 
leader. Teamwork was seen as a way to master innovativeness and flexibility. This all 
entailed a new role for HRM as a source of competitive advantage, which was also 
addressed by the OCC Project.
In comparison to the CE Project Leader, the OCC Project Leader was more successful in 
pushing his proposed changes through. Reasons may be seen in his organisational position 
(senior manager) and the interest of the Technical Managing Director on the OCC Project as 
described above. Other reasons may have been his political skills and the change strategy he 
applied. He was aware that "organisational change intensifies political issues and 
behaviours" and the change agent inevitably encounters resistance to new ideas (Buchanan 
and Badham, 1998, p. 26). Consciously and unconsciously he deployed political tactics to 
dispel resistance and opposition, formed alliances to advance both, his personal and 
organisational change agendas, and tailor his concept to fit into the system.
He engaged in a variety of tactics. One was to make decisions appear less important to 
others. Another, slightly related to the first, was to involve only a minimum of people in 
negotiations and decision-making processes. His argument was that "the organisational and 
cultural change process is not the most important issue and therefore should not bind many 
resources". While other TOP projects were conducted in teams, the OCC Project was run 
without a team (although it wfas probably the broadest and most time-consuming change 
project). The OCC Project Leader single-handed determined the topics of the cultural 
change project. This way he reduced the potential for conflict and disagreement, the level of 
challenge and possible dispute. In addition, he did not expose his wider concept to the 
majority of employees. Instead, he translated the concept into locally workable solutions, 
broken down into manageable steps and actions, which were then communicated to the 
organisation. Thereby he maintained "order to otherwise confused situations" (Buchanan 
and Badham, 1998, p. 4). Given this approach, it was not surprising that the 6-day 
management training for example was equated by many employees w ith the end of the OCC
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Project, while it was rather a starting point.
He was aware that organisational and cultural change requires a lot of time to institutionalise 
and assumed that cultural and organisational change ... will go on fo r  many, many years". 
Consequently, he applied a so-called "philosophy o f little steps". It helped him to minimise 
the insecurity employees perceived in view of the radical change. In exposing only the very 
next step of his wider plan and providing only selected information, the OCC Project Leader 
accommodated the people's desire for security. In doing so he was able to overcome human 
and organisational barriers and successfully avoid scepticism and resistance towards his 
broader vision. He explained that he was "not going to drown people with all these ideas 
because they [the ideas] would fail. We don't have the time and people ... to change 
something every single day o f the week". Consciously or unconsciously he may have known 
that the degree of complexity or uncertainty of change "will adversely affect its chances fo r  
adoption" (Sankar, 1991, p. 318). A complex change like MILSYS' organisational and 
cultural change process, which aimed for radical changes in the behaviour of people and 
most likely causes changes the balance of power, is highly vulnerable to political disruption 
(Buchanan and Badham, 1998, p. 123). Simple changes, introduced slowly and 
incrementally, typically do not cause high degrees of conflict. By limiting the information 
about the OCC Project to a minimum, he was able to maintain control over his activities 
with little interference from others. He minimised the risk of endangering his career or being 
sidelined by the one or other stakeholder group or individual in the company (Buchanan and 
Badham, 1998, p. 18).
On the other hand he formed strong alliances with critical groups and individuals in the 
organisation. He made sure that his plans and proposals were agreed and well supported by 
the Technical Managing Director. He was proactive in proposing further steps and actions 
which was well liked by the Technical Managing Director, at the same time open to include 
his ideas. At times in 1995/6 they met "at least once a week" to discuss ideas and further 
actions regarding MILSYS' organisational and cultural change process. The OCC Project
261
Leader ensured that all actions were justifiable as step towards a knowledge-based company 
(support the "right" causes). This way he met the expectations of the Technical Managing 
Director, secured his lasting strong commitment and won him as his probably strongest 
allies.
Another strong ally was the Engineering Director. By giving him the opportunity to take part 
in the implementation of OCC, and earn a reputation for being proactive and having an 
innovative and successful department, the OCC Project Leader was able to pilot-test and 
fine-tune his proposed changes in the Engineering Department. By setting up the 
comprehensive six-day management training the OCC Project Leader started to create a 
broad alliance with managers of all levels. He used the training to inform them about the 
intended direction of MIL SYS' organisational and cultural change. He also discussed and 
agreed first actions with them (e.g. elaboration of a new vision, mission statement). This 
way he made them to supporters of his ideas. By emphasising the imminent alterations and 
mobilising "powerful outside experts with credibility and the aura o f objectivity" (Pfeffer, 
1992b, p. 254) (e.g. training providers and competency assessors from a Management 
Institute), he not only justified his actions, but assured the commitment of the managers or at 
least dispelled their resistance.
Another political tactic the OCC Project Leader applied was not to insist on getting his own 
way at any cost. He w as able to concede and sacrifice proposals in order to get other more 
important causes through and to maintain alliances. The attitude survey was one such 
example. Originally the OCC Project Leader had planned to repeat the survey on an annual 
basis. With the decision for the AQA self assessment, he relinquished this plan, even though 
he lost the "consistency back against the [previous] survey results". But "rather than 
[having] another survey, we decided to see how this [the AQA Self-Assessment] goes, what 
sort o f feedback we get from  this one". This earned him (additional) respect by the Director 
of QA, who talked of the OCC Project Leader w ith high regard and actively supported his 
proposed changes and actions.
262
8.3.4.3 Position on HRM
HRM was a key point of interest to the OCC Project Leader also in his role as Business 
Administration Manager of the Engineering Department. He directly influenced the position 
of HRM in M3LSYS. At the same time he sidelined potential competitors and rivals, as in 
the case of the HR representatives and the CE Project Leader. Within the scope of the OCC 
Project he tried to raise the awareness of HRM of functional and business administration 
managers and with it to strengthen the status of HRM. He knew about the little interest and 
limited knowledge of many functional and Project Managers in HRM matters and their 
downgraded image of HRM. Hence, he only confronted them with few but gradual changes 
in the HRM area. At the same time he initiated a training program that focused on new 
leadership skills and suggested the assessment of project management staff regarding their 
HRM competencies. He turned to external forces such as the training provider or assessor of 
the competency profile to support his position.
He stressed the need for change from a personnel into a Human Resource Management 
function, particularly with the company's development into a knowledge-based organisation. 
He criticised the HR Department for "not [being] proactive enough" and for its traditional 
personnel focus and lack of expertise to fulfil such strategic role. At the same time he 
deprived them of the opportunity to get involved in the OCC Project and to extend then- 
knowledge. He saw the HR Department's responsibility in hiring, firing, administration and 
welfare. He explained: "It is a bit like this: if... I  go to the HR function and say, 'where are 
the 20 people I  demanded? ... I  need sta ff to do the pro jects'... or i f  I  sat down and say 'we 
must be a little bit more strategic about our training philosophy ... ', I  think this is going to 
come second". While a competency assessment was carried out for Project Managers at his 
suggestion and served as the basing point for further training, he proposed no such actions 
for the HR staff.
Instead, he himself moved into the role of a HR strategist and internal consultant for HRM. 
From 1995 to 1997 he proposed and started to implement a number of changes to existing
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personnel policies and practices. But at the end of the case study in mid-1997 these changes 
did not form a holistic, organisation-wide approach. They did not strongly enforce 
attitudinal and behavioural changes. According to the OCC Project Leader, he was "self- 
taught on ... HR issues" and had no formal qualification or education in the HR field. This 
may have been a reason why he did not seem to grasp the significance of a holistic HRM 
approach with its interrelated HRM policies and practices, and the proposed changes 
remained scattered efforts. It is also conceivable that he fried to strengthen the position of 
BA Managers. With Business Administration Managers of the Departments becoming more 
accountable for HRM (and thus the development of employees - the key source of 
company s competitive advantage), they would significantly influence and contribute to the 
success of the company.
83.4.4 Position on CE
The OCC Project was a potential partner project for the CE Team due to its emphasis on 
organisational structures, culture, and HRM policies and practices and its focus on 
teamwork and communication. The OCC Project Leader saw CE as an opportunity to 
overcome the
"attitude 7 do what I  do, and then I  pass it to somebody else to do what they 
do’. CE to me ... is getting a right team together at the right time with 
everybody- knowing what they- need to do and working together to achieve that 
specific goal. ... That is very much - and pu t a brand on it - teamwork, ... CE is 
a cultural change."
Despite his recognition of CE as cultural change and its dependence on teamwork, he did 
not support the CE Project. This was apparent on a number of occasions. One was the six- 
day management training (in May 1996). An important aspect of the training was to discuss 
and understand the benefits of teamwork. But no link was drawn to CE nor was the CE 
Project introduced or mentioned. Furthermore, the OCC Project Leader covertly refused a
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co-operation with the CE Project Team. A CE Team member claimed that the OCC Project 
Leader "did not support the [CE] team very much There was always a ha lf page summary, 
data is not available' 'I can't get anymore'". He assumed that if he would have been on the 
CE Project Team or even been the project leader, he would have "pulled out all information 
we needed" and worked on the problem until a solution was found. The CE Teams invited 
him several times to their meetings in order to gain detailed insight into the OCC Project and 
discuss the overlap between the two projects and possible areas for co-operation. But he 
never took up the invitation. He saw no need to join the meetings. He had spoken to the CE 
Project Leader on a number o f occasions about this organisational change. And what came 
out o f i t ... was that teamwork and communication, the motivation sort o f thing is very, very 
close to CE. And I'm very surprised that they haven't picked that up". He basically made the 
CE Project Leader responsible for the failure to establish a clear and strong link between CE 
and the organisational and cultural change process.
The CE Project Leader on the other hand was neither powerful enough nor broadly 
politically skilled to win the OCC Project Leader as an ally for CE, as shown in the next 
section.
8.3.5 The CE Project Leader
8.3.5.1 The Power Position of the CE Proj ect Leader
The CE Project Leader was a key figure in the conceptualisation and implementation of CE. 
He was the Manager of the Systems Engineering Department. Despite the importance given 
to Systems Engineering, the department was perceived as of minor status by both managers 
and employees. The Systems Engineering Manager assumed that "you should not spend 
much time here when you are young", as it was not career favourable. The Systems 
Engineering Manager was well regarded for his dedication to his specialised field. Systems 
Engineering. He was respected for his ability to keep projects on track and ensure the 
delivery of stated objectives. According to an external consultant he possessed an
265
intellectual rigor in dealing with problems and analysing issues. He was open to new ideas, 
also those outside his own field of expertise. From the beginning he supported the idea of 
CE and offered himself as candidate for the leadership of a respective project.
8.3.5.2 Vision o f CE
The implementation of CE challenged the status quo of established product development 
practices and the ways these practices had been justified in the past. Hence, it was crucial 
for the CE Project Leader to create a comprehensive vision of CE. A broad vision does not 
only inspire and legitimate these changes. It also helps to form a vast troop of allies to 
support the implementation of the proposed changes and to effectively overcome 
subversion, blockage and ignorance. How the CE Project Leader failed to meet these 
requirements is discussed below.
The CE Project Leader perceived CE as "very closely linked to Systems Engineering" and 
thus, as "part o f [his] normal job ... in as much as most CE applies to the design and 
development process". According to him, one of his main tasks regarding CE was to "put 
together a very strong set o f best practices, a set o f rules fo r  me to oversee projects". On the 
other hand he saw CE as "an opportunity to try something new. ... I  saw the CE initiative as 
a chance to test some o f my ideas, ... the chance to tackle some problems which have 
worried me fo r  some years". He read several books about CE. And "having read these 
books, and fo r  the firs t time trying to apply [CE] in a relevant period o f time", was seen by 
him as a major "personal challenge". It struck him, however, that many of the case studies 
and examples provided in this literature described how extremely bad processes can be 
improved. He claimed that M3LSYS "did not have an universally bad process" and was 
already applying CE, if only in an unsystematic way. In 1996 he assumed that the potential 
for improvement through the introduction of CE in MTLSYS would be rather modest. 
Typical for his engineering background, the CE Project Leader focused on technical and 
procedural solutions but little on the social and people aspects involved. The (in October
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1996) presented solution set reflected his perception of CE as little more than the systematic 
application o f good engineering practice, as the next quote indicates:
"Our solution set o f CE 'best practices'... did apply systematic common sense.
It is hard to get too excited about applying systematic common sense. It is not 
as sexy as we would have hoped at the outset. But it is really ju st focusing on 
the details, having the appreciation o f what goes into the design and 
development process. And basically make it more straightforward in many 
ways."
Similar to the engineering-based CE literature, he recognised the cross-functional team as a 
key to the success of CE. But he largely neglected the organisational context, in which the 
cross-functional product development teams are embedded. He focused on aspects such as 
team training, meetings, and team structure and did not recognise these team characteristics 
and activities as only a "subset o f the set o f elements required to make teams truly effective" 
(McDonough and Griffin, 1997, p. 11). He was not aware that unless teams were placed in 
an organisational context that reinforces attitudes and behaviours required for teamwork, 
high functional integration was not achievable. He did thus not consider the creation of an 
appropriate infrastructure for CE with appropriate HRM policies and practices as within the 
scope of the CE Project.
He avoided or just did not realise the need for structural changes and failed to clearly spell 
out the perspectives for the various groups and individuals in the company. He may not have 
had an answer himself how such structural change would look like. His bounded vision may 
have been due to his engineering background" "with little i f  any recognition o f the human 
and social implications" (Bailey, 1993, p. 190). By leaving the question open "What is in fo r  
me?", he, however, increased people's uncertainty regarding what happens to their job, 
status, reputation, work relationships, workload, personal "comfort zone", (Buchanan and
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Badham, 1998, p. 6). This caused individual and collective, open and covert resistance to 
CE. By only vaguely defining the changes in accountability and responsibility, functional 
managers, for example, who may have seen themselves as "losers" of this process, were not 
given the opportunity to find or adopt a new role or position. Project Managers, on the other 
hand, may not have perceived themselves as winners and thus, also remained hesitant.
The implementation of CE primarily required "workable knowledge" in the form of 
decisions and solutions that would work in this context, and which were both socially and 
practically acceptable (Buchanan and Badham, 1998). The CE Project Leader's limited focus 
proved to be not very effective. As he had no comprehensive vision of CE, he was not 
capable of delegitimising MELSYS' old approach to product development. He was not able 
to show that CE was indeed a concept to enable MILSYS to make the leap from being a 
good company to becoming an excellent one. He was unable to kick-off the creation of new 
values, beliefs, symbols, and ideologies.
8.3.5.3 Political Skills and Behaviour
The success of the CE Project as a complex change effort was not only dependent on the 
technical knowledge and vision of the CE Project Leader. It strongly depended on his 
political skills and behaviour, his ability to obtain the compliance, contribution, and co­
operation of a broad range of individuals and groups with different values, perceptions and 
goals.
The CE Project Leader, however, did not fully realise the highly political nature of CE 
implementation. He neglected the fact that it threatened the vested interests and privileges 
(as well as the long-accepted ways of doing things) of different individuals and groups. 
Moreover, he underestimated the need for powerful alliances for the successful implemen- 9
99 Typical for a systems engineering approach is to clearly restrict the focus of the project (to clearly 
define what is inside, what is outside the project), which enables them to tackle complex problems 
(broken down and tackled in pieces) (see e.g. Grady, 1994; Salomone, 1995).
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tation of CE despite his "formal warrant fo r  change" (Buchanan and Badham, 1998). The 
CE Project Leader did not foresee that even groups and individuals, which at first glance 
would profit from CE (such as Project Managers) did not proactively support the proposed 
changes. Their hesitation may have been due to a number of reasons such as lack of interest, 
uncertainty about their personal job, a limited willingness or ability to take over more 
responsibility and risk. For Project Managers the implementation of CE for example 
involved the need to enhance their "people skills" and to apply a different leadership style in 
order to foster a closer co-operation and communication between different departments, 
groups and individuals. They would have to deal with more diverse goals, perceptions and 
modes of operation than in the past. Not every Project Manager was up to this challenge or 
willing to take it. But the CE Project Leader paid little attention to their hesitation and its 
reasons.
In addition, he was not very clever and sensitive in winning (strong) allies and obtain broad 
senior management commitment. Reasons may be found in his personality and his 
leadership style. His leadership style corresponded with his professional experience in 
strong functional, and thus compartmentalised organisations with a Tayloristic approach to 
work. The Defence industry, with their "militaristic ethic o f a bureaucratic organisation 
Cdo your job and take your ration')" (Buchanan and Badham, 1998, p. 74), traditionally 
expected managers to be authoritative. Hence, it was not surprising that the CE Project 
Leader paid little attention to team maintenance issues and did not utilise the CE Project 
Team as one of his alliances. Instead of developing strong linkages to the functions via the 
representatives at the CE Project Team, he dominated the CE Project Team. He did not 
ensure all members felt included nor did he establish an agreed vision. He did not devolve 
responsibility and often suppressed ideas of team members in favour of his own views. In 
doing so, he steered his team into a direction that emphasised procedures and technical 
solutions.
In his relations with others, especially senior managers, his intensity, intellectual rigor, and
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frankness was, according to an external consultant, at times "somewhat daunting". He was 
forthright, but at the same time blunt and not very diplomatic. This was also the case in 
situations where he needed to win somebody over. A number of subordinates and peers 
positively valued his openness, as several interviews and informal talks revealed. Senior 
managers did not seem to appreciate it. He was not on good terms with his immediate boss 
or the two Managing Directors. His name was not mentioned when senior managers talked 
about the "front-runners" of the company. He was not asked to contribute to the Innovation 
Project. He had to formally ask for every meeting with the Managing Directors. In the 
course of 12 months in 1996/7, according to the CE Project Leader, he only "had four 
meetings with the gentleman [the Managing Director Business Administration]" who 
showed no interest at all in CE, though he was meant to provide overall co-ordination for 
the TOP-Program.
By being open, emphasising support and calling on proactivity and participation100, the CE 
Project Leader adopted a more conventional approach to change. He was unaware of the 
need to engage in political tactics (which was to a degree political naivety), particular in 
winning over senior managers, as the next quote indicates: "If I  have invited them [senior 
managers] along to deliver a message, ... they were there... In terms o f being proactive like 
attending any o f our team meetings or showing any sort o f interest or providing any sort o f 
reward, guidance or anything at all, they did not. They were totally reactive". This "lack o f 
senior management commitment" as he called it, was "really frustrating" for him, reaching a 
climax with the later outlined incident.
According to Lettice (1995) and Bucciarelli (1996), the project sponsor has a critical impact 
on the organisational success of a change process. The CE Project did not have a proactive 
and supportive sponsor. The Engineering Director was the formal sponsor of the CE Project. 
He was also the immediate boss of the CE Project Leader. To the disadvantage of the CE
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Project they had a poor relationship. While the Systems Engineering Manager had an almost 
mentor - protégé like relationship with the former Engineering Director and initial sponsor 
of the CE Project, his relationship with the new Engineering Director was less intense and 
based on a very formal level. The former Engineering Director was very interested in CE. 
He saw CE as of great advantage for the company and fostered the co-operation with the 
University partners. In contrast, the new Engineering Director showed little interest in CE 
nor the course and results of the project. When the CE Project Leader "went fo r  specific 
help, a specific job, he [the sponsor] may or may not have done it". According to the CE 
Project Leader "he was not proactive at all. He did not show any interest, did not turn up to 
any meeting, did not comment any report except fo r  spelling mistakes". As a member of the 
Executive Committee the Engineering Director could have championed certain issues for the 
CP Project, such as the representation of every function at the CE team or the early and 
appropriate allocation of a Pilot Project. But no such attempts were undertaken. This may 
have been a conscious or unconscious protection of his turf, both as individual and 
representative of the group of functional managers, as discussed earlier. But again, the CE 
Project Leader with his limited political skills and possible unawareness of the political 
nature of CE was unable to overcome these difficulties and thus, failed to win the project 
sponsor as an ally for the CE Project.
The exercise of conversation controls, influence tactics, and impression management 
techniques is an exercise of power and thus a form of political behaviour (Buchanan and 
Badham, 1998). An opportunity to apply such power was given to the CE Project Leader 
with the CE introductoiy training in which several senior managers participated including 
the Technical Managing Director. His time was limited and he did not spent half a day on 
many things. His participation was thus, a great chance to win his commitment and get him 10
100 This was largely his approach within the CE Project Team as well. He made, however, clear that 
he is giving the direction and sidelined people who held a different view from him; as discussed 
earlier.
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stronger involved. Knowing the Technical Managing Director, his personality and 
leadership style, it would have been a sign of political sensitivity on the part of the CE 
Project Leader to structure and manage the training and game the way it most likely 
achieved an outcome that pleased the Technical Managing Director (e.g. Why not let him 
and his team win, rather than upset him by losing the game?).
Despite the formal thank you and shaking hands on the part of a number of training 
participants, the incident during one of the introductory training sessions for CE (see section 
8.3.3) reinforced the Technical Managing Director's existing impression of the CE Project 
Leader, as CE Project Leader noted:
"When the [Technical] Managing Director tells you at the end o f a nine month 
project, you are on the wrong track, ... you start mentally preparing your CV 
and making yourself ready to leave the company, because you fe e l like you 
have lost, ... attempting to help the company, you severely hurt your own 
career.”
After two years of dealing with CE, he concluded somewhat disillusioned "I fee l a lot wiser. 
But 1 certainly don't think we have achieved everything we set out to". He felt "not as 
confident anymore as when I  set out that I  know how to fix  the discovered problems". He 
handed in his resignation only couple of weeks after the incident. He left the company in 
order to take up a full-time MBA study. He hoped to learn more about project management 
and the processes involved, but also to increase his knowledge about concepts like CE, 
knowledge management and the like. Though the official reason was not related to the 
incident, several employees interpreted it as a direct consequence.
In his role as change agent the CE Project Leader had to work with individuals and groups 
whose collaboration and compliance was necessary, but over whom he had no formal 
organisational authority. Better political skills may have helped him to recruit allies and 
form coalitions. An understanding of CE as political process may have helped him to find 
ways to accommodate their desires (personal and organisational "agenda fo r change") and
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marginalise their concerns. As he did not have a comprehensive vision and did not gam the 
broad commitment o f individuals and groups, he endangered die success o f the CE Proj ect
8.4 SUMMARY
The results o f the longitudinal case study revealed that the exercise o f organisational power 
and politics had a significant influence on the course and outcome o f the CE implementation 
process and the limited role HRM played in it. The decisions and actions made in this 
process were based cm a combination o f understandings, past experiences, and personal 
assumptions and values (Scfaon, D„ 1983). Key players were caught between their visions 
and traditions, between their practical endeavours and cultural frameworks - particularly 
MILSYS strong engineering culture. Along with a strong engineering culture commonly 
goes a technical mindset, an orientation towards technical solutions and traditionally little 
appreciation o f HRM. The bounded success o f the CE Project and the limitations o f the CE 
concept indicated that the " m a n a g e ria l c h a n g e  a g e n ts  h a d  a  c o n c e p tio n  o f  th e  'o ld * c u ltu re , 
b u t n o  c o m p re h e n s iv e  v is io n  o f  a  n e w  o n e m (Marks et al.. 1996, p. 19; see also Hartley et al., 
1997).
A whole cast o f characters - individuals and groups - influenced the CE implementation 
process. The CE Project Leader, the OCC Project Leader and the Technical Managing 
Director were found to be most critical to the success o f CE. The latter two w ere able to 
draw on rich structural and individual sources o f power, which helped them in the pursuit 
and achievement o f their organisational and personal change agenda. Due to their personal 
and organisational change agenda and limited interest in CE. however, they made no 
attempts to strengthen the CE Project and prevented that HRM was realised as within the 
scope o f die CE Project. The CE Project Lead»- could not match them. He lacked the 
structural power to force through valuable social and organisational objectiv es. In addition, 
he had no comprehensive vision (o f what was achievable with CE) and was inexperienced in 
dealing with organisational politics. He was unable to win die Technical Managing Director
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and the OCC Project Leader as allies for CE. The implementation of CE required radical 
changes in attitudes and behaviours. It threatened the vested interests and privileges of 
various groups and individuals in the organisation. At the same time it called on their 
contribution, compliance and co-operation. This made it an extremely difficult political 
undertaking and highly vulnerable to political disruption. The CE Project Leader did not 
understand CE as a political process. The OCC and the CE Project Leader adopted different 
change strategies. From the results of the case study it appeared, that the one applied by the 
OCC Project Leader (based on incremental changes), was more successful in changing 
established structures and processes, as he was able to tailor his concept to fit into system
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9 CONCLUSION
9.1 RESEARCH SUMMARY
The central focus of this thesis was the role of HRM in the process of defining and 
implementing CE. This was investigated in a longitudinal processual case study of a 
company attempt to improve the product development process by using a CE approach. The 
case study company was an Australian manufacturer of defence electronics. The 
investigation showed that the conventional organisational structure with its strong 
departmentalisation and functional managers as focal point for decision-making power and 
authority over budgets run counter the CE concept and its aim of high cross-functional 
integration. In addition, MILSYS' traditional HRM practices were not fostering cross­
functional integration but hampered teamwork.
The presented case may be interpreted as a negative one as it revealed little consideration of 
HRM issues during the attempt to introduce CE. Though the company had started to realise 
the critical importance of organisational enablers for far-reaching changes and initiated an 
organisational and cultural change process, at the end of the case study, it was too early to 
see a clear impact on CE. Moreover, the two processes - CE and OCC - were not linked to 
each other, and only certain HR issues were discussed, both within the overall organisational 
change process as well as within the CE Project. HRM issues were seen as outside the 
purview of the CE Project - particularly by its leader. No attempts were undertaken to 
develop a strategic HRM approach as part of the CE concept, and there was more of a focus 
on technical and procedural solutions.
Furthermore, the HR Department was not involved with the elaboration of the CE concept 
nor the implementation process, neither was any other HR specialist. Though employees 
were said to be the key source of competitive advantage and the significance of HRM was 
formally recognised by the company's senior management, a disparity existed between 
management rhetoric and its translation into practice. The HR Department was consciously
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limited to the provision of administrative and welfare services and did not meet the demands 
of an HR specialist function. The initiation and management of organisational and cultural 
change, and changes to HRM issues, remained within the purview of the executives and 
selected line managers. Among line managers, on the other hand, there was little recognition 
of the critical importance of HRM to the overall organisational performance and thus, the 
success of the company.
The CE initiative so far proved to be of limited success, as few substantive changes were 
introduced. At the end of the case study period most development projects were still set up 
and managed following the more traditional approach. The limited success was due to a 
number of factors.
A general reason lays in the nature of the CE concept, notably its interpretative flexibility 
(Abrahamson, 1996) (see chapter three).
Another one touches the composition and potential of the nominated CE Project Team, its 
make-up, background orientation and leadership. The CE Project Team was inadequately 
resourced and prepared and basically limited to an advisory committee. It was not 
empowered to authorise more radical changes like the shift from functional to project 
management.
Of severe effect on the implementation concept and process was the insufficient attention 
paid to HR and organisational change issues by the CE Project Team. Successfully 
introducing CE involves substantial organisational and cultural change, which is not simply 
amenable to a "technical f ix ” (Couchman and Badham, 1996), e.g. in the form of tools or 
techniques like CORE, a new DFM/A software tool or the introduction of an INTRANET. 
Though some attention w as given to the design of project teams (addressing issues such as 
team formation, training for team building, the definition of clear team goals, and a team 
charter), the roles, responsibilities and authority of individual teams and team members 
remained largely undefined. Organisational implications of the shift from a functional to a 
more project-oriented matrix structure or heavyweight project teams were not addressed.
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The limitations of this approach later became apparent, when a lack of senior management 
support for the more substantive proposed changes and problems in the CE Pilot Project 
clearly pointed to an inadequate organisational structure and culture and missing team- 
oriented HRM policies and practices.
A problem was also that the CE Project Team failed to present a coherent vision of CE for 
the company (which partly stemmed from the ambiguous nature of the CE concept). It did 
not adopt a comprehensive implementation strategy to address the above mentioned issues 
and ensure that the required actions were taken. At the end of the investigation, it appeared 
that different groups and individuals still had diverse understandings of CE. As a result, and 
despite numerous training courses and seminars, these aspects further contributed to the 
limited success in implementing CE within the company.
An additional constraint was the lack of senior management support and commitment the 
CE Project Team experienced. Though formally of primary7 importance, CE was given 
secondary7 attention by Senior Management. The CE Project Team was not really 
empowered. No "space" was created to foster the required changes. Issues relating to more 
radical changes were avoided. Members of the Executive Committee did not ,Lwalk the talk" 
and made little attempts to link CE with other change projects and initiatives.
Furthermore, on the part of the CE Project Leader insufficient attention was paid to the play 
of organisational power and politics in the context of CE. He did not effectively mobilise 
support for CE, nor did he neutralise any opposition. In this context the missing support on 
the part of the nominated project sponsor, who showed no interest or responsibility for the 
CE Project, was the more weighty'.
The prospects for the full implementation of CE and the adoption of a strategic HRM 
approach in MIL SYS did not look too good in the foreseeable future with a subsequent 
turnover in key managerial staff, including the CE Project Leader and the pressure from 
other strategic business issues in a highly competitive and demanding industry. But the 
results of the stud} also point to the interesting irony of this and similar cases, namely the
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increasing dependence of defence electronics companies on the adoption of more effective 
product development practices (e.g. based on CE principles) in order to remain competitive, 
which will not happen unless a major shift in their approach to HRM is realised. The results 
of the case study indicate that it is unlikely to achieve high levels of cross-functional 
integration without the deliberate and systematic application of supportive HRM policy and 
practices. More conventional HRM policies and practices run counter to teamwork and 
cross-functional integration and tend to reinforce what CE seeks to change. Thus, HRM is 
the hidden agenda of CE. CE, despite the technical connotations of the term, is an 
organisational issue in the sense that its successful implementation requires appropriate 
organisational culture, skills, structures, and interpersonal relations, and implies a major 
shift in the approach to HRM.
9.2 CONTRIBUTION TO THEORY AND PRACTICE
The thesis has made several contributions to theory and practice. The six main achievements 
are summarised in the next section.
First, in the theoretical area the study advanced the understanding of CE by exposing the 
two literature areas CE and HRM to each other. With the growing complexity of processes it 
becomes extremely necessary to build up integration mechanisms to facilitate the work of 
specialists. While the work of "technical" specialists remains and even gains importance, the 
reliance on "integration" specialists and process facilitators becomes at least as important. 
This thesis is one such integration effort in its attempt to overcome the traditional 
independence of the different research streams and by showing their growing 
interrelationship.
Secondly, with the insight that flows from this undertaking, particularly the potential for 
dialogue between the attendant academic disciplines, the study contributes to the internal 
development and enrichment of those respective bodies of literature. It produces a more 
detailed and sensitive understanding of the potential role and implication of HRM in product
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development and further develops the concept of CE, as presented in the conceptual 
framework. While research in the field of CE tends to be prescriptive and presenting the 
implementation of CE as a rational process, the framework introduced here conceptualises 
the implementation of CE as messy, multivariate process. It is argued that there is no "one 
best way , no single solution for implementing CE. The implementation is product and 
process dependent, as well as contingent on an organisation's strategy and structure, which 
in turn will lead to variations in the organisational arrangements for CE.
Furthermore, and this is the third contribution, the study shows the importance of 
organisational enablers in implementing CE, in contrast to the engineering based CE 
research with its focus on technological enablers (such as enabling tools, technologies and 
support systems for the different phases of product development). The framework assumes 
that the implementation of CE involves organisational, procedural and technological 
changes, but from an organisational perspective the achievement of cross-functional 
integration is one of the most important aspects of the CE approach. Within the 
organisational dimension emphasis is given to people management in CE. It appeared that 
almost all aspects of managing the new product development process under a CE approach 
are linked to people management and require supporting HRM policies and practices in 
order to establish an appropriate employee role behaviour.
With the introduced research approach and methodology the study also furthers, and this is a 
fourth contribution, the transition from a speculative stage to an empirical confirmatory 
stage in CE theory building and provides further empirical content to the abstract and 
diffuse concept of CE (Gerwin and Susman, 1996). The CE literature to date has been 
predominantly anecdotal. Numerous CE surveys provide a snapshot in time and convey the 
picture that CE has been widely adopted by companies in many industrialised countries, 
even though there have been few detailed studies of the implementation of CE. The 
problematic processual and complex nature of CE implementations, however, remains 
underexposed. In contrast to ordinary case studies with their often superficial, little
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contextual investigation, this thesis - based on a longitudinal case study of a company 
attempt to implement CE - provides a detailed insight into the implementation process by 
investigating the interdependence of the change process and the causal and temporary 
context it is embedded in.
A fifth contribution is that the study advanced the exploration of the process and the impact 
of CE in a particular industry and country. Most studies to date focus on CE 
implementations in industries such as automobile and aerospace and electronics in the USA, 
Japan and European counties. The investigation here shed light into the implementation of 
CE for a company with a market approach different to the one pursued by the above 
industries, which produce complex products for customer in markets. By contrast, the case 
study company produced complex products but under contract for a single customer. The 
case study results indicate that the market approach does not function as a barrier for CE and 
that CE is applicable in this particular industrial setting - Defence electronics.
For compames considering the implementation of CE, and this is a sixth contribution, the 
case study sen es as a guideline to strategy formulation by directing their focus to the 
organisational side of the process and discussing the consequences if organisational 
requirements are not met. The study sensitises CE steering committees, senior management 
and CE project leaders about the complexity of CE and its political nature. It raises their 
awareness that such a change process does not only require a suitable organisational 
structure but also an appropriate organisational culture and approach to HRM. In addition, 
they are shown that political sensitive behaviour and actions as well as the establishment of 
strong alliances throughout the organisation are required in order to successfully 
institutionalise CE. So when companies begin to consider the introduction of CE, they 
should start such undertaking by focusing on the human side of the organisation.
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9.3 LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Despite the contributions of this thesis, it has several limitations, and caution is 
recommended in interpreting the results. The following section discusses the limitations of 
this research on a theoretical, practical, and methodological level.
On a theoretical level a reason for caution is the conceptual framework which was 
constructed on the basis of the selected research literature. Several factors were identified 
that determine the CE implementation process. But not all were taken equally into account 
in the proposed framework. They may nevertheless be of relevance, which needs to be 
investigated by future research. Beyond it, additional literature may have pointed to further 
determinants of CE.
Also, a number of critical questions remain unanswered. Not all of the relationships in the 
CE framework could be verified. So far little light has been shed into the question how CE 
differs in small and large, technically complex projects, with an hierarchy of collaboration 
between cross-functional teams and individual team responsibility for its own system 
including co-ordination of lower level teams working on subsystems (Clark and Fujimoto, 
1991; Gerwin and Susman, 1996). Future research could explore whether and how CE 
differs under different project conditions and what this means regarding appropriate HR 
policies and practices.
While the study showed that traditional HR policies and practices run counter to teamwork 
and did not foster and support the achievement of high levels of cross-functional integration, 
it could not establish that team-oriented HRM policies and practices have indeed a positive 
impact on CE. Due to the protractedness of the change process it was not possible to 
investigate the effect of the new HR practices on cross-functional integration nor whether 
different cross-functional arrangements and different stages of the development process 
require different HR practices. To establish the assumed positive effect of team-oriented 
HRM policies and practices on CE, could be another objective for future research.
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Future research also needs to establish whether companies with a more traditional approach 
to HRM (HR Department limited to administration and welfare; no internal HR specialist) 
pay less attention to HRM issues in conceptualisation and implementation process of CE 
than companies with a more progressive approach to HRM. Based on the findings of this 
thesis it seems reasonable to suppose that HRM issues as a rule will be neglected if no HRM 
specialist is involved in the CE Project. This will probably be even more the case in 
organisations with a strong engineering culture and an engineer as driver of the CE 
implementation. Due to the technical mindset of such change drivers the critical importance 
of HRM issues will not occur to them.
Moreover additional research is required about the role of organisational power and politics 
in CE and in implementation processes in general. Although the thesis examined this issue, 
future research needs to reveal in more detail who the actors are, what their personal and 
organisational agenda is and what tactics they apply? Answers also need to be found on 
whether the actors, their agendas and tactics differ in the four distinct stages of the CE 
implementation process and how.
Although many factors play a role in shaping the CE application within a company, certain 
factors tend to have a larger influence. Hence, the second potential avenue for future 
research could be the quantitative testing of the proposed framework. Future research could 
quantify the relative impact of different processes or features on CE and statistically 
determine the interaction between the different processes.
A number of practical aspects may also be seen as a limitation of this research, such as the 
time-span of the longitudinal study and its restriction to one CE implementation effort. Due 
to the protractedness of organisational change the study finished at an early stage of the "to 
be" institutionalisation of CE. The researcher was unable to include results from the 
institutionalisation in the overall analysis, which limits the meaningfulness of the study. The 
findings from the institutionalisation may have led to different interpretations and 
conclusions of the implementation process. Studies are needed that are long enough to
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include all stages of the implementation process in order to derive statements of how the CE 
concept is put to work and what modification occur at this later stage. More research should 
be done to understand the problems of sustaining CE practices and skills once the first pilot 
project is completed. Longitudinal studies could explore in more detail how the 
organisational context changes over time with the implementation of CE and in turn again 
influences CE.
The presented study was based on qualitative research, which is by its very nature, theory 
developing rather than theory confirming, and which rises issues of reliability and 
generalisability of the findings. The research findings were based on large amounts of data 
from one company in one particular industry. Expanding the investigation to additional 
companies would expand the base of qualitative input and thus, increase the generalizability 
of the proposed framework. By repeating the qualitative investigation in other companies 
with the same market approach and companies with a different market approach CE research 
could establish whether the proposed framework is equally applicable across different 
industries or is dependent on the type of industry and market approach, the type of product 
and its complexity.
Sensible answers to these questions can greatly advance the field of product development in 
handling product innovativeness and time to the market aspects. Though the thesis was not 
able to answer the above questions and despite the discussed limitations, it provides a 
valuable reference point for further research in the CE area.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Preliminary Case Study - Project Summaries
The investigation focused on two specific product development projects. Both projects had 
already been underway and moved out of the conceptual phase when the case study 
commenced. In one project the development process was at the stage prior to the design of 
production processes. Project participants from Marketing and Research and Development 
had fulfilled their main tasks, when the project was put on hold. In the second project trial 
production had already commenced but initial results were not satisfactory to warrant a full 
production. The two projects presented examples of a new CE approach to new product 
development in the organisation, as company representatives from middle management 
indicated. In addition, a number of company representatives, particularly from the 
Marketing Department, saw the introduction of a "New Product Commercialisation 
Manual" as the beginning of Concurrent Engineering in the company. Although the term CE 
was not used, the manual emphasised cross-functional integration and concurrence in 
product development tasks in order to improve and accelerate development projects. 
Integration was seen as the early possible involvement of all departments directly concerned 
with the development process and their continuous information throughout the process. 
Concurrence embraced the parallel execution of a number of activities within and adjacent 
to the development process. For other company personnel involved in product development, 
particularly outside Marketing, none of the projects run by the company at the time of the 
investigation met the requirements of CE. Some of them questioned whether CE was an 
appropriate way for conducting the company's development process.
Elements of CE were observed in both projects. Both Project Managers were interested in 
the new approach (one of them was involved in the design of the new manual) and tried to 
ensure cross-functional integration by involving project participants earlier and committing 
them at the outset to the decisions made in the project. Both project teams involved 
representatives from up- and down-stream functions. Various communication media and 
techniques were applied to enable and ensure cross-functional communication and co­
operation (video-conferencing, e-mails, telephone, written minutes and memos, meetings, 
etc.). A number of design and development activities were run in parallel.
The extent of the team emphasis, the degree of cross-functional integration as well as the 
extent and variety of communication media used, depended on the Project Manager. CE was 
mostly carried out in an informal manner. The new manual supported a CE approach, but 
did not formalise it; it was indicative but not prescriptive. A project sponsor to support the
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implementation of CE was not appointed. No training, neither at the management level nor 
for the project teams, was provided to facilitate CE. Communication barriers in the form of 
functional disintegration, e.g. the exclusion of Production were observed in both projects. 
Managers and project members were not familiar with the new concept and the new 
requirements. There were differences in the understanding of CE among the project 
personnel. Project Managers had only a limited authority in decision-making processes and 
towards team members and remained in a "lightweight" position (Wheelwright and Clark, 
1992b). Team members as functional representatives were not equipped with decision 
making power. Decisions were mostly reached by functional managers in the home 
department. Team structures were best described as loose networks. Team participants, 
including the leader, remained bound to their home function and were only part-time 
dedicated to the project and not collocated. The organisational implications for CE to realise 
its full potential were not recognised within the company. The approach was not backed up 
by an appropriate organisational structure, nor did the interviewed managers indicate the 
intention of such changes. The company's strong functional structure hampered the 
application of CE, which could not be compensated through a powerful informal network 
within the organisation (supported by a large number of long serving employees). The HRM 
department was not involved with the initiation or management of any changes to the 
development process. For Project Managers, on the other hand, HRM skills and tasks 
(performance appraisal, career management, etc.) played no or only a subordinate role. 
Organisation-wide changes in HRM policies and practices to support the implementation of 
CE were neither planned nor anticipated.
Project 1
Project 1 was already operating for 4 to 5 years prior to the case study. It was a service 
based project. It meant, from a customer point of view, the end product remained 
unchanged. The actual manufacturing process however improved or/and changed. To the 
company the project meant improved technology, higher environmental standards (reduced 
health risk from toxic fumes), lower production costs (smaller amounts can be produced 
more efficiently) and flexibility increase (facility of faster line changes though simplified set 
up of process facilities, new product line two to three times smaller), and thus, a better 
access to other regions. One sub-project was tasked to locate new markets.
One of the tasks the project team was dealing with was the mass limitations for efficient 
production. At the time the customer had to order a certain minimum quantity of the
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product. The question was whether the new line can be utilised to produce smaller 
amounts/quantities efficiently. In order to solve this problem the project team started to 
determine whether mass limitation was a necessary adaptation. On one hand, the team 
started to develop a strategy to test the market (does the market really wants or needs 
smaller amounts?). On the other hand, the team started to investigate the technology for 
possibilities for more rapid changes in the appearance range with same effectiveness.
At the time of the case study the project team was confronted with a number of difficulties. 
The product trial involved only one customer. The project had to overcome some conflicts 
with distributors of the traditional product (e.g. separate handling of the two products; 
delivery guarantee of the new product in case of emergency). The variety in the appearance 
of the differently produced product was still very small compared to the wide range in the 
traditional product. The company co-operated with a number of suppliers to increase the 
variety. But it appeared to be a time consuming undertaking. The commitment to greater 
variety also required in advance preparations (e.g. provision of special storage). Though a 5 
days per week trial was proposed in order to get "real life" production results, the project 
team was only assigned to run 2 shifts per week during the case study period. The profit 
margin of the project was low, therefore the project account still belonged to the Research 
and Development department.
Due to this latter constellation the principal project manager was a representative from 
Research and Development. A representative from marketing was in charge for the 
commercialisation side of the product. The project leader (as well as the team) was 
dominated by another team member from a comparably higher management position, who 
determined decisions and the course of the observed meetings. The lack of strong leadership 
was seen by some team members as a reason for the long duration of the project. Similar to 
the other project investigated, the team leader was not provided leadership or project 
management training. Decision making authority resided with higher management levels. 
The success of the project was measured by the fulfilment of certain milestones.
Project 2
In project 2 a new product was tested as a means of differentiating the company's product 
offering and to react to international market trends. The project started off with a market 
survey in order to find out customer attitudes towards the traditional product. Numerous 
complaints and problems were raised by the customers. This and the market trend in Europe 
and America let to the decision to set up a market trial. Great effort was put into this phase.
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Meetings took place with numerous distributors (used by the company as part of its delivery 
chain and seen as partner to promote the new product) in order to discuss their fears and 
complains about the new product. As it turned out, however, a number of customers were 
resistant towards the new product due to a variability in its surface appearance, while others 
gradually started to appreciate the qualities of the new product. In addition, the capital 
expenditure to set up a new product line was said to be too high, exceeding the initial 
estimations by a multiple.
About a year after its initial start, the project was cancelled as it failed to convince senior 
management of the success of the new product. In consequence the proposed extended 
market trial was stopped completely. The company’s new direction was to find a completely 
new approach to keep and even extend the market share in the traditional product segment 
(feature and quality improvement of the traditional product), but with the option of a market 
conversion to the new product in future times. This move disturbed not only people inside 
the company but also numerous customers (partly representing whole industry segments) as 
they were convinced about the advantages of the new product and did not intend to 
reconvert to the traditional product. Representatives from the marketing department 
assessed, that these customers were likely to turn to other suppliers to satisfy their new 
needs.
The project leader was a representative of the marketing department. He was given only 
limited decision-making authority {"lightweight" leader). Team member remained in their 
old functional reporting structure. Non of the project members nor the project leader were 
dedicated full-time to the project. At the beginning the project leader tried to involve all 
relevant people of the team up-front in discussions and decisions about the project strategy. 
In further steps he differentiated between, as he called it, an involvement of people at a 
direct level and a communication level. He used different communication media, and 
management tools (fishbone diagrams, minutes, telephone-conferencing, telephone, e-mail, 
computer, etc..). His appointment as team leader was not supported by any team 
management or leadership training.
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Appendix B: Preliminary Case Study: Data Collection
Primary Data
- Interviews with Key Players
Project Manager Market Offer 
Division Manager Sales and Marketing 
Senior Supervisor New Product Development 
Supervisor [product] Trial Line 
Supervisor Product Development
National Marketing Manager Manufacturing (former Manager Product 
Development)
Division Manager Human Resources 
Team Members
- Informal Talks Inside and Outside Office Hours
- Observations (e.g. meetings of both projects)
Secondary Data
- Public and Proprietary Documents
- [Company] Referee (1985), [Company] Fact Sheet (1993), [Company] Pocketbook (1994)
- Various [Company] Product Profiles
- Various [Company] Brochures
- [Corporation] Review (quarterly), [Company] News (monthly)
- Various Information Bulletins e.g. about quality projects, supply and purchasing
improvement activities
- Marketing Business Plan 1993/94
- Drafts: new standard price list, demand forecasting, marketing information planning
- [Project 1] commercial application project paper
- [Project 1] meeting summaries and action plan
- Draft: [Project 2]
- [Project 2] meeting summaries and action plan
- Study of [a particular product market] incl. questionnaire
- Defence strategy [for a particular product market] - discussion paper
- Standard Procedure for Commercialization of new Products - New product proposals
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- Other Information Sources
[Company] videos about its products and production process 
Visit of manufacturing sites 
Visit [product] trial line
Data analysis
Triangulation, Proof-reading of the Case study report by company representatives
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Appendix C: Preliminary Case Study: The Design and Development Process (DDP) 
in Company Heavy-Metal
Up to 1993 Sequential Design and Development Process, Lack of 
Documentation
- traditional design and development proceeded mainly in a sequential manner
- responsibility for overall process not fixed to particular position
- no control mechanism to predict success of a project
- final decision for project proceeding at an advanced stage
- lack of documentation concerning procedures of the development process, which made it 
complicated to trace decisions and responsibilities backwards
1993 Product Design and Development Process Procedures
Documented and Revised
- traditional product development process documented and in the following revised 
(assisted by external consultants)
- new process structure worked out with the aid of the Motorola process mapping approach
- people from all relevant departments involved in this design process
- one major alteration: screening of the project idea at an early stage of the project (to 
ensure fit with company market strategy or certain market segment - decisions followed a 
so called "risk adjustment net": concentration on highest returns and preference to 
products with higher market share and volume)
- front end process, the project proposal and evaluation stage, still not efficiently 
implemented in the overall process
- no appointment of a project champion to ensure that the procedures were followed (many 
people involved in the product development process, according to the Senior Supervisor 
new Product Development, did not know there was a certain procedure or knew only a 
tiny segment of the process, the part of their immediate responsibility.)
6/1994 Introduction of the "New Product Commercialisation Manual"
- marketing department initiated the new manual in order to overcome above mentioned 
shortcomings of revised procedures, and to clarify and speed up decision-making 
processes, (project cancellations after several months "down the track" should not 
happen anymore)
- measurement system was proposed in order to calculate the success of a new product in 
the marketplace
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- The new procedure contained the following stages:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 
11 
12
13
14
15
New product proposal 
Project evaluation
New product proposal to DMT (Divisional Management team)
Project management
Research and Development eligibility
Funding trial order
System utilisation
Determining customer requirements 
Materials supplier involvement 
Implement proposal 
Internal trials 
Trials with customers 
Market offer 
Promotional program 
Monitoring first order
- Each step involved different functions and departments.
- Twice during the whole process a project evaluation meeting takes place with 
representatives of all departments involved
- After project proposal set up and evaluation by the marketing department and Research 
and Development, meeting with all other departments to evaluate the project
- responsibility for the following steps then with the Marketing or Research and 
Development department.
- appointment of a team leader from relevant department (taking over accountability for 
project)
- After preparation of project plan, discussion of the plan with all involved departments, 
customers and suppliers to include their alterations and new ideas
- When approved at senior management level, set up of trial run by the Quality integration 
department in close co-operation with the customer
- When customer expectations were met, next evaluation meeting takes place (with 
commercialisation questions raised officially for the first time).
- Parallel to trial run, the information services department starts to modify the system and 
suppliers get involved.
- After these stages customer requirements are checked against supplier constrains and a 
promotional program is worked out to determine customer requirements.
- The last stages include the order placement and the monitoring of the first orders.
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Background to Interviewee
What is your exact position and title (report relationships)?
What are your duties and responsibilities?
Can you tell me more about your career and educational background?
Company Background
Can you provide me with some information about the company’s history?
What is the ownership and legal status of the company?
How would you describe die relationship to parent company?
What are the company's main products?
What are the company's main customers?
How would you characterise the market the company operates in?
Can you give me some background information about the TOP-Initiative?
What are the most important changes within the company since the initiation of TOP?
Business Planning and Strategy Formulation
Do you have a mission/vision statement (who was involved in development)?
Do you have a formal procedure for business planning (who is involved; how often does it take place; 
what is the time horizon)?
Organisational Climate in the Company
How would you describe the organisational climate (communication systems, employee involvement, 
trust)?
Product Development Process
What changes occurred in the product development process since the initiation of TOP?
What changes are planned in the product development process within the next one to two years?
How are new product development projects initiated (initiation, approval, is it formalised)?
How are the functional departments represented in the development process (attention to Production, 
Marketing, HR)?
Are project teams assigned to product development projects (selection procedures, team structure)? 
What role does the of Product Manager play in the product development process (authority, 
responsibilities, accountabilities -  is it formalised anywhere)?
What role does the Product Engineering Manager play in the product development process (authority, 
responsibilities, accountabilities — is it formalised anywhere)?
How would you describe the relationship between functional managers and project managers 
(position/influence of project manager in comparison to functional managers)?
What are die greatest weaknesses in MILSYS's product development process?
What are the greatest strengths in MILSYS's product development process?
Concurrent Engineering
Why did MILSYS's decide to implement CE? ...
Appendix D: Excerpt from Interview Guideline:
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Senior Management Level
Technical Managing Director 
Managing Director Business Administration 
(R) Director of Quality Assurance
(R) Manufacturing Director
Engineering Director 
Middle Management 
(R) Project Manager ( 1 )
Project Manager (2) (Pilot Project)
(R) Project Manager (3)
(R) Business Administration Manager of the Engineering Department
(R) Systems Engineering Manager
(R) Human Resource Manager
Manager Strategy and Planning 
Manager Configuration Management
Staff Level
(R) Tearn Member ( 1 ), from Engineering
(R) Team Member (2), Contractor
(R) Team Member (3), from Manufacturing
(R) Team Member (4), from Quality Assurance
(R) Team Member (5), from Engineering
Team Member (6), from Marketing
(R) Staff (1), from HR, Recruitment and Administration
Staff (2), from HR, Recruitment and Training 
Staff (3), from Manufacturing, Industrial Engineering 
Staff (4), from Engineering, Hardware Engineering 
Staff (5), from Engineering, Systems Engineering (Pilot Project)
Staff (6), from Engineering, Systems Engineering
Staff (7), from Material Planning and Control, Order Planning (Pilot
Project)
Appendix E: List o f Interviewees from Formal Interviews Conducted in MIT .SYS
(R) - Repeat Interview
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Appendix F : Reviewed Documents in Main Case Study
Documents Produced by the CE Project Team
Code Name of Document Issued by
Al Initial CE Implementation Plan 11/95
A2 Project and Design Management Focus Group Results From Problem 
Analysis
2/96
A3 CE Newsletter (3-to 6-monthly) from
2/96
A4 Collaboration Contract Between UOW and MELSYS 2/96
A5 CE Cost-Benefit Study 3/96
A6 CE - Findings of the "as-is" Study 4/96
A7 CE Case Study (analysis of successful development project in MFLSYS) 6/1996
A8 Strategic Framework for CE 6/96
AIO Efficient Communication and Information Sharing: Intranet Proposal 7/96
A ll Rewritten Design and Development Process Manuals and Procedures 7/96-
10/96
A12 Discussion Paper: Design and Development Performance Metrics System 8/96
A13 Systems Engineering Handbook 10/96
A14 Test/Design for Manufacturability Handbook 10/96
A15 Draft: Team Building Training 7/96
A17 Training Material for Various CE Courses 9-11/96
A18 Assessment Results of the Various Training Courses 10-12/96
A19 CE Best Practice Brochure 7/96
A20 CE Status Reports (half-yearly) 1996/97
A21 Memos and Minutes from CE Project Team from
9/96
A22 Memos and Minutes from Other Related Meetings (irregular) up to 
10/97
A23 CE Implementation Plan (for the period March - September 1997) 3/97
A24 Design and Development Process Manual (2nd Draft) 5/97
A25 Proposal: Project Management and Product Life-Cycle Process 
Handbook
7/97
A26 Draft: Project Management and Product Life-Cycle Process Handbook 8/97
A27 Updated CE Implementation Concept 11/97
Documents Produced by the Pilot Project or the CE Project Team for the Pilot 
Project
B1 Minutes from Pilot Project Meetings (irregular) 11/96 - 
5/97
B2 Teamwork Risk Management Tool for Pilot Project 11/96
B3 Recommended Team Organisation for the Pilot Project 12/96
B4 Pilot Project and CE Progress Reports (monthly) 12/96 - 
7/97
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B5 Pilot Project Status Reports (half-yearly) up to 
8/97
O ther Company (and related) Documents with Relevance for Investigation
Cl Vision-Mission Statement 1992
C2 Draft: Engineering Career Structure and Competency Standards 1994
C3 Unpublished Article (The Institution of Electrical Engineers) 1994
C4 Project Management Manual 
(and Process Definitions)
2/95
(2/96)
C5 Company Structures 1995,
1996
C6 Computer-Based Engineering Tools - Interim Policy 10/95
Cl AQA Proposal 12/95
C8 AQA - Guided Self Assessment Report, Results (Summary) 10/96
C9 Corporate Quality Booklet 10/96
CIO Quality Improvement Program 11/96
C ll Results (Summary): Self-Assessment: Project Management Competence 12/96
C12 Internal Memos (e.g. about A-Team/Current Structure) irregular
C13 Company Newsletters quarterly
C14 Corporation Newsletters 2-
monthly
C15 Course Material for "Train the Trainer" for the CE Implementation Team 8/96
C16 Training Need Analysis Forms 1996
C17 Results (Summary): Employee Satisfaction Survey, carried out by 
external consultants
1995
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Appendix G: Excerpt from the Case Study Protocol
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Appendix H: Code List For Main Case Study
Code Number/Code
I Environmental Context
1.1 Market Conditions/T rends
1.2 Competitors
1.3 Customers
1.4 Suppliers/Contractors
II Company Profile/ Organisational Context
1 Company History/Ownership, Legal Status
2 Company Strategy
2.1 Business Strategy
2.2 Vision/Mission
2.3 Strategy Change
2.3.1 TOP
2.3.1.1 -5 Individual Projects (excl. CE)
2.3.2 Change Project and Initiatives Complementing TOP
2.3.2.1-7 Individual Projects and Initiatives
3 Structure
3.1 Employees
3.2 Hierarchy -  Functional Organisation
3.2.1 Functional Managers
3.2.2 Proj ect Managers
3.2.3 HR Manager
3.2.4 CEO
3.3 Executive Committee
4 Organisational Culture
4.1 Communication
4.2 Trust
4.3 Employee Involvement
5 Parent Company
5.1 Background Parent Company
5.2 Relationship to Parent Company
6 Product Development Process
6.1 Stages
6.2 Proj ect Structure/Proj ect Tearns
6.3 Project Management
6.4 Strengths/Weaknesses
6.5 Functional Integration
6.6 Project Initiation
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7 Concurrent Engineering
7.1 CE TOP Team
7.1.1 Team Members
7.1.2 Team Leader
7.2 CE Concept
7.2.1 Tools/Technological Enablers
7.2.2 Organisational Enablers
7.2.2.1 Cross-Functional Arrangements
1 2 2 2 HRM Considerations
7.3 Understanding of CE
7.4 Course of CE Implementation
7.5 Co-operation and Communication
7.5.1 Team-Internal Co-operation and Communication
7.5.2 Co-operation and Communication with Other Change/TOP Projects and 
Initiatives
7.5.3 Co-operation and Communication with Other Company Representatives
7.6 Pilot Project
8 Approach to HRM
8.1 HR Department
8.1.1 Structure/Composition
8.1.2 Involvement in Organisational Change, CE
8.2 HR Strategy, Policies, Practices
8.3 Historical Developments
9 Open Code
9.1 Individual Perceptions
9.1.1-6 Vision and Political Skills of Key Players
9.2 Functional Background
9.3 Relationships and Behaviour Pattern
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Appendix I: Overview of Team Reward Systems
Team
R ew ard
System
Description Pros Cons Exam ples/
Literature
Gain-/
(Profit-)
Sharing
Relatively new term, but includes 
several older reward programs 
like Scanlon Plan, Rucker Plan, 
Improshare.
Key concept: rewards are directly 
related to performance
Goal: share gains of efforts of 
employees with those same 
employees.
Performance (usually labor costs) 
improvements in productivity 
measured on the basis of 
financial formulas;
Gains in form of cash payments 
or non-cash awards
Rewards are 
distributed to 
employees on the 
basis of performance 
of their team.
Rewards are directly 
related to 
performance, thus 
encourage 
improvement of 
input/output 
productivity 
relationship
Plans differ in 
definition of 
unit defined as 
a team (small 
group to entire 
organisation)
Line -of-sight 
connection 
might not be 
given
Forms of 
profit-sharing 
used by 30% 
of U.S. firms 
(Feldman)
Parker, 1994; 
Belcher,
1991;
Cleland et 
al., 1995; 
Feldman,
1996
Knowledge 
-or Skill- 
Based Pay
Team members encouraged to 
acquire new skills and in return 
get pay increments
Rewards behavior of 
xft members on 
basis of number and 
depth of skills 
mastered
Direct line -of-sight 
connection
Does not 
require team 
results before 
receiving 
reward.
Focused 
mainly on 
horizontal skill 
building.
Not suitable 
for all forms of 
xfts
Johnsonville
Foods,
Wisconsin;
Shenandoah
Life
Insureance
Virginia;
applied
mostly in
production
and some
front-line
service
functions
Parker, 1994; 
Cleland et 
al., 1995;
One Time 
Bonus Plan
Temporary team is offered a team 
bonus for achieving certain 
objectives (e.g. ahead of 
schedule, under-budget- 
delivery,...)
Honeywell's
Space
systems
group.
General
Electric
Parker, 1994
Perfor­
mance
Improve­
ment
Program
(PIP)
Provides rewards for actual 
improvement in performance.
Objectives for improvement (e.g. 
productivity, quality, safety, 
absenteeism) and baseline figures 
for a previous period are 
established and rewards are given 
for exceeding the baseline.
Offer non-cash awards in form of 
merchandise.
Focus on efforts of 
individual teams.
Can be run 
temporaiy (less than 
two years) or on an 
ongoing basis with 
adjustment in plan 
design to reflect 
changing business 
objectives.
Parker, 1994
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coni.
Team
R ew ard
System
Description Pros Cons Exam ples/
Literature
Group­
Bonus- or 
Team 
Incentive 
Scheme
Can differ in format, but are 
thought to directly pay for 
specific results;
Attempt to bring awards down to 
the team level in order to 
improve the line of sight between 
team performance and payoff, 
which is seen as motivator for 
XFT.
Tailored to needs of 
company.
Measures team 
performance but 
allows recognition 
of individual efforts.
white collar 
areas in 
biotechnolog 
y company, 
Banks,
Parker, 1994; 
Elliott, 1991; 
Murray,
1991;
Eisman,
1990;
Feldman,
1996;
Armstrong 
and Murlis, 
1995
Employee-
Based
Recog­
nition
Program
Not tied to specific objective - 
rewards team for unplanned and 
extraordinary effort,
Dominant form: 
plaque/certificate alone or in 
combination with other forms 
often with dinner/meal
Gives chance to 
reward team and 
individual members 
the way that 
motivates them 
most.
Bell
communicati
ons
Research, 
New Jersey; 
Boing 777 
project
Parker, 1994, 
p. 127; 
Sabbath,
1996
Informal
Team
Recog­
nition
Based on recognition of team and 
individual efforts (e.g. in 
company newspaper or in a 
meeting).
Suitable for firms 
that can not establish 
a reward program 
for xfts.
Low cost basis
Parker, 1994, 
p. 129
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Appendix J: Roles and Responsibilities in the Proposed Team Structure for CE 
Projects
(Sources: Internal Documents Al 1, A 17)
The Project Management Group (PMG)
The Project Management Group is charged with supporting the Project Manager and the Business 
Administration Manager fulfil their role of ensuring the timely and profitable performance of the 
project. They are primarily concerned with: cost and schedule control and reporting, quality assurance, 
and administrative support to the project.
Team Tasks and Role Member-ship Full- Nominated
Member Responsibilities Over Time or or Selected
Part- by
Time
Project
Manager
(PM)
Champion (forms, leads, 
inspires teams and 
protects them from 
outside interference).
Co-ordinate activities of 
teams with supplier, 
customer and the rest of 
SPES
- Leader of the 
overall project
- Leader of the 
PMT
concept 
design (cd) 
to end
F
Project
Manage­
ment
Business
Admini­
stration
Manager
(BAM)
cd to end F BA Director
Scheduler Responsible for 
producing monthly 
schedule status reports
cd to end F Project
Manage­
ment
Accoun­
tant
Manage project budget cd to end F Finance
Director
Quality
Assurance
Manager
Ensuring that all project 
practices and products 
conform with SPES QA 
standards
cd to end F QA Director
Admini­
stration
Assistant
Responsible for proper 
issue and receipt of 
external correspondence 
+ their filing
cd to end F Project
Manage­
ment
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The Integrated Development Team is responsible for developing the technical design of one or more 
Configuration Items (Cl) that are subsidiary to the overall system or product.
They are primarily concerned with: - requirements analysis and design of the CI(s)
- detailed design and prototyping of the CI(s), and
- integration and testing of the CI(s).
The Integrated Development Team (IDT)
Team Tasks and Role Membership Full- Nominated or Selected by
Member Respon- Over Time or
sibilities Part-
time
Principal
Technical
Specialist
Leader of 
the IDT
concept design 
(cd) to end
F
Hardware
Engineers
cd to end F HW Manager in cons. 
with PEM and Eng. 
Director
Software
Engineers
cd to end F SW Manager in cons. 
with PEM and Eng. 
Director
Site
Designers
cd to end F HW Manager in cons. 
with PEM and Eng. 
Director
Key
Component
Supplier
cd to end F
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Projects with more than one Integrated Development Team (DDT) w ill have a Project Integration 
Team. The Project Integration Team is responsible for completing die system level design and 
specification, and for ensuring that the work done by the IDTs is in harmony with the system design 
and specification.
They are primarily concerned with: requirements analysis and design o f the system, integration and 
testing o f the system, and verifying the requirements analysis and design efforts o f the IDTs.
The Project Integration Team (PIT)
Member- Full- Nominated or
Team
Member
Tasks and Responsibilities Role ship
Over
Time
or
Part­
Time
Selected by
Project
Engineering
Manager
(PEM)
Oversees, directs, and 
manages the design and 
development activities o f the 
PIT, IDTs, SET and DPT 
the way: rigorous 
decomposition and 
development is ensured and 
design and downstream 
planning take place in 
parallel, especially in the 
early phases
Leader 
o f the 
PIT
concept 
design 
(cd) to 
end
F
Eng. Director in 
consultation with 
Systems Eng. 
Mgr., PM, and 
Product Engineer
Systems
Engineers
F PEM + Systems 
Eng. Mgr.
(Systems)
Test
Engineers
F Test Eng. Mgr.
Configu­
ration
Manager
F Config. Mgr.
(Customer
Represen­
tative)
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The Downstream Planning Team is responsible for developing downstream processes whilst the 
Integrated Development Team(s) (IDT) develop the technical design. The DPT also reviews proposed 
changes to the formal configuration baseline.
The Downstream Planning Team (DPT)
Team
Member
Tasks and Responsibilities Role
Member­
ship Over 
Time
Full-
or
Partt
ime
Nominated 
or Selected 
by
Project
Enginee-ring
Manager
(PEM)
Oversees, directs, and manages the 
design and development activities 
o f the PIT, IDTs, SET and DPT the 
way: rigorous decomposition and 
development is ensured and design 
and downstream planning take 
place in parallel, especially in the 
early phases.
Leader 
o f the 
DPT
concept 
design 
(cd) to 
end
F
Eng.Directo 
r in cons, 
with 
Systems 
Eng. Mgr., 
PM, and 
Product 
Engineer
Project ILS 
Manager
P/F
Production
Represen­
tative
P/F
MP&C
Represen­
tative
Installation
and
Commis­
sioning
Manager
Configu­
ration
Controller
P/F
(Customer
Representati
ve)
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The Speciality Engineering Team is responsible for supporting the Integrated Development Team(s) 
(IDT) in creating designs that are manufacturable, supportable and procurable.
The Speciality Engineering Team (SET)
Team
Member
Tasks and Responsibilities Role Member­
ship
Over
Time
Full-
or
Part­
Time
Nominated or 
Selected by
Project
Engineering
Manager
(PEM)
Oversees, directs, and manages 
the design and development 
activities o f the PIT, IDTs, SET 
and DPT the way: rigorous 
decomposition and development 
is ensured and design and 
downstream planning take place 
in parallel, especially in the early 
phases
Leader 
o f the 
SET
concept 
design 
(cd) to 
end
F
Eng.Director in 
consensus with 
Systems Eng. 
Mgr., PM, and 
Product 
Engineer
Logistics
Engineer
P/F
Industrial
Engineer
P/F
MP&C
Represen­
tative
P/F
Represen­
tative from 
Test Eng.
P/F
(Customer
Represen­
tative)
P/F
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Appendix K: Excerpt from Best Practice Brochure Developed by the CE Project 
Team
The new process represents a combination of our traditional strengths and current 
international best practices.
The changes address four areas:
Better Teamwork
We need to get the input from all relevant departments early in the project life cycle. We 
will therefore form larger Project Teams, with representatives from all relevant departments, 
in the pre-tender stage. Even if someone is not assigned full time to a team, they will be 
identified by name, given a clear role and responsibility, and included in regular, structured 
team meetings.
We need to quickly build a sense of teamwork and cooperation in Project Teams. Each 
project will therefore conduct a team building workshop to set agreed standards for 
behaviour and obligation in the team.
We need to explicitly state the goals of the team, and ensure the goals address he 
requirements of all departments. Therefore, at the start of each phase of the project, the 
Project Team will write out what goals the team will achieve by the end of he phase in the 
Project Charter.
Better Techniques
We need techniques that allow us to design and develop a product that is "right the first 
time". Therefore, each project will apply rigorous requirements analysis and system design 
to ensure we understand the needs of the customer better than our competition, and then 
design a solution that meets those needs.
We need to check the Project Team is designing a product that is easy to manufacture, test, 
procure, support and deploy, as well as meeting customer specifications. Therefore, 
appropriate Functional Directors will review the progress of Project Teams at the end of 
each phase. This will ensure a product design that satisfies all its "customers".
We need to design products that are easy to manufacture and test. Therefore, Project Teams 
will apply rigorous Design for Manufacture and Design for Test techniques. This will avoid 
delays in the production and support phases.
We need to maintain better quantitative data on how long we take to do design and 
development tasks. Therefore, Project Teams and functional departments will both maintain
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standard metrics on important tasks. This will both help to identify problems in a project, 
and improve die accuracy of estimates, reducing overruns and increasing profitability.
We need to ensure our project estimates are comprehensive and timely. Therefore, Project 
Teams will apply a generic list of sub-tasks (Work Breakdown Structure) to support 
accurate estimating and comprehensive project planning.
Manufacturing needs to trial the production for a product before it can enter volume 
production. Therefore, Project Teams will work with Operations to produce functional 
prototypes using normal production methods. This will reduce the time spent in setting up 
the production line for a new design, and therefore shorten the overall development cycle.
Better Tools
We need tools that allow us to analyse the customer’s requirements, and confirm that they 
are satisfied by our design. Therefore, tools such as the systems engineering database CORE 
will be widely available throughout the company to support requirements analysis and 
systems design....
We need a tool that allows designers to design hardware that is quick and easy to 
manufacture. Therefore, the Design for Manufacturing software from Boothroyd & 
Dewhurst will be evaluated.
Better Product Planning
All departments must coordinate their planning so the company can quickly and efficiently 
concentrate its resources on important projects. Therefore, Sales and Marketing will be 
inviting representatives from many functions to take part in product planning and help to 
determine the company’s marketing and development strategy. This will lead to greater 
coordination and a clearer sense of common purpose throughout the company, allowing us 
to concentrate our efforts and complete important projects very quickly.
